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BASILIDES, A PATH TO PLOTINUS

BY

MONTSERRAT JUFRESA

Basilides is the oldest Gnostic thinker known to us from reliable sources. According to Clement,[1] Basilides lived in Alexandria during the reign of Hadrian, that is, in the first half of the second century after Christ.

It is well known that the account of Basilides' doctrine, as it has been transmitted to us by Hippolytus' *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* or *Elenchos*,[2] has been a subject of discussion and perplexity among the scholars since the manuscript containing this lost work of the ancient bishop of Rome appeared in a monastery on Mount Athos in the last century.

The long exposition of Basilides' thought which Hippolytus offered did not agree either with the data found in the other Church Fathers (Clement, Irenaeus, Epiphanius) or with a fragment of Basilides in Hegemonius' *Acta Archelai*. These facts led the name of Pseudo-Basilides being given to the author preserved by Hippolytus, and this was indeed De Faye's opinion at the beginning of this century.[3]

The position of the critics changed later and they tried to reconcile the apparently opposite sources in a unified system,[4] ascribing the discrepancies to the presumably incomplete information used by the Church Fathers.

Hippolytus' account is a great cosmogonic myth, structured in a syncretistic way, as is usual in the Gnostic literature. Our purpose is to focus on one aspect: the Supreme Divinity. The God that Basilides conceived shares an important number of features with the Plotinian One. Although this fact has been noted by some scholars,[5] it still deserves more accurate and specific attention, because the relationship between Plotinus and the Gnostic world remains an open question in the history of the spiritual evolution in the early centuries after Christ.

> ἦν, φησίν,[6] ὅτε ἦν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ οὐδὲν ἦν τι τῶν ὄντων, ἁπλᾶ ψιλῶς ... ἦν ὅλως οὐδὲ ἕν ... ἔστι γάρ, φησίν, ἐκεῖνο οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἄρρητον, ὃ ὀνομάζεται· ἄρρητον γοῦν αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ

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οὐδὲ ἄρρητον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ οὐδ' ἄρρητον οὐκ ἄρρητον ὀνομάζεται, ἀλλὰ ἔστι, φησίν, ὑπεράνω παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου.

... ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἦν, οὐχ ὕλη, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐκ ἀνούσιον, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, οὐ σύνθετον, οὐκ ἀνόητον, οὐκ ἀναίσθητον, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἄγγελος, οὐ θεός, οὐδὲ ὅλως τι τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως λαμβανομένων ἢ νοητῶν πραγμάτων ...

ὁ οὐκ ὢν θεός, ὃν 'Αριστοτέλης καλεῖ νόησις νοήσεως, ... ἀνοήτως, ἀναισθήτως, ἀβούλως, ἀπροαιρέτως, ἀπαθῶς, ἀνεπιθυμήτως κόσμον ἠθέλησε ποιῆσαι. τὸ δὲ ἠθέλησε λέγω, φησί, σημασίας χάριν, ἀθελήτως καὶ ἀνοήτως καὶ ἀναιθήτως. κόσμον δὲ οὐ τὸν κατὰ πλάτος καὶ διαίρεσιν γεγενημένον ὕστερον καὶ διεστῶτα, ἀλλὰ γὰρ σπέρμα κόσμου.

Then, Basilides has described God as:

1. not even ineffable.
2. lacking any attribute which could be expressed by a name.
3. completely aside from everything we can reach through our senses or our mind.
4. without being.
5. without any thought or consciousness.
6. without will.
7. deprived of any passion and emotion.
8. nevertheless, creator of the world.

Saying God is not even ineffable is a very curious expression. The frequent speculation of that time, considered by some scholars as commonplace, refers to God as ineffable. The idea that the names are related to the objects which they represent by nature and not by convention, an idea shared in the time by Platonists, Stoics and Pythagoreans, leads easily to the conclusion that, assuming the majesty of the Supreme Being, none of the names can define this Being accurately, and only the human necessity to understand forces men to give him a name. So, this idea appears in Philo,[7] in Albinus,[8] in the Hermetic texts,[9] in the Asclepius[10] (where we find the statement: God has no name, or better said, he has all the names), and in some Gnostic tractates.[11] But the best expression is in Plotinus:[12] "Thus, the One is in truth beyond all statement: any affirmation is of a thing, but "all-transcending, resting above even the most august divine Mind" this is the only true description, since it does not make it a thing among things, nor name it where no name could identify it; we can but try to indicate, in our feeble way, something concerning it."[13]

Basilides shares the conviction that there is no possibility for the human

language to express God in appropiated terms, but he has wanted to go even further saying that God is "not even ineffable". Why? As Wolfson[14] and Whittaker[15] pointed out, we have to suppose that Basilides with this assertion is trying to oppose someone who before him has said: God is ineffable. But, who could this "someone" be? According to Wolfson, Basilides should refer specifically to Philo, because he is the first known to us to have applied the word "ineffable" to God. Whittaker supposes that Basilides is acting against an undetermined Middle-Platonic environment. But, we may ask, why might Basilides oppose the Platonists, if he shares in so many ways their most important conceptions? I think that we can find a better explanation if we consider this "not even ineffable God" as a specific Gnostic[16] characteristic of Basilides, who tries with this expression to differentiate his Supreme Being from the God of the Bible.

As a matter of fact the expression "Ineffable Name" came forth from the Jewish people after the second destruction of Jerusalem's Temple, in which was conserved, written, the sacred Name of God, pronounced once a year by the Great Priest in a solemn and magnificent ceremony.[17] The destruction of the Temple carried the loss of the correct manner of pronouncing God's Name, and the Jews have since referred to him as the "Ineffable", alluding to the material impossibility of pronouncing God's Name as a reflection of his infinite excellence above all created beings. This interpretation seems confirmed by the fact that Basilides further[18] designates as "Ineffable" the Great Archon of the Ogdoas, whom we can in some aspects identify with the biblical God.

Now we shall consider the concept "not-being God". From Dodd's classic article in 1928[19] and Whittaker's more recent in 1969[20] we know that, during the first century before Christ and the two centuries after, some of the Platonist and Neopythagorean philosophers speculated as to whether the First Principle should be deemed as beyond the being. It seems the Neopythagorean were first to propose this interpretation,[21] in order to strengthen at the same time the unity of the First Monad and the otherness of the Indefinite Dyad. This interpretation would have been appropriated by the Platonic school, closely tied with the Neopythagorean at the epoch of the first empire.[22] But the culmination of this idea is, obviously, the Plotinian One, described as "superior than anything we know as Being, fuller and greater".[23] Plotinus' statement was reinforced by Porphyry[24] defining the One as "not-Being beyond being".

We must interpret Basilides' definition of the "not-being God",[25] in the light of this Platonic–Pythagorean tradition, considering that in his case

"to be" does not signify existence, but finite being. The God conceived as "not being" means that he is above the limited nature of the existing beings, an assertion which implies that he is intrinsically infinite and radically different from everything involved in the world of being. The definition means, therefore, to confirm this Being's unity and absolute freedom. Nevertheless, in the case of Basilides, we should ask whether a second purpose could be interposed, a definite intention to contrast the "being God" of the Bible.[26]

In regard of the denial of God's intellectual activity, Basilides uses the term ἀνοητῶς. We can also find it in some Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean writers,[27] but the most widespread tendency also found in the Hermetic and in the Gnostic texts is to consider God as a Mind.[28] Plotinus, who conceives the One as being supranoetic, explains in these terms the motives leading to deny the existence of an intelligent First Principle: "The Intellectual Principle is established in multiplicity, its intellection, self-sprung though it be, is in the nature of something added to it (some accidental dualism) and makes it multiple: the utterly simplex and therefore first of all beings, must, then, transcend the Intellectual Principle, and obviously, if this had intellection, it would no longer transcend the Intellectual Principle but be it, and at once be a multiple".[29]

Plotinus is also obliged to deny that the Supreme Principle has any knowledge of himself, because it would imply a contradiction to its absolute simplicity. Plotinus says: "The knowing principle itself cannot remain simplex, especially in the act of self–knowing, all silent though its self–perception be, it is dual to itself. Of course, The One has no need of minute self–handling, since it has nothing to learn by an intellective act, it is in full possession of its being before Intellect exists".[30]

Coming back to Basilides, after the denial of knowledge in God, he continues with the denial of consciousness, by which we are compelled to consider those conditions to be closely related. Although the distinction between thought and consciousness of the thought goes back to Chrysippus, the denial of a consciousness in the First Principle does not appear until Plotinus. The statement of that question in the *Enneades* will help us to understand clearly what Basilides possibly intended to say. Plotinus wrote: "The One is without self–perception, without self–consciousness and ignorant of himself"[31] and "A reader will often be quite unconscious when he is most intent: in a feat of courage there can be no sense either of the brave action or of the fact that all that is done conforms to the rules of courage. So that it would even seem that consciousness tends to blunt

the activities upon which it is exercised, and that in the degree in which these pass unobserved they are purer and have more effect, more vitality, and that, consequently, the Proficient arrived at this state has the truer fullness of life, life not spilled out in sensation but gathered closely within itself".[32]

In a similar way, therefore, we must suppose that the existence of consciousness in the God of Basilides would go against his absolute unity and indivisibility.

In order to express the next characteristic of God, that is, the lacking of will, Basilides uses three different words, ἀβούλως, ἀπροαιρέτως, ἀθελήτως, which surely means that he considers this point highly important. Only "to use an expression", that is, for the sake of better understanding, Basilides condescends to use the verbal form ἠθέλησε, "he wanted", referring to God in the act of the creation.

This time, indeed, only Plotinus can help us with a parallel statement and a longer explanation.[33] The *Enneade* VI, 8,22,7 ss. is devoted to the difficult problem of the One's will, with frequent allusions to the difficulties of language that this carries. Plotinus says[34] that in truth the One is above will, but for the sake of conveying conviction, at some cost of verbal accuracy, we are to allow activities in the Supreme and make them depend upon will. Nevertheless we do not have to understand this will as a power of election, because outside him nothing exists capable of compelling or attracting him. We must understand, as Plotinus says elsewhere: "The One can neither have yielded assent nor uttered decree nor stirred in any way towards an existence of a secondary ...we have to conceive what rises from the One as circumradiation... and may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generated from that unchanging substance".[35]

In a corresponding manner I think that we have to understand the apparent contradiction which Basilides incurs saying that God, being without will, "wanted" to create the world. Basilides refuses in an explicit way to assimilate the act of creating by God with the conscious and deliberate work of the craftsman, he does not even accept a parallel between God and his creation and the inner production of the web by the spider.[36] These examples imply intentionality that would introduce an element of duality in God. God, in acting like the craftsman or the spider, would be "moved" towards something.

In order to elude this difficulty Basilides, like Plotinus, seems to have wanted to explain the creation as a process of natural production, derived

from the special and unique being of God.[37] As we shall see further, Basilides borrowed from the Stoics the terms of this process of natural production.

It is not necessary to emphasize that the conception of a Divinity who creates without willingness constitutes one of the most interesting aspects in the thought of Basilides. This is not a religious idea belonging to his Christian background nor to the texts of Middle Platonic philosophy known to us that deal with the problems of the human presence in the world.[38] Very different, indeed, is the *Asclepius*, which says that God is filled with his will.[39]

Basilides insists furthermore that the "not being God" does not have passions or emotions. This statement seems unnecessary, because it follows as a consequence of God's lack of knowledge and will. Thus, we may ask why Basilides thought it was necessary to insist on this aspect. It is possible that again we have here his special interest, as a Gnostic thinker, to differentiate his God from the Christian God who creates *ad majorem gloriam suam*, and from the Jewish God, capable of filling himself with anger or pleasure depending on how well humanity behaves. On the other hand, the subject of the ἀπαθεία of God evokes Epicurean echoes. But, what might have led Basilides to reatin those characteristics of the Epicurean gods, if gods in Epicureanism are material and multiple, so much different from the God described by Basilides? Perhaps because, according to Lucretius, *uolgi de dis opiniones esse prauas et impias*[40] or, quoting Epicurus himself, "impious is the man sho shares with the masses the opinions about gods".[41] The elitism contained in these statements, which in the *Letter to Menoeceus* is connected with the lack of feelings of gods in relation to humans, agrees perfectly with the belief that the Gnostic thinkers have with regard to their own superiority.[42]

We shall see, now, in short, in what manner the processes of creation developed according to Basilides. The cosmic seed, he says, contained within it a Triple Filiation. The First, the lightest, as soon as the seed was established, raised up to the "not Being", charmed by his extraordinary beauty and grace. The Second Filiation wanted to imitate the First, but, because by itself it was heavier than the First, needed to be helped in its rise by the Holy Ghost, which Basilides names also the *Pneuma* and the Intermediate *Pneuma*. The Third Filiation, which needed to be purified, stood in the great mass of the cosmic seed, in order to give and to receive benefits. Later and succesively, from the cosmic seed came forth the Great Archon who presides over the Ogdoas, that is, the universe above the

moon, the Second Archon who presides over the Hebdomas, that is, the universe beneath the moon, and, at last, the earthly creatures.[43]

The first thing that catches our attention in this myth is the image of the cosmic seed. This word has a long tradition in the history of Greek philosophy before Basilides' time. Anaxagoras called his ultimate particles "seeds" (σπέρματα)[44] and so all things must have grown from the initial condition in which all the seeds were together. The Epicureans also called the atoms "seeds" or "generative bodies", and Epicurus said a cosmos comes to be when seeds of the right kind come together.[45] Aristotle refers to the atomic elements of Leucippus and Democritus collectively as a πανσπερμία.[46] The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, seem to have thought the cosmos grew from the unit as a seed. This unit-seed began to inhale the infinite void surrounding it, and, by imposing a limit on it, produced the cosmos.[47] The early Stoics called the fire of the conflagration, which is the same as the fire from which the cosmos originates, the seed, *sperma*, of the future cosmos.[48] A later Neopythagorean Nichomachus of Gerasa, who was possibly a contemporary of Basilides, equated God to the Monad and said that he was seminally all things in Nature.[49] In the Christian tradition the image of the seed appears in the parable of the "mustard seed". In Basilides, all those traditions seem to coexist. Sometimes he refers to a unique seed, which he compares to an egg, an image belonging to the Pythagorean background,[50] sometimes he uses the terms σωρός[51] and πανσπερμία, words which seem better to recall the atomist tradition, and we find also a big comparison between the development of the creation and the growth of the plant from the mustard seed. Nevertheless it appears clearly that Basilides conceived this first moment of the creation having in mind the opposition God – materia that we find in the Pythagorean conception of the Monad limiting the Indefinite Dyad,[52] and also the two Stoic ἀρχαί, the active principle, τὸ ποιοῦν, equated with God, and the passive principle, τὸ πάσχον, equated with matter.[53]

The Stoic element is, indeed, the most important in Basilides' cosmogony. The idea that "fire is a seed possessing the *logoi* of all things and the causes of events, past, present and future",[54] besides the conception of God as a fire,[55] allowed Basilides to deny any purpose in God and, at the same time, to state that all the things were established by God in the cosmic seed, setting aside any inferior creator.[56]

The next important thing in Basilides account is the Triple Filiation.[57] Doubtless, those Filiations must represent the different levels in the spiritual world which in the Platonic speculation of the time cover the

distance between the spiritual and the material world, that is, the Divine Mind and the World Soul. The Filiations are said to be consubstantial with the non–being God, but the fact that they came forth from the seed, and not directly from God, seems to indicate that they belong unmistakably to the reign of being, although within it they occupy the highest places. Thus Basilides by these means preserves and fortifies the absolute transcendence of the First Principle.

The term Filiation in itself could have been suggested by the Christian–Gnostic background of Basilides, although in Numenius, the Neopythagorean philosopher contemporary of him, we find a similar terminology: he named his three gods Grand-Father, Son, and Grand-Son.[58] But the fact that the word "Filiation" is of feminine gender in greek, ἡ υἱότης, reminds to us that in some Gnostic myths the second principle after the Supreme God is a feminine figure.[59]

The account of Basilides contains enough elements to carry out the identification, mentioned before, of the First Filiation as a Divine Mind, and the Second Filiation as a Universal Soul. The evidence that, I think, allows to us to identify the First Filiation with the Divine Mind is the homeric expression: ὡς εἰ πτερὸν ἠὲ νόημα (as a wing or a thought, *Od.* 7,36) with which Basilides compares the raising of the First Filiation up to the "not-being God". The reference to the wing must be interpreted as an allusion to Eros, the Love, who in the *Phaedrus* leads to the contemplation of the Supreme Beauty.[60]

The evidence which leads to a recognition of the Second Filiation as a Soul in the myth of Basilides is its close connection with *Pneuma*. The Stoics identified the heat or the *pneuma* of the body with the soul, [61] but I think that in this case Basilides borrowed some Aristotelian concepts belonging to a biological context, and adapted them to the world of transcendent beings. In explaining how soul is transmitted from father to child through the seed, Aristotle states: "In every case there is present in the semen that which makes seeds in general fertile, namely the substance called 'the hot'. This is not fire or some such power, but the *pneuma*, a substance analogous to the elements of the stars".[62] On other occasions Aristotle also suggests that these physical substances are "tools" of the soul and that the pneuma is the soul's instrument which causes movement.[63]

I think that this description fits very well with the function of the *Pneuma* in Basilides' narration. If the *Pneuma* is "the hot", we understand that it can be very helpful in a process of rising, if it is "analogous to the

matter of the stars", it is justificable to fix it, as Basilides does later, as the last sky of the cosmos. Finally, if the *pneuma* is the "tool" of the soul, the Second Filiation, which is helped by the *Pneuma*, has to be Soul.[64]

The Third Filiation, which needed to be purified and stood in the seed in order "to give and receive benefits" reminds us of the Plotinian concept of Nature,[65] the lowest part of the World Soul, mixed with matter and giving to it the benefit of life and movement, while the superior part, in our text represented by the Second Filiation, contemplates the Divine Mind. But further statements in Hippolytus' account make it clear[66] that the Third Filiation represents a more genuine Gnostic concept: the Sons of God, that is, the pneumatics. The pneumatics, the elected men, are this part of the Divine Soul captured by matter and not able to disengage from it. They are waiting for the coming of the Redeemer who will liberate them and permit them to recover their dwelling place in the Superior World.

We have seen, thus, that, in order tot strengthen the "otherness" of God, the generative process of the material world, but also of the spiritual beings, has been conceived by Basilides in terms of an automatic materialism, clearly related with Stoic cosmogonies.[67] The rising of the Filiations and their different weight recalls the processes of evaporation and condensation by which the Stoics[68] explained the consecutive births and destructions of the cosmos. Basilides has retained from this model the process of birth, but not the destruction of the cosmos. For him, following at that point the Platonists, the cosmos is eternal.

There is still one more aspect in the conception of Basilides' God that I think is worth comment. The passionate description of the transcendence of this God "unknowable by any natural way we can afford",[69] doubtless reflects an inner and personal experience of Basilides, and, thus, his strong mystic accent has been rightly pointed out by G. Quispel.[70]

Referring to Plotinus, the importance of the mystical component of his philosophy has been widely recognized and discussed. We thus need only ask if there is any special characteristic in common between the mysticism of our authors. Although so much has been written about Plotinus, I think that one of the best recent approaches to him is due to J. M. Rist, and I agree with his assessments. According to Rist, Plotinus' mysticism can be clearly seen to be of a theistic type, in Zaehner's sense of the word,[71] it is to say, the kind of mysticism where the isolated soul attains to union and is "oned" with a transcendent God, though *a fortiori* it is not itself identical with that God. In Rist's opinion the Plotinian meta-

phors to explain the ascent of the soul, the metaphors of sight, touch, and love, express that the soul is surrendered to God, that it is enraptured, it is filled with God, but that it is not, however, annihilated in God. The soul is not identical with God, although its likeness with God has been pushed as far as possible. The general position of Plotinus is that there is an "otherness" which separates the products of the One from the One itself, and this position is not changed even at the last period of the mystical union.

The evidences that we have about Basilides do not allow us to reconstruct the way in which he conceived the different stages of the ascent of the soul, although we know that he was prone to asceticism and that he considered suffering as a way of purification. Nevertheless in accord to his cosmogony in which all the things had issued from the seed and not directly from God we must suppose the mysticism of Basilides to be of a theistic type. Basilides says that the Third Filiation, when at last purified, rises up to a place close to the "not-being God". That probably means that the elected man who finds insights of God through a spiritual intuition,[72] never has his soul, although it lies in closest proximity to God, fused with God or dissolved into his non-being. The "otherness" of God, even at the culminant moment of the mystical encounter, has been preserved by Basilides.

In conclusion thus I think we are allowed to accept that the characteristics of God in Basilides are clearly depending on a Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean speculation, although original features can be detected in some aspects. On the other hand, his cosmogonic conceptions find inspiration in a Stoic doctrine.

Furthermore the conception of God in Basilides is very similar to the Plotinian One, in spite of the different level of complexity in the two authors. We cannot state if Plotinus depends on Basilides, but because Plotinus was living in Alexandria only several decades after Basilides did, we can suppose that they were in some way connected to a similar philosophic milieu. We can say, at least, that Basilides represents one more link in the long chain which leads from Plato – through Eudorus, Moderatus, Numenius and surely more philosophers unknown to us – to the resplendent One of Plotinus.

NOTES

[1] Clem. Al. *Strom.* 7, 17; also Epiph. *Contra haereses* 24, 6, 72 C.

[2] Hippolytus, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* 7, 20–27, ed. P. Wendland (Leipzig 1916). The work is also known as *Philosophumena*.

[3] E. De Faye, *Gnostiques et Gnosticisme* (Paris 1913).

[4] P. J. G. A. Hendrix, *De alexandrijnsche Haeresiarch Basilides* (Amsterdam 1926). Hendrix supposed that the Church Fathers were more interested in the moral doctrines of Basilides and that Hippolytus reflected the metaphysical speculations. A. Siouville, the French translator of Hippolytus' *Refutation* (Paris 1928) still believed that the source of Hippolytus' account was a text from the Basilidian school, written at the end of the II century A.D.

[5] W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London–New York [3]1929) 107.

[6] There was a time, he says, when nothing was, nor was even the nothing anything existing, but simply ..... nothing at all was... because what is so termed is not absolutely ineffable; we call it "ineffable", and it is "not even ineffable", because the "not even ineffable" is not called ineffable, but is superior to any name than can be named. ... Since, there was nothing therefore, not matter, not being, nor not-being, nor anything simple, nor anything composed, nor anything non-composed, nor non-perceptible, nor man, nor angel, nor God, nor anything at all of the things that can be named, perceived or thought ... then the not-being God, whom Aristotle calls "knowledge of knowledge" ... without thinking, without perception, without intention, without resolve, without emotion, without desire, wanted to create the world. I, says Basilides, say "wanted" but to make myself clear because he was without willing, without thought, without consciousness... and by world, I do not mean the world which later arose by expansion and division in its present order, but the seed of the world. Hipp. *Haer.* 7, 20–21. (I quoted, with some modifications, from R. Haardt *Gnosis. Character and Testimony* (Leiden 1971) 44–45, translated into English by J. F. Hendry).

[7] Philo *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 170.

[8] Alb. *Intr.* 10, 4.

[9] God is ἀνώνυμος, *CH* 5, 1, 9, 10.

[10] *Asclepius* 20.

[11] "He is ineffable because no one could comprehend him to speak about him", *The Apocryphon of John* 2, 1, 15–20 (translated by F. Wisse in *The Nag Hammadi Library* [New York 1977] 100). "How shall we give thee a name? We do not have it. For thou art the existence of them all", *The Three steles of Seth* 7, 5, 125 (transl. by J. M. Robinson in *loc.cit.* 363).

[12] Plot. 5, 3, 13, 1. (I used the edition of P. Henry et H. R. Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera* 1 [Paris-Bruxelles 1951]; 2 [id. 1959]; 3 [id. 1973]).

[13] The translations of Plotinus' text are quoted from S. MacKenna, *The Enneads* (London 1969).

[14] H. A. Wolfson, Negative attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides, *Harvard Theological Review* 50 (1957) 145–156.

[15] J. Whittaker, Basilides on the Ineffability of God, *Harvard Theological Review* 62 (1969) 367–371.

[16] The anti-judaic statements constitute one of the most distinctive features of the Gnostic thought. It has even been considered by some scholars as an essential datum in order to enlighten the origins of Gnosticism. Cf. R. M. Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity* (New York [2]1966).

[17] Cf. J. Klauser, *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York 1959) 47. The *Toldoth Jesu*, a popular Jewish tale about Jesus' life, accuses him of having learned, through deception, the Ineffable Name of God.

[18] Hipp. *Haer.* 7, 24.

[19] E. R. Dodds, The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One, *Classical Quaterly* 22 (1928) 129–142.

[20] J. Whittaker, ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ, *Vigiliae Christianae* 23 (1969) 91–104.

[21] The most important evidence is the fragment which refers to Moderatus and has been conserved in Simplicius *In Phys.* 230, 34 ff Diels. Moderatus is supposed to have been living in the second half of the first century A.D.

[22] Cf. J. M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, New York 1977) 341.

[23] Plot. 5, 3, 14, 16–19.

[24] Porphyry, *Sent.* 26: τὸ μὴ ὂν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν. The expression referred to the First Principle is also found in Marius Victorinus, *Ad Candidum* 4. Cf. the chapter devoted to the Plotinian One in J. M. Rist, *Plotinus . The road to reality* (Cambridge 1967).

[25] On the Gnostic side some of the Coptic tractates in the Nag Hammadi Library provide the same definition of God. The *Allogenes* 11, 3, 61–62, states: "He lives without Mind, or Life, or Existence, incomprehensibly", "He is better than the Totalities in his privation and unknowability, that is, the non-being Existence", "since he is limitless and powerless, and non-existent, he was not giving being, rather he contains all of these in himself, being at rest". (Translated by J. D. Turner and O. S. Wintermute in *The Nag Hammadi Library, loc. cit.* 445). Some peculiarities of the Coptic text of this tractate suggest that the original composition was in Greek, that it was in existence in the third century and was translated into Coptic near Alexandria about 300 A.D. Because the date attributed to it seems to be posterior to Basilides and Plotinus, we will leave aside in this paper the specific relationship, interesting and worth investigating, between our authors and the Nag Hammadi Codices.

[26] Probably against LXX, *Exodus* 3 : 14 : καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸς Μωϋσῆν, λέγων· Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν, as it has been suggested by J. Whittaker, *loc. cit.* 100.

[27] Among the Neopythagorean dealing with a supranoetic First Principle Whittaker, *loc. cit.* 95, quotes Pseudo Brotinus who, although he commonly is considered a contemporary of Numenius, has been dated by H. Thesleff to the III-II century B.C.

[28] *The Apocryphon of John* 12, 1,4 names him "Knowledge giving knowledge", and the *Allogenes* 11, 3, 63 says: "He is primary revelation and knowledge of himself, as it is he alone who knows himself". There is some vacillation in this tractate which previously stated thad God lived without Mind.

[29] Plot. 5, 3, 11, 25–30.

[30] Plot. 5, 3, 10, 44–48.

[31] Plot. 5, 3, 13, 6–8.

[32] Plot. 1, 4, 10, 24–33.

[33] The *Allogenes* 11, 3, 65 says, too, that God exists in himself without desire.

[34] Plot. 6,8, 13.

[35] Plot. 5, 1, 6, 25–30.

[36] Hipp. *Haer.* 7, 22.

[37] Basilides explicitly rejects the use of the concept "emanation" for describing this process.

[38] Albinus, *Intr.* 25 and Iamblichus, *De anima* (ap. Stob. 1, 377, 11 ff. ed Wachs.) – a passage referred to the Calvenus Taurus' school – mention a specific βούλησις θεῶν directed to manifest gods' divinity through their works.

[39] *Asclepius* 20 : *semper uoluntatis praegnans suae parit semper quicquid uoluerit procreare.*

[40] Lucr. 1, 80–101; 5, 1183–1240.

[41] D.L. 10, 123.

[42] The Church Fathers clearly observed that the transcendent and indifferent

Gnostic God bears an unquestionable similarity with the Epicurean gods . Tertullian in *Ad. Marc.* 1, 25 says: *si aliquem de Epicuri schola deum affectauit Christi nomine titulari, ut quod beatum et incorruptibile sit, neque sibi neque alii molestias praestet, hanc enim sententiam ruminans Marcion remouit ab illo seueritates et iudiciarias uires*, and in *Ad. Marc.* 5, 4: *caeterum Deus ille otiosus, nec operationis, nec praedicationis ullius*, and in *loc. cit.* 5, 19: *atquin derideri potest Deus Marcionis, qui nec irasci nouit, nec ulcisci.*

[43] Hipp. *Haer.* 7, 22.

[44] DK 59 B 4.

[45] D.L. 10, 89: Lucr. 1, 58–60.

[46] DK 59 A 45, 67 A 15, 28.

[47] DK 58 B 26, 30.

[48] *SVF* 2. 596, 618.

[49] Ap. Iambl. *Theol. Ar.* p. 31 ff, ed. De Falco. Cf. J. M. Dillon, *loc. cit.* 355.

[50] DK 1 B 13.

[51] The idea of a Primeval Mound which contained within it all of that was to come is also found in the Egyptian cosmogonies. The high God Aton, the supreme God of Heliopolis, is said to have risen up as a High Hill. Cf. R. T. Rundle Clark, *Myth and Symbol in Ancient Egypt*, paperback ed. (London 1978) 37.

[52] D.L. 8, 24–33; Sext. Emp. *Adv. Phys.* 2, 248–284.

[53] *SVF* 1. 85, 98, 495; 2. 301, 310, 312. For further information see D. H. Hahm, *The origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Ohio State University Press 1977) 58 ss.

[54] Zeno, *SVF* 1. 98; 1. 102 = 2. 580. The expression σπερματικὸς λόγος that the Stoics referred to God describes that function of God which is analogous to the function of the seed in the reproductive process.

[55] The identification between fire and God can be clearly seen in the well known passage of Dio Chrysostom, *SVF* 2. 622, which describes the Stoic cosmogony in terms of an allegorized myth.

[56] The two Archons in Basilides are creative powers, but they are not negative figures as in other Gnostic systems. The heavenly creatures are First Archon's works and the earthly creatures are Second Archon's works, but these Archons only execute things that already were in the universal seed. Basilides insists that the Archons are inferior to the Third Filiation which stays in the universal seed and says further that all beings were naturally born by addition from the great amount of the universal seed.

[57] The meaning of this Triple Filiation has been obscure for most of the scholars dealing with Basilides. E. De Faye, *loc. cit.*, considered this concept as something curious but inexplicable, "*même dans le contexte de l'époque*". At the beginning of this century, when the orientalized origins of Gnosticism were widely accepted, J. Kennedy, Buddhist Gnosticism, the System of Basilides, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London 1902) 377–415, intended to identify the Filiations with the three buddhist *gunas*, the intellectual principle, the emotional principle and the dark principle. Later G. Quispel, The Gnostic man: the doctrine of Basilides, in *Gnostic Studies* (Istanbul 1974) 103–133, searching for a more plausible explanation tried to connect the concept of the Triple Filiation with some texts of a similar period, mainly Arnobius 2, 25, and *Asclepius* 32. The passage in Arnobius treats of a God First Principle of all things, followed by two *mentes geminae* and an *anima docta inmortalis perfecta diuina*. Quispel believed the First and the Second Filiation to correspond to the *mentes geminae* as representing the archetypal and the instrumental ideas, and the Third Filiation to be the *anima diuina*, that is, the Gnostic Primeval Man. The passage in the *Asclepius*, a very difficult one, refers to four intellects in God, in a manner that I think does not allow it to be compared with Basilides' myth, in which is clearly said that the First and non-being God is not a Mind. In addition J. M. Dillon, The concept of two Intellects, *Phronesis* 18 (1973) 176–185, pointed out that although this second Mind of God which cares for the

instrumental ideas and performs in relation to the world a demiurgic function appears in some Middle and Neoplatonic texts; the most widespread tendency is to attribute this function to the World Soul. Calcidius' statement in *In Tim.* 177, (p. 206, 3 ed. Waszink) that the *secunda mens* is the *anima mundi tripertita* shows, therefore, that the concept of a second Mind which contains the intelligible archetypes of individuals and the concept of the World Soul were finally equated. Nevertheless in my opinion Basilides solved the problem of the individual forms through his Stoic model: the universal seed contained obviously the ἰδίως ποιόν of everything and although he conserved in his system the figure of the World Soul, its function is scarcely relevant.

[58] Proclus, *In Tim.* 1, 303, 27 ss.

[59] Thus Barbelo, the male virgin who appears as a Trinity in most of the Gnostic tractates of the Nag Hammadi Library. She is the First Thought of the Father, and referred to her we can read in *The Three Steles of Seth* 7, 5, 121: "thou hast empowered the eternals in being, thou hast empowered divinity in living... thou hast empowered this (one) in knowing, thou hast empowered another one in creating..." (Translated by J. M. Robinson in *The Nag Hammadi Library*, *loc. cit.* 363). The role of this trimorphic Barbelo, as it has been pointed out by A. Wire in *NHL*, *loc. cit.* 443, is to make concrete the not being One in three different gradations, Mind, Life and Existence which are comparable to the Plotinian Nous, World Soul, and Nature, and I think, also to the Filiations of Basilides.

[60] We should remember that Basilides following the Platonic point of view attributes extreme beauty to his God. Basilides uses the word κάλλος (Hipp. *Refut.* 7, 22). Plotinus says the One is καλλονή (Plot. 1, 6, 6, 25. Cf. J. M. Rist, *loc. cit.* 53 ss.) We also find this assertion of the Supreme Beauty in God in the *Allogenes* 11, 3, 64.

[61] *SVF* 1. 134–41, 521; 2. 773–87, 796, 879, 885.

[62] *Gen. An.* 2. 3. 736 B 33 – 737 A 1.

[63] *Mot. An.* 10. 703 A 4 – B 2; *Gen. An.* 26. 744 A 1.

[64] Hippolytus certainly recognized the Second Filiation as a World Soul and the fact that in Plato's *Phaedrus* the soul is endowed with wings caused that he interpreted the Pneuma as a wing, although this interpretation does not appear in the words attributed to Basilides (Cf. Hipp. *Refut.* 7, 22).

[65] Plot. 4, 4, 13, 1. Nature is the active faculty of the World Soul, it is that which, added to Matter, gives it its substantiality. Nature is the lowest of the spiritual existence. All the commentators of Plotinus agree that there are two parts of Soul: one engaged in the eternal contemplation of its priors, the other has come down and created the world of material objects and particulars. Cf. J. M. Rist, *loc. cit.* 85.

[66] Hipp. *Refut.* 7, 25.

[67] Stoic concepts have been useful for Basilides in order to avoid the dualism god-matter. Nevertheless some confusion arises when Basilides tries to fit them in the Platonic frame of his Divinity.

[68] Chrysippus and Zeno accepted the idea that the inmediate cause of movement is weight or lightness, *SVF* 2. 434. Cf. D. Hahm, *loc. cit.* 57–90.

[69] The belief that God is unknowable through our senses or our mind is fundamental in Gnosticism. The knowledge of this hidden God constitutes the specific object of the Gnostic faith, because this knowledge, gnosis, is in itself the instrument of personal salvation. This aim can be reached either through a sacred and secret lore revealed by a Teacher or through inner revelation, the enlightement, the mystic ascent. This second way, more difficult, tended in some sects to be replaced by some definite rites and practices directed to promote and to assert the reception of the Spirit into the inner self. But the fragment of Hippolytus which tell us that Basilides claimed to have learned his doctrine from Matthias, does not make any mention of these theurgical practices in Basilides.

[70] G. Quispel, *loc. cit.* 128.
[71] R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* (Oxford 1957), quoted by J. M. Rist, *loc. cit.* 213 ss.
[72] Clem Alex. *Strom.* 2, 3, 10.

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A CLASSICAL INFLUENCE ON THE GNOSTIC SOPHIA MYTH

BY

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The myth of the Gnostic Sophia that proved to be so popular in the early centuries of this era, has proven itself equally attractive to students of Gnosticism in this century. Taken as a whole, it represents more clearly than any other myth the world of thought in which the Gnostic moved. Sophia's act of hybris and subsequent fall lie at the very heart of the Gnostic's understanding of his own existential predicament.

The myth, often simplified in introductory accounts of Gnosticism, is neither simple nor uniformly presented in the sources. It is neither a part of every Gnostic system, nor, in those systems in which it is a part, is it everywhere the same. It is intimately connected to the Valentinian school, though its influence certainly spread much further afield. As with most Gnostic ideas, it seems to be alive in a world of syncretistic thought and imagination, forever in flux, its growth and change dependent upon the particular influences impinging upon the community and/or author. Though the basic themes remain fixed, the details show remarkable variation, and often, much of the myth is taken for granted.

Modern scholarship has worked extensively to unravel the inner development of the Sophia myth[1] and to explore its *religionsgeschichtlicher* background. MacRae, in his article entitled "The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth",[2] goes far in flashing out the dependence of the myth on the personified Wisdom of Jewish apocalyptic and Wisdom literature. This dependence had often been assumed,[3] though not unchallenged.[4] The problem with this relationship, as MacRae and others[5] have seen, lies in the Gnostic translation of the descent of Wisdom into the fall of Sophia. MacRae argues that the hostility apparent in this Gnostic translation is to be understood "in the realization that the essence of the Gnostic attitude, as has often been stated, is one of revolt, and it is a revolt against Judaism itself."[6] He further suggests that the actual source of Sophia's fall is to be found in the Gnostic projection of the Genesis account of the fall of Eve from the material world of men to the celestial world of the Pleroma.

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The actual motivation behind Sophia's action that leads to her fall is agreed to be her desire to imitate the Father. Stead notes that this theme no doubt goes back to Plato,[7] while MacRae makes it dependent on Eve's wish, expressed in Gen 3.5, to be like God.[8] One must note, however, that the Gnostic account enlivens this desire with considerable detail that is unexplainable from either of these sources. Without denying a relationship to Gen 3.5, it is the purpose of this study to explore the details of this particular part of the Sophia myth and suggest a classical influence as the source of the Gnostic's mythological expansion.

One must first note that Sophia's act of hybris and its immediate results have two different means of expression in the Patristic sources.[9] Both agree that the cause of the fall is the presumptive act committed against the Father. However, in one version, this act has a more philosophical or mental goal, while in the other the imagery is more totally sexual. In the former, Sophia's act is presented as an attempt to penetrate the mystery around the Father. In the latter, it is understood as an effort to imitate the Father's creative power by generating a being apart from her consort or syzygy. In the philosophical version it is Sophia's errant thought that separates from her. It is discarded outside the Pleroma and in some way personified. In the sexual account, it is Sophia's aborted, formless offspring, the ἔκτρωμα, that is cast out of the Pleroma and ultimately becomes the demiurge. The sexual imagery is also present in the philosophical version, though here it is not primary. Thus, there also, Sophia's action is errant because it is committed apart from her consort and results from her experiencing a passion to emulate the Father.[10] In this paper I will be dealing only with the sexual version,[11] looking first at Hippolytus' account and then at its presentation in the Nag Hammadi texts of *The Hypostasis of the Archons* and *The Apocryphon of John.*

Hippolytus states[12] that after Sophia was brought forth, she took note of the multitude and power of the begetting aeons (τῶν γεγεννηκότων αἰώνων). She perceived that whereas all the other aeons generated in pairs (κατὰ συζυγίαν γεννῶσιν), only the Father begat without a consort (ἄζυγος). Sophia desired to emulate the Father (μιμήσασθαι τὸν πατέρα) and to generate by herself without her consort (γεννῆσαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν δίχα τοῦ συζύγου). She didn't know that the Father alone possessed the power of self-generation. As a result, her attempt was doomed to failure. She produced only what she was capable of producing, namely, a formless and unfinished substance (οὐσίαν ἄμορφον καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστον).

This led to the introduction of ignorance into the Pleroma, which

created an uproar therein (θόρυβος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ πληρώματι). The other aeons beseeched the Father to put an end to Sophia's grief, for she had wept bitterly on account of her abortion (αὐτῆς ἐκτρώματι).

The Father heeded their request and projected Christ and the Holy Spirit to separate and shape the abortion (εἰς μόρφωσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν τοῦ ἐκτρώματος) and thus put an end to Sophia's moans (τῶν τῆς Σοφίας στεναγμῶν). The amorphous abortion (τὸ ἔκτρωμα τὸ ἄμορφον), produced by Sophia alone and apart from her consort (μονογενὲς καὶ δίχα συζύγου), was separated from the perfect aeons lest they, seeing it, be disturbed by its formlessness (ταράσσωνται διὰ τὴν ἀμορφίαν). Finally, the Father projects Staurus to guard the Pleroma lest the formlessness of the abortion be manifest to the perfect aeons.

In this account of Sophia's error, a sequence of four basic events is to be noted. First, Sophia desires to copy the Father's ability of self-generation. Secondly, this action leads directly and necessarily to the projection of the abortion. The third event witnesses Sophia's regret and the fourth, a rather long, involved account in Hippolytus, is the expulsion of the abortion from the Pleroma. This same sequence is also found in the accounts of Sophia contained within the Nag Hammadi tractates mentioned above.

In *The Hypostasis of the Archons* (CG II,4),[13] it is in a response to a question on the authorities and their origin that the great angel Eleleth discusses Sophia. He reports that she wanted to create something alone without her consort.[14] But the result of her effort was a material product described as an abortion. This abortion became an arrogant beast, resembling a lion, namely, Ialdabaoth. Then follow two accounts of Ialdabaoth's blasphemy, both of which lead to an expulsion. In the first case, it is Sophia herself who introduces light into matter and pursues it[15] down into chaos. In the second, which more closely fits the present purpose, it is Zoe, Sophia's daughter, whose breath, in the form of a fiery angel, binds Ialdabaoth and casts him down into Tartarus below the abyss. Although considerable variation in detail exists between this account and Hippolytus' version, the same sequence of events is seen to occur.

The Apocryphon of John (CG II,1)[16] offers a third example. There Sophia conceives a thought from herself. She wants to bring forth a likeness from herself, without the Spirit's consent and apart from her consort. The result of her effort is, of course, imperfect, and different from her in appearance. Thus she failed to produce the likeness she desired. Her offspring was dissimilar and of a different form because she had

created it without her consort. Her abortion becomes a lion-faced serpent with eyes that flash fire. Sophia, fearing lest one of the immortals see it, casts it away, outside of that place.

Clearly, the same sequence of events lies behind all three accounts. Now although, as was noted above, parallels to the idea of the desire to imitate God have been noted from Plato and Genesis, they go no further in accounting for this sequence of events. In these Gnostic accounts, the desire to emulate the Father is expressed in strictly sexual terms. It is a desire to produce an offspring apart from her consort. The impossibility of such an action results in a misshapen abortion. When Sophia sees it, she is regretful, and the abortion is cast out of the Pleroma.

This sequence of events finds its closest parallel and probable source of origin in the world of classical mythology, and more specifically in versions of the birth of Typhaon (also called Typhoeus) and Hephaistos first met with in Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns.[17]

In the Hymn to Pythian Apollo[18] it is stated that Hera brought forth cruel Typhaon, who became a plague to men, because she was angry with Zeus for bearing Athena from his head, i.e., apart from union with her. She complains in a speech before the assembled gods, accusing Zeus of dishonoring her. She notes that Athena is foremost among the gods, while Hephaistos, whom she bore, is weakly and has a shrivelled foot. She was ashamed of him in heaven at his birth,[19] so that she cast him out into the sea. She desires now to produce a son apart from Zeus, who will be foremost among the immortals. She prays to this effect and her prayers are answered. But when her time is fulfilled, she bears one neither like the gods nor like mortal men, but rather the monster Typhaon. His fate is not followed in this hymn, the story having been introduced only in connection with Apollo's slaying of the dragoness to whom Hera entrusted Typhaon.

However, there is a second account of Typhoeus in Hesiod's *Theogony*.[20] Here he is born in a more natural way to Earth and Tartarus.[21] He is described as a fearful dragon with a hundred snake-heads. Fire flashes from all his eyes, and all his heads produce dreadful noises such as that of a lion or the bellowing of a bull. He creates such havoc in the world that Zeus is compelled to act. He conquers Typhaon and hurls him down, a maimed wreck. It is further stated that in his bitter anger he threw him into Tartarus.

Many of these same motifs recur in the traditions surrounding the birth of Hephaistos. In the *Theogony*,[22] Hera, after a long enumeration of Zeus'

wives, is listed as his last. Then follows the account of Zeus' bearing of Athena from his head. This leads directly to Hera's anger and then to her bearing of Hephaistos apart from union with Zeus. Hephaistos, however, is born lame. And as it is reported in the *Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo*,[23] this fact proved embarassing to Hera, who threw Hephaistos into the sea.

It is not the aim of this paper to explore the complicated history of these classical traditions,[24] though it is important to recognize that these specific ideas and accounts continued on in the later sources.[25] The major intent of this study is to note that these classical stories offer the same sequence of events that is met in the Gnostic Sophia myth. Zeus, as is his perogative, produces Athena out of his head, apart from a consort. This leads to Hera's anger and her attempt to copy Zeus' creative activity. As this is an action beyond her station, the result is imperfect; Hephaistos is lame and Typhaon is a monster. Hera recognizes her error. In the case of Hephaistos, she casts him out of heaven herself. In the case of Typhaon it is Zeus who, reacting to Typhaon's havoc, casts him into Tartarus.

Differences certainly exist between these classical accounts and the Gnostic myth of Sophia. Thus Hera's anger with Zeus has no real counterpart in the Sophia myth. And Typhaon was not an abortion, as was the case with Ialdabaoth. Yet the striking similarity cannot be ignored. Zeus, the father of the gods, bears Athena from his head. The Gnostic Father emanates Thought.[26] Hera, the last of Zeus' wives, in anger wishes to copy Zeus' creative act of self-generation. Sophia, the last of the aeons, desires to emulate the Father by bringing forth a being apart from her consort. Hera's product is imperfect and cast out of heaven. Sophia bares an abortion that is separated out of the Pleroma.

More detailed parallels also suggest themselves. Thus the disturbance among the aeons that leads to the separating of Sophia's abortion outside the Pleroma has a parallel in the havoc created by Typhaon that causes Zeus to cast him out of heaven. Again, in the *Theogony* 869 Zeus casts Typhoeus into Tartarus, and in the *Hypostasis of the Archons* 95.9–13 it is the flaming angel brought forth by Zoe that binds Ialdabaoth and casts him into Tartarus. And Hera's apparent shame over Hephaistos in heaven is paralleled in the *Apocryphon of John* where Sophia fears over her abortion lest "one of the immortals might see it."

Finally, the monstrous figure of Typhaon immediately brings to mind the Gnostic demiurge. He is styled a plague to men, which certainly fits the Gnostic view of Ialdabaoth. He is said to have a hundred snake-heads

with eyes that flash fire. He produces horrendous noises, among which is the sound of a lion. Now although the description of Typhaon cannot be equated with that of the Gnostic demiurge, it is interesting to note that Ialdabaoth is often described as a lion. Further, the *Apocryphon of John* II, 10.9–11 reports that Sophia's abortion was in the "form of a lion-faced serpent. And its eyes were like lightning fires which flash", a quotation that sounds much like the description of Typhaon.

These individual parallels, by themselves, would prove very little. But their combined effect, coupled with the basic outline of the story, suggests that the Gnostic account of Sophia's act of hybris and its immediate results (at least in the sexual version) takes its present form from these classical mythologies. Although it might be argued that the entire account is somewhat sundered in the various classical traditions, it is certainly not hard to assume that the Gnostic exegete could and did make the necessary connections.

It is important to note in this connection that Hippolytus precedes his account of this Valentinian myth with extensive charges against Valentinus and his school for plagiarism of Platonic and Pythagorean materials.

One further point needs to be made. The conclusions drawn here are not meant to argue against the close association of the Sophia myth with the Jewish figure of personified Wisdom. Apart from the question of origins, one cannot deny the tremendous indebtedness of Gnosticism to Judaism, both for narrative material and exegetical methods.[27] At the same time, one should not let that dependence undermine the fact that Gnosticism drew heavily from other traditions as well. The Gnostic author and exegete was capable of multiple exegetical manoeuvers. These various manoeuvers were never seen by the Gnostic as mutually exclusive, but rather as mutually helpful in explicating the ultimate truth. The relationship of the Gnostic Sophia myth to the classical traditions concerning Hephaistos and Typhaon noted here further reveals the extent of the syncretistic cooking pot from which the Gnostic drew.

NOTES

[1] G. C. Stead, The Valentinian Myth of Sophia, *JThS* 20 (1969) 75–104. Stead offers the latest discussion of the material together with a brief Forschungsbericht.

[2] George W. MacRae, The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth, *NT* 12 (1970) 86–101.

[3] F. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de saint Irénée* (Paris 1947); U. Wilckens, Σοφία, *Theol. Wörterbuch zum N.T.*, VII (Stuttgart 1964) 510–514; G. Quispel, Gnosticism and the New Testament, in his *Gnostic Studies*, I (Istanbul 1974)

202–204; R. M. Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity*, rev. ed. (New York 1966).

[4] W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (Göttingen 1907); U. Wilckens, *Weisheit und Torheit* (Tübingen 1959).

[5] MacRae 97 f; O. Betz, Was am Anfang geschah, in *Abraham unser Vater. Festschrift für Otto Michel zum 60. Geburtstag*, hrsg. von Otto Betz (Leiden 1963) 24–43.

[6] MacRae 97.

[7] Stead 78 n. 2.

[8] MacRae 100.

[9] Stead 78–82. This division is part of a two-fold tradition running throughout the Sophia myth.

[10] These two versions, the philosophical and the sexual, correspond to Stead's divisions A and B. The former is most clearly represented in Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* I.2. 2–4, and the latter in Hippolytus, *Ref.* VI.30. 6–31.2. Irenaeus clearly knows the sexual version as well (*Adv. haer.* I.2.3). cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Val.* 9–10. A listing of the other relevant Patristic material can be found in Stead's article.

[11] The sexuality expressed in this account would more expectedly find its origin in the Greek world of thought.

[12] I have used the text edited by Paul Wendland. *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, tom. 2, *Hippolytus Werke 3, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* (Leipzig 1916).

[13] I have used the text and translation given by Bentley Layton, The Hypostasis of the Archons, or the Reality of the Rulers, *HTR* 67 (1974) 351–426 and 69 (1976) 31–101; also, James M. Robinson, ed., *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* (San Francisco 1977).

[14] There is some material concerning a veil and shadow that seems to intervene into the account at this point.

[15] Layton 72 notes that this "it" could refer to either the light or to Samael.

[16] Martin Krause and Pahor Labib, *Die drei Versionen des Apocryphon des Johannes im koptischen Museum zu alt-Kairo* (Wiesbaden 1962).

[17] I have used the text and translation found in the *LCL* series. *Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (London 1964).

[18] *Hymn to Pythian Apollo* 300–363.

[19] This specific line is an emendation to the text, though Hera's action certainly witnesses her regret.

[20] *Theogony* 819–869.

[21] The accounts of Typhaon's birth, as those of Hephaistos, vary between presenting him as born of Hera alone, or from a more natural union. The complicated history of the classical traditions does not concern the present argument. Marie Delcourt, *Hermaphrodite. Myths and Rituals of the Bisexual Figure in Classical Antiquity* (London 1961) 17 f; idem, *Héphaistos ou la légende du magicien* (Paris 1957) ch. 2.

[22] *Theogony* 921–934.

[23] *Hymn to Pythian Apollo* 317–18.

[24] Refer to note 21 above.

[25] Ovid, *Fasti* 5.231 f; Apollodorus, *The Library* I.3.5; Lucian, *On Sacrifices* 6.

[26] The linkage of Athena in this connection with νοῦς and διάνοια occurred very early in the Greek tradition (Plato, *Crat* 407). Irenaeus already connected Athena with the Simonian Helen (*Adv. haer.* I, 23, 4). Gerd Lüdemann, *Untersuchungen zur simonianischen Gnosis* (Göttingen 1975) 55–56. It should further be noted that Epinoia is not the first emanation in all the sources. It is so, however, in the *Apocryphon of John.*

[27] Orval Wintermute, A Study of Gnostic Exegesis of the Old Testament, in *The Use of the Old Testament in the New and Other Essays. Studies in honor of William Franklin*

Stinespring, ed. by James M. Efird (Durham 1972) 241–270. Wintermute offers a good example for the two Nag Hammadi texts used in this study.

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DER MENSCH ALS POLITISCHES LEBEWESEN BEI BASILIOS DEM GROSSEN*

VON

TH. NIKOLAOU

Τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; Diese Frage, die zweifellos die gesamte Geistesgeschichte durchzieht, zielt auf das „Wesen des Menschen" ab, d.h. auf etwas, das nicht geradewegs zum Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Prüfung und Eruierung werden kann. Die Vielfalt der Antworten auf diese Frage (vom aristotelischen *animal rationale* bis zum schellerschen „das lebendige x, das Gott sucht", vom klassischen *homo sapiens* bis zum *homo insipiens* von Ortega y Gasset, vom *homo faber* bis zum marxistischen Konzept des Menschen als „ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse") ist daher nur allzu verständlich.

Eine solche Antwort stellt auch das bekannte aristotelische Schlagwort dar, das den Menschen als „von Natur aus politisches Lebewesen" (φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον)[1] apostrophiert. Mit diesem Schlagwort ist die nacharistotelische Denkgeschichte durchaus vertraut.[2] Auch dem griechisch geschulten christlichen Denker, Basilios dem Großen ist die Bezeichnung des Menschen als „politisches Lebewesen" bekannt. Wie ist sie aber bei ihm zu verstehen? Zur Klärung dieser Frage möchte ich erstens die betreffende Stelle bei Basilios besprechen und zweitens den dadurch herauszuschälenden Sinn des Ausdruckes mit dem aristotelischen Kontext und den Gegebenheiten der griechischen Philosophie überhaupt vergleichen.

1. Die Bezeichnung des Menschen als „politisches Lebewesen" begegnet uns in der ersten der beiden Homilien von Basilios zum 14. Psalm (6: PG, 29,261C). Der Inhalt dieser Homilie, wie auch der übrigen Psalmenhomilien, dient erbaulichen und nicht exegetischen Zwecken. Dies geht auch aus der betreffenden Stelle hervor, an der der Homilet sich auf Vers 5 des Psalms („der sein Geld nicht mit Zinsen verleiht")[3] nur inhaltlich bezieht und anstelle dieses Verses Mt 5,42 („Dem, der dich bittet, gib, und wer bei dir borgen will, von dem wende dich nicht ab") zum Ausgangspunkt seiner Überlegungen macht.

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Diesen Vers, Mt 5, 42, versteht Basilios als Aufforderung (πρόκλησις) an die Christen ἐπὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν καὶ φιλάλληλον καὶ τῇ φύσει οἰκεῖον, d.h. zur Gemeinschaft, Nächstenliebe und zur natürlichen Verwandschaft miteinander. Hierauf folgt die kurze Begründung: Πολιτικὸν γὰρ ζῷον καὶ συναγελαστικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος („denn der Mensch ist ein politisches und in Scharen zusammenlebendes Wesen"). Und er fährt fort: „In der gemeinsamen Lebensführung (κοινὴ πολιτεία) aber und dem Umgang miteinander ist die Freigebigkeit (τὸ εὐμετάδοτον) notwendig, um den Notleidenden aufzuhelfen. ‚Dem, der dich bittet, gib'. Es (sc. dieses Wort) will, daß du denjenigen gegenüber, die dich bitten, einerseits aus Liebe einfach offen bist, andererseits aber daß du die Dürftigkeit eines jeden, der dich bittet, durch die Vernunft unterscheidest".

Worum es hier in erster Linie geht, ist sicherlich nicht ein theoretischer Exkurs über das Wesen des Menschen, sondern die konkrete Ausgestaltung des Lebens der christlichen Gemeinschaft gemäß dem Evangelium. Mit πολιτεία ist hier nicht eine politische Ordnung bzw. eine Staatsform im klassischen Sinne des Wortes gemeint, d.h. der gut organisierten Gemeinschaft, die von Gesetzen durchwaltet wird und konkrete Ziele verfolgt;[4] auch jene andere klassische Bedeutung des Terminus, nach der πολιτεία „βίος ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντος"[5] heißt,ist an dieser Stelle nicht beinhaltet. Der Ausdruck weist bei den Kirchenvätern bekanntlich oft die Bedeutung entweder allgemein der Lebensweise (way of life – ohne ethische Wertung) oder des tugendhaften, vollkommenen, evangeliumsgemäßen Lebens auf.[6] Basilios verwendet wiederholt den Begriff in diesem letzteren Sinne, wenn er direkt von εὐαγγελικὴ πολιτεία[7] bzw. von κατὰ θεὸν πολιτεία[8] oder in Anlehnung an Phil 3,20 von πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς[9] spricht. Hierbei sind πολιτεία und πολίτευμα gleichzusetzen. Die vollkommene Lebensführung ist für den Christen in der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft gewährleistet. Hierin ist wohl auch der Grund zu sehen, warum Basilios sich so sehr für das organisierte Koinobion der Mönche (κοινοβιακὴ κοινωνία) eingesetzt hat.

Die Kirche, insbesondere die konkrete kirchliche Gemeinde, ist die Polis der Christen. Es ist daher nicht zufällig, wenn Basilios in dem Begriff πόλις von Psalm 59,11 die Kirche vermutet; die Kirche ist eine „Polis, weil sie eine Versammlung ist, die rechtmäßig verwaltet wird" (σύστημα νομίμως οἰκούμενον) und weil sie „durch den Glauben umzäunt" ist.[10]

Die Kirche, betont er nachdrücklich an einer anderen Stelle,[11] ist die πόλις θεοῦ (Psalm 45,5; vgl. Hebr 12,2). Die Anwendung des Begriffs

geschieht hier nicht unbedacht. Er zitiert die überlieferte stoische Definition der Polis als σύστημα ἱδρυμένον, κατὰ νόμον διοικούμενον[12] und findet diese Definition passend für das „himmlische Jerusalem" und die „himmlische Polis"; denn diese Polis ist auch eine „geordnete Versammlung (σύστημα) der Erstgeborenen, die im Himmel aufgezeichnet sind" (Hebr 12,23). Die Polis Gottes beschränkt sich allerdings nicht auf das himmlische Jerusalem, sondern umfaßt auch die κάτω ἐκκλησία, die kirchliche Gemeinschaft auf Erden; „die gesamte geistige Schöpfung von den überirdischen Kräften bis zu den menschlichen Seelen muß man als eine Polis verstehen, die durch die Herrschaft des Hl. Geistes erquickt wird". In der Mitte der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft auf Erden „hat der Höchste seine Wohnung geheiligt" (Psalm 45,5). Er herrscht in ihr durch seine Güte, seine Vorsehung und seine Gerechtigkeit. Dadurch erweist sich die Kirche als eine wohlgeordenete Versammlung, als die neue Polis. Jeder Mensch hat sich zu dieser Polis, der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft, hinzuzugesellen. Damit macht man sich zum Soldaten und Athleten Christi, der seine Lebensführung im Himmel hat (Phil 3,20).[13] Der gerechte Mensch gehört noch nicht ganz zu der Polis des lebendigen Gottes; seine endgültige Einbürgerung (πολιτογράφησις) erfolgt dann, wenn er die eschatologische Geltung vor Gott erreicht hat.[14]

Kehren wir aber nun zu unserer Stelle (*Homilia in psalm.* 14,5) zurück. Die πολιτεία, um die es sich hier handelt, ist zunächst einfach die Lebensweise, und in diesem Sinne entspricht sie dem Ausdruck ἀναστροφή (Umgang, Verkehr) im selben Satz. Beide Begriffe werden jedoch durch die Worte κοινὴ (πολιτεία) bzw. μετ' ἀλλήλων (ἀναστροφή) näher bestimmt. Es geht deshalb nicht um eine beliebige Lebensführung, sondern um die gemeinsame und gemeinschaftliche. Die gemeinsame Lebensführung dient nach Basilios an dieser Stelle dem gesellschaftlichen, sozialen Gleichgewicht. Das Gebot des Herrn, dem zu geben, der dürftig ist und bittet, ist eine Grundvoraussetzung einer wohlgeordneten kirchlichen Gemeinschaft. Das Motiv für die Freigebigkeit erblickt unser Autor in der Liebe. Obwohl er unmittelbar danach auf den „Kommunismus" der Urgemeinde hinweist, hat er ein konkreteres Ideal vor Augen: die Behebung der Not in der Gemeinschaft. Er setzt sich nicht mit der Leidenschaft eines Johannes Chrysostomos für die Verteilung aller Güter ein, sondern verlangt von seinen Hörern, den Notleidenden behilflich zu werden, ihren Reichtum richtig zu gebrauchen. Nicht Abschaffung des Eigentums steht im Vordergrund, sondern tätige Nächstenliebe. Die Dürftigkeit des Nächsten bestimmt das Maß unserer Freigebigkeit; diese Dürftigkeit

richtig abzuwägen und ihr entsprechend nachzukommen, ist die Aufgabe der Unterscheidungskraft unserer Vernunft.

Für diese freigebige Haltung des Menschen in der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft sieht Basilios einen gewichtigen Beweggrund auch in seiner natürlichen Veranlagung zum gemeinschaftlichen Leben. Wenn er nun auf das aristotelische Schlagwort über den Menschen als politisches Lebewesen zurückgreift, spricht er eine *opinio communis* aus, deren Richtigkeit vorausgesetzt wird. Es ist eine schlicht selbstverständliche Aussage, daß der Mensch ein Gemeinschaftswesen und als solches auf seinen Mitmenschen ausgerichtet ist. Diese tiefe Überzeugung bringt der große Kirchenvater zum Ausdruck, wenn er an einer anderen Stelle[15] fragt: „Wer weiß nicht, daß der Mensch ein zahmes und gemeinschaftliches (ἥμερον καὶ κοινωνικόν) und nicht ein alleinlebendes und auch nicht wildes Lebewesen ist (οὐχὶ μοναστικὸν οὐδὲ ἄγριον)? Denn es gibt nichts, was unserer Natur so eigen ist, als das Miteinander-Gemeinschaft-stiften und Einander-bedürfen und das Einander-lieben". Hier wird diese Grundeigenschaft des Menschen deutlicher mit der Liebe in Verbindung gebracht. Das Gebot der Nächstenliebe wäre unerfüllbar, wenn der Mensch als Geschöpf Gottes die entsprechende Kraft nicht von Gott eingegeben bekommen hätte. Diese somit der Natur des Menschen eigene „Liebeskraft" macht ihn zu einem Lebewesen, das sich zur menschlichen Gemeinschaft hingezogen fühlt und nur in ihr existieren kann. Die hiermit angesprochene Gemeinschaft ist die kirchliche Gemeinschaft, in deren Mitte Gott ist. Die Bestimmung des Menschen als politisches Lebewesen erklärt daher nach Basilios nicht nur den natürlichen Drang zum gemeinschaftlichen Leben, sondern auch die Zweckursache dieses Lebens, Gott im Gebet zu begegnen, Gottes Gnade zu erfahren. Dies ist m.E. der Grund, warum Basilios im weiteren Kontext der betreffenden Homilie mit dem Zeugnis der Schrift Mt 25,35 („Ich war hungrig und ihr habt mir zu essen gegeben") und Sprüche 19,17 („Wer sich des Armen erbarmt, leiht an Gott aus") argumentiert. Die Behebung der sozialen Not in der Gemeinschaft stellt selbstverständlich etwas Wertvolles für sich dar; doch darüber hinaus führt sie zu Gott, denn das Unterpfand der Hilfeleistung und der Gabe an den Nächsten ist das Himmelreich (Ἐχέγγυον δὲ τοῦ δάνους ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν). Soviel über das Verständnis des Menschen als politisches Lebewesen bei Basilios. Wie verhält sich nun dieses Verständnis zum aristotelischen Kontext und den Gegebenheiten der griechischen Philosophie und seiner Zeit im allgemeinen?

2. Ein solcher Vergleich führt zu einigen Feststellungen. Die wichtigsten davon möchte ich im Folgenden anführen:

a) Nur äußerlich gesehen könnte man meinen, daß Basilios sich durch die Zitation des aristotelischen Ausdruckes als ein Zeuge des politischen Denkens erweist, welches zu den wesentlichen Kennzeichen der griechischen Philosophie fast seit ihren Anfängen bis zum letzten Philosophen in Byzanz, Georgios Gemistos Plethon, gehört. Daß Basilios sich nicht darin einreihen läßt, erklärt sich nicht durch den Wandel der politischen Strukturen von der griechischen Polis über die hellenistischen Staaten zu dem römischen Imperium. Vielmehr ist dies auf die Tatsache zurückzuführen, daß er die Bezeichnung des Menschen als politisches Wesen im Grunde apolitisch, nämlich nicht in Bezug auf die weltliche Ordnung, verwendet. Der Bereich, in dem der Mensch nach Basilios seine Eigenschaft als Gemeinschaftswesen entfaltet, ist die Kirche, die Polis Gottes. Basilios denkt nicht in den augustinischen Kategorien einer Gegenüberstellung des „göttlichen" und des „weltlichen" Staates. Ihn interessiert primär der Gottesstaat in der konkreten Gestalt der kirchlichen Gemeinde. Der Mensch, der dieser Gemeinschaft angehört, erlangt darin sein Heil und somit seine endgültige Einbürgerung in den Gottesstaat im Eschaton. Der konkreten kirchlichen Gemeinschaft steht der weltliche Staat nicht schlechthin gegenüber. Deshalb ist den weltlichen Herrschern gegenüber Gehorsam angebracht. Es ist kein uneingeschränkter Gehorsam; der Christ hat sich nur jenen Herrschern zu unterwerfen, „bei denen das Gebot Gottes nicht verhindert wird".[16] Hierin folgt Basilios der Schrift und meint mit Paulus (Röm 13,1), daß die weltliche Gewalt von Gott herrührt.[17] Es ist nun die Zeit nach Konstantin dem Großen, in der „das Verhältnis zwischen den beiden endgültigen Mächten der Geschichte sich aus einem feindlichen in ein solches der Zusammenarbeit verwandeln konnte".[18] Dieser Verwandlung trägt Basilios hier Rechnung.

b) Die natürliche Eigenschaft des Menschen als Gemeinschaftswesen gründet nach Basilios in der „Kraft" der Nächstenliebe (δύναμις ἀγάπης) die im Menschen als Geschöpf Gottes keimhaft existiert (σπερματικῶς ἐνυπάρχουσα) und sich durch die Gebote Gottes entfaltet.[19] Für Aristoteles ist der Mensch ein politisches Lebewesen, weil er Vernunft (λόγος) besitzt; darin unterscheidet sich der Mensch von allen anderen Lebewesen.[20] Zwar haftet die Kraft der Liebe für Basilios der menschlichen Seele an, aber sie läßt sich trotzdem schwerlich mit dem aristotelischen Logos vergleichen.

c) Auch die Ziele, die der Mensch jeweils in seinem Handeln als Gemein-

schaftswesen verfolgt, lassen sich nicht ohne weiteres vergleichen. Zunächst ist festzustellen, daß sowohl bei Aristoteles als auch bei Basilios durch die Bezeichnung des Menschen als politisches Lebewesen der Bereich der Ethik der Gemeinschaft angesprochen ist. Für Aristoteles vollendete sich die Ethik des Einzelnen, aber auch der Gemeinschaft, in der Polis. In der Ethik der Gemeinschaft, der Politik, sieht er die „Großorganisation der Sittlichkeit".[21] Eine Antinomie zwischen Politik und Sittlichkeit gab es für ihn nicht. Für Basilios ist dagegen die Sittlichkeit nicht die Schöpfung bloß der menschlichen Gemeinschaft, sondern die Frucht der evangeliumsgemäßen Lebensführung, die sich jedoch in der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft verwirklichen läßt. Dort – bei Aristoteles – herrscht das politische Gesetz, das Sittlichkeit ermöglicht und herbeiführt; hier dagegen – in der Kirche – die Gebote Gottes, die über die Sittlichkeit hinausführen. Nicht die Autarkie der Güter und die Eudämonie der Gemeinschaft dient als Ziel in der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft, sondern die Begegnung mit den Mitmenschen. Sie geschieht in der Betätigung der Nächstenliebe, die im konkreten Fall Behebung des Notleidens bedeutet. Aber darüber hinaus – und dies ist das höchste Ziel – bedeutet sie Aneignung der göttlichen Gaben und des Heils, Begegnung mit Gott.

d) Aufgrund der bisherigen Erörterungen läßt sich zum Schluß noch eine Bemerkung machen. Es geht um die vieldiskutierte Frage des Verhältnisses der Kirchenväter zur griechischen Philosophie. Es bleibt unbestreitbar, daß die Verwendung der philosophischen Terminologie bei den Kirchenvätern keine Schwierigkeit bereitet. Ebenso kann man nicht leugnen, daß diese Terminologie oft mit gewissen Vorstellungen und Gedanken verknüpft ist. Die Übernahme von philosophischen Begriffen schließt auch die Übernahme entsprechender Gedanken ein, soweit sie nicht der christlichen Offenbarung widersprechen. Da aber durch die christliche Offenbarung zugleich ein anderes Gedankensystem mitgegeben ist, erfolgt die Übernahme von Begriffen und Gedanken oft durch eine entsprechende Anpassung, ja Umdeutung derselben. Letzteres geht deutlich aus meinen Ausführungen hinsichtlich der Bezeichnung des Menschen als politisches Lebewesen bei Basilios hervor.

ANMERKUNGEN

* Der vorliegende Text ist eine Mitteilung, die beim Regensburger Ökumenischen Symposion 1979 „Die Heiligen der einen Kirche am Beispiel des Hl. Basilius (†379)" gehalten wurde.

[1] Aristoteles, *Polit.* I, 3; 1253 a 2. *Eth. Nic.* I, 5; 1097 b 11. An beiden Stellen bezieht sich der Ausdruck auf das Autarkie-Motiv.

[2] Vgl. Stobaios, *Ecl.* II, 59,4: SVF, III, 63,250 Marcianus, *Instit.* I,1: SVF, III, 77,38. G. Gemistos Plethon, *Nomoi*, 3,31: Alexandre, S. 124; s. hierzu Th. Nikolaou, Αἱ περὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίου ἰδέαι τοῦ Γ.Πλήθωνος Γεμιστοῦ. Byzantine Texts and Studies, 13 (Thessaloniki 1974) 56f.

[3] Näher auf diesen Vers geht Basilios in der zweiten Homilie zum 14. Psalm ein, die er auch „Κατὰ τοκιζόντων" betitelt: PG, 29, 264 C-280C.

[4] Basilios kennt selbstverständlich auch diese Bedeutung; vgl. *Eunomii liber apol.*, 24: PG, 30,861 B; *In Psalm.* 45, 4: PG, 29, 421 D.

[5] Vgl. Plutarch, *Über Monarchie und Demokratie und Oligarchie*, 2–3 (826 CD).

[6] Vgl. Th. Nikolaou, Αἱ περὶ πολιτείας ..., 49ff. G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford 1961) s.v. πολιτεία F 3 C I. Hausherr, *Noms du Christ et voies d'oraison*. Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 157 (Roma 1960) 164ff.

[7] *Adv. Eun.* I, 3: PG, 29, 509 A. Vgl. *In Psalm.* 59, 2: PG, 29, 464 B: τῇ κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἀκριβείᾳ κανονίζειν τὴν πολιτείαν.

[8] *In Psalm.* 1,4: PG, 29, 220A. *Ep.* 2,3: PG, 32, 228C. *In sanctum baptisma*, 7: PG, 31, 440A.

[9] Vgl. *In sanctum baptisma*, 7: PG, 31, 440A. *In Psalm.* 1,2: PG, 29, 213A. *In Psalm.* 7,3: PG, 29, 236A. *De grat. actione*, 2; PG, 31, 220D. *Ep.* 223,2: PG, 32,824C.

[10] *In Psalm.* 59,4: PG, 29, 468B.

[11] *In Psalm.* 45,4–5: PG, 29, 421 B-424 C. Die Kirche als „Polis Gottes", vgl. auch Klemens Al., *Stromata*, 4,26: GCS (Stählin), II, 325,1. Origenes, *Hom. in Jer.* 9,2: GCS (Klostermann) 65,21. Athanasios, *Exp. in Psalm.* 71,16: PG, 27, 325 C; Siehe G. Larentzakis, *Einheit der Menschheit Einheit der Kirche bei Athanasius*. Grazer Theol. Studien, 1 (Graz 1978) 63: „Die Kirche als Stadt ist ... ein bekanntes Symbol, das in der Vätertheologie sehr oft vorkommt".

[12] Vgl. auch Klemens A., *Stromata*, 4, 26: GCS (Stählin) II, 324, 25–28: λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πόλιν, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι πόλεις· λέγεσθαι μὲν γάρ, οὐκ εἶναι δέ· σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἡ πόλις καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἀστεῖόν τι σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον, καθάπερ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὑπὸ λόγου, ἀπολιόρκητος ἀτυράννητος πόλις ἐπὶ γῆς.... [Basilios], *In Isaiam*, 19: PG, 30, 149B: πόλις ἐστὶ σύστημα ἀνθρώπων ἐκ διαφόρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ κοινωνίᾳ βίου συγκεκροτημένον. Dio Chrysostomos, *Or.* 36,20: SVF, III, 81, 15–17: πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐν ταὐτῷ κατοικούντων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον. 29: SVF, II, 327,32: σύστημα ἀνθρώπων. Für Aristoteles war Polis κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων (ἀνθρώπων): *Polit.* III,6; 1279 a 21.

[13] *In sanctum baptisma*, 7: PG, 31, 440A. Die übliche Übersetzung von πολίτευμα (Phil 3,20) ins Deutsche mit „Heimat" oder „Staat" scheint mir unzutreffend.

[14] *In Psalm.* 45, 4: PG, 29 421B: καὶ νῦν ὁ δίκαιος πίνει τὸ ζῶν ὕδωρ καὶ ὕστερον δὲ πίνεται ἀφθονώτερον, ἡνίκα ἂν πολιτογραφηθῇ ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῦ θεοῦ.

[15] *Regulae fusius tractatae, interrog.* 3,1: PG, 31, 917A. Vgl. auch O. Papadopoulou-Tsanana, Ἡ ἀνθρωπολογία τοῦ Μεγάλου Βασιλείου. Analecta Vlatadon, 7 (Thessaloniki 1970) 40–41. Den Menschen als ἥμερον ζῶον καὶ κοινωνικὸν bezeichnete bereits Epiktet, *Dissertationes*, II, 10,14: Schenkl, 147, 5–6; IV, 5,17: Schenkl, 405, 16–17: ἥμερον, κοινωνικόν, ἀνεκτικόν, φιλάλληλον. Plato, *Soph.* 222 b 7: ἥμερον. Epiktet, *Dissertationes*, IV, 1, 126: Schenkl, 378, 20–21: ἥμερον...καὶ φιλάλληλον. 5,10: Schenkl, 404,4–5; III, 13,5: Schenkl, 271, 15–16: φύσει κοινωνικὸν καὶ φιλάλληλον. Stobaios, *Ecl.* II, 7: SVF, III, 172,20: κοινωνικὸν καὶ φιλάλληλον (φύσει). Origenes, *Contra Celsum* VIII, so: SVF, III, 85,4. Siehe hierzu auch M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (Göttingen [4]1972) 66f und 166.

[16] *Moralia*, 79, 1: PG, 31 860B: Ὅτι δεῖ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτάσσεσθαι,

ἐν αἷς ἂν ἐντολὴ θεοῦ μὴ ἐμποδίζηται.

[17] *In Psalm.* 32,9: PG, 29, 344C.

[18] O. Gigon, *Die antike Kultur and das Christentum* (Darmstadt [2]1969) 32.

[19] *Regulae fusius tractatae, interrog.* 3,1: PG, 31, 916D–917A.

[20] *Polit.* I,3; 1253 a 7–10.

[21] J. Hirschberger, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I. *Altertum und Mittelalter* (Basel-Freiburg-Wien [8]1965) 235.

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THREE FRAGMENTS OF PS. CHRYSOSTOM IDENTIFIED

BY

C. DATEMA

In the appendix to his *Codices Chrysostomici Graeci I* Aubineau[1] gives a survey of 73 works which do not form any organic whole, but are either excerpts, or composite pieces assembled from the works of ps. Chrysostom. Aubineau was unable to identify a number of these, and in his preface (p. XVIII) expressed the hope that others would be able to complement his research into the sources of these works. It is in this respect that I hope to make some contribution to his volume and that of Carter[2] in the short study which follows.

CCG I, Appendix 16: In sanctum Pascha

a) Homilia in sanctum Pascha (PG 52, 765–772 lin. 5 ab imo)

b) (?) Καταστῶμεν καὶ τῶν αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν ἐπιτύχωμεν

In Oxon. Auct. T.3.4. on f. 242^{v} there originally ended a paschal homily attributed to Chrysostom (CPG II, 4408; Aldama 144), while at the bottom of the page we find Τοῦ αὐτοῦ as the catch words of the following folio, referring to the text Sermo catecheticus in s. Pascha (CPG II, 4605; Aldama 89). A later hand, however, has deleted the end of the paschal homily (CPG II, 4408) from –στάντες (PG 52, 772, 5 ab imo) as well as the words Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, and put the words καὶ τῶν τοῦ διαβόλου παγίδων ἀνωτέροι κατα– between asterisks. Ff. 243–245, which are a later addition, begin with a repetition, with slight alterations, of the words before the deletion: καὶ τῶν τοῦ διαβόλου παγίδων ἀνωτέροι καταστῶμεν καὶ τῶν αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν ἐπιτύχωμεν. This is clearly intended to connect the new text which follows with that which comes to an end on f. 242^{v}. After two sentences, to which I shall return, there follow the words διὸ ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησίαν πάρεστιν καὶ πάντοτε χαίρειν πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ ἡμέρᾳ μυριοφωτὸς λαμπαδουχίας, in which we recognise a modified beginning of the unedited paschal homily Πάντοτε χαίρειν μὲν πάρεστιν. What we have here, however, is not the homily

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known as CPG II, 4996,[3] but one which goes its own way after the first paragraph.[4] The text of this homily in Oxon. Auct. T. 3.4 shows a relationship with the text of Vat. gr. 455, ff. 30–32^{v}.

We return now to the two intervening sentences, which run: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ (ἀλλ' ἀπέδη MS) θεὸς διὰ πλῆθος οἰκτιρμῶν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς εὐσπλαγχνίαν οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐπιζητεῖ ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑκάστου πρόθεσιν ἀποδέχεται. ἡ γὰρ ἑορτὴ ταύτη τῆς θεϊκῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐστὶ τεκμήριον καὶ βοᾷ τὴν περὶ πατρός, υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος, δι' ἧς ὁ μονογενὴς τὸν κόσμον ἀπολλύμενον (ἀπολύμενον MS) ἔσωσεν καὶ τὸν ἐξορισθέντα ἀνεκαλέσατο ἄνθρωπον. With a few modifications, these lines seem to be a borrowing from the paschal homily which begins with the words Νικᾷ καὶ μόνη ἡ ὄψις (CPG II, 4957).[5]

The result of this analysis is that we can define Appendix 16 more closely, as follows:

a) Homilia in sanctum Pascha: PG 52, 765–772, lin. 5 ab imo
b) Fragmentum homiliae in sanctum Pascha, Νικᾷ καὶ μόνη ἡ ὄψις (CPG II, 4957)
c) Homilia in sanctum Pascha, Πάντοτε μὲν χαίρειν πάρεστιν (a variant version of CPG II, 4996)

CCG I, Appendix 20: In illud *Ascendit Iesus in templum et docebat* (Ioh. 7, 14) et in illud *Non veni ut iudicem mundum* (Ioh. 12, 47)

a) In Herodem et infantes (PG 61, 699 11. 1–15 post init.)
b) (?) Ἀνέβη ὁ Κύριος εἰς τὸν ἱερὸν....

The solution here is much simpler than in Appendix 16: the second section of this composite text is taken from the sermon In illud *Quomodo scit litteras* by Severian of Gabbala (Aldama 535; CPG II, 4201), namely PG 57, 647 lin. 20–652,78 (with lacunae).

CCG III, Appendix 5: In illud *Ascendit Dominus in templum* (Ioh. 7, 14)

a) In illud *Ascendit Dominus in templum* (PG 61, 739, 51–740, 28)
b) (?) Βούλομαι δὲ ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ἀδελφοί, ἱστορίας ἀρχαίας διήγημα

The text analysed in this appendix is transmitted in the well-known codex Scorialensis gr. Φ–III–20, s. IX, ff. 292–296. Here again we find the unidentified section (b) in Severian's homily In illud *Quomodo scit litteras* (Aldama 535; CPG II, 4201), namely PG 59, 651, 74–652, 78.

NOTES

[1] M. Aubineau, *Codices Chrysostomi Graeci, I Britanniae et Hiberniae*, Paris, 1968, pp. 253-266.

[2] R. E. Carter, *Codices Chrysostomici Graeci, III Americae et Europae Occidentalis*, Paris, 1970, pp. 127-138.

[3] This text will be edited and discussed in a forthcoming article "Leontius, presbyter of Constantinople – a compiler?" in JÖB, 29 (1980) 9-20.

[4] Transmitted in Paris. gr. 1181, ff. 40–41; Vaticanus gr. 1633, ff. 251^{v}–252^{v}; Vaticanus gr. 1990, ff. 181–183; and in Vaticanus gr. 455, ff. 30–32^{v}, where the text is prefaced by the beginning of the paschal homily Νικᾷ καὶ μόνη ἡ ὄψις (CPG II, 4957), and where, too, other parts of this homily are subsequently worked in.

[5] In CPG II, 4957 there follows after ἀποδέχετε: λέγωμεν ὅσα δυνάμεθα, and instead of τὴν περὶ we find: τὴν νοητὴν ἀγαθότητα after πνεύματος.

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REFLECTIONS ON A NEW EDITION OF THE DIDACHE*

BY

JOAN HAZELDEN WALKER

The discovery of the *Didache* in 1873 has been acclaimed in many a eulogy, in many a language and by many a scholar. And rightly so. For this work has cast a spell over even the most cautious who, finding its magic irresistible, seek time and again to prise its secrets. For however else can one explain the unending fascination expressed in such an abundance of words for a work written with so few – a bibliography which exceeds any reasonable expectation?

The appearance of another text, translation and introduction in french, is both welcome and opportune. The editors have cited the majority of scholarly works, text editions, studies, monographs and articles, which this enigmatic document has occasioned since the second world war. Little has escaped their notice.[1] Tuilier is responsible for the chapter on the titles of the work, its text tradition, the critical apparatus, the pleasing french translation and that very useful appendix – the text of the *Doctrina apostolorum*, together with three indices : scriptural references (or n.t. parallels) greek words from the *Didache* and latin from the *Doctrina*. Rordorf has written the major part of the scholarly introduction which examines authorship, date, origin and destination of the document, its literary type and the contents in detail. He is also responsible for the valuable and extensive footnotes to the text and translation. The joint work of these two scholars is an excellent contribution to early christian studies.

Authorship, date, origin and destination

Because the liturgical and disciplinary practices in the *Didache* were so far removed from their own experience, the fathers rejected the work from the new testament canon. Its attribution to the apostles could not be accepted in terms of the twelve (14f., 127). Rordorf suggests that an unknown author (A)[2] compiled this treatise from existing written (and oral?) sources adding his own instructions. He begins

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with the two-way teaching, widespread in both judaism and primitive (i.e. jewish-christian) christianity, and adds a 'gospel' section (chs. 1,3b–2,1), which suggests obvious Matthaean parallels, and a conclusion (ch. 6,2–3). He follows this teaching with the rituals of baptism, fasting, daily prayers and eucharist (chs. 7–10), and concludes with disciplinary regulations concerning the reception and support of ministers (chs. 11–13). Some is clearly his own work based upon knowledge of the contemporary situation (chs. 7,2–3b; 11–13). However, the sources he uses betray their archaic origins. Chapters 14 and 15 (the second part of the disciplinary section) he assigns to a redactor (B), similarly chapter 16, the little apocalypse. He dates the *completed* work from the latter part of the first century, thus parting company with most modern writers.[3] Later on (83ff.), he demonstrates that there is no factual evidence that the *Didache* text depends on any new testament canonical writings, inspite of obvious parallels. He ignores Audet's suggestion[4] that the *Didache* may use an earlier Matthew (note *written source* in 15,4), which could be interpreted from the Papias *logion*. For Rordorf chapters 11–13 provide the key to the origin/destination of this work – West Syria. The support for Egypt based, among other things, on the dissemination of the text there, he counterbalances with an eastward circulation. However, I am disappointed that he was not tempted to follow the trail along the silk route that I had indicated.[5] He rejects the location, Antioch, in favour of surrounding rural (farming) communities (13,3) but admits in his footnotes to the text translation (191,10) that they were not all necessarily rural! His further argument against Antioch is based upon silence of both Paul and Ignatius in respect of the *Didache*. However, silence may not necessarily mean ignorance. There are reasons to suppose that Paul when writing to the Corinthians both elaborated and re-interpreted the *Didache* eucharistic rituals (see below).

The literary type

For Rordorf the *Didache* has neither overall unity (17) nor claim to recognition as the first of the church orders (21, n. 2). I disagree. Accepting that the final format blends archaic and contemporary traditions proper to A and B, I suggest[6] that we see here, "the earliest of the church orders ... a recognisable forerunner of the long line of medieval *ordines*. The contents have a logical sequence from pre-baptismal instruction ... to a little apocalypse, the latter clearly pro-

claiming that 'in terms of the old religions, christianity had no sacral space, no sacral time and no sacral staff to perform the rites'". Every section has its concluding passages which lead naturally to what follows, thus betraying the catechetical nature of the document. The whole is *didache* not *kerugma*, as later ordinals are *instructions* as to "what, when and how".[7]

Critical analysis

1. the two-way teaching

Rordorf examines both Qumran and old testament wisdom materials *vis à vis* the known versions and concludes that the *Epistle of Barnabas*, the *Doctrine* and the *Didache* are all independent traditions of a multiform two-way teaching of judaism. He stresses its pre-baptismal use by A (7,1), thus rejecting any theory that this was a later practice of egyptian origin. He draws attention to the command for perfection in 6,2, identical with that in 1,4, the 'gospel section'. However he asserts that 6,2 and 3 are thoroughly jewish and that the seeming reference to the apostolic decree in Acts 15,29 is more apparent than real.

2. the liturgical section

The frequent use of the rubric περὶ δὲ is intentional. It occurs, also by intent, at the introduction of the μύρον prayer in the coptic version.

a) *baptism.* The trinitarian formula, the rubric to baptise in running water and the pre-baptismal fast belong to primitive christianity. The change to the second person singular in 7,2, Rordorf reveals as A's awareness of the more complex rituals in his own day. The full implications of the shorter formula, ... in the *name* of the lord, appear to have escaped him.[8]

b) *fasting and daily prayers.* Hypocrites are interpreted as *judaisers* not jews. Rordorf accepts Jaubert's work in establishing the christian significance of wednesdays and fridays but remains cautious (as others) towards her Qumran theory.[9] The significance of the triple *Pater* also remains unexplained. I suggested (1959)[10] that both this rubric and the previous one are linked with a catechetical instruction on the passion, pre-Marcan in date and antiochene in origin.

c) *eucharist.* Many of the hypotheses agape/eucharist, eucharist/agape are discussed together with the cup/bread sequence and absence of an institution narrative. I disagree with his opinions on the latter. Rordorf's search for a theological solution to these texts leads him to examine

the term παῖς (for Jesus : 9,2; 9,3; 10,2; 10,3. for David : 9,2a). From them he concludes that primitive christology was defined with reference to David. Furthermore, he notes that the eucharistic prayers are couched in messianic expectation. Although he draws attention to "the profound significance" of the verb γνωρίζειν, he makes no reference to the work of Jean Magne. I have already written[11] that Paul in I Corinthians, the evangelists in accounts of the miracle of the loaves, the last supper and the Emmaus incident, represent a sophisticated development of eucharistic theology in its gentile context. Paul was aware of the archaic prayers of the *Didache* tradition at which he must have assisted. Neither his cup/bread sequence nor unity in one loaf is a coincidence. The Corinthians, far removed from those gentile assemblies whose own manual preserved the gems of the earliest judaeo-christian liturgy, would have found them inexplicable and inadequate. Paul included the narrative of institution[12] and made the connection between passover rituals, the last supper and the cross – a connection completely wanting in the *Didache*.

3. *disciplinary section*

a) Part 1 (11–13). Rordorf's survey of the early christian ministry is crystal clear. He distinguishes between apostles = twelve (apostolic college) and apostles = itinerant missionaries. The *Didache* is concerned only with the latter. Prophets and teachers = resident ministers, presidents at assemblies, recipients of 'first fruits', thus the antiochene community described in Acts 13,1–4, whose resident prophets and teachers laid hands on Paul and Barnabas and sent these forth as apostles. The antiochene pattern was repeated throughout the mediterranean world and beyond, although often unrecorded in canonical writings. The asceticism of these early ministers (cf. 11,7) is investigated, and Rordorf draws attention to a later syrian witness (Ps. Clement, *On Virginity*). The rules governing hospitality as well as those concerned with the proper scrutiny of credentials, are clearly those known to biblical writers (jewish and christian), but in this context they reflect the situation as A knew it.

b) Part 2 (14–15). The redactor B's return to the eucharist in 14 is explained in terms of the continuing influence of judaisers (cf. Ignatius, *Magnesians*, 9). B's acceptance of A's 'order', together with the normal timing of the main meal, implies a sunday evening celebration (cf. letter of younger Pliny). In 14, B returns to the precept in the two-ways, 4,14. A, however, had not taken up the concept of μετάνοια in

the baptismal rituals. The precise timing of this public confession is conjectured by Rordorf from the *aorist* participle προσεξομολογησάμενοι, that is before communion. However, confession without reconciliation is ineffectual. B re-echoes the golden rule in 1,2 and the equally jewish precept cited by Matthew in his gospel (5,23) and Paul in his letter to the Corinthians (I Cor. 11,23). The 2nd-century addition of the kiss of peace before communion symbolises this reconciliation. The purpose of both confession and reconciliation is the offering of a pure sacrifice. However, for Rordorf, there is no doubt that this is free from any sacrificial interpretation associated with the passion. (cf. my remarks above).

The command to elect from *their number*, bishops and deacons dates B's redaction. A had already indicated the difficulties in finding worthy and proven candidates, and, moreover, in 13,4 recognised a shortage. The decline and degeneration of both prophets and itinerants, led naturally to a desire for a stable ministry. Authority was vested in the community but delegation had always been essential. The use of ἐπίσκοποι coined from *current* graeco-roman usage, viz. *moderators*, was now generally acceptable in gentile-christian communities in preference to its earlier parallel(?) πρεσβύτεροι elders, viz., men chosen by age and experience to exercise the functions of prophets and teachers. Rordorf concludes that B's omission of πρεσβύτεροι is obvious if one accepts the origin/destination of the *Didache*. B portrays a transitional stage (15,12,2), suggesting both controversy, opposition and an ever-widening notion of collegiate ministry. Events moved swiftly. Ignatius of Antioch was soon to argue for a single moderator to preside over a college of elders, deacons and faithful. (His insistence in his letters on this count, I believe, comes from a certain knowledge that his suppositions, so flatteringly expressed, were far from a reality.) Rordorf (73ff and nn.) is inclined to Harnack's definition of διάκονος rather than Lemaire's[13] contention that the role of servant was proper to all ministers from Christ.

4. *the little apocalypse*

In 16, B(?) rounds off the treatise with a message in familiar vein although, according to Rordorf, independent of christian texts.

The text tradition : titles, manuscript tradition, indirect testimony.

Tulier introduces his appraisal of the text tradition with a short commentary on the titles[14] found in the Jerusalem manuscript together

with a short version omitting reference to the twelve.[15] He rightly concludes that they are all bound up with authorship and dating, hence any positive assessment is not feasible. Although surveying material available in more recent editions of the *Didache* Tuilier, nevertheless, updates the bibliography and, in substantiating his choice of sources used in the critical apparatus, adds several new observations which provide a mine of information for the reader.

His observations on *Hierosolymitanus* 54(H) reveal how this manuscript reproduces faithfully a prototype contemporary with *Sinaiticus* and *Alexandrinus*. Whereas these ancient codices include certain apostolic fathers in their editions of the biblical text, the prototype of H appears to have made a careful distinction between holy scripture and apostolic fathers. It is an interesting hypothesis that the latter were regrouped into a collection at the very moment when they were being finally excluded from the canon. H, in respect of the *Didache*, represents a recension of an ancient text written at the time when the additions of the 'gospel section' and concluding verses had been made to the two-way teaching, together with the liturgical and disciplinary section and the little apocalypse. In other words, Tuilier demonstrates that H is a direct descendant of B's redaction of the late first century and, moreover, is the same recension as that used by the fathers when they cite the *Didache*.

In his commentary on fragments, versions and citations, Tuilier brings additional evidence to bear upon his 4th century dating for the prototype of H. Furthermore, such surviving recensions of the two-way teaching are evaluated as an important testimony to a source earlier than A (i.e. they have no 'gospel section').

The Appendix: *Doctrina apostolorum*, introduction and text.

The editor's decision to include both text and introduction of a latin version from a now lost greek recension of the two-way teaching is highly commendable. Apart from its obvious testimony to a tradition earlier than that used by A, the manuscripts from which it is taken record a little-known fragment of western-liturgical history. The two 11th century lectionaries of the same choir office (Freising abbey, north Bavaria, and Melk abbey, south Austria) include a sermon from St. Boniface, the 8th century apostle to the Germans. The title of the sermon also suggests the continued use of the two-way teaching as a preparation for baptism among the heathen. Such liturgical survivals

in the latin west were ultimately suppressed during the pontificate of Gregory VII. As a direct result of the gregorian reform, such precious relics of antiquity disappeared from the text tradition of the west.

Eight centuries later a very different christian west became engrossed with its ancient past. The discovery of the *Didache* in an 11th-century codex from eastern christendom, dated and autographed by one Leo, notary and sinner, was providential. A hundred years later its many mysteries have yet to be solved.

NOTES

* *La doctrine des douze apôtres* (*Didachè*). Introduction, Texte, Traduction, Notes, Appendice et Index, ed. Willy Rordorf and André Tuilier (Sources chrétiennes, 248). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1978. 228 p. F. 169.

[1] I miss reference to the english translation and notes in Ancient Christian Writers Series 6 (London/Westminster MD 1948). This edition by J. A. Kleist did much among english students to redress what this present edition calls the viewpoint of the anglo-saxon school (13, n. 3).

[2] I have used the letters A and B to designate Rordorf's proposed redactors.

[3] E.g.: A. Vööbus, *Liturgical Traditions in the Didache* (Stockholm 1968); S. Giet, *L'énigme de la Didachè* (Paris 1970); J. P. Audet, *La Didachè. Instructions des apôtres* (Paris 1958) *et al.*, all of whom see redactions into the second century.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 116ff., and 208ff., and Vööbus, *op. cit.*, 36 believes no awareness in *Didache* of Matthew! Although quoting my article (97, n. 7): 'An argument from the Chinese for the Antiochene origin of the *Didache*' in *Studia Patristica* 8, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin 1966) 44-50, in respect of a syrian origin, he has missed its message, namely that there is irrefutable evidence that the first two documents which belong to the initial decade of the coming of christianity to China, have *not only a substantial portion of the Didache but also reveal a marked preference for Matthaean-type material in the Chinese life of Christ.*

[5] 'An argument ...' *loc. cit.*, 45ff.

[6] 'A pre-Marcan dating for the *Didache*. Further thoughts of a liturgist', published in Volume 3 of the *Proceedings of the VIth International Congress on Biblical Studies* (*Oxford, 3–7 April, 1978*) by the *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* (Sheffield 1980).

[7] See S. J. P. van Dijk and J. Hazelden Walker, *The Origins of the Modern Roman Liturgy* (London/Westminster MD) 26; and by the same authors, *The Ordinal of the Papal Court from Innocent III to Boniface VIII and Related Documents* (*Spicilegium Friburgense*, 22) 1975, introd.

[8] It seemed to me 'Pre-Marcan dating ...', *loc. cit.*, that the full implications of these rituals and the term *name* needed considerable scrutiny especially in the light of J. Magne's studies, cf., 'Le chant de la perle à la lumière des écrits de Nag Hammâdi' extract from *Cahiers du Cercle Ernest-Renan*, 100, 1977, 33ff.

[9] A. Jaubert, *La date de la Cène* (Paris 1957) and 'Jesus et le Calendrier Qumrân' in *New Testament Studies* 7 (1960)1ff.

[10] 'Terce, Sext and None. An Apostolic Custom?' Paper read at the third international patristic conference, Oxford 1959; published in *Studia Patristica*, 5 ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin 1962)206ff.

[11] 'A pre-Marcan dating' *loc. cit.*

[12] The concept of the *spoken* word and name is part of man's earliest religious thinking and persists among tribal peoples even to this day. This, I believe in the understanding of I Cor. 10,16; 11,23ff. and early eucharistic theology.

[13] A. Lemaire, *Les ministères aux origines de l'Église* (Paris 1971)142f., 149f.

[14] Viz: *The teaching of the twelve apostles; The teaching of the Lord* to the gentiles through the twelve apostles.

[15] *The teaching of the apostles.*

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NOTIUNCULAE MARTYROLOGICAE

BY

JAN DEN BOEFT AND JAN BREMMER

During a seminar about texts illustrating the persecution of Christians in the Roman Empire we studied a number of *Acta Martyrum*. For our basic texts we used H. Musurillo's *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs* (Oxford 1972). Without doubt this is a most useful textbook, providing both the original texts and a quite readable translation for those who have little or no Latin and Greek. On the other hand Musurillo's book clearly leaves something to be desired, when one takes a closer look at the details of the translation and the accompanying notes, as has already been stated by F. Millar in his review in the *Journal of Theological Studies* 1973, p. 239–243.

In this paper we present a few critical notes on some problems and passages which in our view deserve closer attention.

We have followed the order in which Musurillo has published the Acts. In a few instances a passage is quoted according to the edition of G. Lanata, *Gli atti dei martiri come documenti processuali* (Milan 1973), when that edition provides a further improvement on the text.

Martyrium Justini 5. Near the end of the *Acts of Justin* the prefect Rusticus questions Justin about his expectations after his imminent execution. Justin expresses his confident belief in an immediate ascension to heaven, the usual opinion concerning martyrs, founded on *Luke* 23.43: σήμερον μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ (*hodie mecum eris in paradiso*), whereas the other elect have to wait until the general resurrection on the Day of the Lord. One of the clearest examples of this belief[1] is provided by Cyprian: *Sanguine autem suo baptizatos et passione sanctificatos consummari et diuinae pollicitationis gratiam consequi declarat in euangelio idem Dominus, quando ad latronem in ipsa passione credentem et confitentem loquitur et quod 'secum futurus sit in paradiso' pollicetur* (*Ep.* 72.22.2).

When the prefect tries to make him waver by a threat of punishment

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(τιμωρηθήσεσθε), Justin answers: δι᾽ εὐχῆς ἔχομεν τιμωρηθέντες σωθῆναι (5.5). Musurillo's translation runs as follows: "we are confident that if we suffer the penalty we shall be saved". This does not seem satisfactory. Justin has already expressed his confidence, and indeed δι᾽ εὐχῆς ἔχειν has another meaning, as can be concluded from Stephanus' *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* III 2520D: δι᾽ εὐχῆς ἐστί μοι τοῦτο, *precor, opto hoc, optatum habeo, hoc mihi est in votis.*[2] For the comparable use of διά c.gen. in combination with ἔχειν cf. Kühner-Gerth II 1, p. 483, e.g. δι᾽ οἴκτου ἔχειν (Euripides, *Hecuba* 851) as the equivalent of οἰκτίρειν. In the same way one could put the expression δι᾽ εὐχῆς ἔχειν on a par with εὔχεσθαι.[3] The correct translation should be 'we pray'.

Now for the second part of Justin's words. Musurillo's rendering does not bring out the lapidary style of the paradox with which Rusticus' treat is met. Although the Church strongly disapproved of those who voluntary were seeking martyrdom and death, the real martyr's wish to reach his salvation through suffering was deemed completely normal. It is again well expressed in Cyprian's terms, adapted from Psalm 115: *Quis non libenter et prompte calicem salutis accipiat, quis non adpetat gaudibundus et laetus in quo aliquid et ipse Domino suo retribuat, quis non pretiosam in conspectu Dei mortem fortiter et constanter excipiat*? (*Ep.* 76.4.2). Examples are also to be found in the *Acta martyrum*, e.g. Pionius' laconic answer whilst being tortured: ἐλέχθη αὐτῷ· τί σπεύδεις ἐπὶ τὸν θάνατον; ἀπεκρίνατο· οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸν θάνατον ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ζωήν (*Mart. Pionii* 20.5).[4] This comes quite close to the paradox in Justin's words, when, picking up Rusticus' menacing words "I shall have you punished", he immediately answers: "That is exactly what we pray for, viz. to contrive our salvation through your punishment".[5] Indeed the crown of the martyr can only be earned in the agon of the passion.[6]

Passio Scillitanorum 1. When the proconsul Speratus interrogated the Christians, he offered them pardon *si ad bonam mentem redeatis.* Why should the proconsul suggest that the Christians lacked a *bona mens*? The answer is to be found in the Roman concept *superstitio.* In two highly stimulating articles L. F. Janssen[7] has demonstrated that for the Romans *superstitio* was not so much our 'superstition', something which can be laughed at, but everything which opposed the true Roman *religio* such as the activities of astrologers and fortune-tellers.

Into the same category the Roman officials also classified "the national cults of the non-Roman population; thus the cult of Serapis and Apis in Egypt, the cult of Isis, the national deities of the Gauls, Germans, Jews, Parthians and, incidentally, even the cult of the otherwise much honoured gods of the Asiatic Greeks were all contemptuously marked as *superstitio*".[8] The Christians were no exception to this rule. Tacitus (*Ann.* 15.44.3), Suetonius (*Nero* 16.2) and Pliny (10.96.8) all call Christianity a *superstitio*. Janssen further demonstrated that these *superstitiosi* were supposed to lack a *bona mens*, and Pliny (10.96.4) speaks indeed, as is well-known, of the *amentia* of the Christians. But neither Janssen nor A. N. Sherwin-White in his major commentary on Pliny have observed that the martyrs' acts supply numerous examples of this Roman attitude towards the Christian *superstitiosi*, as appears from the frequent use of the terms *dementia*, *furor*, μανία and ἀπόνοια. Besides our passage we may compare of this passion c. 8 *Nolite huius dementiae esse participes*; *Pass. Cypriani* 4.1 Lanata *nec te* (Cyprianus) ... *a secta felicissimorum temporum suorum obdurati furoris ad caerimonias populi Romani colendas bonamque mentem*(!) *habendam tanto tempore potuerunt* (viz. the emperors) *revocare*; *Pass. Marcelli* 11 Lanata *Quo furore usus es ut proiceres sacramentum et talia loquereris*; *Mart. Agapae* 3.7 (cf. also 4.2 and 5.1); *Mart. Pionii* 10.20.2, 3; *Mart. Irenaei* 3.4; *Mart. Eupli* 2.3; *Mart. Phileae* 29.

Given the great importance of *superstitio* for a better understanding of the Roman attitude towards the Christians we may use this occasion for another addition. Janssen[9] has shown that one of the main characteristics of *superstitio* was an all too great effort of parents to be survived by their children, which meant "eine einseitige Zuneigung zu der eigenen Familie und *gens*, welche die Gefahr innehielt, dass sie sich von dem gesamtrömischen Gemeinwesen loslösten". For this Roman fear we have also a very fine example in the Roman imperial oath of which one of the clauses was : *neque me neque liberos meos eius salute cariores habebo* (CIL II.172 = Smallwood, *Documents illustrating the Principates of Gaius, Claudius and Nero*, no. 32),[10] a clause which is significantly lacking in the Greek versions.[11]

Passio Scillitanorum 3–4. In these sections one finds a curious little altercation. First the proconsul says : *et nos religiosi sumus et simplex est religio nostra*, next Speratus, obviously embroidering on this theme, puts forward this proposal : *si tranquillas praebueris aures tuas, dico mysterium simplicitatis.*

This passage has not met with due attention, witness especially the translation of *mysterium simplicitatis*: "the mystery of simplicity" (Musurillo), "het mysterie van de eenvoud" (Sizoo), "ein Geheimnis der Einfalt" (Rauschen), "a mystery of simplicity" (Barnes), "il mistero della semplicità" (Allegro).

To gain a better understanding we have to consult O. Hiltbrunner's thorough study of the word *simplicitas*.[12] In this study its author shows how *simplicitas* in the course of the second century of our era has become a kind of catchword in imperial and aristocratic Roman circles: Tacitus' *Germania* shows this prevailing touch, due to the "*simplicitas*-Ideologie der traianischen Zeit" (p. 80) and at the end of the second century the idea finds "einen literarischen Anwalt kaiserlichen Ranges" (p. 83) in Marcus Aurelius. Even more important is its spreading through the Empire: "Im Laufe des 2. Jh. ist das Schlagwort vom Hofe und vom römischen Senat herabgestiegen zu den verdienten Honoratioren der Kleinstädte" (p. 83). This can be illustrated by funerary and even by honorary inscriptions, in which people are being praised as *simplex* and *simplicissimus* or because of their *simplicitas* or *simplex uita*: Hiltbrunner supplies examples concerning both Christians and pagans.

Another symptom of the popularity of the concept *simplex* is its appearance as a name, in later times extended to *Simplicius* and *Simplicianus*.

These facts shed a new light on the passage we are discussing. In his praise of Roman religion Saturninus uses an epithet which is neither arbitrary nor very significant in itself: *simplex* rather expresses a value highly estimated in contemporary society. Roman religion is of the honest, straight sort. Speratus immediately takes this challenge, lifting the discussion to a higher plane: he is ready to expound the *mysterium simplicitatis*. Before entering into the problem posed by *mysterium* it may be useful to cite a few texts from the author nearest – chronologically and geographically – to the *Acts of the Scillitans*, viz. Tertullian. Three times he uses the expression *simplicitas ueritatis* (*Ad Nat.* II 2.5, *Apol.* 23.7 and 47.4), in *De Anima* XVIII 7 he also combines the words *simplicitas* and *ueritas*, while in *Adv. Praxean* I 6 he mentions the *simplicitas doctrinae*. In all these instances *simplicitas* is linked with the truth of (orthodox) Christian religion. Such also seems to be the case in Speratus' expression *mysterium simplicitatis*. This expression is dealt with by Chr. Mohrmann in her *Études sur le latin des chrétiens* I p. 243, where she has this to say:

"*mysterium* ... a toujours pu désigner, dans le latin chrétien, le mystère dans le sens théologique de doctrine, de vérité religieuse cachée". This tallies with the ideas put forward in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, in which the lemma *mysterium* is divided into two groups, the second *magis de doctrinis, sententiis arcanis revelatione vel interpretatione cognitis* dealing with pagan, Jewish and Christian religion. In Christian texts it is often followed by a genitive, e.g. *crucis*, *trinitatis*, *incarnationis*, *redemptionis*, *passionis*. Perhaps this has led to the translation of *mysterium simplicitatis* by "the mystery of simplicity" or by similar expressions. But the term *simplicitas* cannot be put on a par with *crux*, *trinitas*, *incarnatio* etc., which concern fundamental parts of Christian doctrine. *Simplicitas* certainly has been incorporated in Christian thought, as a moral value, and indeed also in the theological sphere, but in the latter sense it does not concern one particular part of Christian faith,[13] but rather qualifies the whole of its truth, and the respectful way one has to treat it, in contrast with the misinterpretations of heretics and philosophers.[14]

So the genitive *simplicitatis* needs a different interpretation. Mohrmann in the passage quoted in the above refers to the expression as "la tournure biblique avec l'abstrait au génitif". This turn, in which the genitive of a substantive derived from an adjective takes the place of that adjective is used quite often in translations of the Bible and in the writings of Christian authors. It may here be illustrated by one of its clearest examples : the biblical expression *odor suauitatis*.[15]

If this is right, the words *mysterium simplicitatis* mean "a simple (and true) religious doctrine" and one could paraphrase the altercation under discussion in this way : Saturninus praises Roman religion as honest and straightforward, after which Speratus answers : "My dear proconsul, if you really are interested in honest religion, listen to me, I shall expound a doctrine which is indeed characterized by this quality".[16]

Passio Scillitanorum 11. Quite often in the *Acta martyrum* the authorities are pictured as rather reluctant to pronounce the inevitable death-sentence. They try to persuade the defendants to finish with their Christian ways or at least to go through the formal movements of the required sacrifice to the pagan gods. Sometimes they even urge them to accept the time for reflection which they will most gladly grant. It would seem that apart from the understandable tendency

– which is peculiar to all authorities – to postpone nasty decisions a certain human kindness is responsible for the disinclination for a summary execution of people who have nothing in common with normal criminals. Instances of the offering of a time for consideration can be found in the following *Acts*: Apollonius 10, Dasius 10, Felix 18, Marinus 3, Phileas 200. An interesting example is provided in the *Passio Scillitanorum*, when the proconsul Saturninus, not having been able to dissuade Speratus and his friends from their stupid ideas finally says: *numquid ad deliberandum spatium uultis*? (section 11). There is a difficulty involved in the particle *numquid*: this interrogative particle[17] is used in "introducing questions where a negative answer is anticipated", to put it in the terms of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* s.v. It implies anxiety or incredulity, so that one might be tempted to translate: "surely you do not want time for consideration?", meaning that Saturninus is fed up with Speratus c.s. and does not want to grant them any further delay. But this interpretation clearly is wrong, for after a short interlude concerning the books in possession of the defendants, Saturninus repeats his offer with more urgency, this time using the imperative and subjunctive: *moram XXX dierum habete et recordemini*. In other words, in the question we are discussing the use of the particle *-ne* at first sight would have seemed easier to understand.

This way of reasoning, however, is not subtle enough. In fact the formula that *num* is used, when a negative answer is expected or, in the words quoted from the OLD, anticipated, is too strict. The rule can better be stated in these terms: "*num* implies that the idea of a negative answer is present in the mind of the questioner", a wording proposed by D. R. Shackleton Bailey in his paper "Num in Direct Questions: a Rule Restated" (*Class. Quart.* 47 (1953) 120–125). Although none of the examples adduced in that paper has the characteristics of Saturninus' phrase, viz. a question which point of fact is the equivalent of an appeal, Shackleton Bailey's formula can be made to fit the situation quite aptly: one might paraphrase Saturninus' words in this way: "I am afraid you will disregard my advice, but would it not be wise to take some time for reflection?" If this is right, the use of *numquid* adds a nice touch to the portrait of Saturninus.

Passio Cypriani 3.5. After Cyprian had refused to perform the religious rites, the proconsul said *consule tibi*. Musurillo translates with

'Take care!', although elsewhere (*Passio Irenaei* 3.9) the same expression is translated with 'Take thought for yourself'. And indeed, Cyprian's answer '*Fac quod tibi praeceptum est. in re tam iusta nulla est consultatio*' clearly shows that the proconsul exhorts him to think things over, a practice we have already commented upon (above). The expression is closely parallelled in *Mart. Apollonii* 10 Δίδωμί σοι ἡμέραν, Ἀπολλώ, ἵνα συμβουλεύσῃς σεαυτῷ περὶ τῆς ζωῆς σου where the Greek appears to be a translation of the Latin.

Passio Cypriani 5.3. After Cyprian had removed his outer cloak, *ad lineam stetit* 'then he stood erect'. Thus Musurillo, accepting Saris' emendation instead of the transmitted *in linea stetit*. But *ad lineam* never has the meaning 'erect' but always contains a sense of direction, cf. Cato *Agrar.* 161.1 *ad lineam palo grana bina aut terna demittito*; Cic. *Fin.* 1.18 *censet ... corpora ferri deorsum suo pondere ad lineam*; ThLL s.v. *linea* II.A.1.a. Moreover, the emendation is unnecessary, since in Late Antiquity *linea* sometimes has the meaning of *linea tunica*[18] (the word significantly does not occur in the new OLD which does not go beyond 200 A.D.), and the ThLL (s.v. *lineus* 2.a) actually mentions this passage as the first example. The *linea* usually was *maxime pretiosa* (ThLL), as it will have been in the case of the rich Cyprian who performed as a *grand seigneur* till the last moment by giving the executioner twenty-five gold pieces.

Passio Fructuosi 2.6. Musurillo prints the words of the praeses Aemilianus as follows: *Hi audiuntur, hi timentur, hi adorantur; si dii non coluntur, nec imperatorum uultus adorantur*, and he renders these words as follows: "These are obeyed, these are feared, and these are adored; if the gods are not worshipped, then the images of the emperors are not adored".

Two points are worth noting: 1. Who are meant with *hi*?, 2. *nec* cannot be simply rendered by 'not': if Musurillo's punctuation is right, one should translate *nec* by 'neither' or 'not even'.

Ad 1: Probably Musurillo takes *hi* to refer to the pagan gods, who have been the subject of a short altercation in the preceding paragraphs. But in that case the use of the present indicative is difficult to understand, apart from the fact that there are no instances of *audire deum* or *deos*, 'to obey to a (the) god(s)'.

Ad 2: The correct translation of *nec* in Musurillo's punctuation

would lay undue stress on the worship of the emperor, which, as has been shown by F. Millar,[19] in any case took only second place in pagan worship.

All problems can be solved, if one follows P. Franchi de' Cavalieri in putting a comma instead of a semicolon behind *adorantur*. In that case the words *nec imperatorum uultus adorantur* are dependent on the conjunction *si*, and the demonstrative *hi* with Franchi's punctuation refers to Fructuosus c.s. Franchi's translation runs as follows: "Questi (dimostrativo da riferirsi a Fruttuoso e ai suoi pari), questi qui vengono ascoltati, questi temuti, questi venerati, quando non si venerano gli dii e non si adorano le immagini degli imperatori".[20] This is quite convincing, especially in view of the sequel of the text: Aemilianus continues with these words: *noli uerba Fructuosi auscultare*, which corresponds with *hi audiuntur*. After that he asks one of Fructuosus' followers: *numquid et tu Fructuosum colis*?, reminding one of *hi adorantur*.

This way of understanding the text would ascribe to Aemilianus the fear of a sort of religious worship towards Fructuosus. Such a fear lines up with the facts reported in the remainder of Fructuosus' Passion. Section 3.1 tells about the enormous popularity of the bishop in all quarters, even in pagan circles: *amorem habebat non tantum a fratribus sed etiam ab ethnicis*. And after Fructuosus' death at the stake there is an outburst of popular religion: *cineres eorum collectos prout quisque potuit sibi uindicauit* (6.2).

It seems quite understandable that the praeses is afraid of the enormous influence of Fructuosus c.s., an influence which in his view might easily lead to the abolition of pagan worship, both of the gods and the emperors.

At all events the importance of punctuation in any kind of text has been illustrated once again.

Passio Fructuosi 5.1. Musurillo prints this paragraph as follows: *Post haec solita Domini non defuere magnalia, apertumque caelum, Babyla et Mygdonio fratres nostri ex familia Aemiliani praesidis, filiae eius, dominae suae carnali, ostendebant Fructuosum cum diaconibus suis, adhuc stipitibus quibus ligati fuerant permanentibus, ad caelum ascendentes coronatos*. His translation of the words *apertumque ... Fructuosum* is: "Babylas and Mygdonius, two of our brethren in the household of the governor Aemilianus, saw the heavens open, and this they also

revealed to Aemilianus' daughter, their mistress according to the flesh : there was the saintly bishop Fructuosus etc." As can be seen, there is a remarkable discrepancy between the Latin and Musurillo's translation. Besides, the text, as it is printed, cannot be construed. Obviously something has gone wrong.

Franchi de' Cavalieri, from whose edition Musurillo has adapted his text, provides this reading of the crucial words :[21] *apertumque caelum Babylon et Migdonius fratres nostri* (the rest of the paragraph is identical with the quotation at the beginning of this note). Now *apertum caelum* is rather difficult and one can understand these additions, reported in Franchi's apparatus criticus : *est* and *uidentibus* (with consequent change of *fratres nostri* into *fratribus nostris*). Indeed Ruinart's well-known edition presents this streamlined version : *apertumque est caelum, videntibus Babylan et Mygdonio ex familia Aemiliani Praesidis, qui etiam filiae ejusdem Aemiliani etc.* Judging from his translation one gets the impression that Musurillo meant to print something in this vein.

All troubles would have been avoided, if he had simply followed Franchi de' Cavalieri's text, which is perfectly understandable, when one takes *apertum caelum* as an *accusativus* (or a *nominativus*) *absolutus* (J. B. Hofmann-A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*, 143–144). Admittedly it would be a somewhat early example of such a construction, but Y. M. Biese, *Der spätlateinische Akkusativus Absolutus und Verwandtes* (Helsingfors 1928) 2 sqq. provides some examples from third century inscriptions. The use of a non-classical construction is entirely in tune with the general stylistic level of the *Passio Fructuosi*, the author of which according to Franchi de' Cavalieri must have been a "persona non letterata".

Only one, very slight, alteration of Franchi's text is needed, viz. the removal of the comma between *praesidis* and *filiae*. After that no further difficulties are left.

As regards the correct reading of the first name in the quoted text Franchi's *Babylon* (or *Babylo*) definitely is the *lectio difficilior*, since Babylas was a well-known martyr from Antiochia who was widely worshipped,[22] whereas Babylo(n) is a very rare name, which occurs only in Solinus 12.10 and CIL VI 26753[a]. The combination of the two names suggests that both 'brethren' came from Mesopotamia, where part of the Mygdonians had settled.[23]

To conclude : the passage we have been discussing could be rendered

as follows: "and when the heaven had been opened, Babylo and Mygdonius, brethren of ours belonging to the household of the praeses Aemilianus, showed his daughter etc."

Passio Marcelli 1 (Recension N). The study of the highly complicated tradition of this text was first put on a sounder footing in 1923 by H. Delehaye who distinguished two basic recensions, M and N, of which he considered M to be superior. More recent research[24] (which is neglected by Musurillo) has demonstrated, however, that manuscripts which were discovered after Delehaye's analysis contain a much more reliable text. This research is fully taken into account by Lanata whose edition[25] is at present the best available. In section 1 of the newly constituted text and the N-recension we find the exact year of the passion: *Fausto et Gallo consulibus* (298 A.D.). This passage has been overlooked by the PLRE s.v. Anicius Faustus 6 and Virius Gallus 2. The omission is probably due to the absence of the consuls in the M-recension which at this point, however, was inferior to the N-recension, as has been shown by the later discoveries.

Martyrium Dasii. This 'amazing tale' (Musurillo) of the soldier Dasius who died in Durostorum during the reign of Diocletian, because he refused to be king at the Saturnalia, has evoked a lot of scholarly interest in the course of time. Although its first editor, Franz Cumont,[26] still accepted its authenticity, present scholarly opinion agrees that the martyrdom is legendary.[27] Yet, the historical existence of a martyr Dasius can hardly be doubted, since he is repeatedly mentioned in the synaxaries and martyrologies.[28] For this existence we can also adduce an onomastic argument. The name Dasius is Illyrian and was popular in Moesia.[29] Its occurrence in Durostorum looks therefore authentic.

The beheading of Dasius is dated on "the twentieth of November, on Friday (παρασκευῇ) at the fourth hour, on the twenty-fourth day of the moon" (c. 12). On the basis of these data Cumont[30] calculated the year as 303 A.D., taking παρασκευή as meaning 'Saturday', a meaning it, unfortunately, never has.[31] Although the precise year then has to remain obscure, a date during the reign of Diocletian is not improbable. In c. 11 it is described in great detail how Dasius refused to offer incense and such a refusal would be exemplary in the time of Diocletian when *arae turicremae* were put in all public places, cf.

Optat, *de schism. Donat.* III.8 *qui ad sacrilegia venire non poterant, ubicumque tus ponere cogebantur*; *Pass. s. Sebasiani* n. 65 ap. *Acta SS.* II ian. 275 *ut nullus emeret vel venumdaret aliquid, nisi qui statunculis positis in eo loco ubi emendi gratia ventum fuisset turis exhibuisset incensum, circa insulas, circa vicos, circa nymphaea quoque erant positi compulsores qui neque emendi copiam darent aut hauriendi aquam ipsam ... nisi qui idolis delibassent*; P. Franchi de' Cavalieri, *Studi e Testi* 222 (1962), 111f.

Martyrium Dasii 2. In this section Dasius is said to have stood his difficult test most excellently; this is expressed in these terms: ὡς ῥόδον ἐξ ἀκανθῶν, καθὼς λέλεκται, ἀνεβλάστησεν. Obviously this refers to *Song of Songs* 2.2: "as the lily among thorns". Now the exact identity of the flower mentioned in the original Hebrew text is disputed,[32] but there is no question of it being a rose, and in any case the Septuagint has ὡς κρίνον (*sicut lilium* in the Vulgata). Clearly the use of ῥόδον is a deliberate alteration of the Biblical text.

In fact this modification is not surprising, as the following texts will show. Speaking about the Church in his letter to the martyrs Cyprian has this to say: *erat ante in operibus candida; nunc facta est in martyrum cruore purpurea. Floribus eius nec lilia nec rosae desunt* (*Ep.* 10.5.2). Thus after the lilies of the good works in general the blood of the martyrs now provides roses to the Church. Apart from their colour roses have another quality apt to illustrate martyrdom: *sunt enim spinae rosarum, quia tormenta sunt martyrum* (Ambrose, *Exp.Ev. sec.Luc.* VII 128). Also the crown gained by the martyrs is composed of roses: in his in memoriam of Paula Jerome consoles Eustochium with these words: *Non solum effusio sanguinis in confessione reputatur, sed deuotae quoque mentis seruitus inmaculata cotidianum martyrium est. Illa corona de rosis et uiolis plectitur, ista de liliis* (*Ep.* 108.31). Indeed in the *Passion of Marian and James* 11 a dream of James is reported in which a young martyr executed a few days before appears, *corona rosea collo circumdatus.*

To conclude, when Dasius is likened to a rose,[33] and not to a lily, this must immediately have procured a clue to the expert reader, in whom the expectance of Dasius' martyrdom was raised.

Martyrium Dasii 3. Here the author, or perhaps rather the compiler, is complaining about the wicked practices of pagan folklore and religion

which are still abounding: οὔτε λήγοντος γὰρ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἔθος τὸ κακὸν τέλος λαμβάνει κτλ. Musurillo renders this as follows: "For the world ... does not give up the wicked practice". It is not clear how he understands the structure of the sentence, but possibly he takes λήγειν c.acc. to mean "to give up". Apart from a few occurences in Homer this is not the normal Greek construction: λήγειν usually takes the genitive.[34] Besides one wonders how Musurillo understands the words τέλος λαμβάνει. In fact his translation misses a vital element, which is not overlooked in the correct translation by Rochow:[35] "denn nicht einmal wenn die Welt aufhört nimmt die üble Sitte ein Ende". Indeed the verb λήγειν can be used absolutely with the meaning 'to come to an end, to terminate', e.g. αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἡμέρα οὕτως ἔληξε (Xenophon, *Cyrop.* V 3.7), περὶ λήγοντα τὸν ἐνιαυτόν (Demosthenes XXIV 98), λήγοντος τοῦ θέρους (Aristotle, *Hist.an.* V 28,555b30), λήξαντος τοῦ χειμῶνος (Flavius Iosephus, *Bell. Iud.* 4.658).

The correctness of Rochow's rendering is made even more plausible by the phrase immediately preceding the quoted text: αὕτη ἡ μυσαρὰ παράδοσις καὶ μέχρις ἡμῶν τῶν ἐσχάτων περιελθοῦσα ἀθλιωτέρως παραφυλάττεται. For, if the words περιελθοῦσα μέχρις have a temporal sense, which seems very likely, that must also hold good for τῶν ἐσχάτων. Indeed from the writings of the New Testament onwards ἔσχατος in a temporal sense is quite normal in Christian texts, in which one often finds the idea that the world's end is drawing near: (*nos*) *quos mundi finis inuenit* (Ambrose, *Exp.Ev.sec.Luc.* X 10).[36]

Martyrium Dasii 7. After Dasius had confessed to be a Christian the commander Bassus urged him: Δεήθητι τοῖς ἴχνεσιν τῶν δεσποτῶν ἡμῶν. Cumont was highly puzzled by these 'feet' and emended the transmitted ἴχνεσιν into εἰκόσι, an emendation which has been accepted by Musurillo. However, Cumont had overlooked the fact that the same expression occurred in a papyrus published in 1895. In this papyrus (CPR 20.11.3ff.) a petition is deposed at the *Sebasteion* παρὰ τοῖς εἴ[χ]νεσιν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. The parallel was noted by F. Blumenthal, *AFP* 5 (1913), 335 note 4, who consequently rejected the emendation of Cumont. The expression recurred in *POxy* 2130.17ff (published in 1927) ... ἀνεθέμην ἐν τῷ αὐτ[ό]θι Σεβαστείῳ πρὸς τοῖς θείοις ἴχνεσι τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. The latter text inspired F. Millar[37] to reject Cumont's emendation but he evidently overlooked the fact that 60 years ago Blumenthal had preceded him in this rejection. The custom

to depose a petition at the feet of the emperor's statue finds its parallel in the religious custom of attaching a request to the statue of a god[38] and may well derive from it.

NOTES

[1] Cf. W. Rordorf, L'espérance des Martyrs chrétiens, in *Forma Futuri. Studi in onore di M. Pellegrino* (Turin 1975) 445–461; idem, *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* X (Paris 1978), s.v. *Martyre*, col. 726; A. Solignac, *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* VII (Paris 1968), s.v. *Immortalité*, col. 1611.

[2] Cf. Alexander Aphr., *De fato* 1 (164.3 Bruns).

[3] Thus also K. H. Rengstorf, *A Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus*. Vol. II (Leiden 1975) 249 s.v. εὐχή, referring to *Vita* 292: ἅπερ ἔχει δι᾽ εὐχῆς, δι᾽ εὐχῆς ἔχειν = 'to wish, desire'.

[4] Other examples can be found in these *Acts*: Julius 3.7 and Carpus 41.

[5] Although the translations of G. Rauschen: "Unser Wunsch ist, um unseres Herrn Jesu Christi willen gemartert und so selig zu werden" (Rauschen uses the so-called B-recension), and of G. Lanata: "Noi ci auguriamo di ottenere, in seguito alla tua punizione, la salvezza" are much better than Musurillo's, still the vital element of the paradox is not expressed clearly enough.

[6] *Non enim potest martyr coronari, nisi sanguinem emiserit et corpus per uirtutem passionis sanctificauerit* (*De centesima* 18).

[7] L. F. Janssen, Die Bedeutungsentwicklung von Superstitio/superstes, *Mnemosyne* IV 28(1975)135–188 and: 'Superstitio' and the Persecution of the Christians, *Vigiliae Christianae* 33 (1979) 131–159.

[8] Janssen 1979, 158.

[9] Janssen 1975, 158–173 (our quotation on p. 173), summarised in Janssen 1979, 139.

[10] Cf. Suet. *Calig.* 15.3 *De sororibus auctor fuit, ut omnibus sacramentis adicerentur "neque me liberosque meos cariores habebo quam Gaium habebo et sorores eius"*.

[11] See the detailed study by P. Herrmann, *Der römische Kaisereid* (Göttingen 1968).

[12] O. Hiltbrunner, *Latina graeca* (Bern 1958) 15–105: 'Simplicitas. Eine Begriffsgeschichte'. To the examples of the Greek equivalent ἁπλότης discussed by Hiltbrunner can be added L. Robert, *Hellenica* XIII (1965) 36 n. 1 and *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 101 (1977) 90.

[13] The theological doctrine of God's *simplicitas* has only been fully developed in later times. In any case it is unthinkable that Speratus refers to the doctrine. Cf. Hiltbrunner, *o.c.* 95, note 35.

[14] Hiltbrunner, *o.c.* 95–97.

[15] Cf. J. Schrijnen/C. Mohrmann, *Studien zur Syntax der Briefe des heiligen Cyprian* (Nijmegen 1936) 85–86; P. A. H. J. Merkx, *Zur Syntax der Kasus und Tempora in den Traktaten des heiligen Cyprian* (Nijmegen 1939) 15–17.

[16] Although S. Pezzella's explanation of the formula *mysterium simplicitatis* as 'il nucleo essenziale della sua fede' is better than the meaningless translations quoted in the text, there is no need for this specification. Besides, Pezzella's wording does not explain *simplicitatis* (S. Pezzella, *Gli Atti dei Martiri* (Rome 1965) 118). L. F. Pizzolato's treatment of the expression is unsatisfactory. He apparently is not acquainted with Hiltbrunner's study (L. F. Pizzolato, Cristianesimo e mondo in tre 'passiones' dell'età degli Antonini, *Studia Patavina* XXIII (1976) 501-519).

[17] In later Latin *numquid* supplants *num*, which is usual in classical Latin, cf. J. B. Hofmann-A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*, 463.

[18] *ThLL* s.v. *lineus* 2.a; add Franchi de' Cavalieri, *Studi e testi* 33 (1920) 152f. and *Studi e testi* 49 (1928) 216.

[19] F. Millar, The Imperial Cult and the Persecutions, in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* XIX (Geneva 1973) 143–165.

[20] P. Franchi de' Cavalieri, Gli Atti di S. Fruttuoso di Tarragona, *Studi e testi* 65 (1935, 127–199) 140.

[21] *Studi e testi* 65 (1935) 191.

[22] *Bibliotheca Sanctorum* 2 (Rome 1962) 679–681.

[23] Strabo 16.1.23.

[24] See the survey by G. Lanata, Gli atti del processo contro il centurione Marcello, *Byzantion* 42 (1972, 509–522) 509–513.

[25] Lanata 1972, 513–516 and 1973, 202–204.

[26] F. Cumont, Les Actes de S. Dasius, *Anal. Boll.* 16 (1897) 1–16.

[27] See most recently *Bibliotheca Sanctorum* 4 (1964) 483f.; S. Weinstock, Saturnalien und Neujahrsfest in den Märtyreracten, *Mullus. Festschrift Theodor Klauser* (Münster/W 1964) 391–400; I. Rochow, Die Passio des heiligen Dasius (BHG 491) – Ein Zeugnis für die anti-heidnische Polemik gegen Ende der frühbyzantinischen Zeit, in J. Irmscher/P. Nagel (eds.), *Studia Byzantina*. Folge II = Berliner Byzantinische Arbeiten 44 (Berlin 1973) 235–247.

[28] Rochow o.c. 235.

[29] Cf. A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia* (London 1974) 65.

[30] Cumont o.c., 8 who is followed by Rochow 235 and J. Helgeland, Christians and the Roman Army, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang* 23.1 (1979, 724–834) 783 note 287.

[31] Cf. Lampe, *PGL*, s.v. παρασκευή.

[32] Cf. M. H. Pope, *Song of Songs. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York 1977) 368.

[33] The special significance of the rose for the martyr's crown has been insufficiently taken into account by K. Baus, *Der Kranz in Antike und Christentum* (Bonn 1940) 181.

[34] R. Kühner/B. Gerth, *Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* II 1, 400 A 3.

[35] Rochow o.c., 241.

[36] Mercati's reference to Cyprian, *De mortalitate* 20: *nobis quoque ipsis minimis et extremis* does not provide a parallel to ἡμῶν τῶν ἐσχάτων (G. Mercati, *Opere minori* II = *Studi e testi* 77, Rome 1937, 109). The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* V 2 col. 2004.53–55 quotes this passage as an example of *extremus* with the meaning *minimi aestimandus, humillimus*. The correctness of this is proved by the parallel expression in Cyprian, *De habitu virginum* 3: *extremi et minimi et humilitatis nostrae admodum conscii*, cf. also A. E. Keenan's note ad loc. in her commentary on *De habitu virginum* (Washington 1932). Presumably Cyprian's modest, self-humiliating expression goes back to Paul's words in I *Cor.* 15.8–9: ἔσχατον δὲ πάντων ὡσπερεὶ τῷ ἐκτρώματι ὤφθη κἀμοί. Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἀποστόλων.

[37] Millar (n. 19), 140.

[38] Cf. P. J. Alexander, The Oracle of Baalbek (Washington 1967) 31; H. S. Versnel, Van onderen ... Antiek gebed in kelderlicht, *Lampas* 12 (1979, 7–49) 25–28.

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GREEK COSMIC LOVE AND THE CHRISTIAN LOVE OF GOD

BOETHIUS, DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE AND THE AUTHOR OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

BY

CORNELIA J. DE VOGEL

Not long ago Prof. G. Quispel published a comparatively small article on the above almost excessively large subject. He presented his communications on this vast theme under a both concise and provocative title: GOD IS EROS.[1] Provocative no doubt for most theologians, since in their guild the tradition that opposes "Greek eros" to "Christian love", a notion which they use to indicate by the Greek word "agápe", is still alive. Quite a problematical tradition, to be sure. At the moment, however, I wish to pass over the problems involved in it and follow Q.'s argument.

He starts with Boethius' metrum 8 in the *Consolatio Philosophiae*, book II, which he quotes in a now and then modified form of the 17th century English translation printed in H. F. Stewart's edition in the Loeb Class. Library.[2] Not disturbed by any philosophical problems Q. declares: "The love of which Boethius speaks is *a cosmogonic Eros*." By introducing this term rather emphatically Prof. Q. orientates us immediately in the direction he wishes us to take: not to the explanations of philosophers – which in Boethius' case might seem natural, after all, since he was a philosopher and in his deep depression let himself be led by the lessons of Lady Philosophia – but to the earlier origin of Greek thought, the cosmogonies of mythology. Of course it is quite true that the Eros introduced by Plato in his *Symposium* in such an impressive way as the son of Penia and Poros, makes his appearance at a fairly late stage of Greek thought. The beginnings of the Greek Eros, conceived as a god, reach back into the 7th-6th centuries, in the Orphic myth of the world-egg. Nobody is willing to deny this.

Whether the Orphic myth was actually in Boethius' mind, when he wrote his song on the *amor quo caelum regitur*, remains another question. Let us grant for the moment that it may have been somehow

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"behind" his mind, or in the back of his thoughts. This much is clear, Prof. Q. is so much interested in the Orphic myth because it is exactly this kind of cosmogonic fantasies he is finding again and again in the Gnostic writings of the first centuries of our era. In the Chaldaean Oracles, of which the written form is said to date from the second part of the second century A.D., there is most clearly a divine cosmic Love descending to the lower levels and holding the world-order together. This is the cosmogonic Eros of Orphism, a downward-flowing divine Love, such as we find in Proclus as well, in particular in his commentary on Plato's *Alcibiades*.[3] Proclus took his concept of ἔρως προνοητικός from the *Orac. Chald.*, declares Q. – somewhat one-sided, no doubt, for it is fairly clear that the Oracles were by no means Proclus' only source in his reflexions on "divine love". Anyhow Q. is not at all "at variance" with me, neither in mentioning the Oracles as one of Proclus' sources nor in finding the concept of "pronoetic love" in the Commentary on the *Cratylus* as well. What I said in my commentary on Boethius' m. 8 of *Cons.*II, in the opening nr. of *Vivarium*, 1963, was not that Proclus' love terminology would occur only in the Alcib. commentary, but that it is absent from the *theological treatises* in the strict sense. This I called a remarkable fact, – and I *do* think it is. I mentioned both the *Elementa Theologiae* and the *Theologia Platonica* and, somewhat tentatively, offered an explanation of the absence of the term ἔρως in those writings which for Proclus were the scientific expression of his theology. My suggested explanation was that, in writing those works, apparently the idea of divine Love was not very much alive in his mind. The fact that he omitted *the term* ἔρως precisely in these works led me to the conclusion that, apparently, the idea of divine Love did not take an essential place in Proclus' theology.

Prof. Q.'s reaction – which is somewhat out of proportion and apparently a fruit of rather careless reading[4] – makes it clear to me that I have to formulate the above conclusion more precisely. Indeed I have to thank Prof. Q. for the fact that by his very way of arguing in the present article he makes me do so and thus to correct a previously used formula which apparently could give rise to misunderstanding. I shall come to that later on and continue following Q.'s argument.

From Boethius' *amor quo caelum regitur* Q. passes immediately on to ps.Dionysius the Areopagite, *De div.nom.* IV 11.[5] He is just delighted with that passage (11-18). It is "one of the most daring and delightful in Greek literature", so he declares. To which he adds: "No wonder

that translators did all they could to make it incomprehensible, translating Eros by "Yearning" and glossing over the erotic relation between David and Jonathan!"

Dionysius speaks Proclus' language when distinguishing four kinds of Love, (1) the ἔρως ἐπιστρεπτικός, of lower things for higher ones and ultimately for the absolute and transcendent Good, (2) the ἔρως κοινωνικός, of equal things for one another, (3) the ἔρως προνοητικός, of higher beings for lower ones, (4) the ἔρως συνεκτικός, of things for themselves.

A few background problems.

(1) *Did Aristotle make eros into a cosmological principle?*

In my previous paper I observed that the first of these four kinds is Plato's eros extended to everything in nature. Among theologians it seems to be a still rather generally accepted opinion that it was Aristotle who introduced the view of a universal upward-striving motion in the world. I found this not only in Anders Nygren,[6] who follows the classical German "authorities" such as Zeller, and for Plato by preference Wilamowitz (which sometimes may lead to rather strange results), but also in Karl Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* IV, 2 (1955).[7] Apparently following the same German tradition Barth – who, by the way, did not like Nygren and disapproved of the anti-Greek tendency in the theology of the last decads[8] – says that Aristotle made Eros into a "cosmological principle", dominating "the universe" as the upward-striving "urge" in matter into realization by form. This is correct in so far as the "urge" of matter be understood as a natural predisposition by which the impersonal process of nature is ruled. It turns into misunderstanding Aristotle as soon as the "urge" is explained by psychological terms and understood as *eros*. Aristotle never used that term in describing the physical process.[9] Moreover, speaking of Eros as a "cosmological principle" is somewhat confusing, because it suggests an universal upward-striving of "all things" towards an ultimate transcendent *agathon*, such as was conceived in the notion of ἐπιστροφή, first introduced by Plotinus, and taught by Proclus with a complete eros-terminology. However, that was not Aristotle's view of the universe, though some scholastics, who followed the lead of Siebeck, even recently attributed it to him.[10]

(2) *Greek love terminology.*

Prof. Q. touches on two other rather complex background problems that are still alive in the world of theologians, first, that of love-terminology in the Greek and later Hellenistic world, second, that of "Eros and Agape" as they have been opposed the one to the other as radically different attitudes of mind. Though the two problems are connected, the former, which requires a definitely philological treatment, among theologians is frequently passed by somewhat too rapidly to come to a correct view of the basic facts. Hence it is still a rather generally accepted view that "*agápe*" and "*agapân*", in spite of their "occasional" occurrence in other writings, have a specifical New Testament character. In a sense, of course, this is true, viz. in so far as the New Testament testifies to the revealed Love of God. Not, however, in this sense that the words *agápe* and *agapân*, in contradistinction to the Greek language of so-called "profane" sources, would have been peculiar to the Septuaginta and the N.T. This belief is a rather queer remnant of the antiquated idea that the New Testament was written in a peculiar kind of Greek, different from the normal Greek language, and to be learned by aspirant students of theology in handbooks of "New-Testament-Greek". Since the beginning of this century we know that the difference between the Greek of the N.T. and that of almost the whole of literary Greek was not the difference between "profane" and "sacred" sources, but the difference between the literary prose of the classical era which was the model of literary language for later Greek prose writers as well, and on the other hand the spoken language of everybody in the first centuries. This was also a written language sometimes used by quite civilized people, such as the historian Polybius in the second century B.C. What about 1900 was called "N.T.-Greek" is now recognized to be "Koine", which is the general Greek language, formed shortly after the disappearance of the city-states, after the reign of Alexander.

Has such a well-known fact to be remembered? It seems so. Or would the words ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν be just a single, exceptional case? Words have their history. The history of the classical word φιλεῖν, so frequently found in the Socratic dialogues, is that in the connotation of "loving" it went more and more out of use from the fourth century B.C. onward, while ἀγαπᾶν was more and more used instead of it. That as early as the 2nd cent. B.C. ἀγαπᾶν was the common word for "loving", both in the spoken and in the written language of everybody,

is a verifiable fact.[11] There is nothing "sacred" about it, and the N.T. use of the term is by no means an almost isolated fact.

The Old Testament often speaks of the kind of love that in Greek is called ἔρως. Remarkably the *Sept.* very rarely use that word. As a rule they speak of ἀγάπη, which may denote any kind of affectionate relationships, including sex relations, including also the love of God for his chosen people. The prophet Hosea describes that love as a man's love for his unfaithful wife. In the *Sept.* it is referred to by the word ἀγάπη. Apparently the word ἔρως is deliberately avoided, no doubt because in common language it had a rather vulgar ring. By stating this fact of course nothing is said against the higher kind of eros, known so well to Platonist philosophers.

(3) *A theological antithesis.*

Here we enter the battle-field of Anders Nygren with his grim opposition of Eros and Agape. The Swedish theologian drew up a συστοιχία of, on the one part, the excellencies of A., on the other the perversions of E.[12] In this schedule all "upward-going" love of man, that is to say, *all love for God*, is brought under the E.-category and as such falls under the verdict of being egocentric instead of theocentric; for eros is coveting, is wanting to get and to possess. Eros is essentially self-love, while agape is just the opposite: it makes self-love disappear.

We remember Plato who, as the first principle of human life, laid down that not man, but God is the measure of all things, and that, before and above all other things, including our own soul, man has to honour God. Moreover, he prescribed that, when his "philosophers" after their long and very hard training had attained to the μέγιστον μάθημα, which was: the vision of the Highest, they should not be allowed to stay on the height of their beatific vision, but should be compelled to do their service to their fellow-men, leading them towards a life according to the right principles.

Obviously the Swedish theologian had not the faintest idea of what the spirit of Platonism was. But even the "love of God" among Christians appears to him a rather suspect affair. For – *any* "upward-striving love" belongs in the wrong part of the συστοιχία.

I am glad to find that Karl Barth did not feel comfortable in the spiritual climate of Nygren's argument. At first he avoids mentioning his name, but rejects the alternative which he thinks "ziemlich billig", and finds in non-Christian humanism a via media between E. and A.[13]

In a later volume[14] where he deals more explicitly with Christian love and its "great adversary", he underlines the "human reality" of "that other love", which a Christian cannot just disown as if he had nothing to do with it.[15] Faced with the works of Heinrich Scholz, *Eros und Caritas*, 1929, and Nygren's work, of which the important second volume had appeared in 1937, Barth declares that he likes Scholz better. In his work he finds a more dignified description of "the other love". When faced with the Neoplatonist conception of πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή, that view of how everything issues from the Deity and returns to it (a "Heimkehr"), he is impressed by the grandeur of that vision, but does not wish to see it interchanged with the Christian Love of God.

In spite of their critical attitude towards the sharp antithesis made by the Swedish theologian, we find both with Barth and with Bornkamm the idea that "of course" in principle the Greek eros was wrong. That is to say, these reformatorian theologians accepted somewhat too lightly the one-sided and simplistic statement that "Eros" is "selfish". Hence they did not come to see that in fact the picture drawn by Nygren was not true. They did not observe that, right from the beginning, the "Greek love" of a Socrates and a Plato was essentially a love that "cared for the other's soul". Again there has been here a change of terminology: that which by Proclus was called ἔρως προνοητικός, by Socrates and Plato was simply called ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς. And Socrates thought it his lifetask, at the cost of his private interests to practise that ἐπιμέλεια, by order of the Delphic god.[16] No doubt, this was a special case. But what else did Plato by his work in the Academy? What else did the Cynics and later such Stoics as Musonius and Epictetus? All these men practised a personal care for the souls of their fellow-men. However, the ἐπιμέλεια had also a cosmic dimension: Plato declared it to be proper to "Soul" (in the cosmic sense) to care for all that is not ensouled.[17] Thus, the later views of Proclus are to be found in Plato's well-known classical dialogues.

Both A. J. Festugière and J. Trouillard could show that, in fact, "Greek love" was by no means as selfish as the Swedish theologian and his followers would have us believe. They expressed it in these terms that "amour" is not only "concupiscence", but also "générosité". True love is always superabundant, or as Plato says, it brings forth "fruits of virtue".

The Canadian J. Rist in his book *Eros and Psyche*[18] was concerned

with the same problems. When dealing with Origen, who thought it justified to attribute "eros" to God, Rist[19] suggests that Origen has been aware of the duality of the theory from its beginning in Plato himself. By which he means "that he (Plato) recognized a downward-flowing ἔρως as well as the normal ἔρως which is desire". – Of what is he (Mr.R.) thinking? He explained it in a preceding chapter.[20] In the Diotima-speech Love is "an appetitive emotion", which implies an egoistic outlook. But at the same time Rist discovers "a more fruitful notion" in "that of Creation as a result of Love perfected".

Well, as a matter of fact, according to Diotima's initiation, Love inspired by Beauty will always be creative. Even at the top, when the soul will have reached the vision of Beauty-itself, she cannot but bring forth "fruits of true virtue", because she has come into contact with true Being.[21] This then is what Mr. Rist means by the "downward-flowing ἔρως", which from the beginning would have been recognized by Plato. However, it is Mr. Rist's terminology, it is not Plato's. In fact, Plato never speaks of a downward-flowing love. He *does* speak of an upward-striving love and is definitely at variance with those who think that "love must have and retain some sort of physical basis".[22]

The Canadian professor who expressed himself in these terms, spoke clear language indeed. When parting company with Plato where Diotima reached the beauty of laws and institutions, the professor shows not to be able to follow her higher initiation into Love. Rist quotes him to illustrate how difficult it is "for us" to understand what Plato meant. One might think that for a Christian who loves a God invisible and unseen, it would not be so difficult. Are not to him the "things invisible" more real and far more important that the things to be seen? – I think so. Anyhow, I would suggest to follow Plato's terminology. Doing so implies two things: (1) since eros springs from a need, it cannot be attributed to a God, (2) since eros strives upwards, it leaves behind all that can appropriately be called an appetitive emotion.

From the first implication follows, that for a Platonist saying that "God is Eros" is abusive language; from the second that by its very object the upward-striving Eros does not seek itself but essentially seeks that which is beyond it.

Rist's speaking of the "fruits" of Platonic eros is of course perfectly well-founded, only he uses the fact not in the right way. Upward-going eros has simply to be acknowledged as true love to God, as well as

some Jewish psalmist's words who says that he loves God. There is nothing suspicious about that. It only testifies to the fact that some people are "drawn from Above". That such a thing may happen also in the pagan world, belongs to the secret of Him who alone knows the hearts of men. Proclus understood something of it when he said that, wherever men love God, that love must be inspired from "Above".

Proclus and the Chaldaean Oracles.

No doubt Proclus traces the origin of the love of the "perfect soul" back to the νοητοὶ θεοί of the transcendent order. He does so[23] while citing from the *Chaldaean Oracles*[24] the words "The Father has sown (into the world) the fire-laden bond of love", in order that the whole world may be held together by the indissoluble bonds of friendship. Thus Proclus concludes with a reference to Plato's *Timaeus* 32 c, where the term φιλία testifies to the *Pythagorean* origin of Plato's cosmic view.[25]

What did the *Chaldaean Oracles* mean by "the Father"? A modern reader, used to the spiritual climate of Jewish-Christian monotheistic thought, will perhaps too easily be inclined to think of "God", the Creator of the heavens and the earth, and he might read this from the *Oracles*. Yet, he would be wrong. The "Father" of whom the *Logia* speak, was certainly a νοητὸς πατήρ, which means, a Father situated at a transcendent level, transcendent also to the level of the "divine" (i.e. "perfect") Soul. We know this kind of metaphysics from Proclus and Plotinus; we know it in principle even from Plato. But then we know also that the level at which "the Father" is ranked, is, ontologically speaking, not the top. Whatever may be thought of Plato's metaphysics, this much is clear, that he made a sharp distinction between the αἰτία, the ultimate Cause of all Being, and that which is caused by it, that is, as its immediate causatum, intelligible Being and its being known.[26] I know, of course, that the difference of ontological level is frequently not acknowledged. This is simply due to the fact that Plato had to introduce an entirely new metaphysical theory and had to make use of hitherto unknown terms. The First Principle which is the Cause he spoke of as "the *Form* of Good" (ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). Now, since the immediate causatum, which is intelligible Being (νοητά), is called "Forms" as well, the basic ontological distinction is sometimes not observed. Yet, Plato has been quite clear: he declares it to be a basic error to confound that which is "similar to the Good" (the

ἀγαθοειδές) with the Good itself, – as elementary an error as confounding the objects that are illuminated by the sun and thus, in a sense, "sunlike", with the sun itself.[27]

Granting then that for Plato "the Good" was beyond intelligible Being, we have to acknowledge the fact that in Platonic metaphysics there were not only degrees of being, but there were also degrees within the realm of "the divine". Mr. Rist on his way of looking for arguments to attribute "eros" to "God" as well, first comes across the fact that by Plato the perfect soul is called "divine": the perfect soul is a god – and it is said to have "eros", the love for that which is beyond it. This might seem contradictory: if the soul is perfect, how is she still deficient? And if not deficient, how can she long for something "more divine"?

Well, for Plato the perfect soul is not at the top. She attains to the view of the νοητά. These are "above" her. But again, they are not the top. There is the Cause, that transcends them.

That is what we find again in Plotinus and in a more complicated form in Proclus. In the *Chaldaean Oracles* too. One shouldn't be satisfied too soon with the νοητοὶ θεοί of Proclus, nor with the πατρικὸς Νοῦς of the *Oracles*, and think this is "God" – as any modern monotheistically-minded person will readily understand it. For "us", let us say, that kind of speech is rather confusing. Mr. Rist was already dupe of Plato's way of speaking about the Demiurge as "God" who made the visible world "because He was good". The overflowing goodness of God, well, that is nothing but "the Love of God" in Christian terms, so he thought.[28] And so, after all, Origen was justified in speaking of God as Eros. Plato *might* have done so.

But he did not. And not only did he not use the term of Eros either in this case or in speaking of the ultimate Cause of all Being which is the Agathon, but his demiurge has to be ranked at the level of intelligible Being and is, so to speak, the personified symbol of intelligible forces, working at that level. He was definitely not the ultimate and total Cause.

Rist is quite right when observing that Plato and the Platonists did believe in gods that "care for man" and his individual soul. Besides the *Apology*[29] he might have mentioned Plato's admonition to the young man who thought himself not cared for by the gods.[30] The question is only to know at which ontological level these gods had to

be ranked.[31] And this is exactly what applies to Proclus' νοητοὶ θεοί and the πατρικὸς Νοῦς of the *Chald.Oracles* as well.

As for Proclus, he is very precise in assigning his place to Eros. "One cannot rank this god either in the first realms of Being", so he says in his commentary on the *Alcibiades*,[32] or in the lowest ones. For in the first ones he is not to be found, because the object of love is above love (τὸ ἐραστὸν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἔρωτός ἐστιν), and in the lowest regions one has not the right to place him, because the loving subject takes part of love. Thus he must have his place midway between the object and the subjects of love and must be next in rank to Beauty, but first of the other things" (τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ δεύτερον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρῶτον).

This is followed up in Proclus' text by a detailed explanation about the precise place and function of Eros within the region of "the spiritual and hidden gods" (ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ κρυφίοις θεοῖς).[33] In that region, so we are told, there is a threefold hypostasis, of which the first is characterized by the agathon-itself which is the object of its thinking, while the second is according to Wisdom "where also is the first noèsis", and the third is "according to Beauty". Now according to these three noetic causes three monads arise, which manifest themselves primarily "in the ineffable order of the gods" as *Pistis*, *Aletheia* and *Eros* (reference to the *Chald.Oracles*[34]). The first of these founds everything in the Agathon, the second reveals the *gnosis* in all things existing, while the third makes all things return [to their Source, ἐπιστρέφων] and leads them together to the nature of the Beautiful. "Thus this triad goes out from there over all the divine systems of order in the universe and radiates over all things the unification with intelligible Being." – A few lines further on we read the sentence which Quispel (p. 196) quotes in O'Neill's translation: "From above, then, love ranges from the intelligibles to the intramundane making everything revert to the divine beauty, truth illuminating the universe with knowledge, and faith establishing each reality in the good. "For everything", says the Oracle, "is governed and exists in these three"."

We are constantly very close to the *Chaldaean Oracles*. The same kind of metaphysical ontology is behind their imaginative language, in which we hear of "the bonds of admirable Eros, who first leapt forth out of Mind (ἐκ Νόου), wrapping his binding fire in the fire (of Noûs), that he might mix the mixing-bowls of the Sources, spreading there the flowers of his fire".[35]

And again, according to a next fragment, "the spark of the soul" is mingled with mind and divine will, and as a third the Father added "chaste Eros, the binder of all things and their exalted guide" (ἐπιβήτορα σεμνόν).[36]

The question we have to ask here is : which is, ontologically speaking, the place of that divine Mind who is called "the Father" and "Fire"? For the whole system that is behind the *Oracles* is extremely complicated. We can find it traced out in Psellos' *Hypotyposis*, printed in Des Places' edition of the *Oracles*, and H. Lewy draws up the schedule of it in his above-cited commentary, p. 483. At the top we find "the ineffable One" (Ἓν ἄρρητον), on the second level a "πατρικὸς βυθός". The scheme is complicated by a triadic subdivision at this level and by the insertion of other "intelligible and intelligent triads" (τριάδες νοηταί τε καὶ νοεραί) which serve as unifying forces – not to speak of "instruments" to denote the ἴυγγες and συνοχεῖς between the second and the third level of Being. It is at the third level that we find "three sourcelike Fathers" (πηγαῖοι πατέρες), the first of which is the Νοῦς πατρικός, referred to as ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα. From the second of the three, which is called "Hekate" or "life-generating Source" (ζωογόνος πηγή), the souls originate.

Eros, then, is said to be the first to spring from the πατρικὸς Νοῦς, and at this source-level we have to situate the triad of Pistis, Aletheia, Eros.[37] It is a *transcendent* level of Being, to be sure; transcendent both to the World-soul, which will be ranked fourth,[38] and to the visible world. In Greek terms, thus one can refer to the "Mind of the Father" as "God" and find Eros here as a divine being, springing directly from "God". Only to the modern reader such a language is confusing, since it evokes associations that do not correspond to the background of the Chaldaean texts. For the "Paternal Noûs" is not the First and ultimate Principle which is the Ἓν ἄρρητον. Nor is he to be identified with the πατρικὸς βυθός of the second level.

As we found, one has to remember the same at reading in Proclus that love comes "from above". When rereading those remarkable pages of his Alcibides-commentary[39] on the "divine love" of Socrates who by "caring for the soul" of Alcibiades, was his only true ἐραστής, we find there :[40] "From where would this particular kind of love that is in the souls of men, have come, if it had not before existed in the gods themselves? For all that is good and salutary in the souls has its determined cause in the world of the gods. That is why Plato says

that of all the virtues and physical goods, such as health, strength, righteousness and selfrestraint, the prototypes must pre-exist yonder.[41] How much more then shall we assume that of the erotic virtue the first-working cause exists in the gods? For "it is given by a divine gift", as Socrates himself says in the *Phaedrus*."

This is Greek thought on love, – love that is called "divine" because it cares for the soul. Proclus does speak of Eros as a god: he likes to speak of "the true lover" not directly as "divine", but rather as "inspired". He has the god "within him" (is ἔνθεος); he "belongs to" the god, is akin to him, after whom he is named (ὁ τῷ θεῷ προσήκων οὗπέρ ἐστιν ἐπώνυμος).[42] Of this god then Proclus says that he must have his place "midway between the beloved object and the lovers",[43] and with regard to him he asks: "Where then did he first come to subsist and how does he go out over all things (Πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα πρόεισι) and with which monads did he "spring out"?"[44] (The word ἐξέθορε here is certainly a reminiscence of *Chald.Or.* fr. 42, where Eros was said to have first leaped out of the divine Intellect).

It is here that we get the before cited explanation[45] about the "three hypostases" in the region of the "intelligible and hidden gods", three intelligible causes from which the three "monads" Pistis, Aletheia and Eros are said to come into separate existence (ὑφίστανται), under one form existing in the intelligible order, but manifesting themselves (as three) "in the ineffable order of the gods". – Then follows the description of the function of each of the three "monads", of which Eros has the particular task of making all things "revert" and lead them together to "the Beautiful".

Conclusions

When thinking this over, we are led to the following conclusions.

(1) Proclus' Greek Eros-god does not betray his Platonic origin: what he inspires is the upward-going love which "makes everything revert".

(2) While taking his starting-point in Socrates' love for Alcibiades, which was a person's caring for another person's soul, Proclus assigns to his Eros-god a place in the cosmic order so as to be able to act on men for the good, in the same way as Plato said in his *Laws* that, in their struggle against evil, men will always have "gods and heavenly spirits" as their helpers.[45]

(3) Proclus' Eros-god extends his care not only to men, but to "all

things" in the cosmos, acting as a force that makes them revert to their "source". Thus, he is presented not so much as a cosmogonic deity as rather in a kind of "soteriological" rôle. The "love for the Beautiful" is a "saving" love, and Eros who inspires it is a "saving" deity.

(4) Proclus' Eros comes "from above" : his origin is traced back to the "noetic gods". While akin to the wisdom of the *Chaldaean Oracles*, to which he refers again and again, Proclus presents his doctrine of the divine origin of Eros in a more theoretical and less mythological form than the *Oracles* did. However, in neither of them was Eros ranked on the level of the First and ultimate Principle of Being nor even on the second.[46]

Certainly, that could not be expected otherwise. It has just to be noticed as a fact. More important is, when a comparison with "the Love of God" as known from the Jewish-Christian testimonies of Revelation is made, that in spite of similarity of words, a very different spiritual reality is referred to. On the one hand, it cannot be said that the "above" from which either the Proclean or the Chaldaean Eros springs, would be identical with the God and Father known from the biblical Revelation. On the other hand, the "saving" Eros-god of Proclus and his binding force in the universe both in Proclus and in the *Oracles* is very different indeed, both in his origin and in his character, from Him who according to the New Testament was sent by God to save men by his Cross. The essential difference is, no doubt, that in the Jewish-Christian Revelation God is personal, while on the other part this is not so.

Exception to be made for Plotinus?

Did Plotinus make an exception, when in *Enn.* VI 8,15 he wrote, in speaking of the One : "It is lovable, and Love-itself and love to itself"?[47] – Explaining himself he goes on in the masculin : "because He is beautiful not otherwise than from Himself and in Himself. For also being together with Himself would not be possible otherwise than if that which is together and that with which it is together are one and the same."

It must be remembered that any predicate attributed to the One is applied to it "as it were", the οἷον indicating that our language is not adequate to express anything whatsoever of the "nature" of the First. In this case no difference between the subject and its predicates can

be made here: the One *is* its goodness, its essence, its will, its action, – its love. No other object of that Love is thinkable but itself. Using Plotinus' own words one might ask the rather silly question: "What else could it love?" suggesting that "there was nothing either beyond or "after" it."[48]

I remember this way of speaking of Plotinus to make the modern reader understand that there is nothing to be disapproved of or to be despised in the "self-love" of the One, as conceived by that philosopher. It is, on the contrary, the model of the most perfect Love, because it is the Love for the Highest.[49]

However, at the same time this will make clear that Plotinus' declaration that "the One is Eros" differs altogether from the N.T.-writer's word that "God is Love". This is not a question of disparagement of either Plotinus or Neoplatonism, but the simple statement of a fact: the background of John is totally different.

The ps.Dionysius, who lived in the world of Proclean forms of thinking, expressed what *Christians* mean by "the love of God" when saying that the divine love "goes out of itself", seeking the other.[50] It is true, no doubt, that the One of Plotinus is superabundant. It may be said, therefore, that it is "overflowing Goodness". It *radiates* round about it, so that there is ever an encircling light, streaming from it eternally. But it cannot be said that it "goes out of itself, seeking the other". It does not "seek" anything. It stays within itself, turned towards itself in an unfailing self-intention, which Plotinus – just once – called its ἔρως. And the circumradiation that surrounds it (περίλαμψιν, like the sun's encircling light: *Enn.* V 1,6.28f.) is so to speak the by-product of its contemplation.

Ps. Dionysius on divine love.

Dionysius speaks in a different way on the "ecstatic" character of divine Love when saying:

"We must dare to say also this in behalf of the truth: that also the Cause of all things, by the noble love of all things and by means of a superabundance of erotic goodness, goes out of Himself (ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται), by extending His providential cares (προνοίαις) to all kinds of being, and that He so to speak is captivated by (His) goodness, affection and Love".[51]

It should be noticed that "the Cause of all things" is referred to here not in the neuter, but as αὐτὸς ὁ πάντων αἴτιος.

In my earlier paper I concluded that, in contradistinction to Proclus, Dionysius innovated in two respects: first, in that he attributed divine love to God himself, the Cause of all things; second, in that by this very attribution he gave to divine love a central and important place in his theology.

The first-mentioned remark will not require any further explanation, the second, however, does. For Prof. Quispel seems to be rather shocked by the implied suggestion that divine Love would not have taken a central part in Proclus' theology. To prevent further misunderstanding it should be remembered that I was speaking there of "theology" in the strict and limited sense of a science that uses its own technical terminology. For my judgment was based on the fact that the term ἔρως, so frequently used in the Alcibiades-commentary, is absent from the *Elementa Theologiae* and hardly occurs in the *Theologia Platonica*,[52] and this while the whole apparatus of such terms, as προνοητικός, ἀγαθοειδής, σωστικός, τελειωτικός and συνεκτικός, is fully present in those works. Apparently Proclus is avoiding there the term ἔρως. From this fact – which cannot be denied – I concluded that apparently the notion ἔρως was not essential to his theology; moreover, that apparently in the *Elements* he did not especially intend to produce a counterpart to the Christian doctrine of the love of God.

Proclus in his theological works.

To the question, then, of why Proclus avoided the term "eros" in his properly speaking theological works my answer is: he did so on methodological grounds. After all it should not be forgotten that, in spite of his inclination towards "theurgy", Proclus was a philosopher and, as Dodds observed in his Introduction to the *Elements*, a rationalist. Apparently in a work of strictly scientific systematical theology he wished to avoid a term that might be considered to belong more to mythology than to philosophy.

I think Prof. Q. could agree fairly well with me, if he is willing to grant that it is desirable and even necessary to make such a methodological distinction. He can find it right at the beginning of Greek philosophy, with the Milesians Thales and Anaximandros. The latter were preceded by the Orphics and Hesiod who created a mythical theogony, but separated themselves from their way of looking at things and took a different path: that of explaining the cosmos by rational

principles. Certainly, now and then there is still a part of mythology in the systems of the early Greek philosophers. Q. is happy to find Eros together with Aphrodite in Parmenides' explanation of the universe. Nonetheless, it is this philosopher who knew one way of truth only, excluding the other as the way of error, gone by the mass of mortals who never attain to any real insight. Truth is only reached by the intellect, not by the senses. Is it not rather risky then to declare on this basis that cosmogonic, demiurgic, divine Love, conceived by the Orphics, was "received by the Presocratics"?[53] And is it not interesting to see how the ἔρως κοινωνικός of Proclus, which plays so large a part in Boethius' vision of the cosmic order, in Dionysius' version clearly bears the mathematical features of its Pythagorean origin?[54]

I mention this only to remember that the cosmic eros of both Boethius and Dionysius cannot be explained by the cosmogonic Eros of mythology only. Without denying the impact of the *Chaldaean Oracles* on Proclus' thought, of which indirectly an echo is heard in Dionysius, and *sometimes* in Boethius too, I do think the mythological constituent should not be overrated.[55] It was certainly not the only ground of that whole conception of cosmic love, and in the form it took in their thoughts I think it was not even the essential one.

Eros and Christian love in later Greek terminology.

Dionysius denotes the love of God by the term Eros, an act for which he is warmly praised by Q. Now with this usage of language Dionysius is finding himself consciously on the track of Origen. In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song of Songs the Alexandrian master declared that it is just a matter of words either to speak of "amari Deum" (from ἐρᾶν) or "diligi" (from ἀγαπᾶν). One can with equal right say that God is "amor" as, like John, name Him "caritas". "I remember that one of the Saints, I think Ignatius, said about Christ: "My love is crucified". In my opinion he is not to be blamed for that".[56]

Now if Ignatius had actually written those words with reference to Christ, Origen's opinion would be justified. But an inspection of the text referred to[57] shows us with perfect evidence that Ignatius did not speak of Christ when writing those words, but of his desires for earthly things.[58] We must conclude then that Origen's opinion was not well founded. Hence, we cannot follow him in saying that John, instead of

writing "God is agape" might have said with equal right: "God is eros".

Yes, even with a greater right, says Dionysius, for "agapân" is too ordinary a word, "erân" for loving God is certainly more dignified, and "eros" denotes a higher kind of love than the more common "agape".

Here both Origen and Platonism had done their work. The former had been followed by a number of Christian writers, and for a Platonist, no doubt, "eros" was the most appropriate term for "divine things". It must be noticed, however, that this development of Greek love-terminology dates from late Antiquity (4th-5th centuries) and was limited to certain circles.[59]

The Johannine writings in the N.T.

Could this, or rather the revival of the Orphic cosmogonic myth in the Gnostic writings of the 2nd cent., be a ground for us to follow Prof. Q. in his interpretation of the Johannine writings in the N.T.? What he thinks about these writings is the following: "The prophet John", the author of the Apocalypse, wrote a gospel for the congregation of Ephesus, which was "heavily edited" by a Hellenistic Jew, a member of the same community.[60] That the original Gospel was a Jewish-Christian work, appears rather clearly from different features. However, in the form the text has been handed down to us, Q. finds a number of so obvious Greek Eros-elements, that it seems impossible to him that the author of the original Gospel could have written them. And this applies to the text of the First Letter of John as well. He gives "only three examples".

1. Jo. 15.12-13. To the original commandment of loving one's brother Q. thinks the editor added "as I have loved you", so that our love might be like His, self-denying. The additional character of the quoted words might be not directly so obvious to us. What follows is certainly stronger. "No man has greater love for his friends than he who gives his life for them." Certainly, a number of well-known Greek examples may be remembered, and Latin ones as well. But is it true, as Q. says, that there is no parallel whatsoever in the Old Testament, because "the Greek idea of friendship is quite foreign to the Hebrews"? Was it really? How could he forget here David and Jonathan! They are remembered even by Dionysius, *Div.nom.* IV 12.[61]

2. Jo. 13.23, in the description of the Last Supper: "One of his pupils, whom Jesus loved" ...

Q.: "It is unthinkable that the editor found this in his source. – He has introduced something new by making the Last Supper into a symposium."

Did he really? I think we better leave this interpretation entirely to Prof. Q.'s responsibility. As to my own way of reading that text, I can only say that, though Greek literature is quite familiar to me, in reading that passage of John I was not reminded of a Greek symposium, unless in a very exterior way.

3. I John 4, 10 and 19. "All this is typically Orphic and Hellenic."

Well, this is really an amazing statement. Are we then hearing here about a cosmogonic Eros? I thought John was speaking about personal relationships. We read there that "love is out of God". The best parallel to this is Proclus, *in Alcib.* 233, Q. thinks, and for the definition that "God is love" we are sent to Plotinus VI 8,15: there "we find the equivalent."

Here we have to reply quite categorically: "No, we do not." We reflected on the philosopher's words and found that he meant, first, that somehow the prototype of all desire for the Perfect, for Goodness-itself (taken impersonally), must be in the Good-itself; and next, that of course the "love" or "striving" of the First cannot be for anything inferior to itself. But with these reflexions we are certainly not there, where John (or his supposed "editor") is. For John by no means speaks of the Love of God from a human point of view, not as a striving or a prototype of striving for Perfection. John is thinking of the God of Israel who elected the Jewish people, who spoke to them through the prophets and who at last sent them His Son. There is nothing Greek and nothing of mythology either behind or in his words. There is a piece of history behind it: Jesus Christ crucified and risen. On this ground John could say that God is love.

Boethius and Dionysius.

I am afraid that Prof. Q. is missing the point when he finds in Boethius and in Dionysius the Areopagite "the most thoughtful and sagacious exegetes of John" in his speaking about the love of God.[62] I should like to read Q.'s following sentence[63] in this form:

"Both Dionysius and Boethius show how easily a Christian formed in the Neoplatonist school of the end of the fifth or the beginning

of the sixth centuries might come to integrate the cosmological and philosophical thoughts about Eros into his own system, and how great the danger was that in doing so he would not really speak about the love of God in the sense of Christian Revelation."

I do think that Dionysius transformed and corrected Neoplatonist theology, precisely in transforming the idea of eros. As for Boethius' metr.8 of *Cons.*II, in rereading it on the occasion of Prof.Q.'s paper I am most struck by the fact that this "*amor*" was essentially a *cosmic* love, primarily directed towards the world, ruling it and keeping it together, towards man only secondarily. What strikes me next is that in the world of man that cosmic love is aiming first at collective entities, peoples being connected by alliances, next at connexions between individuals, either in the bond of marriage or of a faithful sodalicitas. It seems as if the individual person as such is not aimed at at all! – This is, so one might say, a highly modern view of man: human existence is a being-for-the-other, and it should be so. Yet it does seem to me that Jesus Christ was interested in individual man, not primarily under the aspect either of marriage or of faithful friendship, and first of all, that the love of God, as brought out both in the Old Testament and in the New, was primarily directed towards man. There seems to me, then, to be an essential difference between Boethius' cosmic love and the love of God as it is known to us through the Bible and in particular through Jesus Christ.

However, Boethius will have his XV centuries birthday congress this very year,[64] and this will give me, I hope, the opportunity of saying a few words more on his "amor quo caelum regitur".

NOTES

[1] In: *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition.* Théologie historique 53, in honorem Robert M. Grant, ed. by W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Beauchesne 1979) 189-205.

[2] Not correct is in l. 4 "the *frightening* seeds of things" instead of "fighting" (*pugnantia semina*!) and *lame* instead of *tame*. In the last few lines, where the *amor quo caelum regitur* is mentioned, of course *Eros* had to come in, which causes a complete recasting of the English version.

[3] Q. refers to the dialogue as Plato's. It should be mentioned that there are decisive grounds for denying its authenticity, though it certainly came from Plato's immediate surroundings. The grounds against the authenticity were summed up by E. de Strycker in *Les Études Classiques* 1942, p. 135-151.

[4] By some kind of "photomontage"-process he makes me say *in dealing with Proclus* that *for Greek thought in general* it was a kind of anomaly to speak of divine Love. In fact, the tenor of my account of the love terminology in Greek philosophy, as expounded in the *Vivarium* article, was rather to contradict such a general statement. After all, such a blunt verdict as this, that "the concept of divine love (sic) was completely alien to Greek thought" could hardly be expected from the author of the three volumes of *Greek Philosophy*. Nor would it have been possible to that author, after having found the concept of pronoetic love in Proclus, to declare that "this does not mean anything", and such because it would have been "an anomaly in Proclus". In fact I *did* speak of the term ἔρως applied to a divine being as a kind of anomaly in nature, such as was called a *teras* by Aristotle and by the Latins *monstrum*. However, I said that not in dealing with Proclus (p. 31, where Q. puts it in), but on p. 16–17, where I explained that *Plato by defining Eros as he did*, "could not, according to his way of speaking, have attributed an ἔρως to the gods". A way of speaking which, indeed, left deep traces in Greek thought and language, even in later centuries.

[5] In my *Vivarium* paper of 1963 I took Dionysius, *De div.nom.* IV, up at ch. 10 and reflected extensively about it (my comments took more than twenty dense pages).

[6] A. Nygren, *Eros und Agape, Gestaltwandlungen der christlichen Liebe*, vol. I (Gütersloh 1930)160f., declares that in Aristotle Eros is "zu einer allgemeinen Weltkraft erhoben": in "matter" there is already the "longing" for "form". For this psychologizing interpretation of a natural process N. refers to H. Siebeck, *Aristoteles*, 1910. He neither observes that in explaining the process of "*Selbstentfaltung*" in natural objects Aristotle never spoke of ἔρως, nor did he notice that this very process is closed as soon as the form is realized in the object. By this self-realization the *telos* is reached, so that any further "striving" after an ultimate transcendent *agathon* is excluded. Cp. my paper on 'La méthode d'Aristote en métaphysique d'après *Metaph.* A 1–2' in: *Aristote et les problèmes de méthode* (Symposium Aristotelicum, Louvain 1960), ed. 1961, p. 147–170.

[7] p. 838.

[8] In *K.D.* III, 2 (1948)341, Barth called that tendency in the theology of the last decads "*etwas Ungutes*".

[9] In *Phys.* II. Aristotle's account of the physical process is excellently explained by A. Mansion, *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*, Paris-Louvain ²1946.

[10] I am thinking in particular of L. B. Geiger, *Aristote et Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain 1957) esp. p. 202.

[11] Robert Joly of the University of Brussels traces the history of the words φιλεῖν ἀγαπᾶν in a comparatively recent treatise, *Le vocabulaire chrétien de l'amour est-il original?* φιλεῖν et ἀγαπᾶν *dans le grec antique*. Brussels 1968, ²1971. He does not cease at the first century, but goes on into the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D. Joly offers a highly probable explanation for the change in Greek love terminology of which the beginnings can be found in 4th century classical writers. He mentions a nice parallel in the French dislike of the verb "baiser". Of a particular interest is his remark about the frequent use of φιλεῖν, occurring especially in papyrus letters of the Hellenistic age (treated by C. Spick, Le lexique de l'amour dans les papyrus et dans quelques inscriptions de l'époque hellénistique, in: *Mnemosyne* 1955, p. 25–33). These are informal documents, written in everyday language, so one might think. On closer in-

spection this appears not so. For the verb φιλεῖν is used there regularly in the closing formula of letters. Now such a formula is precisely not everyday language!

Joly mentions the much earlier work of B. B. Warfield, 'The Terminology of Love in the N.T.' in: *The Princeton Theol.Rev.* 1918, p. 1–45, 153–203. Warfield was clearly inspired by the pioneering work of the German scholar Adolf Deissmann, who towards the end of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th cent. worked on the then new papyrus- and ostraka-material of the Hellenistic age and on the basis of these non-literary testimonies dealt with the New Testament as a Hellenistic "book of the people" (*das NT als hellenistisches Volksbuch*). It is curious that R. Joly does not mention Deissmann's epoch-making "Licht vom Osten" by a single word.

[12] The schedule is found in *Eros und Agape*, part I, 185f.

[13] K.D. III 2, par. 45.2.

[14] K.D. IV 2, par. 68.

[15] A similar protest against the "sharp antithesis" made by Nygren, which led to "fatal consequences", was made by G. Bornkamm, *Jesus von Nazareth* (Stuttgart 1956, [3]1959) 106–108.

[16] Plato, *Apol.* 29d–30a.

[17] Plato, *Phaedr.* 246b.

[18] J. M. Rist, *Eros and Psyche. Studies in Plato, Plotinus and Origen.* Toronto 1964.

[19] O.c. 207.

[20] O.c. 25f.

[21] Called τὸ ἀληθές by Plato, *Symp.* 212a.

[22] This was Prof. Grube's opinion, quoted by Rist, p. 23f., by way of introduction to his treatment of the theme of love in Plato. Grube thought that with Plato on his upward journey "something had gone wrong". Why? Well, because he (G.) could not understand that the contemplation of supreme Beauty could produce a satisfaction which "we" could call "the satisfaction of love". Love, so he thought, "must surely be limited to the relations between individuals". Therefore, "we should part company with Plato, where Diotima reaches the beauty of 'laws and institutions'."

[23] Procl. *in Alcib.* p. 26.2ff. Westerink, quoted extensively in my *Vivarium* paper of 1963, p. 33, with the reference to the *Chald.Oracles*. Quispel, 'God is Eros', p. 196, cites the English translation by O'Neill, 1965.

[24] I referred to Kroll, *De orac. Chald.* p. 25. In the more recent edition of E. des Places (Coll.Budé, 1971), it is the fr.39.

[25] I notice this in order to remember that Plato did not speak of ἔρως in this context. He shared the *Pythagorean* view of ὁμόνοια, φιλία and ἁρμονία as principles that rule both the kosmos and the world of man, *Gorg.* 504–507. It is almost certain that this Pythagorean view was present to Proclus' mind as well, and certainly it was to Boethius.

[26] *Rep.*VI, 508e–509a. On this passage my contribution 'Encore une fois: le Bien dans la République de Platon', in *Zetesis* (Mélanges De Strycker), Antwerpen 1973.

[27] It is to be remembered that for Plato and many of his contemporaries the sun was not just another visible object, but actually of a higher ontological order. The heavenly bodies were, in Plato's terminology, "visible gods".

[28] Rist, *o.c.*, p. 30f. judiciously defends A. E. Taylor's explanation of the divine goodness of the Demiurge. He also remarks quite correctly that on no account Plato's

Demiurge "worked like a human craftsman", as has been frequently said by early Christian writers. Rist marks the difference: first, the human craftsman does not make his products in order that all things might be as much as possible like "himself"; next, he does not produce them "because he is good". He might be a scoundrel and yet a good craftsman! That is right. Nonetheless, Taylor was "christianizing" when understanding the Demiurge as "God" the Creator in the biblical sense, simply because the Demiurge was, ontologically speaking, not at the top.

[29] *Apol.* 30e–31a, referred to by Rist, o.c. p. 32.

[30] *Laws* X 904c–905b. Cf. 906 a–b.

[31] It is interesting – though a very late parallel – to read Porphyry's admonition to his wife Marcella (*Ad Marc.* 21–24) about divine providence. The passage shows a remarkably close correspondence to Plato's words to the young man, cited above. To be noticed in Porphyry's passage is, that apparently the word θεός is used there in rather a vague and general sense, never with the article and repeatedly alternating with θεοί. The belief in divine providence (ὅτι ὑπὸ θεοῦ προνοεῖται πάντα) and that divine messengers (the διαπορθμεύοντες of Plato, *Symp.* 202e) and good genii (δαίμονες) are perpetually supervising our deeds, Porphyry calls a "privilege" (γέρας) of those who "know" (about the gods) and "believe". On the contrary, those who forget god (θεός, sing. and without article) will become the dwelling-place of daemons. "For the soul is either a dwelling-place of gods (plur.) or of daemons". And never a man will escape divine superintendence: the eye of the gods is always on him.

Up to here the correspondence with Plato is almost perfect. The passage illustrates very well how misleading it is to modern ears to speak here simply of "God".

[32] Procl., *In Alcib.* 51. 1–6; p. 22f. Westerink.

[33] Ibid., 51.8–52.14 (p. 23 W.).

[34] Fr. 46 des Places. Porph. *Ad Marc.* 24 (Nauck p. 289.17f.) wishes to establish four principles (τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα), adding ἐλπίς to the three mentioned by the *Oracles*. So does Proclus, *in Tim.* I 212.21. Ἐλπίς seems to be of Chaldaean origin. It occurs also in Iambl., *De myst.* II 6; V 26. Des Places, *Orac.Chald.*, Notice, p. 275; H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theology*, Caïro 1956, p. 144–147, with notes 289–296.

[35] Fr. 42 des Pl.; Lewy, *o.c.*, 127.

[36] Fr. 44 des Pl.; Lewy 179.

[37] Apparently Iamblichus admitted three intelligible Triads, viewing each particular member of his first Triad as a new one. After these three νοηταὶ τριάδες and, as it seems, after three others of νοεροὶ θεοί, he speaks of a νοερὰ ἑβδομάς, of which the first three – the πηγαῖοι πατέρες – by Procl., *In Tim.* I, p. 308f., are more or less described according to their functions, the first of them as the πατρικὸς Noûs, the middle as the source of divine life, while the third is identified with the Demiurge. I quoted the text in *Gr.Phil.* III 1451b, with some comments and related texts of Damascius a.o.

Psellus in his Hypotyposis of the *Chald.Or.* refers to it as the πηγαία τριάς, by which we can rank it on the third ontological level, which is that of the πηγαία ἑβδομάς, on which the Demiurge Noûs is placed.

[38] This is in accordance with Arnobius' account, *Adv. nat.*II 25, who assigns to the perfect, immortal and divine Soul the fourth rank, "*post Deum principem rerum et post mentes geminas*". Cf. Des Places, Notice p. 29ff. The "two minds" of Arnobius' "*viri novi*" are paralleled by the First and the Second Noûs of Numenius.

[39] Proclus *in Alcib.* 49–56 (p. 22–25 Westerink).

[40] 55.15–56.2.

[41] I avoid using the term "models" for παραδείγματα, because it evokes different associations from Plato's metaphysical archetypes in the minds of modern scientists and scholars.

[42] Ibid. 50.20 (p. 22, Westerink).

[43] Ibid. 51.5 (p. 23, W.).

[44] Ibid. 51.8ff., cited in n. 32.

[45] Plato, *Laws* 906ab.

[46] It might be not superfluous to notice that the idea of "a stream of divine Love descending from Above" was certainly not first introduced into Greek philosophical thought by Proclus. Dodds in his *Introduction* and *Commentary* to the *Elem.Theol.* remarked that Zeller was mistaken on this topic: Proclus found his explanation of the world-process by the triad of μένειν, προιέναι and ἐπιστρέφειν at any rate in Iamblichus, from whom he borrowed a considerable part of his terminology (Dodds, *o.c.* XXIIff. and 220f.).

[47] Quispel, p. 194, cites: "He is loveable, Love itself and self-love". As a matter of fact, this is not what Plotinus wrote according to the best manuscript tradition. It reads: Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως. Which was correctly rendered when I noticed (p. 21,1.1–2 of my *Vivarium* article, 1963) that in VI 8,15 we find "the First Principle called ἐράσμιον and ἔρως at the same time". That is what the text says. It is interesting that W. Theiler suggested to delete the ὁ before αὐτός. However, we cannot say that the MS reading makes no sense. Henry and Schwyzer had good grounds for not following Theiler's suggestion. I have quoted Plotinus' text correctly, but let it follow by a non-precise translation, which unfortunately was taken over by prof. Q.

[48] Cp. the passage in *Enn.* V 1,6.11–27, where he emphasizes that the One stays always with itself, not turning to anything else, "for there was not anything". I commented on VI 8,15 in *Vivarium* 1963, p. 21f.

[49] Among theologians, or perhaps in the reformatorian world as a whole, since Anders Nygren the word "self-love" has acquired an extremely unfavourable sense. "Selbstliebe", that is exactly what has to be cast out from our hearts, and only when that bad "Greek love" has disappeared, can the true love of God come in. I can imagine that it must have been almost intolerable to Prof. Quispel (who is an Eros-enthusiast) to find in my Boethius-paper of 1963 that for Plotinus, according to *Enn.* VI 8,15, the Love of God was "self-love". Well, there is nothing to be done about that. Only this much can be said with certainty, that for Plotinus the Love of God was the highest and most perfect Love and as such could only be the love to Himself.

[50] *De div.nom.* IV 13: Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐκστατικὸς ὁ θεῖος ἔρως, οὐκ ἐῶν ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐραστάς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων. I quoted this sentence of Dionysius in my earlier paper (*Vivarium* 1963, p. 22) and noticed the difference from Plotinus in *Enn.*V 1,6.

[51] In the same par. 13 of *De div.nom.* IV. The Greek text and the English translation are in my above-cited paper, p. 25.

[52] The words ἔρωτι βαθεῖ, a quotation from the *Chald.Or.* (fr. 43 des Pl.) in the *Theol.Plat.* (4.25 Portus), are not a part of the "Theology" itself. They occur in an

introductory chapter (I,2) on the method to be followed and the required disposition of the student's mind: his soul must be totally filled by that "deep love" which is mentioned in the *Oracles*.

[53] Quispel, o.c., p. 201.

[54] *De div.nom.* IV 10, cited in English translation in my *Vivarium* paper of 1963, p. 11ff. The ἔρως κοινωνικός and its mathematical character is discussed there, p. 15f.

[55] As for Boethius, his cosmic Love, as described in *Cons.* II m. 8, does seem to me essentially determined by philosophical conceptions, not by a mythological cosmogonic Eros. Elsewhere, however, traces of Chaldaean influence are manifest. I am thinking of *Cons.* III, m. 9 (*O qui perpetua*), l. 19 (astral bodies attached to souls in their ascent through the heavenly spheres) and l. 21, *reduci igne reverti*. Lit.: Fr. Klingner, *De Boethii Consol.* (Berlin 1921)48 and 50; W. Theiler, 'Antike und christliche Rückkehr zu Gott', in: *Mullus* (Festschrift Klauser) 1964, p. 359.

[56] Origenes, *Comm. in Cant. Cant.*, Prologus, p. 71.22ff.

[57] Ignatius, Ad Rom. 7.2.

[58] The first to remark this was, as far as I know, Harnack. He wrote a special treatise, *Der "Eros" in der alten christlichen Literatur* (Sitzungsberichte d.Preuss.Akad.d.Wiss., 1918, I, 81–94), in which the text of Ignatius is discussed (82–84). A. Nygren, *Eros und Agape*, vol. II (1937) 188f., deals extensively with it. On Dionys.Areop. *ibid.*, 410–414.

[59] Quispel p. 192, n. 3, quotes the Christian author Macarius. One other instance taken from a pagan author is Porphyrius, who writes to his wife that one must turn to God (πρὸς τὸν θεόν this time: he is speaking now of the πρῶτος θεός) and in faith try with all one's forces to know the truth about Him, and then, after coming to know Him, ἐρασθῆναι τοῦ γνωσθέντος (*Ad Marc.* 24).

[60] The theory that the Fourth Gospel is based upon a Jewish-Christian gospel, which has undergone a thoroughgoing revision, was recently defended by Robert T. Fortna, *The Gospel of Signs*, Cambridge 1970, and 'The Theological Use of Locale in the Fourth Gospel', in: *Anglican Theol. Review*, Suppl.Series 3 (1974), 58–95. Prof. Q. refers to these works.

[61] I think it better not to speak of an "erotic relation" either in this Jewish case or in such bonds of solid friendship as, for instance, that of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer, of Nisus and Euryalus in Vergil, or of the Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias. Neither the Hebrew nor the primary Greek and Latin sources give us any grounds for using such an ambiguous term which for moderns evokes exactly that kind of associations which in none of the originals was either given or implied. It should be remembered that Socrates, who ironically called himself an ἐρωτικός and in a sense is described as such, according to a first hand testimony (that of the half-drunk Alcibiades, praising Socrates in a symposium! Plato, *Symp.* 216c–217a), when put to the test, "despised the beauty" of his young friend completely, and that Greek philosophers on the whole – not only Plato and Plotinus – had an extremely strict idea about σωφροσύνη. What, for instance, Plotinus held about sex relations, did not differ anyhow from the most severe instructions of "*Humanae vitae*", neither in the positive nor in the negative.

[62] Quispel, o.c., 205.

[63] Q. wrote: "Both Dionysius and Boethius show how easily a Christian could

integrate the Orphic and philosophical concept of Eros into his own system, when he wanted to speak about the love of God."

[64] This was written in 1980. The Boethius Congress was held at Pavia, 5-8 Oct. of the same year. The Records ("Atti") will be published by the Istituto Patristico "Augustinianum", Rome (1981). My contribution will appear in French: '*Amor quo caelum regitur*: Amour cosmique provenant de la philosophie grecque, ou l'amour du Dieu de la Bible?'

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REVIEWS

Origène, *Traité des Principes*, Livres III–IV. Tome III : Introduction, Texte critique de la Philocalie et de la version de Rufin, Traduction. Tome IV : Commentaire et Fragments, par Henri Crouzel et Manlio Simonetti (Sources Chrétiennes, 268–269). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1980. 432, 280 pp.

Par ces deux tomes s'achève l'édition avec traduction et commentaire du *Traité des Principes* d'Origène. Un cinquième volume apportera plus tard un complément à l'introduction ainsi que les Index. La présentation du texte de ces deux livres est notablement différente de celle des livres I et II, parce que les livres III et IV ont été conservés non seulement dans la traduction latine de Rufin, mais aussi, pour une grande partie, en grec dans la *Philocalie*. Cela s'applique au chapitre I du livre III du *Peri Archon* et aux chapitres I et II et à la plus grande partie du chapitre III du livre IV. De ces parties on trouve ici deux textes avec deux traductions françaises.

En étudiant ces deux textes il ne faut jamais oublier que le texte grec n'est pas en tant que tel préférable à la version rufinienne. Il ne représente qu'une tradition *indirecte*. Parfois la traduction de Rufin semble donner une 'version' qui est plus fidèle à l'original que celle de la *Philocalie* (p.e. IV 3, 10). Le jugement des éditeurs dans cette matière est très prudent.

La lecture de ces deux tomes a donné lieu aux remarques suivantes.

III 1, 5 (ligne 75) : Origène, s'opposant à ceux qui disent que l'homme est contraint par des stimulants extérieurs, dit que cela est οὐκ ἀληθὲς οὐδὲ εὔγνωμον, βουλομένου τε λόγος ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου παραχαράττειν. Traduction du Père C. : »ce n'est ni vrai ni noble ; la raison de qui veut qu'il en soit ainsi est la suivante : falsifier la notion du libre arbitre« (p. 31). Evidemment il fait dépendre le verbe παραχαράττειν de λόγος et doit ajouter un objet au participe βουλομένου. Mais la construction est beaucoup plus

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simple : le verbe παραχ. dépend du participe, qui à son tour dépend de λόγος (ἐστιν). Alors : »c'est le raisonnement de quelqu'un qui veut falsifier la notion du libre arbitre". La traduction de Rufin est un peu libre mais juste : *Quod ... ad hoc solum fingitur, ut libertas arbitrii denegetur.*

III 5, 1. *Post haec iam quoniam quidem unum de ecclesiasticis definitionibus habetur praecipue secundum historiae nostrae fidem, quod mundus hic factus sit ...* Dans ce passage on traduit les mots *secundum historiae nostrae fidem* par »selon la foi qu'il faut avoir en notre histoire«. A mon avis, il faudrait traduire : »selon le témoignage de notre histoire (c'est-à-dire de la Genèse)«. Cf. un peu plus loin : *secundum scripturae fidem* (2.65-66).

III 5, 3. Origène a fait remarquer que l'opinion qui dit que le monde a commencé dans le temps engendre les objections suivantes : Que faisait Dieu avant que le monde ne commence? Etait-il alors oisif et immobile? Y avait-il un temps où la bonté ne faisait le bien, et où la toute-puissance n'exerçait pas sa domination? Et Origène poursuit : *Ad quas propositiones non arbitror aliquem haereticorum secundum rationem dogmatis sui posse facile respondere.* Dans le commentaire on lit : »En fait les hérétiques admettent le début et la fin du monde : les objecteurs sont donc des païens«. *A priori* cela me semble déjà extrêmement invraisemblable, pour ne pas dire impossible. On devrait au moins apporter des textes parallèles pour un tel emploi du mot *haeretici.* Mais le raisonnement des éditeurs me semble d'ailleurs être illogique. La plupart des païens croyaient en un monde sans début et sans fin. Pourquoi auraient-ils besoin d'une réponse à une thèse qui n'est pas la leur? En d'autres termes, si Origène dirait ici qu'un païen ne pourrait pas facilement répondre à ces propositions, ce serait une observation vaine. A mon avis Origène parle ici de gens qui, comme Origène lui-même, admettent un début et une fin de ce monde visible, mais qui n'adhèrent pas à la théorie développée par Origène dans ce chapitre pour échapper à ces conséquences.

III 5, 6 (ligne 157). En plusieurs endroits les commentateurs ont découvert dans la traduction de Rufin des réminiscences virgiliennes. Ici *non ... tali auxilio* rappelle au lecteur l'*Aen.* 2, 521.

IV 4, 6. Dans la récapitulation, à la fin de son traité, Origène discute d'une façon relativement extensive le problème de la matière. Il constate d'abord qu'il n'a pas trouvé jusqu'alors dans les Écritures le mot ὕλη dans ce sens – excepté seulement dans la *Sagesse de Salomon,*

»livre dont l'autorité n'est pas reconnue de tous« (il vise à *Sag.* 11, 17 : ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης). Mais, dit-il, il y en a beaucoup qui pensent que la terre invisible et sans ordre de Genèse 1,2a Moïse n'indique autre chose que la matière informe. S'il s'agit vraiment là de la matière, Origène poursuit, il s'ensuit que les principes des corps ne sont pas immuables. Cela veut dire que les philosophes qui admettent des principes restant immuables à travers tous les changements (comme les atomistes) ont tort : »Ils n'ont pu placer parmi les principes le mot de matière, c'est-à-dire ce qui définit au premier chef la matière«. Jusqu'ici l'argumentation est claire. Origène poursuit : *Neque enim cum materiam subiciunt omni corpori per omnia convertibilem substantiam vel commutabilem vel divisibilem, extra qualitates eam secundum proprietatem suam subicient. Quibus etiam nos adquiescimus* ... La première phrase contient une contradiction. Car lorsqu'on fait de la matière le substrat de tous les corps, comme une substance convertible, changeable et divisible de toute manière, *on doit* la faire selon sa nature propre sans qualités. Quand on maintient *neque*, le texte dit *qu'on ne le doit pas.* (La traduction française de la dernière partie de cette phrase dans l'édition présente est très forcée : »ils ne pourront *le* faire selon sa nature propre *en faisant abstraction des* qualités«). A mon avis la négation (*neque*) n'a pas sa place dans cette phrase. Cette opinion est confirmée par les mots suivants : *Quibus etiam nos adquiescimus.* Qui sont les penseurs à qui (*quibus*) Origène se joint ici? Evidemment ceux qui tiennent que la substance corporelle (la matière) est complètement transformable et, par conséquence, sans aucune qualité propre. Voyez les derniers mots de ce passage : *Quae omnia documento sunt quod substantia corporalis permutabilis sit et ex omni in omnem deveniat qualitatem.*

Alors, les philosophes à qui le pronom *quibus* renvoie, ne sont pas les atomistes etc., de la phrase précédente, mais leurs adversaires, selon lesquels une matière sans qualité est le substrat de tous les corps. Donc la négation *neque* n'a pas sa place ici. Les éditeurs allemands de ce *Traité des Principes*, H. Görgemanns et H. Karpp (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976) ont constaté aussi l'incohérence du texte latin et ils ont fait une suggestion intéressante pour expliquer cette lecture erronée. Elle aurait été causée par une corruption du grec original, où on aurait lu οὐ au lieu de οἱ.

Les éditeurs présents ne commentent pas ce passage. Ils ne mentionnent donc pas la suggestion des éditeurs allemands. Dans le pre-

mier volume (p. 63) ils ont dit que malheureusement ils n'avaient pu tenir compte de l'édition allemande pour la préparation des livres I et II. Est-ce qu'il en était de même pour les livres III et IV?

IV 4, 7. Dans ce paragraphe Origène mentionne une théorie remarquable selon laquelle la matière n'est autre chose que l'ensemble des qualités. Une telle théorie a l'avantage que le problème d'une matière incréée ne se pose plus. Car, dit-on, les qualités sont tout, et quant à ces qualités tous affirment qu'elles ont été faites par Dieu. Origène formule cette argumentation de la façon suivante: *Unde et hi, qui haec adserunt* (c'est-à-dire que les qualités sont tout) *adseverare conati sunt ut, quoniam omnes, qui materiam infectam dicunt, qualitates a deo factas esse confitentur, inveniatur per hoc etiam secundum ipsos nec materia esse infecta, si quidem qualitates sint omnia, quae utique sine contradictione ab omnibus a deo facta esse pronuntiantur.* Plusieurs savants ont eu des difficultés avec la construction de cette phrase. Ils ont supposé qu'il y avait une lacune avant *adseverare*. Les éditeurs présents disent dans l'apparat critique: *post* adserunt (il faudrait dire: *ante* adseverare) *lacunam signavit Koe* (= Koetschau), *reputans hic deesse* mirum quoddam *vel quid simile, sed nulla cogente ratione, quia sensus sermonis bene fluit etiam sine supplemento.* Quant au sens de la phrase, on a sans doute raison. Mais n'a-t-on pas vu qu'une construction du verbe *adseverare* avec *ut* est assez remarquable? Je n'en connais pas d'autres exemples.

Pour les idées développées dans ce passage le commentaire renvoie le lecteur à quelques textes (Plutarque, Diogène Laërce etc.) qui ne me semblent pas expliquer beaucoup. On trouve de vrais parallèles dans l'article de Mme M. Alexandre, L'exégèse de Genèse 1, 1–2a dans l'In Hexaéméron de Grégoire de Nysse: deux approches du problème de la matière, *Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie*, herausg. von H. Dörrie, M. Altenburger, U. Schramm (Leiden, Brill, 1976, p. 159ss.). Le problème de l'origine de cette théorie remarquable demande encore une étude plus approfondie.

Ces remarques ne doivent cependant pas obscurcir les grands mérites de cette édition qui aidera beaucoup à mieux comprendre ce texte extrêmement important.

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Heinrich Bacht, *Das Vermächtnis des Ursprungs. Studien zum frühen Christentum I* (Studien zur Theologie des geistlichen Lebens, 5). Würzburg, Echter Verlag, 1972. 292 S.

Der Titel dieses Buches lässt nicht vermuten, dass es sich hier um einen einzigen koptischen Mönch handelt, nämlich Horsiesius, Jünger des Pachomius, und zunächst um seinen nur in der lateinischen Übersetzung des Hieronymus überlieferten „Liber", dessen Text (S. 58–189) mit deutscher Übersetzung den Hauptteil dieses Werkes ausmacht. Dem Text geht eine Einleitung über den Mann und sein Werk voraus und es folgen vier Exkurse, deren Themen sind: die Rolle der Heiligen Schrift bei Horsiesius, die Vaterschaft des Pachomius, sein Armutsverständnis, „Meditatio" in den ältesten Mönchsquellen.

Der Titel verrät jedoch den Gesichtspunkt, von dem heraus das Buch geschrieben ist. Es soll, sagt der Verf. in seinem Vorwort, „nicht musealer Neugier dienen, sondern die Aktualität dessen zeigen, was ‚im Anfang' war". Diese Zielsetzung verleiht den beigegebenen Studien, die Überarbeitungen früherer Veröffentlichungen sind, eine grosse Lebendigkeit, die jedoch die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Abhandlungen keineswegs hindert.

Der „liber" des Horsiesius zeigt klar, dass es eine Form von Askese und Mystik gegeben hat, die nicht von hellenistischer Spekulation beeinflusst war. Sein Buch, das sich als ein Testament beim Hinscheiden präsentiert, hat als einzige Quelle die Heilige Schrift. Verschiedene Gelehrten haben über die grosse Vertrautheit mit der Schrift ziemlich negative Urteile geäussert. Lietzmann hat den häufigen Schriftgebrauch sehr denigrierend als im Grunde „ein geistiges Mattenflechten" qualifiziert. Das Werk des Horsiesius bietet dem Verf. eine gute Gelegenheit dieses Urteil zu bekämpfen.

Da es sich um die erste vollständige deutsche Übersetzung handelt, schien es sinnvoll dieser spezielle Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen. Dies hat die folgenden Bemerkungen veranlasst.

Der Text fängt an mit einem Zitat aus Baruch, dessen erster Satz, *Audi, Israhel, mandata vitae, auribus percipe et intellege prudentiam*, so übertragen wird: „Höre, Israel, die Gebote des Lebens: vernimm [sie] mit den Ohren und begreif [sie mit] Klugheit". Die Übersetzung des zweiten Teils scheint mir nicht einwandfrei. Die Worte „vernimm [sie] mit den Ohren" sind eine allzu sklavische Übertragung, und „begreif [sie mit] Klugheit" ist m.E. unrichtig. Die Klugheit oder

Weisheit ist das Objekt des *intellegere*. Der Septuagintatext lautet: ἐνωτίσασθε γνῶναι φρόνησιν. Dies wird in der Vulgata mit *auribus percipe, ut scias prudentiam* übertragen, und hier schreibt Hieronymus: *auribus percipe et intellege prudentiam*. Also: „höre zu und verstehe (oder: „um zu verstehen") was Klugheit ist". – Auch die Übersetzung des weiteren Zitats ist nicht einwandfrei. Die Verbalformen *inveterasti, commoratus es* und *comparatus es* sind ungenau übertragen, und auch ist nicht deutlich, warum diese Verben von *quid est quoniam* abhängig gemacht werden. In den Septuaginta ist das zwar der Fall, der Verf. sagt jedoch (S. 21, Anm. 2), dass es sein Bemühen ist die im „Liber" gebotene Version wiederzugeben.

Nachdem Horsiesius die Pflichten der Hausobern und der „Zweiten" behandelt hat, sagt er (Kap. 19): *Sed et vos omnes, fratres, qui subiecti estis per ordinem liberae servitutis* (*servituti* ist ein Druckfehler) ... B. übersetzt: „Aber auch ihr Brüder alle, die ihr euch, jeder nach seinem Rang, der freien Dienstbarkeit unterworfen habt ...", und gibt diese Erklärung: „Die Vorstellung vom ‚ordo' als der durch das ‚Professalter' bestimmten Rangordnung spielt also schon von Anfang an im Mönchtum eine wichtige Rolle" (S. 99, Anm. 68). Nun muss man dem Verf. zugestehen, dass es im frühen Mönchtum offensichtlich eine solche Rangordnung gegeben hat, aber darüber spricht der in Rede stehende Text m.E. nicht. Es handelt sich hier um alle Brüder, die den Obern unterworfen sind *per ordinem servitutis*, d.h. im Range von Dienern, und zwar in einer freigewählten Dienstbarkeit. In dieser Hinsicht sind sie alle gleich; sie gehören alle zu dem *ordo servorum*. Es lässt sich ja doch auch kaum denken, dass die Pflicht des Gehorsamkeit für die Mönche je nach eines jeden Rang, d.h. je nach dem Professalter, verschieden gewesen wäre. Das hätte eine ganz merkwürdige Klosterstruktur gegeben.

In Kap. 54 sagt Horsiesius: *Meminerimus esse praeceptum quoties peccanti in nos ignoscere debemus*. B. übersetzt: „Denken wir daran, dass es ein Gebot gibt, dem Sünder so oft zu verzeihen, als er gegen uns gesündigt hat". Der Text sagt jedoch: „Denken wir daran, dass es ein Gebot gibt, wieviel Mal wir jemandem, der gegen uns sündigt, verzeihen müssen". (Siebzig Mal sieben Mal!).

In Kap. 56 liest man: *Nec subtraxi aliquid quod vobis utile sentiebam, ut non dicerem*. B. übersetzt: „Ich habe euch nichts vorenthalten, was mir für euch nützlich schien, dass ich es euch sagte". Man soll das *ut non dicerem* mit *nec subtraxi aliquid* verbinden und übersetzen: „so dass ich es euch nicht sagte".

Im selben Kapitel eignet sich Horsiesius Paulus' berühmte Worte zu: *bonum certamen certavi* etc., fügt aber etwas hinzu, indem er sagt: *certamen bonum ex parte certavi.* B' Übersetzung lautet: „Ich habe für [meinen] Teil den guten Kampf gekämpft". Aber dann hätte dort etwa *pro mea parte* stehen müssen, und davon abgesehen, was hat eine derartige Hinzufügung für einen Sinn? Man kann ja doch den Lebenskampf nur ‚für seinen Teil' kämpfen. Es zeigt sich hier, m.E., Horsiesius' Bescheidenheit, die Paulus' Worte einigermassen abschwächt und sagt: „ich habe teilweise den guten Kampf gekämpft.

Der lateinische Text, den der Verf. bietet, ist der von A. Boon, *Pachomiana latina.* In der Übersetzung weicht er jedoch bisweilen von der dort gegebenen Interpunktion ab. Es folgen hier einige störende Druckfehler: in Kap. 1 am Ende füge man nach *suos* hinzu: *et quasi pater filios emendans*; Kap. 42, Zeile 12: *metamus* (statt *metuamus*); Kap. 47, Zeile 16: *domino* (statt *domini*); Kap. 52, Z. 3 a fine: *patri* (statt *parit*).

In Kap. 48 zitiert Horsiesius numeri 24,17: *exsurget homo de Israhel, qui percutiet principes Moab et vastet filios Seth.* Die Verbalform *vastet* regt hier Bedenken. In der Vulgata liest man *vastabit.* Der Hosiersiustext in Migne (P.G. 103, 472C und P.G. 40, 890C) lässt das Verbum aus. Man kann Hieronymus eine Verbalform *vastet* nach dem Futurum *percutiet* kaum zutrauen.

Der Verf. hat diesen Band als ersten einer Reihe von drei geplant. Man sieht erwartungsvoll der Fortsetzung dieses Werkes entgegen.

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Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum. Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der Antiken Welt. Herausgegeben von Theodor Klauser, Carsten Colpe, Ernst Dassmann, Albrecht Dihle, Bernard Kötting, Wolfgang Speyer, Jan Hendrik Waszink. Lieferungen 81, 82, 83. Stuttgart, Anton Hiersmann, 1979-80.

Die Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der Antiken Welt, der dieses Lexikon gewidmet ist, prägt sich je nach den verschiedenen Gebieten des Lebens verschieden aus. Sie kann zunächst bestehen in Verschiedenheit von Beurteilung einer Praxis. Um eine derartige Materie handelt es sich in den hier zu rezensierenden Lieferungen in dem

Artikel 'Gladiator' (Werner Weismann), 'Girlande' (Robert Turcan) und 'Glocke' (Maria Trumpf-Lyritzaki). Es kann auch gehen um eine Verschiedenheit in Anwendung bestimmter materieller Sachen, wie in 'Glas' (Clasina Isings) und 'Glyptik' (Josef Engemann). Es gibt auch Gegenstände, wobei man kaum von einer Auseinandersetzung zwischen den beiden sprechen kann, z.B. bei ‚Glossolalie'. Hier geht es um eine „eigene Gestalt ekstatischen Redens", wie der Verfasser Dirk Dautzenberg sagt, mit der man höchstens ekstatische Erscheinungen im Heidentum (und Judentum) vergleichen kann.

Wiederum anders liegen die Verhältnisse, wenn es geht um die Begriffe ‚Gloria' (A. J. Vermeulen), ‚Gleichheit' (Klaus Thraede), ‚Glück (Glückseligkeit)' (Ragner Holte) die sowohl im Heidentum wie im Christentum grosse Bedeutung hatten. Sie wurden jedoch auf ganz verschiedene Art und Weise ausgefüllt. Diese Verschiedenheit in Ausfüllung wurde von den drei Verfassern mit grosser Fähigkeit dargestellt.

Bleiben noch zwei zentrale Themen übrig, nämlich 'Gnade' und ‚Glaube'. An dem Artikel ‚Gnade' haben vier Autoren gearbeitet: Heinrich Dörrie für den griechisch-römischen Bereich, Herbert Dittmann für den israelisch-jüdischen, Otto Knoch für das Neue Testament und die apostolischen Väter, Alfred Schindler für die christliche Gnosis und die patristische Literatur. Selbstredend steht Paulus in dieser Abhandlung zentral: er ist der Theologe der Gnade. „Der Begriff χάρισμα ist eine von ihm geprägte Neuschöpfung, die Wesentliches über Inhalt und Wirkung der χάρις im einzelnen Christen und in den christlichen Gemeinden aussagt" (Sp. 353). Über das Verhältnis zwischen den Begriffen χάρισμα und χάρις bei Paulus sind die Autoren sich nicht einig (Vgl. Sp. 317 und 353).

Es ist interessant festzustellen, wie bei verschiedenen griechischen Vätern der Gnade-Begriff eine viel geringere Rolle spielt als bei Paulus. Offensichtlich hat der philosophische Apparat, den sie verwenden, hier seinen Einfluss gehabt: ein interessantes Beispiel von Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der Antiken Welt. Der ganze Artikel ‚Gnade' scheint mir sehr gut gelungen zu sein.

Und schliesslich der Beitrag ‚Glaube'. Man könnte sagen dass es sich hier um eine Sache handelt, wobei die Auseinandersetzung des Christtentums mit der Antiken Welt bis ins Tiefste geht. Ist es ja nicht gerade die Konfrontation des christlichen *Glaubens* mit dem griechischen *Denken* die darin zur Debatte steht?

Es ist daher sehr bedauerlich feststellen zu müssen, dass die Behandlung dieses Themas in diesem Lexikon nicht einwandfrei ist. Und dies nicht, weil der Autor, Dieter Lührmann, eine anfechtbare These verteidigt, was in einer Angelegenheit wie diese nahezu unvermeidlich ist. Es sind die klaren Unterschiede und die genauen Formulierungen die hier mangeln.

Der Anfangssatz ist ein interessantes Beispiel dieses Mangels. „Der Ausgangspunkt für diese Untersuchung liegt nicht in einem religionsphänomenologisch definierten Begriff Glaube, sondern in der Beobachtung, dass allein in der jüdisch-christlichen Sprachtradition Glaube die das ganze Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott und der Welt benennende Bedeutung gewonnen hat". So der Verfasser Sp. 49 mit Verweisung nach Ebeling, ‚Was heisst Glauben?'

Zunächst die Formulierung: „die ... benennende Bedeutung". Was bedeutet das? Findet hier nicht eine Kontamination statt zwischen zwei Aussagen, nämlich 1) „dass ‚Glaube' das ganze Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott und der Welt *benennt*", und 2) „dass ‚Glaube' das ganze Verhältnis ... *bedeutet*"?

Aber ist die Aussage selbst richtig? Bedeutet der Terminus ‚Glaube' tatsächlich „das ganze Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott und der Welt"? Oder ist es so, dass ‚der Glaube' die Gesamtheit von *Überzeugungen bezüglich* des Verhältnisses des Menschen zu Gott und Welt andeutet? Wenn man von ‚der Glaube' der Christen spricht, dann bezeichnet man mit diesem Wort ja doch die Gesamtheit von allem was er glaubt, den Glaubensinhalt, so man will, und nicht das Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott und Welt selbst. Hätte der Verfasser gesagt, dass ‚*das* Glauben' (τὸ πιστεύειν) *sich auf das ganze Verhältnis* des Menschen zu Gott und der Welt *bezieht*, dann wäre dies eine richtige Aussage gewesen. Er spricht aber deutlich von Sprachtradition.

Das Bedenklichste jedoch in dem Anfangssatz ist die Gegenüberstellung vom „religionsphänomenologisch definierten Begriff ‚Glaube'" und der „jüdisch-christlichen Sprachtradition". Die Ausarbeitung dieses Satzes macht nämlich klar, dass der Verfasser der Meinung ist, dass „die jüdisch-christliche Sprachtradition" (er spricht auch von „der frühchristlichen Entwicklung des Glaubensverständnisses" und „spezifisch christliche Begriffsbildung") einer religionsphänomenologischen Behandlung im Wege steht. Was er beabsichtigt ist offensichtlich folgendes: Das jüdisch-christliche Wort, bzw. der Begriff ‚Glaube' ist derartig, dass es sich nicht in eine phänomenologische Behandlung

dieses Begriffes hineinpassen lässt. Aber hat die Bedeutung des Wortes ‚Glaube', im Sinne von Gesamtheit von Überzeugungen bezüglich des Verhältnisses des Menschen zu Gott und Welt, etwa mit Religionsphänomenologie zu tun? Das Objekt der Phänomenologie ist ja doch nicht Wortgebrauch sondern das *phainomenon* des Glaubens. Sie beabsichtigt eine menschliche Aktivität, das πιστεύειν.

Und hier kommt wiederum zu Tage, dass der Terminus G. für zwei Realitäten steht: 1) das Glauben, eine geistige Aktivität; 2) der Glaube, im Sinne von einer Gesamtheit von Überzeugungen. Selbstredend besteht zwischen den beiden eine enge Beziehung. Es ist ja möglich, dass der Inhalt des Glaubens das Glauben als Phänomen beeinflusst. Es ist jedoch sehr gefährlich sie nicht deutlich zu unterscheiden. Meiner Meinung nach hätte die Behandlung dieser Unterscheidung eine angebrachte Einleitung zu diesem Artikel sein können, und ich möchte nachstehend einen Versuch zu einer solchen Einleitung bieten.

Offensichtlich nimmt der Glaube, im Sinne von ‚das Glauben' (τὸ πιστεύειν), im Christentum eine hervorragende Stelle ein. Er bezieht sich auf das ganze Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott und der Welt.

In der Antiken Welt hatte Glaube (πίστις) ein viel engeres Objekt, nämlich die sinnliche Welt. Wenn es sich um die höheren Realitäten – so kann man genanntes Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott und Welt andeuten – handelte, wurde von ἐπιστήμη gesprochen. Dieser Begriff konnte in zwei Bedeutungen angewendet werden: 1) im Sinne von ‚das Wissen' (τὸ ἐπίστασθαι), z.B. wenn Platon das ‚Wissen' dem ‚Glauben' gegenüberstellt (*Resp.* 534a); 2) im Sinne von ‚die Gesamtheit von dem was man weiss bezüglich der höheren Dinge', wie zum Beispiel in der berühmten stoischen Definition der Sophia: θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμη (Aëtius, *Plac.* 1, prooem. 2). Der Terminus πίστις hat dort nur die Bedeutung von τὸ πιστεύειν.

Im Christentum, wie gesagt, wird die höhere Realität Objekt des *Glaubens*. Im Vergleich zum Denken in der antiken Welt könnte man sagen, dass πίστις die Stelle von ἐπιστήμη übernahm. Dies hatte zwei wichtige Folgen: erstens steht der Terminus πίστις weiterhin nicht nur für ‚das Glauben', den Glauben*sakt*, sondern auch für die Gesamtheit von dem was man glaubt, den Glauben*sinhalt*. Der Begriff ‚Glaube' erobert sozusagen die Vorrangsstelle die im griechischen Denken von ἐπιστήμη eingenommen wurde. Und zweitens: von diesen zwei Bedeutungen hat in den frühchristlichen Schriften die zweite oft

die Überhand. Πίστις ist ‚der Glaube' im Sinne von dem was man glaubt. Und da dieser Inhalt als *die* Wahrheit angesehen wurde, erhielt der Terminus πίστις oft eine noch grössere Prägnanz. Er steht für die wahre πίστις, die einzige πίστις, im Vergleich womit alles andere keine πίστις ist. Man könnte diese Entwicklung vergleichen mit jener des ἐπιστήμη-Begriffs bei Platon: ἐπιστήμη ist sensu stricto nur die Kenntnis der wahren Wirklichkeit, d.h. die Kenntnis der Ideen, und auch mit der des Weisheitideals in der Stoa: der Weise ist der Inhaber aller Wahrheit und aller Tugenden.

Eine derartige Entwicklung des Glaubensbegriffes wurde vielleicht gefördert durch die Tatsache, dass das Phänomen des Glaubens bei den Griechen – denn es hat selbstredend einen Glauben der Griechen gegeben – nicht mit dem Terminus πίστις ausgedrückt wurde.

Wenn ich es recht verstehe, beabsichtigt der Verfasser in seinem Anfangssatz diese Prägnanz des Glaubebegriffes, von der er dann meint, sie stehe einer phänomenologischen Behandlung im Wege. Diese letzte Folgerung ist meines Erachtens nicht richtig. Die Prägnanz des Begriffes ‚Glaube' widerspiegelt sich ganz klar in der frühchristlichen Literatur und deshalb ist ‚das Glauben' als Phänomen für uns durchaus zugänglich.

Es wäre hinzuzufügen dass der Inhalt des Adjektivs πιστός eine derartige Entwicklung zeigt. Indem πιστός in der Antiken Welt nur die passive Bedeutung hat von ‚zuverlässig' usw., erhält es in der christlichen Welt auch die aktive Bedeutung ‚glaubend'; die Christen werden sogar πιστοί genannt, eine Benennung die vom Gesichtspunkt der Antike unsinnig ist und z.B. Porphyrius nur Spott entlocken kann.

Die Auseinandersetzung konnte sich nun, ganz allgemein gestellt, auf zwei Ebenen bewegen: 1) auf der des Verhältnisses zwischen *Glaube* (πίστις = πιστεύειν, das Glauben) und Wissen (ἐπιστήμη). Die Heiden fechten die Auffassung der Christen hinsichtlich des *Glaubens* an: sie behaupten, dass es im menschlichen Leben um Wissen, um Logos usw., geht und dass Glauben nicht ausreichen kann, ja sogar gefährlich ist. Der Christ stellt demgegenüber, dass der Glaube in Christus als Offenbarung Gottes über alles menschliche Wissen geht. (Man denke hier an die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Celsus/Porphyrius und Origenes.) 2) auf der des Verhältnisses zwischen *Glaube* im Sinne von ‚was man glaubt' ‚den Glaubensinhalt' und dem Inhalt des antiken Denkens. Hierzu gehört sowohl die Reaktion der Heiden auf die

Dogmen der Christen wie die Reaktion der Christen auf die Dogmen der Heiden, d.h. die Lehrsätze der antiken Philosophie.

Da man im hier rezensierten Artikel derartige Unterscheidungen vermisst, liegt über dem Ganzen eine gewisse Unklarheit. Oft scheint es alsob der Verfasser die Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der Antiken Welt aus den Augen verliert und nur von dem Inhalt des christlichen Glaubens handelt. Ich meine, dass anhand des obengesagten eine klare Ordnung des unzweifelhaft wichtigen Materials das vom Verfasser geboten wird möglich wäre. Aber dies geht über die Grenzen einer Rezension hinaus.

Ich möchte nur noch auf einige Ungenauigkeiten in dem sehr kurzen Abschnitt über die πίστις in der Philosophie (Sp. 51) hinweisen. Parmenides' merkwürdigen Ausdruck πίστις ἀληθής (VS 28B1, 29) übersetzt der Verf., Seidl folgend, mit ‚die Gewissheit von den Dingen, die wahre Seinserkenntnis'. Hier muss der Leser ausmachen, ob er πίστις als ‚Gewissheit' oder als ‚(Seins)erkenntnis' versteht. Diels-Kranz übersetzt ‚wahre Gewissheit'. – Anlässlich πίστις im Empedokles, VS 31B71, sagt er, dass es im Gegensatz zu Zweifel oder Unglaube die *Einsicht* (meine Kursivierung) in die Richtigkeit einer Behauptung bedeutet. Wie der Verfasser so etwas behaupten kann, ist mir ganz unklar. Wie könnte πίστις jemals ‚Einsicht' bedeuten? – Bezüglich Platons Auffassung sagt er: „Gegenstand der πίστις ist allein die sinnliche Welt". Das ist natürlich richtig, aber die Verweisung nach *Tim.* 27d/28a ist hier nicht am Platz, da Platon dort nicht über πίστις spricht. Das tut er wohl in *Tim.* 29c, eine Stelle die ein wenig später vom Verfasser erwähnt wird, aber ungenau. Er schreibt: „Das Verhältnis von πίστις zu ἐπιστήμη entspricht dem von γένεσις zu οὐσία. Platon stellt jedoch an dieser Stelle nicht die ἐπιστήμη sondern die ἀλήθεια der πίστις gegenüber. – Der Verf. sagt weiter: „so sehr sie (= πίστις) hier (= in der sinnlichen Welt) ausreicht, lässt sich doch mit ihr die Erkenntnis der Ideen nicht erreichen". Ich meine dass Plato sich niemals so aüssern würde, alsob πίστις ein Mittel, ein Erkenntnisvermögen wäre, womit man so weit kommt, und nicht weiter. Sie ist eine ‚geistige Aktivität' die passt bei einer bestimmten Realität. Von ‚ausreichen' und ‚mit ihr erreichen' ist keine Rede. – Anlässlich *Leg.* 12,966 c/d, wo Platon von einem Glauben an die Götter spricht, sagt der Verf.: „auch Plutarch bezeichnet später mit πιστεύειν die *Überzeugung* (meine Kursivierung) von der Existenz der Götter" und er zitiert den folgenden Text aus *Superst.* 11(107F): οὐκ οἴεται θεοὺς

εἶναι ὁ ἄθεος, ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων οὐ βούλεται, πιστεύει δ' ἄκων· φοβεῖται γὰρ ἀπιστεύειν. Der Verf. lässt Plutarch also sagen, dass der δεισιδαίμων *gegen seinen Willen überzeugt* ist. Das kann er doch nicht meinen. Für den δεισιδαίμων, sagt Plutarch, möchten die Götter nicht bestehen; er nimmt jedoch gegen seinen Willen ihre Existenz an, da er fürchtet das nicht zu tun. – Auch die Bemerkungen bezüglich Aristoteles und der Stoa sind nicht einwandfrei.

Wer diese Aussagen über die πίστις in der griechischen Philosophie übersieht, entdeckt, dass der Meinung des Verf. nach dieser Terminus so verschiedene Sachen wie ‚Gewissheit', ‚Seinserkenntnis', ‚Einsicht', ‚Überzeugung' bedeuten kann. Das kann a priori kaum richtig sein. Πιστεύειν bleibt doch immer eine geistige Aktivität oder Haltung, die etwas mit ‚Vertrauen schenken', ‚in Vertrauen etwas annehmen' zu tun hat. Der Verfasser scheint das *phainomenon* aus den Augen zu verlieren. Das macht seine Aussagen über die πίστις in der Philosophie verwirrt und unzuverlässig.

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H. Chadwick, *Priscillian of Avila. The Occult and the Charismatic in the Early Church*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976. XIV, 250 pages.

Anathema sit qui Manetem et opera eius, doctrinas adque instituta non damnat; cuius peculiariter turpitudines persequentes gladio, si fieri posset, ad inferos mitteremus. (CSEL XVIII 22.13–15); one is tempted to regard these words as a specimen of tragic irony: their presumable author was executed himself in 385 on account of his heretical ideas and practices after a trial before the usurper Maximus at Trier. That was the dismal end of the Spanish nobleman Priscillian and a few of his loyal followers, though by no means of his movement, which in Spain, especially in Galicia proved to be a persistent problem for the Church.

In recent years some important studies have been devoted to Priscillian: in 1974 an extensive survey by B. Vollmann appeared in *RE* Suppl. XIV 485-559, followed in 1976 by A. B. J. M. Goosen's Nijmegen dissertation on the background of Priscillian's asceticism and by the book at present under review. To these must be added K. Girardet, Trier 385. Der Prozess gegen die Priszillianer, *Chiron* IV

(1974) 577–608 and J. Fontaine's brilliant paper on the Sallustian (and Tacitean) style of Sulpicius Severus, *Chron.* II 46–51, our only testimony for the course of events (*Classica et Iberica. Festschrift Marique*, Worcester, Mass. 1975, 355–392).

Apart from the chapters with which Sulpicius Severus winds up his universal history the main source for the Priscillian movement is the collection of 11 tractates edited by G. Schepss in 1889, from the first of which the quotation at the beginning of this review was taken. According to C. "it is not unreasonable to think Priscillian himself the principal author of the tractates" (69), but in any case there can be no doubt that they belong to the Priscillianist group. (Vollmann is only inclined to ascribe the second piece to Priscillian in person.) Goosen, who shows very little doubt about Priscillian's authorship, having examined the tractates with his purpose (asceticism) in mind, comes to the conclusion that the accusations of heterodoxy are baseless: he pictures Priscillian as an ascetic, perhaps even a mystic, preacher, who, lacking theological experience and having no great talent for consistent theoretical reflection, employed outdated and at times somewhat clumsy formulae.

C. reaches a different conclusion. His vast learning and experience as an historian of the early Church has sharpened his eye for the dogmatically suspect elements in the movement. He does not subscribe to the current view that Priscillian was a crypto-Manichee (*Priscillianistae, quos in Hispania Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum et Manichaeorum dogmata permixta sectantur*, Augustine, *De Haeresibus* 70, "... the para-Manichaeism of the Priscillianists ...", P. Brown, *JRS* 59 (1969) 101). But e.g. his interest in the apocryphal Acts and "the principle that divine truth can be found outside the exclusive, narrow limits of the official documents" make him "genuinely vulnerable... to orthodox anxieties about his position" (99). Apart from this tendency to occultism there are further problems, as the Monarchian colouring of his Trinitarian doctrine, the fasting on Sundays and the not altogether impossible charge of witchkraft.

This is definitely more convincing than the serene picture presented by Goosen, who obviously is rather moved by sympathy for what one could justly call his hero, although it must be stressed that his conclusions are based on a thorough analysis (and the translation) of the tractates. C.'s study, however, covers a far wider area, ranging in time from the start of the movement until its extinction in the 7th century

and comprising the details of councils, the niceties of imperial politics and a great variety of writings relevant for the subject.

On the whole the accent in this book is on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical aspects of Priscillianism, less on its social background. Of course that is a subject for which the information in the sources is not abounding, but one would have liked more attention to the following of Priscillian. After all, this following must have been considerable, not only among the nobility: *multos nobilium pluresque populares ... allicuit in societatem* (Supl.Sev. *o.c.* II 46.5), women even flocking to him *cateruatim*. Was this merely a case of "the longing for deeper feeling" (8), which the ordinariness of their bishops' instruction could not satisfy? Or was there more to it, was Priscillianism a large-scale protest against the official Church? And in that case, what exactly fascinated people in Priscillian? In this connection I must admit that I do not fully understand the second half of the sub-title of C.'s book. There is indeed much about the 'occult', but, explicitly at least, little on the 'charismatic', either in its 'Pauline' sense (1 *Cor* 12) or in its modern, secularized, meaning.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the movement is the firm wish to operate within the Church. The tractates are out to stress the genuinely Catholic faith of the adherents (*nec enim nos damnari debemus qui catholici sumus*. CSEL XVIII 42.8) and indeed Priscillian himself with some confidence appealed to some of the highest orthodox personalities, Pope Damasus, Ambrose and Maximus, without success, in the last case even with fatal consequences. Was the ultimate reason of the rejection by the official Church merely of a dogmatic character? About the final undoing of the leader of the movement C. reports: "Priscillian was eventually executed for sorcery rather than heresy" (143) (*conuictum maleficii*, Sulp.Sev. *o.c.* II 50; cf. however Girardet, *o.c.*, 599). This is clarifying, but it does not entirely solve the enigma, less so as in this respect a large part must have been played by malicious exaggeration caused by a deep-rooted hatred and prejudice against a man considered to be dangerous for the Church.

In the end the study of this important book somehow leads to a paradoxical result. The wealth of information and the impressive scholarly handling of a large variety of documents greatly augments the knowledge of Priscillianist practice and (especially) doctrine, but exactly this rich information makes it difficult to understand why the orthodox hierarchy rejected the movement with such acrimonious vehe-

mence. But perhaps this embarassment is not surprising, even the contemporary Sulpicius Severus could not quite make up his mind about Priscillian : *felix profecto, si non prauo studio corrupisset optimum ingenium* (*o.c.* II 46.4).

Leiderdorp, van Effendreef 15 J. DEN BOEFT

J. Fink, *Bildfrömmigkeit und Bekenntnis. Das Alte Testament, Herakles und die Herrlichkeit Christi an der Via Latina in Rom* (Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte. Heft 12). Cologne-Vienne, Böhlau Verlag, 1978. 160 P. 20 planches.

Bâti sur une série de conférences, ce livre comporte trois chapitres. Le premier d'entre eux conduit le lecteur à travers toutes les chambres d'une catacombe du 4ème siècle, soulignant le lien qui unit leur mode de décoration et la doctrine qui l'a inspirée. Dans la description et l'interprétation des peintures, l'auteur analyse, sans les épargner, les commentaires de ses collègues qui, avant lui, s'efforcèrent de situer les images malaisées à expliquer. Ses corrections visent surtout Ferrua et, plus particulièrement, la représentation de Hagar à la source (p. 15-17) ainsi que celle du Roi Assa souffrant du mal du pied (p. 19-27). Il prend position dans la discussion existant au sujet du cycle Heraklès (p. 29-33) et conclut que dans la catacombe de la Via Latina, la figure d'Heraklès fut intégrée dans l'imagerie biblique, en étayant soigneusement ses arguments sur des références à des textes bibliques.

A la fin de cette promenade – de la chambre A à O – le lecteur bénéficie d'un apercu très clair à propos des thèmes iconographiques et peut se former une idée des problèmes les concernant. Il paraît évident que l'Ancien Testament constitue la source prépondérante de cet ensemble et que les thèmes empruntés au Nouveau Testament sont plutôt rares (4 seulement) bien que d'une extrême importance tel que la Majestas Domini (p. 18). Les scènes mythologiques et bibliques sont replacées par l'auteur dans leur contexte chrétien, c'est-à-dire ancien-testamentaire.

Le deuxième chapitre traite de »l'église issue du peuple juif«, de »l'église issue du paganisme« et de leurs interférences. En effet, le problème interne de la jeune église avait pour origine la double culture des premiers chrétiens. Des explications précises sont fournies quant

à la manière de comprendre des notions telles que »judéochrétiens« ou »chrétiens issus de milieux païens«. Par la même occasion, l'auteur souligne que l'art paléochrétien est la résultante de deux cultures, qui ont trouvé dans la chrétienté une foi nouvelle et commune. Cette constatation est illustrée par une comparaison des programmes des peintures de la Via Latina avec celles des mosaïques de Santa Maria Maggiore, où l'accent est également mis sur des scènes de l'Ancien Testament.

Cette préférence pour l'Ancien Testament ne peut cependant être interprétée comme le témoignage d'une priorité juive dans la jeune église. J. Fink met en relief, dans l'art paléochrétien, la présence sensible de la tradition artistique juive. Elle lui paraît claire sinon plus évidente encore que le repertoire antique mythique. Dans ce contexte un parallèle est également établi avec les représentations de Doura Europos. Comme dans le premier chapitre, J. Fink truffe son exposé de considérations et d'objections sur la littérature scientifique qui a traité le problème des traditions juive et païenne dans l'art paléochrétien ou qui omettait d'en parler. En guise de conclusion, l'auteur indique en quels lieux de la catacombe l'église païenne et l'église juive apparaissent d'une façon explicite. De plus, il insiste sur le fait que c'est justement ici qu'une harmonie s'établissait, une harmonie romano-chrétienne tournée vers l'avenir : l'attente du salut telle qu'elle s'inscrit dans le Nouveau Testament et telle qu'elle se concrétise dans la décoration des chambres funériares.

Le troisième article étudie les thèmes de la pénitence et de la profession de foi. Que l'idée de pénitence soit le fil conducteur des images choisies pour ces chambres funéraires semble être l'évidence même pour l'auteur, dans la mesure où il estime que le concept de pénitence est caractéristique du peuple juif. Ici également il entre en discussion avec ses collègues et explique en quoi les idées de pénitence juive et chrétienne se différencient. La première est fixée vers le passé. La deuxième articulée sur l'avenir. Il décrit également l'évolution de ses propres opinions surtout dans le domaine des représentations de Noé ou de Jonas. Les thèmes iconographiques, utilisés à la Via Latina, illustrent la nouvelle perspective que la pensée de la pénitence, si ancrée dans le peuple juif, a trouvée dans l'art paléochrétien; les chrétiens, qui y furent enterrés, ont fait acte de foi dans la rédemption par le Christ pour tous les hommes par le biais des thèmes de pénitence juifs. L'attention du lecteur est attirée, à la fin de ce chapitre, sur le

fait qu'il doit surtout éviter de croire que les chrétiens, reposant dans cette catacombe, seraient principalement issus du peuple juif. La préférence pour les scènes de l'Ancien Testament s'explique par l'habitude que l'on avait de cette partie de la bible dans les premiers temps de la chrétienté et par le manque de thèmes du Nouveau Testament. Le paganisme ne pouvait, dans les circonstances données, fournir que quelques contributions, inspirées par son propre répertoire d'images, puisque celles-ci devaient être adaptées à la doctrine chrétienne.

Le livre est complété par un appendice consacré à Moïse, Isaac qui envoie Esaû à la chasse, Alceste, les Paons. Il se termine par une critique des études les plus récentes à propos du problème de l'origine de l'art paléochrétien et, en rapport direct, de l'étude sur la catacombe de la Via Latina. D'après l'auteur, les interprétations de ce sujet très actuel sont plutôt décevantes. L'ouvrage de J. Fink comporte des notes extrêmement soignées et un index alphabétique. Le style en est très coulant et les prises de position face aux argumentations des autres spécialistes ne gênent pas la lecture. L'illustration eût pu être plus abondante et les plans un peu plus élaborés. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'un lecteur, même profane en art paléochrétien, prendra connaissance de ce volume avec beaucoup d'intérêt.

2253 TR *Voorschoten* (Pays Bas), MIREILLE MADOU
Planciusplantsoen 5[1]

Maxentii aliorumque Scytharum monachorum necnon Ioannis Tomitanae urbis episcopi opuscula, accedunt 'Capitula S. Augustini'. Cura et studio Fr. Glorie (Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina LXXXVA). Turnholti, Brepols, 1978. XLVIII, 418 pp.

Cette collection d'écrits de Maxence, d'autres moines scythes et de Jean, évêque de Tomi, date pour la plus grande part d'environ 520–525 et a pour sujet une discussion sur certaines formulations théologiques. Pour la plus grande part, elle a été publiée auparavant dans la *Patrologia* de Migne et puis dans les *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum* de E. Schwartz. Dans sa nouvelle édition, M.Glorie a incorporé deux textes (l'*Epistula Scytharum monachorum ad episcopos* et des extraits du *Rescriptum*) déjà publiés parmi les œuvres de Fulgence, parce qu'ils sont en rapport avec les autres pièces. En outre, dans un appendice, il a fourni une première édition intégrale des soi-disant *Capitula Sancti Augustini in urbem*

Romam transmissa. Ils portent ce titre devenu traditionnel, parce qu'ils sont empruntés partiellement à l'*Enchiridion* de saint Augustin. M. Fr. Glorie à bon droit partage l'opinion de ceux qui estiment qu'ils ne peuvent pas être de la main des moines scythes. Il est exclu que Maxence serait l'auteur puisque, dès 520, ils se trouvaient dans les archives ecclésiastiques à Rome. Il se range à l'avis de Nautin qui considère les *Capitula* comme écrits en Gaule. Pour sa part, il veut proposer comme auteur possible Prosper d'Aquitaine. Si cette hypothèse s'avère correcte, les *Capitula* seraient envoyés à Rome avant 435.

La documentation réunie dans le volume 85A du *Corpus Christianorum* se réfère à un conflit qui éclata à Constantinople au moment où une délégation envoyée par le pape Hormisdas à l'empereur Justin arriva dans la capitale de l'Orient. Des moines scythes accusèrent un certain diacre Victor d'hérésie entre autres parce qu'il se servait des formules *uno de trinitate crucifixo* et *Christo composito*. Un *Libellus fidei* présenté par les moines aux légats n'ayant pas été accepté, une députation des moines se rendit à Rome où elle fut accueillie avec bienveillance. Mais Hormisdas préféra laisser la jurisdiction dans cette affaire au patriarche de Constantinople. Comme il ressort de la correspondance et des autres documents, la question a traînée pendant quelques années.

L'édition de M. Glorie a été faite avec beaucoup de soin et avec une minutie admirable. C'est avec peine que nous avons trouvé une petite inexactitude dans le texte. A la page 109, ligne 1153, il fait lire *quia* au lieu de *qui*: *hoc non accipio, quia nulla hoc statuit synodus* (comp. aussi p. 110, ligne 1157).

Parfois on peut différer d'opinion en ce qui concerne le choix d'une leçon. Je me demande, par exemple, si la correction apportée à la page 116, ligne 28 (*super* au lieu de *per*; = cod. L, Schwartz) est nécessaire (il est à relever qu'à la page 130, ligne 220, où L est le seul témoin, on trouve la même tournure: *super hunc fere annum*).

On peut se demander si dans quelques cas la supplétion de *est* est nécessaire. Une phrase nominale semble bien possible à la page 65, ligne 391 *et ideo nimis ‹est› impium, saluatorem omnium salu‹a›tis* et à la page 451, ligne 45 (*est* ne figure pas dans le seul codex L) *nemo ‹est› qui nesciat* (cf. M. Leumann, J. B. Hofmann – A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik* II, München 1965, p. 420–423).

A la page 45, ligne 53 *qui* a été modifié en *quae*: *Nestorianae perfidiae ... quae ... praedicare convincitur*. Mais *qui* (leçon de L, acceptée par Schwartz) est bien possible, puis qu'en latin un relatif peut se référer à un adjectif dérivé d'un nom propre.

Dans une note explicative (p. XXXIII[58]), il faudra lire *Constantinopolim redierunt* (au lieu de *Constantinopoli rediti*) de même que *scripsisse ... monachos* (au lieu de *scripsisse ... monachi*). Dans l'introduction aux *Capitula*, on lira *dicta* (p. 243, ligne 1) au lieu de *directa*.

Il est intéressant de noter que les textes nous offrent certains termes assez rares, p. ex. *conuncupatio* (p. 12, ligne 150), qui ne figure pas dans le Dictionniare de Blaise, où manquent aussi les tournures *verbum imperativum* et *verbum potestatis effectivum*. Dans le même lexique pour le terme rare *mathema* il n'est enregistré qu'un seul passage, d'ailleurs contemporain, de l'épître 129 d'Hormisdas. La valeur de l'*Index nominum et verborum selectorum* où des termes d'intérêt linguistique ou théologique sont réunis est évidente. Un tel index est toujours un instrument de travail très utile. Chez *struthio* on trouve par exemple un renvoi à un des passages assez rares dans la litterature de l'Antiquité tardive où la conduite de certaines personnes est comparée à la coutume des autruches d'enfoncer la tête dans le sable (cf. Pauly–Wissowa, Zweite Reihe 4, 1, 344, où ce pasage-ci n'est pas enregistré): *Stultorum struthionum* (corriger *struthiorum* dans l'index) *more, qui, collo tenus absconditi, munitos se putant, et reliquum periculis corpus exponunt*.

Nous devons à M. Glorie une édition solide des écrits des moines scythes. Elle a été faite avec beaucoup d'exactitude et la valeur en est augmentée tant par l'apparat critique très détaillé que par les introductions précises et les riches indices.

6523 L H *Nijmegen*, Postweg 152 G. BARTELINK

KERYGMA UND LOGOS. Beiträge zu den geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Antike und Christentum. Festschrift für Carl Andresen. Herausgegeben von Adolf Martin Ritter. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979. 520 S. Lw. Dm 148.00.

Der packende Haupttitel dieser Festschrift wird in dem Untertitel deutlich erklärt. Es handelt sich also um eine Sammlung von Beiträgen die auf ein zentrales Thema konzentriert sind. Selbstredend kann hier keine Besprechung der individuellen Artikel gegeben werden. Wer aber die Namen der Mitarbeiter und die Titel der Aufsätze sieht wird kaum an den hohen Wert dieses Buches zweifeln. Man kann Herrn Anderesen nur beglückwünschen zu einer solchen Festgabe und den Herrn Ritter zu der vorzüglichen Herausgabe.

INHALT: Barbara Aland, *Fides und Subiectio. Zur Anthropologie des Irenäus* (9–28). Kurt Aland, *Methodische Bemerkungen zum Corpus Paulinum bei den Kirchenvätern des zweiten Jahrhunderts* (29–48). Alexander Böhlig, *Zum Gottesbegriff des Tractatus tripartitus* (*Nag Hammadi C.I, 5*) (49–67). Carl Joachim Classen, *Der platonisch-stoische Kanon der Kardinaltugenden bei Philon, Clemens Alexandrinus und Origenes* (68–88). Carsten Colpe, *Von der Logoslehre des Philon zu der des Clemens von Alexandrien* (89–107). Carmelo Curti, "*Spiritalis intelligentia.*" *Nota sulla dottrina esegetica di Eucherio di Lione* (108–122). Albrecht Dihle, *Zur Schicksalslehre des Bardesanes* (123–135). Heinrich Dörrie, *Der Prolog zum Evangelium nach Johannes im Verständnis der älteren Apologeten* (136–152). H.J.W. Drijvers, *Kerygma und Logos in den Oden Salomos, dargestellt am Beispiel der 23. Ode* (153–172). Leo C. Ferrari, *From pagan literature to the pages of the Holy Scriptures: Augustine's Confessions as exemplary propaedeutic* (173–182). William H.C. Frend, *The fall of Macedonius in 511 – a suggestion* (183–195). Olof Gigon, *Lactantius und die Philosophie* (196–213). Hermann Goltz, *Ivan der Schreckliche zitiert Dionysios Areopagites. Ein Baustein zur Theorie der Autokratie* (214–225). Alois Grillmeier S.J., "*Christus licet uobis inuitis deus.*" *Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über die Hellenisierung der christlichen Botschaft* (226–257). Ilsetraut Hadot, *Ist die Lehre des Hierokles vom Demiurgen christlich beeinflusst?* (258–271). Pierre Hadot, *La présentation du platonisme par Augustin* (272–279). Robert Hanhart, *Jüdische Tradition und christliche Interpretation. Zur Geschichte der Septuagintaforschung in Göttingen* (280–297). Alasdair Heron, *The Holy Spirit in Origen and Didymus the Blind: a shift in perspective from the third to the fourth century* (298–310). Robert Joly, *Notes pour le moyen platonisme* (311–321). Franz Heinrich Kettler, *Origenes, Ammonius Sakkas und Porphyrius* (322–328). Bernhard Kötting, *Martyrium und Provokation* (329–336). Andreas Lindemann, *Paulinische Theologie im Brief an Diognet* (337–350). Bernhard Lohse, *Beobachtungen zum Paulus-Kommentar des Marius Victorinus und zur Wiederentdeckung des Paulus in der lateinischen Theologie des vierten Jahrhunderts* (351–366). Claudio Moreschini, *Tertulliano tra stoicismo e platonismo* (367–379). Ekkehard Mühlenberg, *Das Vermächtnis der Kirchenväter an den modernen Protestantismus* (380–394). Georg Pfligersdorffer, "*Fremdgespräch*" *und* "*Selbstgespräch*" (395–403). Adolf Martin Ritter, *Zum homousios von Nizäa und Konstantinopel. Kritische Nachlese zu einigen neueren Diskussionen* (404–423). Willy Rordorf, *Christus als Logos und Nomos. Das Kerygma Petrou in seinem Verhältnis zu Justin* (424–434). Basil Studer, *Der apologetische Ansatz zur Logos-Christologie Justins des Märtyrers* (435–448). Giovanni Maria Vian, Κήρυγμα *e* κλῆσις ἐθνῶν *negli scritti atanasiani* (449–454). John Whittaker, *Valentinus Fr. 2* (455–460). Ulrich Wickert, *Christus kommt zur Welt. Zur Wechselbeziehung von Christologie, Kosmologie und Eschatologie in der Alten Kirche* (461–481). Wolfgang Wischmeyer, *Die Petrus-Leseszene als Beispiel für die christliche Adaption eines vorgegebenen Bildtypus* (482–496). I. Stellenregister (497–513). II. Autorenregister (514–519).

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BOOKS RECEIVED

The inclusion of a book in this list, which contains all books received by the editors, does not guarantee its subsequent review.

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Vigiliae Christianae 35, 105-151; *North-Holland Publishing Company* 1981

PHILO'S DE AETERNITATE MUNDI: THE PROBLEM OF ITS INTERPRETATION

BY

DAVID T. RUNIA

1. *The double problem**

In the most recent introductory manual on Philo, Sandmel devotes the following brief remarks to the treatise *De aeternitate mundi*:[1]

> While *On the Eternity of the World* is customarily printed in the collections of the writings of Philo and is often ascribed to him, only a minority of scholars regard it as authentically his. The principal basis for denying the work to Philo runs as follows. In many of his writings, Philo has dealt with God's creation of the world. God is omnipotent over the universe, even to the point of being able to destroy it, should he wish. However, if the world is destructible, it cannot be eternal; to believe in the eternity of the world, then, is in effect to deny God's ultimate power over it. Precisely because the treatise affirms the eternity of the world, the majority of scholars deny the treatise to Philo... All in all, the treatise, genuine or not, is relatively unimportant.

Although Sandmel is incorrect in suggesting that most scholars consider the treatise inauthentic, the hesitant attitude portrayed in his words is typical of Philonic scholarship as a whole. Because the short essay contains much valuable information on diverse aspects of Hellenistic philosophy, between 1875 and 1900 it all of a sudden attracted the attention of some of the best scholars of the day, many of whom were not particularly sympathetic to Philo's literary and intellectual achievement.[2] They noted the problematic relation of the treatise to the rest of Philo's œuvre and the initial response was to declare the work inauthentic. Soon afterwards Philonic authorship was reaffirmed and interest in the work subsided. Nevertheless the interpretative problem perceived by the nineteenth century savants has never been sufficiently resolved, thereby casting a shadow on the treatise's interpretation and causing the tentative attitude illustrated by the quote above. The interpretative problem reveals a double aspect.

Firstly the treatise presents difficulties on account of its *formal and structural* features. At a first reading it appears to be a patchwork of

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doxographical accounts, philosophical arguments, vigorous polemics and rhetorical illustratory passages. After a brief introduction Philo presents a long sequence of arguments which are evidently derived from source material but are interspersed with his own comments. Philo's precise relation to these arguments, however, is far from clear. In the last sentence of the work another set of arguments is promised, but this sequel has not survived, so that the work remains incomplete. But what has disturbed the readers of the treatise more than its seemingly haphazard organization is the gap that separates it from almost all Philo's other writings. Philo dedicated a large part of his life to the immense task of writing a philosophically orientated commentary on the Pentateuch of Moses, of which thirty-nine books survive. In the *De aeternitate mundi*, however, Moses and his divinely inspired words are only briefly mentioned on one occasion (*Aet.* 19). Exegetical commentary wholly recedes in favour of philosophical argument. Accordingly the treatise has been traditionally included, together with four others,[3] in the group of so-called 'philosophical treatises'.[4] The characteristic features of this group are that they use Greek literary forms and source material in order to discuss philosophical themes for their own sakes, with only a minimum of references to scripture and Jewish traditions. Yet even within this group our treatise has its idiosyncracies. To a greater extent than the other 'philosophical treatises' it appears to attempt a *systematic* handling of its theme. Moreover the explicit manner in which it refers to Greek philosophers by name and deals with their views is without parallel in the Philonic corpus.

The second problematic aspect of the treatise's interpretation is of a *philosophical* nature and has already been broached by Sandmel in the passage quoted above. The topic of whether the cosmos is destructible or indestructible introduces cosmological and theological concerns close to Philo's heart. But the arguments presented in the treatise put forward a viewpoint inconsistent with the views recorded elsewhere in Philo's writings. They argue not only that the cosmos is indestructible (ἄφθαρτος) but also that it is uncreated (ἀγένητος). The first half of the proposition, if properly qualified, can be considered Philonic, but it is questionable whether these necessary qualifications are sufficiently stressed in the treatise as we have it. The second half of the proposition is without doubt in direct contradiction to Philo's unshakeable conviction that God has created this cosmos. The im-

portance of the issue at stake can be gauged from the fact that Weiss, in his substantial monograph on the cosmology of Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism, felt obliged to commence his study with a 'prophylactic' chapter on our treatise in order to show that Philo, *in spite of* the treatise *De aeternitate mundi*, did not run the risk of denying the fundamental doctrine of Jewish cosmological thought, the creation of the cosmos by God.[5] An ancillary (philosophical) problem which has taxed the minds of scholars is that a philosophically plausible content must be suggested for the missing sequel. Since no fragments of this part have ever been identified, any hypothesis must be entirely based on the philosophical problematics as they are presented in the treatise's incomplete state of preservation. In this question the formal and the philosophical problem of the treatise's interpretation merge together. A satisfying solution will have to dwell on both aspects.

2. *Attempted solutions*

The first attempt to solve the interpretative problem of the *De aeternitate mundi* has already been briefly noted. Although some earlier scholars had had doubts about its authenticity,[6] it was Bernays (1863, 1876, 1882) who for a time won acceptance for the view that the work was falsely attributed to Philo.[7] The strength of Bernay's arguments was by no means in proportion to the drastic conclusion which he drew from them and, since they have been adequately refuted on a number of occasions,[8] we will not dwell on them here. Already in 1880 Zeller pointed out that the work must have been produced by an Alexandrian Jew.[9] But, in Zeller's opinion, this unknown author had done nothing but superficially and incompetently adapt a treatise of an eclectic Peripatetic who had lived in the first century B.C. Von Arnim (1888) advanced even further along these paths of speculative *Quellenforschung*.[10] But all these attempts were reduced to naught by the study of Cumont (1891).[11] In a brilliant demonstration of philological expertise Cumont showed that the linguistic and stylistic features of the treatise were unmistakably Philonic. Moreover a good argument could be put forward that its contents were in harmony with many, if not all, aspects of Philo's thought.[12] Cumont's study was warmly received and, although not all scholars were immediately convinced, today it can be said that the treatise is only ascribed to a pseudonymous author through inadvertence. It should be noted that all the proponents of the work's inauthenticity had an extremely low

regard for its author's abilities. Von Arnim expressed this view most forcefully in response to Cumont:[13] "Ich bin kein Verehrer Philos, aber ich halte es für eine Profanation, ihn mit dem Menschen zu identificieren, der περὶ ἀφθαρσίας verfasst hat; wenn ihm dieser Ausdruck nicht zuviel Ehre anthut. Denn er ist ein blosser Compilator." The work is apparently so shoddily put together that it falls well below the level of Philo's literary performance. The structural problems of the treatise emerge here, but are not seriously examined.

A second solution to our problem was first suggested by Cumont and still continues to receive support in some quarters. Cumont asserted that the *De aeternitate mundi* is a youthful work, a *Jugendschrift*.[14] Juvenile stylistic features are the repetition of argument, fiery polemic and frequent quotation of authors, such as Plato and Euripides, who were read at school. Together with the other philosophical treatises it is to be dated to the time of his youth to which he so wistfully looks back in the opening words of *De specialibus legibus* III, ἦν ποτε χρόνος ὅτε φιλοσοφίᾳ σχολάζων ...[15] Even if none of these youthful works had survived, it could have been deduced from Philo's other works that there was a period in his life in which he devoted all his time to the study of the Greek philosophers. Cumont's suggestion was eagerly taken up by Wendland (1892), Cohn in his article on the subdivision and chronology of Philo's writings (1899), Reinhardt (1920) and others.[16] Cumont used this argument chiefly to explain the formal characteristics of the treatise (for the philosophical problem he had another line of attack, as we shall see). It is evident that the theory creates a gap between the youthful treatise and Philo's main body of work, so that the interpretative problem is 'explained away' and considerably reduced in importance.

A different nuance was given to the *Jugendschrift* theory by Bousset (1915) in his research on Philo's use of source material.[17] The *De aeternitate mundi* is a *school* treatise in the narrow sense of the word. It does not represent Philo's own thought. The youthful Philo has recorded, in his own style, the lecture material of one of his Greek teachers with the intention of refuting this viewpoint later on. The word παρειλήφαμεν in the final paragraph (*Aet.* 150) must be interpreted as meaning 'what we have taken over as traditional school material (*Schulüberlieferung*)'[18]. Bousset in fact attempts a compromise between the views of Bernays and Cumont. Philo has written the work, but what he records is the thought of another (unknown) author.

Recently two French scholars have expressed their approval of the *Jugendschrift* theory, but both stress that these youthful works have served Philo as a valuable *praeparatio* for his later work. Arnaldez (1969) writes of the *De aeternitate mundi* that "cet ouvrage, quoique incomplet, nous montre comment Philon a formé sa pensée au milieu du vaste tourbillon des doctrines philosophiques, comment son sentiment religieux l'a très tôt guidé par les voies les plus sûres, en un mot comment sont nées les grandes conceptions qu'il devait orchestrer dans son œuvre du Commentateur de Moïse".[18] Nikiprowetzky (1977) concurs with this view, but emphasizes that one cannot speak of an intellectual evolution in his thought, but rather of a literary manner which first searches, and then later in the exegetical treatises finds its feet.[19]

But, attractive though this theory as a solution is, it poses problems of its own. In the first place it is now widely accepted that the dialogues with Alexander belong to the period of Philo's maturity, perhaps even to his old age.[20] Thus we have the choice of either splitting the group of philosophical treatises into a youthful and a mature sub-group, or keeping the group together and regarding them all as mature works. When we consider that there are strong thematic resemblances between our treatise and *De Providentia I* and *II*,[21] and that the 'schoolmaster' tone of the dialogues with Alexander can occasionally also be detected in the *De aeternitate mundi*,[22] we must conclude that the (admittedly slender) evidence favours the second alternative, i.e. that the philosophical treatises as a whole are mature works.[23] Secondly the presuppositions of the *Jugendschrift* thesis must be recognized for what they are. It presupposes the validity of the application of a *genetic or developmental approach* to the thought and writings of Philo. This approach, frequently accompanied by speculative psychological observations, has been attempted on numerous occasions in Philonic scholarship, but has always failed on account of a total lack of evidence.[24] Nikiprowetzky, in the remark noted above, wishes to make a distinction between intellectual evolution and the development of a literary manner. But this is to deny the close relation between form and content in Philo's writings, which elsewhere in his study it is Nikiprowetzky's constant aim to affirm. Finally it must be observed that the *Jugendschrift* thesis, as one would expect, is often accompanied by a deprecatory view of the quality and value of the philosophical treatises, and of the *De aeternitate mundi* in particular.[25]

Not content with his already strong defence of the treatise's authenticity, the fertile mind of Cumont also put forward another solution to its interpretative problems, this time concentrating on the *philosophical* difficulty which was briefly outlined above.[26] Cumont concedes to Bernays that the diverse arguments are presented in the *De aeternitate mundi* in such a vigorous way that there can be no doubt that the author is convinced of their validity. Philo's aim in the extant half is to refute the Stoics, and in order to achieve it he makes a temporary alliance with Aristotle. He can do this because, according to Cumont, he concurs with the doctrine that the cosmos is created from all eternity (*ab omni aeternitate creatum*). It is philosophically not permissible to say that the cosmos has been created in time (*in tempore exstitisse*).[27] In the missing sequel Philo would have shown to what extent he differed in his interpretation from his temporary ally, Aristotle. Arnaldez finds Cumont's solution very satisfying and adds that in the area of *cosmology* Philo found that Aristotle provided a sure philosophical basis, but that in the area of *theology* he found Aristotle inadequate and turned to the doctrine of Plato. Hence his desire to reconcile the two philosophers.[28]

Cumont's attempted solution raises a number of very important issues which will need to be discussed further below. For now it suffices to say that we reject its main thesis that Philo subscribes to the Aristotelian doctrine of *creatio aeterna*.[29] In our opinion, therefore, this approach cannot solve the problem of the treatise's interpretation.

Finally the efforts of some scholars to pay closer attention to the treatise's literary form and structure should not be overlooked. They work on the assumption that Philo's intentions in writing the treatise can only be reconstructed if also its structural and literary features are analysed and understood. In neglecting these aspects other interpreters have gone astray.

An extremely radical solution along these lines was proposed by Leisegang (1937, 1941).[30] There is no doubt in his mind that the arguments put forward in the *De aeternitate mundi* are sincerely meant, but can they be attributed to Philo? The answer to the riddle which the treatise poses is to be found in its *dialogic structure*. Leisegang notes that also *De Providentia I* discusses the problem of the eternity of the cosmos. This thematic resemblance shows us that our treatise should be read in close connection with the three treatises which Philo wrote in order to engage in philosophical discussion with his nephew,

Alexander. What Philo attempts to do in *De aeternitate mundi* can best be seen if one compares his method in *De animalibus*. There, after a few dialogic interchanges Alexander gives a lengthy speech (*logos*) arguing on behalf of the thesis that animals possess a rational faculty, to which Philo makes a shorter reply arguing the opposite thesis. A similar procedure was followed in *De aeternitate mundi*, but both the dialogic framework and Philo's reply have been lost. What remains is only the speech (*logos*) of Philo's opponent (possibly Alexander himself), arguing a thesis which Philo wholly rejects and which he would refute along Stoic lines in the missing sequel. Only in the last sentence is there a hint of the original dialogic framework.[31] The word παρειλήφαμεν should be translated simply as "heard", "understood". Philo is telling us in this final sentence that he has recorded to the best of his ability the words of his opponent as he heard them.

Not only is Leisegang's solution radical – in effect only one sentence in the whole work can be attributed to Philo himself – it is also radically false. That Philo should wish to defend as his own considered opinion the Stoic doctrine of the cyclical destruction and regeneration of the cosmos is wholly improbable.[32] Nevertheless Leisegang has at least demonstrated how important it is to understand the literary and structural features of the treatise. His article shows what happens when the hints that Philo gives are not properly understood.

Much more limited in his aims is Colson (1943) in the brief preface to his edition and translation of *De aeternitate mundi*.[33] In a discussion of the work's authenticity he makes two very important observations on its structure. Firstly he asserts that a distinction should be made between the first part of the work up to the first sentence of *Aet.*20 and the remainder. In the first part Philo is without doubt speaking for himself. This is not necessarily the case for the lengthy sequence of arguments in the second half. (This distinction had been totally ignored by Leisegang and others.) Secondly he suggests a new possibility for the status of the arguments in *Aet.*20–149 :[34]

> In describing the arguments for the eternity of the Cosmos he puts them forth with such gusto and denounces the opponents so vigorously that at first sight anyone would suppose that he is giving us his own conviction. But it is Philo's way to reproduce with all his vigour opinions and doctrines which he is really going to controvert later... So when I read in *De Aet.*35 and 49 that some argument must be "clear to everyone" or in 69 "that the foolish imaginations of the opponents have been refuted" I do not feel sure that Philo might not talk very differently when he gives to each point the opposition which he promises in his final words.

Colson here breaks through the fixed assumption of Bernays, Cumont and Leisegang, namely that the sequence of arguments represent the firm conviction of the author (or speaker) who is presenting them. We shall see that Colson is correct in this suggestion, although it will be necessary to refine it to some extent.

At the end of our survey it appears that it is in the analysis of literary form and structure that we are likely to find the clue we so badly need in order to resolve the interpretative problem posed by the treatise. We will proceed now to make a number of observations in this area which will be necessary in order to come to an improved understanding of Philo's intentions in writing the work.

3. *Some literary and structural observations*

As has already been noted, Philo's five 'philosophical treatises' have been placed together in a separate subdivision of his writings, not only on account of their philosophical content, but also because their literary form and structure is based on the manner of writing practised in the Greek philosophical schools. The latter aspect has perhaps received insufficient stress and has certainly been insufficiently researched.[35] In the case of the *De aeternitate mundi*, is it possible to specify what type or model or genre of philosophical treatise Philo is following in its composition? Can parallels be adduced with respect to form and structure which give a clearer picture of what Philo is doing in our treatise? Both questions we would wish to answer in the affirmative. We shall commence by outlining two illuminating parallels.

The first parallel is, rather surprisingly, to be found in one of Philo's exegetical treatises, *De plantatione*.[36] Philo wishes to comment on the words of Moses at *Gen.*9:20–21a, ἤρξατο Νῶε ἄνθρωπος εἶναι γεωργὸς γῆς· καὶ ἐφύτευσεν ἀμπελῶνα, καὶ ἔπιε τοῦ οἴνου, καὶ ἐμεθύσθη (quoted at *Plant.*140). According to Moses, Noah the just man becomes drunk.[37] But before Philo comments on these words (in the treatise *De ebrietate*), he presents to his readers what the Greek philosophers have said on the subject, i.e. on the theme εἰ μεθυσθήσεται ὁ σοφός. It is generally agreed that he adapts for this purpose a Greek philosophical treatise of unknown provenance,[38] and that the original form of this treatise can still be discerned behind Philo's adaptation. The literary and structural aspects of this treatise which are of relevance to the *De aeternitate mundi* are as follows:

Treatise on εἰ μεθυσθήσεται ὁ σοφός (Philo, *Plant.* 142–77).

I introduction (προοίμιον, cf. ὡσανεὶ προοίμια 149):

(a) subject introduced, ἐσπουδάσθη δὲ παρὰ πολλοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων ἡ σκέψις οὐ μετρίως. προτείνεται δὲ οὕτως, εἰ μεθυσθήσεται ὁ σοφός (142);

(b) analysis of a central term in the proposition, ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μεθύειν διττόν, ἓν μὲν ἴσον τι τῷ οἰνοῦσθαι, ἕτερον δὲ ἴσον τῷ ληρεῖν ἐν οἴνῳ (142);

(c) résumé of chief opinions held on the issue, τῶν δὲ ἐπιχειρησάντων τῇ προτάσει οἱ μὲν ἔφασαν μήτε ἀκράτῳ πλείονι χρήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν μήτε ληρήσειν...(143) οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν οἰνοῦσθαι καὶ σπουδαίῳ προσῆκον ἀπεφήναντο, τὸ δὲ ληρεῖν ἀνοίκειον...(144) οἱ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς περὶ τὸ πάθος ὑπερβολῆς οὐ κατανοήσαντες...(145). Von Arnim considers that the second οἱ δέ refers to a third group who maintain a compromise position midway between the first two; I am inclined, with Colson, to think that there are only two groups, and that the second οἱ δέ refers back to the first position.[39]

II arguments in favour of the proposition:

(a) transition to second part, τὰ μὲν οὖν ὡσανεὶ προοίμια τῆς σκέψεως τοιαῦτά ἐστι, τὸν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον ἤδη περαίνωμεν διπλοῦν ὡς εἰκὸς ὄντα, τὸν μὲν ὅτι ὁ σοφὸς μεθυσθήσεται κατασκευάζοντα, τὸν δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅτι οὐ μεθυσθήσεται βεβαιούμενον. τοῦ δὲ προτέρου τὰς πίστεις ἁρμόττον λέγειν πρότερον, ποιησαμένους ἐνθένδε τὴν ἀρχήν (149–50);

(b) sequence of five arguments in favour of the proposition (i) τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ὁμώνυμα...(150–5) (ii) μία μὲν ἀπόδειξις περὶ τοῦ τὸν σοφὸν μεθυσθῆναι λέλεκται, δευτέρα δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη... (156–64) (iii) δεύτερος μὲν δὴ λόγος οὗτος εἴρηται, δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐκ ἀλλότριον σπουδαίου τὸ μεθύειν, τρίτος δ' ἐστίν...(165–71) (iv) τίς γε μὴν οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι δυεῖν ἐναντίων...(172) (perhaps a subsection of the third argument) (v) εἰ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μὴ μόνον ταῖς ἐντέχνοις ἀποδείξεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἀτέχνοις λεγομέναις χρηστέον, ὧν μία ἐστίν... οὐ τοίνυν διαμαρτησόμεθα λέγοντες ὅτι μεθυσθήσεται (173–4).

III argument(s) against the proposition.[40]

(a) transition to third part, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδεὶς καθ' αὑτὸν ἀγωνιζόμενος ἀναγράφεται νικῶν, εἰ δὲ ἀγωνίζεται, σκιαμαχεῖν μᾶλλον ἂν εἰκότως δόξαι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον κατασκευάζοντας λόγους εἰπεῖν, ἵνα δικαιοτάτη γενηθῇ κρῖσις, μηδετέρου μέρους ἐξ ἐρήμου κατα-δικασθέντος (175);

(b) argument against the proposition, which is immediately refuted ἔστι δὲ πρῶτος καὶ δυνατώτατος οὗτος... φήσει δή τις ἐναντιούμενος... (176–7) The words in 176 ἀλλ᾽ οὖν πρὶν ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑξῆς συνείρειν, indicate that Philo certainly intended to adduce (and refute) more than just the single argument found in the text, but at 177 the Mss. of *De plantatione* break off abruptly.

Comments. Philo is recording, as he explicitly tells us, the views of the philosophers, so that there is no need for him to indicate his own opinion. But it is evident that he supports the arguments in favour of the proposition. The third argument is given added force by a brief excursus on a favourite Philonic theme, the joy of the perfect soul Isaac (*Plant.*168–70). The outcome suits Philo well, since there is no doubt that in the *Genesis* account Noah does get drunk. As so often Moses anticipates the discoveries of the Greek philosophers.

The second parallel is a brief treatise of no great literary or philosophical merit entitled Περὶ τοῦ πότερον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ χρησιμώτερον, found in the Corpus of Plutarch's *Moralia*.[41] Again we shall briefly outline those aspects of the treatise which are relevant to our purpose:

Treatise on περὶ τοῦ πότερον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ χρησιμώτερον.

I introduction:

(a) brief survey of thinkers who support either side of the proposition, φησὶν ὁ Πίνδαρος... συμφωνεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος... ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῶν μαρτύρων ἑκατέροις ἴσον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πῦρ εἰσιν οἱ τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἀποφαινόμενοι... (955D–E);

(b) statement of treatise's method (also transition to the first set of arguments), ἀφέμενοι δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, σκεψώμεθα εἰς ἑκάτερον λόγους πῇ μᾶλλον ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς (955E).

II first set of arguments:

sequence of arguments in favour of the proposition that water is more useful than fire, strung together by introductory phrases and connecting particles, and including diverse attempts to refute in advance the opposite view on the proposition ἆρ᾽ οὖν χρησιμώτερον ἐκεῖνο... καὶ τί μικρολογοῦμαι... μετίωμεν ἀπὸ τῶν χρωμένων... καὶ μήν... ἔτι μήν... καὶ μήν (955E–957F)

III second set of arguments:

(a) transitional sentence, τί πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἄν τις ἐντεῦθεν ἔχων λέγοι; (957B);

(b) sequence of arguments in favour of the proposition that fire is more useful than water (i.e. the reverse of the previous position),

again loosely strung together and frequently arguing against the opposite point of view, τῶν δὲ δυεῖν αὖθις... καὶ μὴν, οὗ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλαγέντος φθείρεται τὸ ζῷον, τοῦτ᾽ ὠφελιμώτερον· δῆλον γάρ... ἀπ᾽ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς... τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς ἔστι ποθ᾽ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνευ πυρὸς ἄτοπον... καίτοι γ᾽ εἰς τοὐναντίον λάβοι τις ἄν... ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου γεγόναμεν... καὶ μήν... (957B–958E).

Comments. Noteworthy is the fact that the author does not adjudicate between the opposing arguments. Does this mean that he is just a neutral observer, having no preference one way or the other? He uses the first person for both arguments, so this is no way to decide. It is only possible to look at the relative strength of the arguments. It would seem that the arguments on behalf of the primacy of fire are the stronger, being less trivial and more philosophically orientated. The final argument (958E), alluding to a famous and edificatory passage from Plato's *Timaeus* (47a–c) would then form a fitting climax. The author thus in all probability favours the second proposition and gives it the final and stronger position in the structure of the treatise.[42]

If we now take the *De aeternitate mundi* together with the two parallel treatises, a number of common characteristics emerge:

(1) the treatises focus on a central proposition;

(2) the structure is essentially tripartite, consisting of an introduction and two series of arguments;

(3) the introduction contains definitions (if necessary) of crucial terms in the central proposition and a brief summary of opinions held on the proposition;

(4) the two series of arguments take opposite points of view on the central proposition and a decision needs to be made as to which series is the more persuasive (either settled already by the author or left to the reader);

(5) it is to be expected that the stronger series of arguments would be presented second and form the climax of the treatise;

(6) the series of arguments are themselves introduced by transitional sentences which mark the turning-points of the treatise;

(7) the sequences of arguments are joined together by introductory phrases and connecting particles, but there is no attempt to construct a logically coherent and consistent sequence of argument;

(8) both series of arguments aim to be as persuasive as possible – the author can speak in the first person on behalf of both.

It will be agreed that the far-going similarities between three treatises of disparate provenance cannot be accidental, but is the result of dependence on a common generic literary form. This form is the genre of the θέσις.[43]

The genre of the θέσις or *quaestio infinita* can be defined as the treatment of a general proposition by the method of *in utramque partem* on a popular-philosophical level. The rhetor Theon (1st–2nd cent. A.D.) defines the genre as follows:[44]

> θέσις ἐστὶν ἐπίσκεψις λογικὴ ἀμφισβήτησιν ἐπιδεχομένη ἄνευ προσώπων ὡρισμένων καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, οἷον εἰ γαμητέον, εἰ παιδοποιητέον, εἰ θεοί εἰσι. διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ τόπου, ὅτι ὁ μέν ἐστιν ὁμολογουμένου πράγματος αὔξησις, ἡ δὲ θέσις ἀμφισβητουμένου.

The proposition on which the θέσις focusses must belong to the ἔνδοξα, i.e. that class of propositions which are not of necessity true, but concerning which one can form an opinion. The proposition must be a general one, without reference to specific persons or events (περίστασις). Otherwise, according to the definitions of the rhetorical theorists, it will be a ὑπόθεσις, not a θέσις. It is crucial to realize that the θέσις is essentially, as Theon clearly indicates, disputative in character, arguing *pro et contra* the proposition. Examples of the themes of θέσεις (in addition to those given by Theon) are found in the works of Greek and Roman writers:[45]

> εἰ φιλοσοφητέον (Aristotle's *Protreptikos*)
> *an philosophandum sit* (Cicero's *Hortensius*)
> εἰ ἄπειρος ὁ κόσμος (Aëtius, *Placita* (Diels, *Dox.Gr.* 274))
> εἰ ζῷον ἢ μὴ ζῷον ὁ ἥλιος (*ibid.*)
> εἰ σφαιροειδὴς ὁ κόσμος (Hermogenes, *Rh.Gr.* II 17.30 Sp.)
> *solum sapientem esse divitem* (Cicero, *Par.Stoic.*42)
> εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή (Plutarch, *Mor.*439A)
> ὅτι ὁ θεωρητικὸς βίος ἀμείνων τοῦ πρακτικοῦ (Maximus Tyrius, *Orat.*16) etc.

The distant roots of the θέσις can be seen in the practice of arguing *pro et contra* initiated by the sophists Protagoras and Gorgias (cf. also the *Dissoi logoi* and Socrates' two speeches in Plato's *Phaedrus*). But the genre as practised in the Hellenistic period has its origins in the theories and praxis of Aristotle and the Peripatos. Also the Academy and the Stoa adopted this disputative method. The New Academy found it especially useful because it gave expression to the school's

probabilistic theories and methods. Its members themselves argued both *pro* and *contra* diverse propositions, as Carneades did on the notorious occasion of the embassy to Rome in 156 B.C. Our best evidence is found in Cicero, though his great preoccupation with the relation between philosophy and rhetoric is of no concern to us. The θέσις was used as a paedagogic method in both the philosophical and rhetorical schools of Philo's day. Philo may have become acquainted with it there, or followed examples of the genre which he came across in his reading.[46]

It is necessary now to examine the relation between the theoretical prescriptions pertaining to the genre and the way that the genre is brought to actual expression in the form and structure of a literary work. On the basis of the evidence at our disposal it must be concluded that the genre does not present one single rigidly maintained literary form. The essential feature of the genre is its disputatory character, finding expression most often in the practice of the *pro et contra dicere* or *in utramque partem tractare*, as Cicero repeats on numerous occasions.[47] Disputation necessarily entails a declamatory element (cf. the use of the first person in the presentation of arguments in the examples analysed above). Accordingly Cicero likes to clothe his θέσεις in the form of a dialogue, as in the *Tusculanae disputationes*. But it was also possible to present θέσεις in the form of a treatise or an essay, as we find in Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and our three examples. The declamatory element is still faintly present, but it is difficult to imagine the dry sequences of arguments actually being spoken aloud. The rhetor Theon does not prescribe a specific literary form for the θέσις, but only a division into προοίμιον and κεφάλαια (121.5–6 Sp.). The method of *in utramque partem tractare* would lead one to expect a tripartite structure to be normal in a θέσις, i.e. *proemium*, arguments *pro*, arguments *contra*. Our evidence shows that this structure is common, but by no means obligatory. Often only the case in favour of the proposition is presented, but the speaker or writer, adhering to the disputative character of the genre, does bear the opposing case in mind and takes care to refute various arguments in advance (as seen in the stock example εἰ γαμητέον of the rhetor Aphthonius (50–3 Sp.) where the opposing arguments are introduced by an anonymous φησί). Also with respect to the question of whether one set of arguments must be stronger and 'win the contest' there are no rigid rules to be followed. Cicero, with his inclination towards

Academic scepticism, often likes to keep the issue open, as in the enigmatic conclusion of his *De natura deorum*. A more dogmatically-minded author, however, will leave no doubt in the mind of the reader as to which point of view he favours. Finally a word must be said about the manner in which the requisite arguments are presented in the genre. It is evident that its disputatory character is not conducive to a rigorously systematic and dispassionate handling of the theme under discussion. In the examples that have survived we continually observe the structural feature which must be considered a characteristic of the θέσις, namely the practice of stringing together long chains of arguments and illustratory material without making any attempt to construct a systematically presented and logically coherent whole.[48]

Let us return to the three examples with which we started out. There can be no doubt that they reveal the essential features of the genre of the θέσις. But there remains a puzzling aspect. The correspondences both in structure and in phraseology between the three treatises are much more striking than the observations made above on the literary form of the θέσις would lead us to expect. It is necessary, therefore, to postulate the hypothesis that we are dealing here with one widely disseminated manner of composing a θέσις in the form of a treatise or essay. Only by means of this hypothesis, based on an examination of practical application rather than theoretical prescription, can the marked similarities between the treatises be explained.

We may thus conclude that Philo's treatise has as its formal basis the genre of the θέσις as practised in the rhetorical and philosophical schools of his day.[49] The proposition εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος (*Aet.*3) or its equivalent is mentioned as a typical theme for a θέσις by Aristotle and Quintilian,[50] but our treatise is the only example that has survived. The literary form and method of the θέσις is also relevant to the other philosophical treatises of Philo.[51] We shall do well, however, to bear the following *caveat* in mind. In utilizing the genre of the θέσις in order to compose the *De aeternitate mundi* Philo is not obliged to adhere to rigidly fixed rules of form and content. One would expect him to play around with the genre and adapt it to his own (philosophical) purposes, as indeed we shall discover when we analyse the treatise. But before we can proceed to that undertaking, there remains a structurally vital passage in the work which requires a preliminary examination.

The *De aeternitate mundi* in its finished form would have followed

the tripartite structure which we have seen to be a basic feature of the θέσις. The three parts are clearly demarcated by two transitional sentences (*Aet.*20,150), parallels to which we noted in the two treatises which are structurally parallel to our treatise (*Plant.*149,175; Plut., *Mor.*955E,957B). It is the function of these sentences to indicate the precise relation between the three parts. The difficulty is that the two transitional sentences are laconic in the extreme. *Aet.*150 is obscure because the part which it introduces is missing. Such an excuse cannot be given for the first sentence of *Aet.*20, which all on its own makes the transition from the introductory section to the sequence of arguments in the second part. Yet the sentence is very difficult to interpret. Indeed we would wish to affirm that the failure to interpret it correctly has been *a crucial factor* in leading to a misinterpretation of the treatise as a whole. In order to substantiate this claim a careful look at the sentence is a first *desiderandum*. Our text is based on Cohn's edition :[52]

τοὺς δὲ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον κατασκευάζοντας λόγους ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν ὁρατὸν ⟨θεὸν⟩ αἰδοῦς προτέρους τακτέον οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν λαβόντας.

τὸν ὁρατόν U : τὸ ὁρατόν MHP(v), θεόν add. Bernays οἰκείαν : ὁσιαν coni. Cumont.

The sentence reveals two chief difficulties. In the first place the phrase ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν ὁρατὸν ⟨θεὸν⟩ αἰδοῦς floats as it were in the middle of the sentence, so that one has to decide whether it qualifies the participle κατασκευάζοντας or the verbal complex προτέρους τακτέον. Moreover if the phrase qualifies the latter, it must be decided whether the αἰδώς referred to belongs to the subject or the object of the verbal complex. Thus there are three ways of reading and translating the sentence (omitting the final phrase, to which we will return later).

1. We can take the 'floating phrase' to qualify κατασκευάζοντας so that the αἰδώς is shown by the λόγοι, or, less literally, by those who put forward the arguments. The sentence is read in this way by Wendland and Festugière.[53] A translation would read, "the arguments which, on account of their reverence for the visible god, maintain that the cosmos is uncreated and indestructible we should present first".

2. It is possible that the 'floating phrase' is meant to qualify προτέρους τακτέον, and that the αἰδώς refers to the *subject* of the verbal complex, namely Philo. This is the way in which the sentence is read by most translators and commentators, including Bernays, Von Arnim, Colson,

Bormann and Pouilloux.[54] A translation would then read, "the arguments which maintain that the cosmos is uncreated and indestructible we should, on account of *our* respect for the visible god, present first".
3. A third possibility is that the 'floating phrase' again qualifies προτέρους τακτέον, but that this time the αἰδώς refers to the *object* of the verbal complex. This manner of reading the sentence has, to my knowledge, not been suggested before. A translation would read, "the arguments which maintain that the cosmos is uncreated and indestructible we should, on account of *their* reverence for the visible god, present first".

Is it possible, on the basis of purely syntactical considerations, to decide between these rival translations? It may seem rather rash to cross swords with the coeditor of the *editio maior* of Philo's works, but it seems to me that the first suggestion, while clearly not impossible, is the least likely of the three. It is normal practice in Greek syntax, if a prepositional phrase qualifies a subordinate verb or participle, to include that phrase either wholly or partially within the relevant clause or phrase of the verbal form. In this way any possible ambiguity is avoided. Examples abound in the writings of Philo, who on the whole writes syntactically correct and lucid (if rather long-winded) Greek.[55] The 'floating phrase' stands wholly outside the phrase containing the verbal form κατασκευάζοντας, so it would seem more natural to take it with the main verb of the sentence, προτέρους τακτέον. Von Arnim's objection that λόγοι cannot be personalized in the manner of the first and third translations is groundless.[56] If λόγοι can be instrumental in destroying the cosmos, they can certainly be attributed with αἰδώς or lack thereof.[57] On the other hand there seem no grammatical criteria to help us decide whether the αἰδώς of the 'floating phrase' should be attributed to either the subject or the object of the sentence's main verb. Examples of both can be found in Philo.[58] Only the context will allow us to decide.

But we have not exhausted the difficulties of the sentence at *Aet.*20. There is also a problem concerning the phrase which has so far been left out of consideration, οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν λαβόντας. The rôle of this phrase can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly it can be read as commenting further on Philo's decision to start off his debate with the arguments which maintain the uncreatedness and incorruptibility of the cosmos. We might translate, "the arguments... we should present first, (in this way) making an appropriate start". This interpretation is

favoured by all the translators of the treatise.[59] Alternatively we can read the phrase as making a transition to the argument (i.e. *Aet.*20ff.) which immediately follows. This argument is then seen as making a particularly appropriate starting point for the lengthy sequence of proofs which Philo is about to present. A translation would read, "the arguments... we should present first, making (now) an appropriate start". A large number of parallels, both in and outside Philo's writings, show that the latter interpretation is the more probable. The most important parallel is the sentence at *Plant.*150 which performs exactly the same transitional function in the θέσις structure as *Aet.*20. There Philo writes ποιησαμένους ἐνθένδε τὴν ἀρχήν, the word ἐνθένδε pointing to the first argument which begins without further ado. Other parallels add strength to our conviction that Philo is using a conventional formula often placed at the beginning of a philosophical discussion in order to indicate that the author is moving to the first argument or item of discussion.[60] The word οἰκείαν troubled Cumont and Leisegang, but in this interpretation the word is not significant and means merely 'suitable', 'convenient'.[61]

Both the structure of *De aeternitate mundi* and the enigmatic sentence at *Aet.*20 have not yet yielded all their secrets. But we can no longer discuss them in isolation from what Philo wants to say in the treatise. Form and content, grammatical structure and meaning can only artificially be kept apart. It is time to pass on now to a *partial analysis* of the treatise in order to discover what Philo's intentions were in writing it and what the message was that he wished to convey. We emphatically describe the analysis as 'partial', not so much out of a sense of modesty, but because in our study it will only be possible to concentrate on those aspects which are relevant to the solving of the interpretative problem outlined at the start.

4. *A partial analysis*

The introductory section of the *De aeternitate mundi* begins with an *exordium* (1–2). It is brief, and written in an extremely compressed manner. If we were to investigate the many themes and doctrines to which it fleetingly refers, we would be taken right into the very centre of Philo's thought. The function of the *exordium* is threefold, namely introductory, protreptic, methodological. It introduces the subject of the treatise. It exhorts the reader by pointing out the importance and value of the subject to be discussed. It underlines the status of the opinions and arguments which are about to be presented.

Although it was normal practice to commence a θέσις with a προοίμιον, we would not expect this literary form on the basis of the *exordium* here presented. It speaks only of τὸν ὑπὲρ ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου λόγον. Indeed it is remarkably parallel, both in terms of function and subject matter (*mutatis mutandis*), to the *exordium* of Plutarch's *De Iside et Osiride*,[62] a treatise written in the manner of a philosophical discourse. Only at *Aet.*3, where Philo speaks of τοὺς ζητοῦντας εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος, could we reasonably begin to suspect a θέσις structure.

The fact that the *exordium* is built up around two passages from Plato's *Timaeus* is not without significance in relation to Philo's aims and intentions, for Plato's philosophical viewpoint will play a vital rôle in the treatise. In the dialogue Timaeus tells his colleagues that it is a sound practice to invoke the godhead if undertaking a discussion on the universe εἰ γέγονε ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν.[63] Given our human nature, he continues later on, we shall have to be content with a probable account on the coming into being and the nature of the cosmos.[64] Philo's method is to make *explicit* what in terms of his own thought is *implicit* in Plato's words. Plato vacillates in his invocation between θεόν and θεούς τε καὶ θεάς. It is to be expected that Philo will substitute Θεός, and that he makes explicit the relation between God and the cosmos and between God and knowledge is also hardly surprising. When discussing the question of the indestructibility of the cosmos we should invoke God because he is the ἀγαθὸς γεννητής, perfect in the noetic realm, just as there is nothing more perfect than the cosmos in the sensible realm.[65] It is important to note that God's status as creator and the perfection (within limits) of the cosmos receive stress at the very outset of the treatise. Further, God possesses complete knowledge and is the source of all knowledge, also in the sensible realm. The way, however, in which Philo now proceeds to relate God's omniscience to Plato's hint of the limitations of human nature has surprised many readers.[66] He conceives of two levels of knowledge. True knowledge is dispensed by God through dreams, oracles, signs and wonders. It is reserved for the elect few who have cleansed themselves from all passions and diseases of the soul. We, who are still soiled and stained by folly and vice must remain content with a μίμημα τῆς ἀληθείας by means of εἰκότες στοχασμοί. Such a distinction between two levels of knowledge and emphasis on the hindrance of sin and guilt can be paralleled in other authors of Philo's

time.[67] But I feel certain that when he thinks of the elect few he has especially in mind the Jewish patriarchs and above all Moses, the inspired prophet to whom God revealed his word, and to whose works he himself devoted a lifetime of study and meditation.[68]

Philo proceeds now to a short section in which he defines the two central terms of the proposition εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος, namely κόσμος and φθορά, and indicates in which sense he wishes to use them (*Aet.*3–6). As we saw above, a preliminary definition of crucial terms fits well into the προοίμιον of a θέσις.[69] But this does not answer the question of the precise function that Philo wishes to give to the definitions here presented. Short definitions can say much. Certainly that is the case in the treatise *De Mundo* (attributed to Aristotle), in which a definition of κόσμος very similar to the one Philo accepts is located.[70] But I cannot go all the way with the keen-witted analysis of Arnaldez, who considers that Philo sees deep-seated cosmo-theological motives behind the various definitions and that his awareness of these motives determines his presentation and choice of definitions.[71] It seems to me more likely that Philo is using these definitions in order to eliminate in advance possible misunderstandings which could impede the progress of the treatise. By rejecting the second definition of κόσμος, namely κόσμος in the meaning of οὐρανός, he indicates that his treatise will not focus on the subject discussed by Plotinus in *Enn.*II 1. The third definition of κόσμος explains why at *Prov.*II 48 the Stoics could be considered proponents of the view that the cosmos was uncreated and eternal. Such an interpretation would be fatal to Philo's intentions in the doxography that follows the definitions and is thus eliminated.[72] Similarly the definition of φθορά is directed specifically against the Atomists and Stoics, as is evident in its phraseology. Philo will not allow a definition of destruction as a total *reductio ad nihilum*, because then they could claim that their theories do not propose true destruction at all.[73]

The first surprise awaiting the attentive reader of the *De aeternitate mundi* comes at the beginning of *Aet.*7. He would expect that only *two* opinions can be held on the proposition εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος, but Philo calmly states that *three* δόξαι are possible – that the cosmos is ἀγένητος and ἄφθαρτος; γενητός and φθαρτός; γενητός and ἄφθαρτος (the μικτὴ δόξα). Perhaps in retrospect the reader realizes that he could have been warned by the statement at *Aet.*5, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν γίνεται, οὐδ' εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεται. For Philo,

as for all philosophers in the ancient world, γένεσις and φθορά are inseparably coupled. The question of the ἀφθαρσία τοῦ κόσμου cannot be discussed without taking into consideration the question of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου. Hence the three views on the question (Philo discounts the possibility that anyone would assert that the cosmos was ἀγένητος καὶ φθαρτός). It will appear, however, that this does not mean that the *subject* of the treatise has changed. Then Philo could justifiably be accused of careless composition. The subject of the treatise remains the indestructibility of the cosmos. The question of its coming into being is complementary and necessary, but remains subordinate.

The doxography (*Aet.*8–19) that follows the τριτταὶ δόξαι introduced at *Aet.*7 fits well into the structure and method of the θέσις. Both the close structural parallels to the *De aeternitate mundi* which we adduced above contained a doxographical section in the προοίμιον. Further evidence is abundantly present in Cicero's philosophical writings.[74] Indeed the compilation of doxographical material was a very fashionable practice in Philo's day. As Festugière pertinently points out, the practice is not without considerable dangers.[75] The doxographer wrenches his material from its original context and isolates it from the philosophical system of its author, so that the sharp edges of the original meaning inevitably become blurred. When we turn to Philo's doxography we observe that its contents can in no way be described as original. Its basic format is traditional and goes back to Aristotle's *De philosophia* and *De caelo.*[76] In the meantime it has been brought up to date. Epicurus has been placed beside the Atomists, and the Stoics have replaced Presocratic cosmologists. When Aristotle is said to oppose the Stoics and Epicurus, the doxography is presented in the spirit of a *dialogus mortuorum.*[77] Yet, in spite of the doxography's lack of originality, it needs to be emphasized that Philo does not succumb to the pitfalls observed by Festugière. We shall see that he has carefully organized his doxography and so reveals that he has made a penetrating analysis of the cosmological and theological views of the philosophers whose δόξαι he records.

The first position, that the cosmos is γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός, has two groups of representatives, Democritus and Epicurus on the one hand, the majority of the Stoics on the other (*Aet.*8–9).[78] But for Philo these two groups do not stand on the same level. The atomists with their mechanistic explanations for the coming into being and destruction of the cosmos and their dogma of a plurality of worlds present

a wholly godless doctrine. Philo chooses his words with care. One can almost hear the clashing and clattering of the mass of atoms. The Stoics, however, must definitely be placed on a higher level. Not only do they subscribe to a single cosmos, but they also consider God to be the cause of its genesis. And when the cosmos perishes in the great conflagration its rebirth takes place under the guidance of Divine Providence. It seems at first sight puzzling that Philo explicitly refuses, when reporting the Stoic doctrine, to ascribe the destruction of the cosmos to God. Does this mean that he fails to take Stoic monism seriously? I would suggest that Philo is viewing the Stoic doctrine through the spectacles of his own thought.[79] To describe God as the source of the cosmos' destruction is blasphemous.[80] Philo wants to keep the doxography under the tight control of his own views.

Such control is also evident in the transition to the second position, that the cosmos is ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος (*Aet.*10–12). In opposing the doctrines of the Atomists and Stoa, Aristotle acted μήποτ᾽ εὐσεβῶς καὶ ὁσίως. That Philo approves of Aristotle's opposition is evident (its effusiveness has surprised many commentators) but the extent and import of his approbation must be carefully evaluated.[81] Aristotle's piety consists in recognizing the ἀθεότης of his opponents. The word 'atheism', however, does not have the usual meaning found in Philo's writings. Aristotle recognized the cosmos, with its πάνθειον of heavenly bodies, as a ὁρατὸς θεός. The atheism of the Atomists and the Stoa consists in their threatening the cosmos with destruction and not recognizing its divine nature. This attitude of *reverence* towards the cosmos, as Philo describes it at *Aet.*20, was displayed and defended by Aristotle in his lost dialogue *De philosophia.*[82]

It is clear, however, from the construction of the doxography that Philo's commendation of Aristotle's pious and religious spirit is not meant in an absolute sense, i.e. as the result of his maintaining that the cosmos is ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος, but as the direct consequence of his opposition to those who maintain the first position.[83] His doctrine is more pious than that of the Stoics because he has an eye for the perfection of the ordered structure of the cosmos, which differs from the constructions built by human hands in that it will not one day suddenly collapse like a shoddily built house.[84] Here can be perceived the *first philosophical criterion* which Philo uses to organize the doxography and the treatise as a whole, namely *the admiration for the perfection of the cosmos.* Philo agrees with Aristotle that indestructibility

is a fitting attribute for the marvellously constructed work of art which man is privileged to observe all around him. It must be observed, however, that, in presenting Aristotle's argument against his opponents, Philo concentrates on the possibility of the cosmos' destruction. The reciprocal part of Aristotle's doctrine, the uncreatedness of the cosmos, could perhaps be read into Aristotle's accusation that the cosmos would be no different than mere χειρόκμητα, but it is not stressed as part of his 'pious and religious spirit'.[85]

The transition to the third position in the doxography, that the cosmos is γενητὸς καὶ ἄφθαρτος is made without any fuss or bother. The position is allowed to speak for itself, beginning with a quote from Plato's *Timaeus* (*Aet.*13). The choice of this text, *Tim.*41a7–b6, is anything but random, despite the casual air of Philo's doxographical φασί. The importance of this text in Philo's thought is matched by the frequency of its utilization in Middle Platonism.[86] Philo finds elsewhere and here, the following doctrines compressed within its confines: (i) the creation of the cosmos by God; (ii) the basic validity of the axiom that all that is born must die; (iii) the eternity of the cosmos guaranteed by God's βούλησις; (iv) the intimate connection of the eternity of the cosmos with the doctrine of Divine Providence; (v) the task of the Logos as the δεσμός which holds the cosmos together.[87] Plato has realized that the cosmos, for all its impressive perfection, is not autonomous. It is dependent for its genesis on God's goodness, for its preservation and indestructibility on God's providential care. Here Plato's views are clearly superior, in Philo's eyes, to those of Aristotle. A brief glance at the important text, *De opificio mundi* 7–12, will greatly clarify Philo's intentions in the doxography. There he affirms that those who pronounce the cosmos uncreated and eternal not only show too much admiration for the cosmos and not enough for its creator, but also do not realize that they deny the doctrine of Divine Providence, since there can be no proper relation between that which has not truly been created and One who has not been its creator.[88] Accordingly in the doxography Philo is careful to indicate (*Aet.*14) that he does not accept the views of those who interpret the *Timaeus* as not presenting the doctrine of a real creation but rather Aristotle's doctrine in a didactic jacket.[89] Such an interpretation undermines, in his view, the basic message of the *Timaeus* passage which he has quoted.

On the basis of this *Timaeus* passage and the interpretative comments

which Philo appends to it, the *second philosophical criterion* used for the organization of the doxography and the treatise is brought to the fore (albeit in a rather subtle fashion), namely *God's relation to the cosmos as its creator and providential maintainer.* The first criterion proved inadequate because it was double-edged. One could have insufficient admiration for the cosmos as a perfect work of art, but also too much. Aristotle's theology was not up to the standard of his cosmology.

It may seem that we are extracting too much from the doxography, since Philo makes no explicit editorial comments on the third position. But he has not yet finished with his exposé of the proponents of the γένεσις καὶ ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos. He proceeds to mention the possibility that the poet Hesiod was the father of Plato's doctrine (*Aet.*17–8), not with the motive of discrediting Plato,[90] but to illustrate a principle in the history of philosophy to which he attaches great significance, the principle of *maior ex longinquo reverentia.* The older a doctrine is, the more respectability it is likely to have and the more truth it is likely to contain.[91] In this way Philo can at last smoothly come to the δόξα of the Jewish lawgiver, Moses, introduced by an emphatic μακροῖς δὲ χρόνοις πρότερον (*Aet.*19). One is expected, it seems, to recall the Jewish apologetic device of the 'theft of the philosophers'.[92] Philo implies that Moses is the source of inspiration for the doctrine that the cosmos is γενητὸς καὶ ἄφθαρτος. At the very least he is a guarantee of its validity. Having now reached the end of the προοίμιον, Philo thus returns to the theme introduced in the *exordium*, that to some purified souls God has revealed the truth by special means of revelation. The Pentateuchal quotations vouch for the truth of the third opinion (although Philo, true to the methodology outlined in the *exordium*, is not about to embark on Biblical exegesis). In spite of the lack of direct editorial comments on the third opinion, we can be wholly certain that it represents Philo's own view.[93]

We end this all too brief analysis of the doxography by drawing the conclusion that, far from fulfilling the perfunctory rôle one might expect of a doxographical section in the θέσις, it has evidently been carefully thought out and organized. Philo has rearranged the traditional doxographical material in such a way that it proceeds step by step in a hierarchical sequence to reach a fitting climax in the δόξα of Moses (a literary structural technique which he has also used elsewhere[94]). Each δόξα is superior to the one that precedes it – in the

sequence, Democritus and Epicurus, Stoa, Aristotle, (Pythagoreans), Plato, (Hesiod), Moses.[95] The two chief turning points of the doxography, from the first to the second, and from the second to the third opinion, are each motivated by a philosophical criterion based on systematic philosophical analysis, namely the admiration for the perfection of the cosmos, and God's relation to the cosmos as its creator and providential maintainer. We shall see that the philosophical judgments made in composing the doxography closely accord with his views on the subject elsewhere in his writings. But first it must be determined what the relation is between the προοίμιον as we have analysed it and the remainder of the treatise.

We must return now to the sentence at *Aet.*20 which marks the transition from the προοίμιον to the long sequence of arguments at *Aet.*20–149. We saw earlier that from the grammatical point of view the sentence is ambiguous and is subject to two, or perhaps three, interpretations. It is this sentence which provides the reader of the treatise with his second surprise. After speaking of three positions in the doxography, Philo all of a sudden reverts back to two (made clear by the use of προτέρους instead of πρώτους).[96] In the tripartite structure of the θέσις, however, we would expect two, as is indicated by the parallels we adduced.[97] If the structure of the treatise is to become clear, Philo must show what two positions he will set out in detail, and how they are related to his doxography. The arguments to be presented first are τοὺς ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον κατασκευάζοντας λόγους, i.e. those of Aristotle and his followers. Then he adds the 'floating phrase' ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν ὁρατὸν ⟨θεὸν⟩ αἰδοῦς which has already drawn our attention. At this point the interpretation of the sentence becomes critically important.

The wording of the phrase evidently is meant to refer the reader back to the description of Aristotele's reverence for the cosmos (*Aet.*10–11) and the first philosophical criterion used to organize the doxography.[98] Let us recall our three alternative interpretations of the sentence.[99] On the basis of the first (and grammatically least likely) interpretation Philo does not attempt to motivate his decision to start with these arguments but simply repeats the connection between the philosophical position of the ἀγενσία καὶ ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos and the attitude of cosmic reverence as outlined in the doxography. On the basis of the second interpretation, Philo indicates that he *himself* subscribes to Aristotle's attitude of 'reverence towards the

visible god' and for this reason the arguments on behalf of his viewpoint should be presented first. Philo is therefore giving open support for the philosophical criterion of the admiration of the cosmos, a fact which we could not have deduced from the doxography alone. The third interpretation of the sentence gives us another possibility. The Aristotelianizing arguments are presented first, not because they accord with Philo's own viewpoint, but because their relative merits justify giving them a first say. Merits relative to what, one might ask. Relative to the arguments in favour of the first position propounded especially by the Stoics. And what are the arguments that will be presented ὑστέρους? Here is raised the vexed question of the nature and content of the missing third part, to which we will return later. Philo adds that he is in this way making an appropriate start (οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν λαβόντας) presumably because he is about to start off his arguments with four propounded by Aristotle himself, the chief proponent of the opinion.[100]

Just like Philo in his doxography, I have presented the alternative which seems to me most persuasive last. The significance of the philosophical analysis of the doxography is not restricted to the introduction, but is *used to plan the structure* of the entire treatise. In the doxography it was evident that Philo did not give his unreserved approval to the admiration shown by Aristotle towards the cosmos because the Stagirite did not recognize the implication of the cosmos' dependence on a transcendent cause. Thus also here we do not have to credit Philo with an attitude of unqualified 'reverence towards the visible god' which cannot be paralleled elsewhere in his writings.[101] Aristotle's view has a commendable aspect, which becomes particularly apparent when arguing against the Stoic position, *but it is not Philo's own view*. Also the problem which has troubled generations of commentators, namely whether Philo as a practising Jew would not feel qualms in describing the cosmos as a 'visible god', falls away, since the phrase is presented as Aristotle's rather than Philo's.[102] Of the other two interpretations the first is, from the viewpoint of the meaning, quite plausible and definitely to be preferred above the second. This interpretation – the one found in all translations of the work – is positively misleading because it encourages the reader to conclude that the arguments which follow have received Philo's support, whereas in fact he is only reporting them. In the light of these results we consider the claim justified that the misinterpretation of this short

sentence has been one of the crucial factors which have led scholars to a misinterpretation of Philo's intentions in the treatise as a whole.

The remainder of the extant part of the *De aeternitate mundi* is devoted to the long sequence of arguments introduced as τοὺς ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον κατασκευάζοντας λόγους. As Reinhardt saw, κατασκευάζειν is the *terminus technicus* for the presentation of arguments in a θέσις.[103] Philo has undertaken to collect a series of arguments on behalf of the ἀγενησία and ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos and present them in as persuasive a manner as possible. He is doing precisely what was expected in the disputatory method of the genre of the θέσις. Because of the investigation we have made into the literary background of the treatise, we are now in a position to refine the statement of Colson quoted earlier.[104] It is not only *Philo's* way to reproduce with all his vigour opinions and doctrines which he is really going to controvert later, it is *the way of the* θέσις which Philo has taken over for his own ends. It is a convention of the disputatory genre that the use of the first person in putting forward arguments does not necessarily mean the expression of one's own personal opinions. Other literary features of the second part of the treatise can now be placed in perspective, that the arguments so often begin and end with introductory and concluding phrases added by the author to keep them separated, that no attempt is made to build up a coherent body of argument that defends the proposition in a systematic way, that it is difficult to separate source material from Philo's own additions, that a number of obvious and seemingly careless repetitions are encountered.[105] These are not signs of youth, inexperience or haste, but acceptable consequences of the literary method Philo has chosen. This is of course not to say that the work is a literary masterpiece. We can hardly disagree with Colson when he remarks that the citation of a poetic quote three times in a short work is a piece of careless composition.[106]

A detailed examination of the arguments which Philo presents is not possible within the scope of this article. We will confine ourselves to a few generalizing remarks. Just as in the doxography Aristotle is used to oppose the Stoa, so also the Aristotelianizing arguments are used to controvert the Stoic position, with a good dose of polemic thrown in.[107] It is noteworthy that most of the arguments are concerned with intra-cosmic or immanent causes and events, i.e. the level on which we would expect Stoics and Peripatetics to dispute with each other. Only three of the twenty four arguments refer to God in his

capacity as creator or maintainer of the cosmos, and even in these his transcendence is not stressed.[108] It would be absurd to say that this merely reflects the nature of Philo's sources. The theme of reverence for the cosmos is recalled to mind when the arguments at regular intervals focus on the imminent death threatening the cosmos and its parts as the result of the godless opinions of the philosophers.[109] Finally it must be observed that, although the arguments are meant to prove both the ἀγενησία and the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos, emphasis is chiefly placed on the latter aspect in the actual arguments themselves,[110] reinforcing our belief that the question of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου plays only a subordinate rôle in the purpose of the treatise.

How, then, are we to evaluate Philo's position in relation to the sequence of arguments which he has put forward? We believe that Philo *does not support these arguments* and that they cannot be quoted as representing his considered opinion. Commentators have been led astray by the conviction with which they are presented and the use of the first person. Philo *finds the arguments useful* for the preliminary task of refuting the inanities of the Stoa, but, as he has subtly indicated in the introduction, they are not without shortcomings of their own. Therefore we disagree with all the commentators who consider that Philo is persuaded of the validity of these arguments.[111] Especially to be rejected is the suggestion of Weiss that Philo, in reworking his source material, allowed many statements with which he disagreed to remain standing, for the reason that philosophical consistency was not high on his list of priorities and his aim in writing the treatise was apologetic rather than philosophical and systematic.[112] Also to be rejected is the verdict of Cumont and Arnaldez that Philo considers the Aristotelianizing arguments that the cosmos is uncreated in time and eternal to be philosophically *valid* and necessary as far as they go, but from the theological point of view *inadequate*.[113] Their viewpoint is, however, subtle and well thought out. In order to set out our objections to it we must now place our discussion in a wider context.

It is necessary first to pose the central question – is the position which Philo presents in the doxography as his own view on the subject of the indestructibility (and the coming into being) of the cosmos in the *De aeternitate mundi*, as we have interpreted it, the same as that found in the rest of his writings? The answer must emphatically be given in the affirmative, as will become evident in a brief survey of relevant passages located in the *Corpus Philonicum*.

The question of the γένεσις/ἀγενησία and φθορά/ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos is one of the most basic questions of philosophy, initiated when man uses his gift of sight to look at the movements of the heavenly beings.[114] It is one of those questions on which philosophers and sophists are bitterly divided, thereby showing the hopelessness of their quest for the truth.[115] Philo's answer is that which he gives in the doxography, and he repeats it over and over again – the cosmos has been created and should in theory come to an end, but is preserved from destruction by the will and providence of its creator.[116] The theory that the cosmos consumes itself and is reborn in an eternally recurring cycle is nothing but myth-making τερατολογία.[117] A distinction is made between the heavenly beings who receive direct immortality, and man in the sublunary sphere, who as an individual perishes but as a race receives immortality.[118] As biblical exegete Philo discusses on numerous occasions the theme of divine punishment applied on a cosmic scale, but always in terms of natural disasters or θεήλατα in parts of the cosmos, and not in terms of a universal eschatological perspective.[119] Those who do consider the cosmos uncreated and eternal fail to recognize God's providence and are filled with godless arrogance. Such were the builders of the tower of Babel, who were duly punished with total confusion.[120]

Also the way in which the two philosophical criteria are used to structure the doxography is indubitably Philonic. Philo on many occasions reveals his admiration for the cosmos as a work of art in lyrical descriptions of its perfection.[121] But invariably admiration of the cosmos either leads to or is accompanied by recognition of and admiration for its creator.[122] Philo's thought can thus be summarized as follows – true piety entails an attitude of *relative admiration* for the cosmos as God's created handiwork and *absolute admiration* for God as creator and ruler of the cosmos. Characteristic is the passage at *Plant.* 126–31. God in his goodness confers benefits on his creation, and all that his creation can do in reply is to give thanks and praise, "so that high honour may be given both to the creator and the cosmos, the one, as someone has said, the best of causes, the other the most perfect of created things".[123] Another significant parallel to the thought of our treatise is the confrontation between Moses and the Chaldeans at *Migr.*178–84. The Chaldeans were impressed with the unity and concord of the cosmos and thought it to be either God or to contain God as its soul. Moses endorses the doctrine of cosmic sympathy but

strongly disagrees with their theology. The cosmos is not the first God, but is held together by God's powers, while God the creator is wholly transcendent. Just as Abraham migrates from Chaldea to the promised land, so in *De aeternitate mundi* the movement is from the doctrines of the Stoa and Aristotle to those of Plato and Moses.[124] Significant also is how often Philo associates the themes of admiration for the cosmos and its creator and the genesis and indestructibility of the cosmos with the theme of Divine Providence and the images of God as κυβερνήτης, ἡνίοχος, ἔφορος and so on.[125] There are indications, however, that Philo's conception of God's providential maintenance of the cosmos differs from that found in Platonic philosophy in that it does not flow automatically as it were from God's nature (as if God is restricted by how man reasons about him).[126] The cosmos is preserved through God's mercy.[127] Men must come as suppliants to the creator to ask for perpetuity of his works.[128] The doctrine of the indestructibility of the cosmos must not be affirmed at the expense of, but rather as the consequence of the doctrine of God's omnipotence.[129]

Conversely, arguments and statements which claim that the cosmos is indestructible on purely immanent and non-theological grounds (i.e. parallel to the arguments in *Aet.*20–149) are not to be found in Philo's writings. At *Her.*152 the cosmos is eternally preserved because of the proportional mixture and distribution of its elements, but the statement occurs in a passage discussing the activity of the Divine Logos. For Philo the immanent bond that holds the cosmos together is the Logos and/or the Divine powers,[130] but this doctrine is nowhere to be found in the Aristotelianizing arguments of *De aeternitate mundi.*

Is there, then, any reason to follow the viewpoint of Cumont and Arnaldez and conclude that Philo is nevertheless sympathetic towards the arguments that assert the cosmos' ἀγενησία and ἀφθαρσία, because they can help him solve the problem of the relation of the creation of the cosmos to the concept of time. We believe not. Philo is not wholly consistent on the question but the main lines of his thought are clear. On the authority of Moses (*Gen.*1:14–18) and Plato (*Tim.*37d–38c), Philo maintains that God is the creator of time and that time came into being with the cosmos.[131] As he vividly says, if the cosmos is God's (younger) son, then time is his grandson.[132] There can be absolutely no doubt that Philo considered the creation of the cosmos to have been a real event that actually took place.[133] He likes to use the Platonic phrase ἀρχὴ γενέσεως to indicate such a beginning.[134] We are even

told that the creation took place on the vernal equinox, although it is not possible to deduce how many years ago the event occurred.[135] But on the question of whether one can say that the cosmos was created in time, Philo is strictly speaking not consistent.[136] Certainly, however, there is no reason whatever to conclude that Philo is tempted to incline towards the view of a *creatio aeterna* which allows a compromise with Aristotle's affirmation of the uncreatedness of the cosmos and a reconciliation of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed the explicit rejection of an Aristotelianizing interpretation of the *Timaeus* at *Aet.*14–15 appears to have been included for the very purpose of refuting this view in advance. Cumont and Arnaldez have been misled into thinking that the question of time and genesis is much more important than it actually is in the context of the treatise's aims. Only one of the twenty-four arguments, *Aet.*52–4, concerns the question of time, and it maintains a viewpoint that cannot be paralleled in Philo's writings.[137] It is another indication that Philo does not himself subscribe to the arguments he is presenting in *Aet.*20–149. It must be repeated that the question of the γένεσις of the cosmos only plays a subordinate rôle in the *De aeternitate mundi.* In fact it is only introduced because it allows Philo to distinguish sharply between two very different kinds of ἀφθαρσία with very different theological implications.

One question remains and it is the most enigmatic of all. What did Philo write in the section of the treatise which is no longer extant? We saw that a tripartite structure was common in the genre of the θέσις. Moreover the final sentence of the treatise, – ἃ μὲν οὖν περὶ ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου παρειλήφαμεν, εἴρηται κατὰ δύναμιν· τὰς δὲ πρός ἕκαστον ἐναντιώσεις ἐν τοῖς ἔπειτα δηλωτέον (*Aet.*150) – is similar in formulation and function to the single sentences in the two parallel treatises outlined above which effect a transition to the third part of the θέσις.[138] The sentence on its own, however, is laconic and rather imprecise, so that from it alone we can gain no real clue about the contents of the missing part.[139] As Arnaldez rightly points out, any conjectural reconstruction must wholly depend on the hypotheses one has made concerning Philo's intentions in what has preceded.[140] But the question is important enough to justify a certain amount of speculation.

Four possible solutions to the mystery have been brought forward. The first is the simplest. The sequel was never written! Several scholars

have toyed with the idea, though it is of course impossible to prove.[141] If we are correct in asserting that *Aet.*20–149 does not represent Philo's own viewpoint, it would seem most unlikely that he would leave the work unfinished with his own point of view stated only in the προοίμιον and further left undiscussed. A second possibility, which suggests that in the missing section Philo would have defended his own view that the cosmos was γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός, does not deserve serious discussion, totally ignoring as it does the rôle of the doxography in the construction of the treatise.[142] A third suggestion is actually a variant of the second, that Philo in the missing section would have presented arguments opposite to those in *Aet.*20–149 (arguments defending the Stoic position that the cosmos was γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός) but that he would have made clear, as he did in the doxography, that he did not support them.[143] From the point of view of the genre of the θέσις such a procedure would be surprising but possible.[144] The wording of the final sentence (*Aet.*150), which can be read as meaning that the author has finished discussing the subject of ἀφθαρσία and will pass on now to opposite arguments (ἐναντιώσεις), might appear to favour this solution. But on the basis of our interpretation it meets with the formidable objection that Philo will in fact at no stage present his own viewpoint. The treatise would then amount to no more than a purely 'academic' exercise, but that is not the impression we gain from the way it starts off in the first twenty sections.

Thus the only plausible suggestion is the one that remains, namely that in the missing part Philo presents the view which he made clear was his own in the doxography, that the cosmos is ἄφθαρτος but at the same time also γενητός. This solution is consistent with our view that the doxography represents Philo's considered opinions on the subject of the ἀφθαρσία τοῦ κόσμου and that it is used to organize the structure of the treatise. Moreover it concurs with the method of the genre of the θέσις, in which, if two opposing groups of arguments are set out, the second is normally the stronger. The majority of scholars have favoured this solution, but without being at all specific about what the missing section may have contained.[145] A number of comments need to be made.

Although Philo will be defending the position that the cosmos is γενητὸς καὶ ἄφθαρτος, it is not at all probable that the emphasis will now fall on the subject of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου. As was stated in the introduction, the treatise has as its theme the question of the ἀφθαρσία

τοῦ κόσμου. Philo will only broach the subject of the creation of the cosmos inasmuch as he needs it to elucidate his views on its indestructibility. The length of the final section cannot be estimated with any certainty. One would expect a response of at least equal length, but in the dialogue *De animalibus* (which as we saw has a θέσις structure[146]) Philo's reply is much shorter than the speech which he refutes. Another question which must be raised but to which no certain answer can be given is whether the final section would have contained only negative arguments (as announced at *Aet.*150) against those presented in *Aet.* 20–149, or whether Philo would have launched into positive arguments which represented and clarified his own position. The formulation τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἐναντιώσεις at *Aet.*150 is too vague and can be interpreted in either direction.[147] Moreover, would Philo have retained the literary structure of a sequence of arguments loosely strung together, or would he now have preferred to present a coherent, systematically organized line of reasoning on the subject? His use of the genre of the θέσις points to the former, but we cannot be wholly certain. Finally it is pertinent to raise the question of whether in the missing sequel Philo would have continued to draw on philosophical arguments similar to those in *Aet.*20–149, or whether he would have embarked on biblical exegesis. In our opinion the statement in the *exordium* that the treatise will remain on the level of a μίμημα τῆς ἀληθείας is decisive for the settling of this question. Thus in its avoidance of exegetical exposition the *De aeternitate mundi* would have remained similar to the other so-called philosophical treatises.[148] But emphatically this does not mean that the figure of Moses has departed from the scene. The presence of the Jewish lawgiver continues to dominate the treatise precisely because he had reached the very summit of philosophy[149] and is the guarantor for the validity of Plato's and Philo's viewpoint on the treatise's subject.[150]

Our speculations on the actual content of the final section will be brief and will aim at being consistent with our interpretation of Philo's philosophical analysis as revealed in the doxography and also with our interpretation of his attitude towards the Aristotelianizing arguments in the second part. It can be held probable that Philo would have pointed out the shortcomings of the many arguments which contended that the cosmos is indestructible on account of its αὐτάρκεια or autonomous existence. The statement that the cosmos is the cause of its own subsistence (*Aet.*70) is radically deficient. For its existence

it is dependent on a transcendent cause, God its creator and protector. Nor can it be said that the cosmos cannot undergo destruction because there is no internal or external cause mighty enough to destroy it (*Aet.*20–24). There is a third possibility – it will perish because of its own intrinsic nature.[151] Philo would in all probability have appealed to the stern Eleatic principle that all that is born must die, or, in terms of Plato's phraseology in *Tim.*41a-b, πᾶν δεθὲν λυτόν. The argument at *Aet.*27 requires drastic revision. The fact that ἀγενησία is consequent upon ἀφθαρσία through φυσικὴ ἀκολουθία would not be denied,[152] but the pair of attributes are not applicable to the cosmos. The cosmos is φύσει γενητός and in theory should be subject to διάλυσις. The appeal to Plato's *Timaeus* at *Aet.*25–27 in order to show that the cosmos is immune to destruction is in vain,[153] for *Tim.*32c–33a is overtrumped by *Tim.*41a-b.[154] If the cosmos has had a beginning, also time cannot be considered without beginning or end (*Aet.*53). Then it would not be χρόνος but αἰών, an attribute of God and the noetic world.

We cannot be sure whether Philo would have switched from opposition to a presentation of positive arguments of his own. If he did so, it is instructive to compare the first section of *De Providentia I*, where he attacks those who posit the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the cosmos because they effectively deny the existence of Providence. It is especially intriguing to speculate whether he might have used the Stoicizing arguments which are briefly (and perfunctorily) refuted at *Aet.* 143–4, but are used to good effect in *Prov.* I 9–19.[155] If the parts of the cosmos have come into being and are subject to decay and destruction, also the whole will be threatened with total dissolution. The fact that Stoicizing arguments are used to bolster a Platonizing position would not trouble Philo.[156] The arguments demonstrate in a dramatic way the crucial importance of the doctrine of God's providential care, which counters and holds in check the forces of dissolution. It has been suggested that Philo, instead of writing the sequel to our extant version of *De aeternitate mundi*, wrote *De Providentia I* in its place.[157] The suggestion seems unlikely.[158] Nevertheless the contents of that treatise (and especially its many proofs for the existence of Providence) could well form a guide to the positive arguments that Philo developed in the missing section, with the proviso that the chief emphasis must have remained on the subject of the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos. Philo may also have raised the problem of *how* the cosmos

is bound together by God's providential activity. What is the immanent δεσμός of God's transcendent βούλησις (cf. *Tim.*41b4–5)? In the exegetical works the answer lies in the activity of the Logos and the Divine powers.[159] But in the philosophical treatises he is reticent about introducing these aspects of his thought,[160] and we cannot be sure that he would have raised the subject here. It is certain that Philo would *not* have introduced the doctrine of a *creatio aeterna* as a positive argument in his sequel, the solution envisaged by Cumont and Arnaldez. This for the reasons discussed at length above. Therefore the French scholar is not justified in weakening the force of ἐναντιώσεις at *Aet.*150 to "nos *désaccords* relatifs à chaque point" in order to accommodate his own interpretation.[161] Even though both sets of arguments support the position of the cosmos' indestructibility, Philo can speak of 'opposition' because he is persuaded of the radical deficiency of the arguments presented in *Aet.*20–149.

It is apparent, therefore, that the most plausible reconstruction of *De aeternitate mundi* is that after an introductory section Philo presented two sets of arguments in favour of the indestructibility of the cosmos, the one set arguing in favour of its ἀγενησία and ἀφθαρσία, the other on behalf of its γένεσις and ἀφθαρσία. This structure was clearly foreshadowed and introduced in the doxography. If so, the paradoxical situation emerges that Philo, although certainly utilizing the genre of the θέσις, has not adhered to its most basic feature, namely that the two series of arguments should argue for and against the proposition which forms the subject of the dispute. In a θέσις on the subject εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος one would expect one side supporting the destructibility of the cosmos, the other its indestructibility. This is not to suggest, in retrospect, that the genre and structure of the θέσις are irrelevant to our treatise. On the contrary. Philo has, in fact, rather subtly adapted the basic structure of the θέσις to the philosophical exigencies of his subject. Instead of having only two positions, where the second defeats the first, he has unfolded three positions, using the second to refute the first and the third to triumph over the second, while the basic disputatory structure of the θέσις remains basically intact. The conclusion is permissible that Philo was more interested in doing justice to the philosophical problematics of his theme than in strictly adhering to the rules of the disputatory genre.

Can we agree with Arnaldez that the treatise is "un ouvrage très bien construit et agencé"?[162] With respect to the overall design and

the philosophical analysis behind that design we can certainly assent. But at crucial points in the structure of the piece, namely at *Aet.*13,20, 150, Philo becomes brief and cryptic to the point of being obscure. Possibly he reckoned on a greater familiarity with the literary form he uses than we now possess. When this deficiency on our part is added to the fact that the final section is lost, it can no longer be considered surprising that the treatise has been so long and often so radically misunderstood.

5. *Towards a reappraisal of Philo's philosophical treatises*

Although the problems of interpreting Philo's treatise *De aeternitate mundi* are considerable, the main problem of its interpretation can be resolved if close attention is paid to three aspects which we have studied in this article: (1) the conventions of the literary genre of the θέσις which Philo has adapted to his own purpose; (2) the organisatory rôle that the doxography at *Aet.*7–19 plays in the structure of the work; (3) the correct interpretation of the enigmatic sentence at *Aet.*20 which introduces the long sequence of arguments in the second part of the treatise. It is beyond all reasonable doubt that the contents of the treatise, if interpreted correctly, are *wholly in line with Philo's thought* as it is found in the remainder of his writings. The arguments at *Aet.*20–149 which, if taken as Philonic, have caused scholars so many headaches, *do not represent his true thought.* He presents them as the arguments of others, although finding them useful for refuting the theologically even more inadequate views of the Stoa. Because the arguments defending Philo's own position are lost, the treatise's contribution to Philonism must be found above all in the first twenty paragraphs. A corollary is that the content of *Aet.*20–149 should not unreservedly be quoted as Philo's own opinions, even though the manner of expression is indubitably Philonic.

On the basis of these results the question of the relation of the *De aeternitate mundi* to Philo's other writings, and especially to the exegetical treatises, becomes all the more urgent. Philo's purpose and intentions in writing it are not made explicit. Its 'academic' presentation conceals the occasion, discussion or person which motivated it. We can only conjecture whether it was written for Alexandrian intellectuals, proselytes, fellow Jews (perhaps his nephew Alexander), or even maybe solely for himself. Pohlenz has suggested that it forms a kind of sequel

or appendix to the *De opificio mundi*, where the same problem area is discussed. The subject was so important and the philosophical material so copious that a separate monograph was required.[163] Daniélou sees important points of contact between the treatise and the *Exposition of the Law*, which he thinks was written for non-Jews in the decade 30–40 A.D.[164] Both suggestions lack conviction, however, because they do not take into account the fact that in our treatise Philo deliberately avoids his usual practice of concentrating on biblical exegesis.[165]

No matter for whom or for what occasion Philo wrote the treatise, we have seen that he considered it worthwhile to devote some of his time to a systematic philosophical handling of a theme which he obviously thought important but which was not often explicitly mentioned in the Pentateuch. The treatise may therefore present us with evidence of Philo's educational and intellectual milieu, but more importantly it gives us insight into an aspect of his own preoccupations. This is a result of some importance at a time when Philonic scholarship is (rightly) coming to the realization that Philo was above all an exegete of scripture and used philosophy primarily for the purpose of illuminating the Law of Moses.[166] Such a view need not entail, in our opinion, that he rejected the method of philosophy as an intrinsically valid, if limited, manner of reflecting on the nature of God and the worlds of intelligible and perceptible reality. Indeed we have seen that he was prepared to utilize it also for himself, in a manner that was certainly not irrelevant to his exegetical and religious preoccupations elsewhere.[167] To assert dogmatically without the support of any evidence that the *De aeternitate mundi* is a youthful work reflecting the (immature) period of Philo's philosophical studies is to beg the entire question of the relation between exegesis and philosophy in Philo's achievement.

A fortiori these remarks apply to the group of the philosophical treatises as a whole. Although they have long been drawn upon as a fertile source of evidence for ancient philosophy and Hellenistic culture, in Philonic studies they have suffered an unreasonable neglect. Insufficient account has been taken of the special evidence which they provide in the attempt to construct a general picture of Philo. Doubtless a contributing factor to this neglect has been the severe philological difficulties encountered in the three 'Armenian' treatises.[168] A solution to these difficulties is a first requirement, which it is to be hoped will

be fulfilled soon.[169] The time is drawing nigh, we consider, for a reappraisal of the philosophical treatises and what they contribute to our knowledge of Philo as a many-sided writer and thinker.

NOTES

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[1] S. Sandmel, *Philo of Alexandria : an introduction* (New York) 76.

[2] Scholars such as Bernays, Martin, Diels, Zeller, Von Arnim, Wendland, Cumont, Norden, Gomperz.

[3] The treatises are *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, *De Providentia I* and *II*, *De animalibus*. The last three (often called the 'dialogues with Alexander', although *De Providentia I*, as we have it, is not in dialogue form) survive only in an Armenian translation. Fragments of the original text of *De Providentia II*, amounting to about a quarter of the whole, are preserved in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* of Eusebius.

[4] The tripartition of Philo's writings into exegetical, philosophical and apologetic treatises has become universally accepted since the studies of E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (Leipzig [4]1909) 633–95; L. Massebieau, 'Le classement des œuvres de Philon', *Bibl. de l'école des hautes études : Sciences religieuses* 1(1889)1–91; L. Cohn, 'Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos', *Philologus* Suppl.VII(1899)385–436.

[5] H.-F. Weiss, *Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des hellenistischen und palästinischen Judentums. TU* 97 (Berlin 1966) 18–26.

[6] See J. Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* (ed. H. Usener, Berlin 1885) I 284 n. 1.

[7] J. Bernays, 'Über die Herstellung des Zusammenhanges in der unter Philon's Namen gehenden Schrift Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου durch Blatterversetzung', *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1863(15 Jan.) 34–40 (also *Ges.Abh.* I 283–90); 'Die unter Philon's Werken stehende Schrift Über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls nach ihrer ursprünglichen Anordnung wiederhergestellt und ins Deutsche übertragen', *Abh. der Berl. Akad.* phil.-hist.Kl. 1876 209–76; 'Über die unter Philon's Werken stehende Schrift Über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls', *Abh. der Berl. Akad.* phil.-hist. Kl. 1882 1–81.

[8] F. Cumont, *Philonis De aeternitate mundi* (Berlin 1891) i,ix-xii; F. H. Colson, *Philo*. Loeb Classical Library (London 1929–62) IX 172–5; R. Arnaldez, J. Pouilloux, *De aeternitate mundi. Les œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* (ed. Arnaldez-Mondésert-Pouilloux) 30 (Paris 1969) (introduction and notes Arnaldez, traduction Pouilloux).

[9] E. Zeller, 'Der pseudophilonische Bericht über Theophrast', *Hermes* 15(1880)137–46 (repr. *Eduard Zellers Kleine Schriften* (ed. O. Leuze Berlin 1910) I 215–25).

[10] H. von Arnim, *Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria* (Berlin 1888) 1–52.

[11] Cumont *op.cit.* (n.8).

[12] See further below p. 110.

[13] H. von Arnim, Review of Cumont in *Philosophische Monatshefte* 28(1892) 466.

[14] Cumont xxiii-xxiv.

[15] *Spec.*III 1. It should be noted that for Philo φιλοσοφία is a many-sided word, which can signify both Greek philosophy and Jewish study of the Law. See V. Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie*. ALGHJ XI (Leiden 1977) 97–116, on this passage 106.

[16] P. Wendland, *Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung* (Berlin 1892) 2; Cohn (*art.cit.* n.4) 389; K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (München 1921) 212–3.

[17] W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (Göttingen 1915) 134–52, esp. 135–6.

[18] Arnaldez (*op.cit.*n.8) 70, cf.33–4.

[19] Nikiprowetzky (*op. cit.* n.15) 215; cf. 'Recherches esséniennes et pythagoriciennes', *REJ* 125(1966) 323–4.

[20] Cf. M. Pohlenz, 'Philon von Alexandreia', *Nach. d. Akad. d. Wiss. in Göttingen* phil.-hist.Kl. 1942 412–5; J. Daniélou, *Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1958) 71–5. In a forthcoming article in *Aufstieg und Niedergang des römischen Welt* Prof. A. Terian (Andrews University, U.S.A.) will endeavour to show that the dialogues must be dated to the closing years of Philo's life.

[21] Cf. *Prov.*I 6–36, *Prov.*II 45–60.

[22] At *Aet.*77 we read οὐ γὰρ νεότητος ἀλλὰ γήρως τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ περιμάχητα διιδεῖν... Admittedly the contrast between youth and old age was a *topos* (cf. *Somn.*I 10–11), but its presence is less likely in a youthful work. More 'schoolmasterish' is the remark at *Aet.*132 ἀναγκαῖον δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοσαύτην εὑρεσιλογίαν ἀπαντῆσαι μή τις τῶν ἀπειροτέρων ἐνδοὺς ὑπαχθῇ, very reminiscent of the solicitude which Philo shows for Alexander's mistaken opinions at *Prov.*II 85–6,98,113–6.

[23] Cf. A. D. Nock *CR* 57 (1943) 78. "Accordingly, *Prov.* and *Alex.* may be dated near 30, and *Aet.* probably goes with them".

[24] A fine example of the use of the genetic method at H. Leisegang, Art. 'Philo' *RE* XX.1 (1949) 5–6; cf. also Cumont xv who thinks Philo may have *changed his mind* on the subject of the indestructibility of the cosmos; for an example of the use of psychological criteria cf. Wendland (*op.cit.* n. 16) 2, "dasz er eine solche, man könnte fast sagen griechische Periode in seiner Entwicklung durchgemacht hat... musste man vorauszetzen, um die Genesis seines späteren Systems *psychologisch* zu erklären...". For critical comments on both the use of the genetic method and the tendency to psychologism, see Nikiprowetzky (1977) 192–4, 240. I surmise that Nikiprowetzky nevertheless wishes to retain an early date for the philosophical treatises because otherwise they do not fit in so well with his main thesis that Philo is first and foremost a commentator on scripture.

[25] E.g. O. Stählin, *Griechischer Literaturgeschichte* (München [6]1921) 628, "eine noch etwas unbeholfene Jugendarbeit Philon's"; an exception must be made for the view of Arnaldez, cf. below p. 138 and n. 95.

[26] Cumont xi-xv. The trouble with Cumont's study is that it is *too* clever and inventive. He is interested above all in demonstrating the authenticity of *Aet.*, and so marshalls as many arguments as he can. Thus he says at xv that if one does not accept his solution to the philosophical problem, two possibilities still remain, (i) that Philo as so often is simply being inconsistent, (ii) that he changed his mind as he grew older. Accordingly it is not easy precisely to pin down Cumont's point of view.

[27] Cumont appeals to remarks at *Opif.* 26–8, *Leg.* I 2–3, *Deus* 31, *Prov.* I 7. Texts such as *Opif.* 7 and *Fug.* 12 bring him into difficulties – hence the escape routes noted in n. 26.

[28] Arnaldez 28–30, 68–9.

[29] It must be borne in mind that Philo is drawing his information on Aristotle (either directly or via another source) from the lost *De philosophia* and not from his scholastic works. It is probable that in this dialogue Aristotle espoused a *creatio aeterna* and not the maturer doctrine of the *De caelo*. See J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Paris 1964) 472–92; B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'*. Zetemata 50 (München 1970) 7–23. Thus the passage from Zacharias of Mytilene which speaks of an ἀιδίου δημιουργικοῦ αἰτίου – quoted by Cumont xii in order to prove that Philo held this position – is derived from Aristotle's *De philosophia* via Porphyry, and not from Philo as Cumont suggests (cf. M. Baltes, *Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten*. Philosophia Antiqua XXX (Leiden 1976) 192–207).

[30] H. Leisegang, 'Philons Schrift über die Ewigkeit der Welt', *Philologus* 92 (1937) 156–76 (summary in his *RE* article cited above n. 24).

[31] Leisegang (1937) 166.

[32] Cf. the sound comments of Arnaldez 34–7.

[33] Colson (*op.cit.* n. 8) 173–4.

[34] Colson 174.

[35] Cf. the vague comments of Cohn (*art.cit.* n. 4) 389, "seine Übungsarbeiten im philosophischen Stil", and Pohlenz (*art. cit.* n. 20) 411, "hier behandelt Philon philosophische Probleme ganz in der Weise der Griechen". For a sound discussion of the literary genre of *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, see M. Petit, *Quod omnis probus liber sit. Les œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* (ed. Arnaldez-Mondésert-Pouilloux) 28 (Paris 1974) 39–43.

[36] The similarity was noted by Von Arnim (1888) 102, Leisegang (1937) 165 and others, but has not been exploited. Text at Colson III 284–304.

[37] The typology of Noah as ὁ δίκαιος is based on scripture (*Gen.* 6:9). From there it is only a short step to the Greek philosophical conception of the σοφός.

[38] There has been much dispute concerning the source of the treatise, cf. Colson III 209 (who omits to say that substantial parts have been claimed for Aristotle's lost *Symposium*; cf. V. Rose, *Aristoteles qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig 1886, repr. 1967) 99–101).

[39] Von Arnim (1888) 109–14; Colson III 498; cf. also W. J. Schmidt, Περὶ μέθης: *een onderzoek naar de Griekse opvattingen over de dronkenschap* (diss. Leiden 1947) 50, whose view is similar to Colson's.

[40] I have assumed that the structure of the treatise was tripartite (thus almost wholly parallel to the *De aeternitate mundi*). Colson III 211 thinks that we possess only the supporter's speech (including arguments professing to meet those of the opponent) and that the opponent's speech is wholly lost. The words of *Plant.* 175, which speak of τοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον κατασκευάζοντας and a δικαιοτάτη κρῖσις, seem to me to indicate that the break between the *pro* and *contra* arguments occurs at that point. Philo does not, however, give the *contra* arguments a free hand, but, as he himself tells us at *Plant.* 176, refutes them straight away, presumably for the sake of economy. For other examples of Hellenistic philosophical treatises with a similar structure, cf. I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften* (Breslau 1928, repr. 1968) II 97–9.

[41] Text at W. C. Helmbold, *Plutarch's Moralia*. LCL XII (London 1957) 290–307. The authenticity of the treatise has been frequently questioned; cf. the scathing attack by F. H. Sandbach, *CQ* 33 (1939) 198–202. He reserves the possibility, however, that Plutarch himself wrote it as a parody or when a schoolboy!

[42] Also very similar in form and structure to the two parallels which I have adduced is the first of Tyrwhitt's fragments of Plutarch's *Moralia*, Πότερον ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος ἐπιθυμία καὶ λύπη (text at F. H. Sandbach, *Plutarch's Moralia*. LCL XV Fragments (London 1969) 32–59, also considered pseudonymous). It is not, however, so rigidly divided into two opposing sets of arguments.

[43] On the subject of the θέσις I have relied heavily on the excellent monograph of H. Throm, *Die Thesis*. Rhetorische Studien 17 (Paderborn 1932). Cf. also H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (München 1960) I 69–73; A. Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron* (Paris 1960) 211–9. The relation of the *De aeternitate mundi* to the genre of the θέσις was pointed out *en passant* by Reinhardt (*op.cit.* n. 16) 212–4 (though not wholly correctly, cf. Throm 78). Reinhardt's remarks appear to have been overlooked by subsequent interpreters of the treatise.

[44] *Rhetores Graeci* (ed. Spengel) II 120.13–17; cf. Hermogenes, *ibid.* 17.10ff., Aphthonius, *ibid.* 49.14ff.

[45] Further examples at Throm 78–9. An exhaustive list has, to my knowledge, never been compiled.

[46] For the evidence on which this brief historical survey is based, cf. Throm esp. 160–89. Philo always speaks in very general terms about his rhetorical and philosophical training, so that we cannot determine with any certainty how he obtained it and can only deduce its nature and extent from the evidence in his works; cf. the excellent article of M. Alexandre, 'La culture profane chez Philon', *Philon d'Alexandrie. Actes du colloque national Lyon 11–15 septembre 1966* (Paris 1967) 105–130, esp. 114–5 where the θέσις is discussed without actually described as such. A word must be said about the so-called genre of the διατριβή. It is one of Throm's main theses that the genre of the διατριβή, as postulated by Wendland and others, is in fact not a separate genre at all, but a subsection of the θέσις as worked out on a popularizing level. This view is important for an understanding of Philo's works, since he is considered to supply significant evidence for the διατριβή; cf. A. Michel, 'Quelques aspects de la rhétorique chez Philon', *ibid.* 81–101. But it must be added that Throm's theory, despite the strength of his arguments, has not found universal acceptance and one still frequently finds the diatribe mentioned as an independent genre (e.g. A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern ^{3}1971) 755, 919).

[47] Cf. Cicero, *De orat.* III 80, *Tusc. disp.* II 9, *Fin.* II 2; also Plutarch, *Stoic.Rep.* 10 1036Bff., Quintilian, *Inst.Or.* III 5 5 etc.

[48] Cf. the examples given in the rhetors mentioned at n. 44 and also the remarks of Reinhardt 213–4, A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris 1945–54) II 414.

[49] This does not mean we have an argument here in favour of the *Jugendschrift* theory. As Marrou has pointed out, in Greek culture after Isocrates the line between 'school' and 'real life' becomes more and more blurred (H.-I. Marrou, *A history of education in antiquity* (Eng. trans. London 1956) 204). Philo would have continued to use literary forms which he had learnt in his grammatical and rhetorical training.

[50] Aristotle, *Topica* I 14 105b25 (πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀίδιος ἢ οὔ); Quintilian, *Inst.Or.*

VII 2 2 (*ut in generalibus, an atomorum concursu mundus sit effectus, an providentia regatur, an sit aliquando casurus*).

[51] That the two dialogues are based on the θέσις genre is obvious: *De Providentia II* on the proposition εἰ ἔστιν ἡ πρόνοια (cf. Cicero, *De nat.deor.* II 4–72, Sex.Emp., *Adv.Phys.* I 13–193, Theon, *Rh.Gr.* II 126.3–128.3 Sp.); *De animalibus* on the proposition ὅτι τὸν λόγον ἔχει τὰ ἄλογα (cf. the two treatises in Plutarch's *Moralia* 959E–992E). *Quod omnis probus liber sit* has as its subject the proposition of a θέσις, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἀστεῖος ἐλεύθερος (*Prob.* 1, cf. Cicero, *Par.Stoic.* 33) but in its presentation it is a hybrid form between a θέσις and a philosophical discourse; cf. Petit (*op.cit.* n. 35), where her remarks on the diatribe form should be modified in the light of what we have said above in n. 46. *De Providentia I* similarly reveals hybrid characteristics. There are sequences of loosely connected arguments reminiscent of a dossier from a θέσις (e.g. *Prov.* I 9–33). But the overall structure of the treatise shows the tighter, more coherently organized layout of a philosophical discourse.

[52] Text and sigla from L. Cohn and P. Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt editio maior* (Berlin 1896–1915) VI 79.

[53] Wendland, Review of Cumont, *Berl.Philol.Woch.* 1891 1031; A.-J. Festugière (*op.cit.* n. 48) II 239.

[54] Bernays (1876) 226; Von Arnim (1892) 465; Colson IX 199; K. Bormann, *Philo von Alexandria: Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung* (ed. Cohn-Heinemann-Adler-Theiler Berlin 1909–64) VII 84; Pouilloux (*op.cit.* n. 8) 89.

[55] E.g. wholly included *Leg.* III 209, *Mos.* II 61; partially included *Opif.* 61. For another example of a sentence with a 'floating' prepositional phrase which causes ambiguity cf. *Praem.* 34. Here it is likely that we should read πραττομένοις ἅπασιν ἄνευ τῆς ἑκουσίου κακίας (sc. οὖσιν) εὐαρστητέον, rather than take the 'floating phrase' with the participle.

[56] Von Arnim (1892) 465.

[57] *Aet.* 10,47; cf. *Post.* 52, *Conf.* 114.

[58] E.g. parallel to the second interpretation *Contempl.* 13; parallel to the third interpretation *Opif.* 74.

[59] Bernays, Colson, Bormann, Pouilloux (references above n. 54).

[60] *Post.* 7, *Praem.* 7; cf. Aristotle, *De caelo* I 2 268b14, *Pol.* B 1 1260b36–7, Albinus, *Epit.* XI 3, Plotinus, *Enn.* III 2 (47) 1 10.

[61] Cumont wanted to emend to ὁσίαν; for Leisegang's view cf. 1937 173–4. An exact parallel for this use of οἰκείαν perhaps at *QE* II 69, 'rightly and appropriately beginning with the table' (translation Marcus). (Prof. J. C. M. van Winden has suggested to me that οἰκείαν ἀρχήν may have a more specific reference than I have given it in my interpretation, namely the general principle enunciated at the beginning of the argument at *Aet.* 20 that all things liable to perish are subject to either an internal or an external cause of destruction.)

[62] Plut., *De Is.* 351C–F.

[63] Plato, *Tim.* 27c–d. The reading at 27c5 has been much disputed. The reading I have given (εἰ...ἤ...) is probably what Philo read (cf. Baltes (*op.cit.* n. 29) 73, 112).

[64] Plato, *Tim.* 29c–d.

[65] A paraphrase of *Tim.* 29a2–6.

[66] Bernays, devout Jew though he was, spoke of 'offenbaringssüchtiger Schwärmerei' (1882 5).

[67] Cf. Plut., *De Is.* 351D, 382F, Seneca, *Nat.Quaest.* VII 29 3 (a fine parallel for ἐπιστήμη τῶν οὐρανίων). An important source was doubtless Plato, *Phdr.* 250b–c.

[68] Cf. *Prob.* 62–4, where, as Nikiprowetzky (1977) 100 has remarked, Philo has the Jewish patriarchs in mind without specifically alluding to them by name. Leisegang's theory that the speaker (Alexander?), in referring to the elect few, has a jab at Philo himself is quite incredible (1937 168).

[69] See above p. 113, 115 on *Plant.* 142; for an important text on the rôle of definitions in θέσεις, cf. Cicero, *Fin.* II 3–4. Daniélou (*op.cit.* n. 20, p. 61–2) remarks that these definitions reveal Philo's acquaintance with contemporary philosophy. We might add that they show acquaintance not only with the *content* of such philosophy, but also with the *method* of contemporary philosophers.

[70] Ps. Aristotle, *De mundo* 2 391b9–12. Two definitions of κόσμος are given. It is arguable that tension between these two definitions determines the whole movement of the treatise (suggested to me by Prof. A. P. Bos).

[71] Arnaldez 41–53.

[72] The point is again made clear at *Aet.* 9, 54.

[73] Cf. again the discussion at *Prov.* II 45–9.

[74] E.g. *Tusc.Disp.* I 18–22, *De nat.deor.* I 1–5.

[75] Festugière (*op.cit.* n. 48) II 344, 350–69, especially 361.

[76] See Pépin (*op.cit.* n. 29) 251–77, especially 252, 256. But we must beware the excesses of *Quellenforschung*. A fine example is found at R. Harder, '*Ocellus Lucanus*': *Text und Kommentar* (Berlin 1926) 32. Philo has 'mechanically transcribed' the doxographical section, with the result that the statement at *Aet.* 12 in the first person that he has read in the treatise of Ocellus applies not to himself but to his source. This remark is surely an insult to Philo's intelligence.

[77] A common practice at the time; cf. Cic., *Lucullus* 119, Seneca, *Ep.* 65.7.

[78] ὁ πολὺς ὅμιλος τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς φιλοσόφων is generally taken to refer to the numerical strength of the Stoic school. The remark would gain more point if it was taken to imply that not all Stoics subscribed to the doctrine of the destructibility of the cosmos. Philo mentions several renegades at *Aet.* 76–7.

[79] A practice also found in the works of Aristotle and Plotinus, cf. H. J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' psychology* (The Hague 1971) 13. For another suggestion cf. Arnaldez 55–6.

[80] Axiomatic is that θεὸς οὐδενὸς αἴτιος κακοῦ παράπαν (*Prov.* II 102, cf. *Spec.* IV 187). Divine punishment is carried out by God's powers or ministers, cf. *Fug.* 65–74. But see further below n. 126, 148.

[81] We are not aided by the fact that the meaning of μήποτε in Philo appears to fluctuate from 'perhaps' to 'surely' (in the context the meaning 'on no account' is out of the question).

[82] For Aristotle's attitude of cosmic reverence in the *De philosophia* cf. fr. 14 Ross and discussions at Festugière II 233–47, Pépin 287–91. The passage *Aet.* 10–11, regarded as *De phil.* fr. 18 Ross, is riddled with problems of interpretation which we cannot possibly discuss in detail here: (i) was the ἀθεότης at *Aet.* 10 part of Aristotle's comments or an editorial imposition of Philo (so read by Arnaldez 56)? (ii) did Aristotle's reference to the ὁρατὸς θεός apply to the whole cosmos or only the οὐρανός? (iii) was Aristotle's accusation in the *De philosophia* originally levelled at the Atomists or Plato's demiurgic account in the *Timaeus*? Philo's independent-minded use of the passage can offer us no secure answer to the last two questions.

[83] For reasons that will become evident later I cannot agree with Arnaldez, who rightly says (56) that Philo's praise of Aristotle is only comprehensible in terms of what has proceded, but then later affirms (69) that "Philon se tourne, d'abord, et *très sincèrement*, vers le Maître du Lycée" (my italics) because only he can help him solve the philosophical problems associated with the creation of the cosmos.

[84] Cf. *Aet.* 76, where the renegade Stoics τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες πρὸς θειότερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ηὐτομόλησαν (Cumont and Cohn unneccessarily conjecture ὁσιώτερον).

[85] Cf. Colson IX 175, "the words that follow show that 'piously and religiously' apply to indestructible rather than to uncreated".

[86] Cf. W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1930) 14–5; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 158, 245, 262, 288.

[87] Compare the following texts: *Her.* 246, *Decal.* 58, *Migr.* 181, *Prov.* I 19, *Conf.* 166, *Migr.* 220.

[88] The argument reappears in later Middle Platonism, cf. Baltes 52–3, 115ff.

[89] On this question see Pépin 86–94, Baltes *passim* and esp. 32–4.

[90] The *doxographicum* on Hesiod may reflect a Peripatetic source (cf. Baltes 33), but that tells us little about what Philo wants to do with it.

[91] The principle was certainly not confined to Jewish and Christian apologetics, but was widespread in Philo's time (e.g. Cic., *De Harus.* 19). The phrase is taken from Festugière I 14.

[92] Philo utilizes the device explicitly on a number of occasions (e.g. *Leg.* I 108, *Her.* 214, *Prob.* 57 etc.), but it is not generally recognized how frequently he *implicitly* refers to the doctrine, as he does here.

[93] None of the commentators who consider the work to be Philonic deny this (except Bousset). It is on the implications of the observation that the interpretations diverge.

[94] E.g. *Praem.* 40–6, *Leg.* III 97–103, *Cher.* 21–30. Fine parallels in other authors are Plotinus, *Enn.* III 1(3)2 and Justin Martyr's stylized account of his intellectual pilgrimage (*Dial.* 2). The climax of Aristotle's doxographical sections tends to be the opinion held by himself which inevitably follows them. For a modern example remarkably parallel to Philo, cf. C. J. de Vogel, *Theoria* (Assen 1967) 201–2.

[95] Cf Arnaldez 61–2, "Il convient de remarquer d'ailleurs que l'examen des trois groupes de doctrines se termine sur la figure de Moïse en un bel accord final, ainsi que l'habile écrivain alexandrin aime à le faire chaque fois qu'il a atteint au sommet de ce qu'il avait à dire".

[96] Noted already by Von Arnim (1888) 5 and Cumont xii. Von Arnim considers the change "recht charakteristisch für die Unklarheit des Gedankens, in welche der Kompilator(!)... befangen war".

[97] *Plant.* 150 προτέρου, πρότερον, 175 μηδετέρου, Plut., *Mor.* 955E ἑκάτερον; cf. above p. 113–5.

[98] The Mss. favour the reading τὸ ὁρατόν, but Bernay's emendation to τὸν ὁρατὸν θεόν has been accepted by all commentators except Leisegang (1937 173). The reading τὸ ὁρατόν can only make sense, in our opinion, if it refers back to the distinction between νοητόν and αἰσθητόν at *Aet.* 1 (and not outside the treatise as Leisegang wishes), which is not wholly impossible. But a direct reference to the report of Aristotle's words at *Aet.* 10 is much more probable. Also the scribes did not understand the sentence at *Aet.* 20 properly, and thus bowdlerized the text (cf. Cumont xxv).

[99] See above p. 119–20.

[100] It remains mysterious why Philo does not tell us that these arguments were put forward by Aristotle. Are we meant to deduce this from *Aet.* 20 too?

[101] Philo almost always uses αἰδώς and αἰδεῖσθαι in a limited ethical sense, i.e. respect for one's elders and superiors, the opposite sex, traditions, institutions etc. Only in a few cases are the words used to express reverence for God (*Mos.* I 36, *Mut.* 201, *QG* I 99(?), *QG* III 54) and never to express reverence for the cosmos or its parts. The often cited reference to *Conf.* 173 is not relevant, because there οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες means 'felt no shame'. This observation supports our conviction that Philo has imported the notion of αἰδώς for the cosmos from Aristotle's *De philosophia* (cf. above n. 82). On Philo's attitude to the cosmos see further below p. 132.

[102] Cf. Bernays (1882) 35, Colson 172–3; Philo is not puritanical in his use of the word θεός (it is after all only one of God's names). His attitude towards the phrase ὁρατὸς θεός and other similar phrases can best be seen at *Congr.* 103, where he describes the cosmos as αἰσθητὸν δοκήσει θεόν. If the cosmos is called divine then strictly speaking a qualification is required.

[103] Reinhardt 213; cf. *Aet.* 12, 20, 56, 94, 113, 118, 124, *Plant.* 149, 175, Theon Rhetor, *Rh.Gr.* II 121.1,19 Sp., Alex.Aphr., *in Top.* 27.12f. etc.

[104] Above p. 111.

[105] Cf. Reinhardt 213–4, Daniélou 66. Von Arnim's labyrinthine analysis is a *reductio ad absurdum* of what happens when the literary background is ignored or misunderstood (1888 1–52).

[106] Colson IX 286.

[107] Specifically at *Aet.* 47–51, 56–69, 89–103, 117–149.

[108] *Aet.* 39–44, 83–4, 106; note especially *Aet.* 84 ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεός – Philo is arguing with a conception of God quite different from his own (cf. also *Aet.* 47).

[109] *Aet.* 45-7, 73, 78, 108, 112; recalling *Aet.* 11 πρὸς τῶν τὸν ἅπαντα κόσμον τῷ λόγῳ καθαιρούντων.

[110] With the important exception of the argument from time at *Aet.* 52–4, on which see further below p. 133, 137.

[111] Cumont, Pohlenz, Weiss, Arnaldez and others.

[112] Weiss (*op. cit.* n. 5) 25–6.

[113] Cf. above p. 110.

[114] *Opif.* 54, *Abr.* 162, *Spec.* III 189, a development of Plato, *Tim.* 47a–c.

[115] *Ebr.* 199, *Her.* 246; cf. Nikiprowetzky (1977) 186.

[116] Creation of the cosmos *Opif.* 1–12, 171–2, *Migr.* 180, *Plant.* 50, *Praem.* 1, *Prov.* I 6–8 etc.; cosmos destroyable but not to be destroyed, *Mos.* II 61, *Somn.* I 158, *Migr.* 181, *Decal.* 58, *Sacr.* 40 etc. (cf. our remarks above p. 126 on Plato, *Tim.* 41a–b).

[117] *Her.* 228, *Spec.* I 208, cf. *Leg.* III 7.

[118] *Praem.* 1, *Spec.* I 76, *Spec.* II 5, *Mos.* II 61, *QG* II 12 etc.

[119] *Mos.* II 59–66, 263, *Abr.* 1–2, 39–47, 142–6, *Praem.* 22–3, *QG* I 96, *QG* II 12–13, 54, *QG* IV 51 etc. (exegesis of *Gen.* 6–8, 19); cf. the Platonic and Aristotelian theory of periodic natural disasters, Pl., *Tim.* 22c–e, *Laws* 676–9, *Pol.* 270c, Ar., *Meteorol.* I 14, *Met.* XII 8, *De phil.* fr. 8 Ross.

[120] *Conf.* 114, *Somn.* II 283, cf. *Opif.* 7–9, 171, *Prov.* I 6.

[121] *Spec.* I 210–1, *Spec.* II 151–6, *Spec.* III 187–8, *Leg.* III 99, *Plant.* 127–8 etc.

[122] Cf. all the texts cited in n. 121.

[123] *Plant.* 131; the allusion is to *Tim.* 29a, also used in the *exordium*, *Aet.* 1.

[124] Much energy has been expended on the question of whom Philo has in mind when, in response to the biblical text, he portrays the Chaldeans. It seems most likely that they represent an amalgam of philosophical and astrological doctrines which Philo considered dangerous, and that they cannot equated with any particular thinker, school or doctrine.

[125] *Migr.* 181, *Decal.* 58, *Conf.* 98, 114-5, *Somn.* II 283, *Opif.* 7–9, *Spec.* I 209, *Spec.* III 189, *QG* IV 88, *Prov.* I 6–36, *Prov.* II 45–9 etc.

[126] Cf. *Spec.* IV 187, κἀκείνῳ (i.e. God) δύναμις μέν ἐστι δρᾶν ἑκάτερα (i.e. good and evil), βούλεται δὲ μόνα τἀγαθά; also the remark of H. A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (Cambridge Mass. 1947) I 316, "With all his (i.e. Philo's) insistence upon the indestructibility of the world, he does not mean that God could not destroy the world if He had the will to destroy it. He only means that we can rely upon God's promise that He would not destroy it.". The contrast with the philosophy of Plotinus, with its rigorous distinction between human λογισμός (which can and does change its mind) and divine νοῦς (which cannot and does not), is most instructive; cf. Plot., *Enn.* III 2 (47) 1–2, VI 7(38)1.

[127] *Mos.* II 61, cf. *Deus* 106.

[128] *QG* II 13 (exegesis of *Gen.* 7:4,10).

[129] It will be agreed that the statement of Sandmel quoted at the beginning of our study is insufficiently nuanced. The words 'eternal' and 'eternity' are ambiguous and should be avoided in a discussion of the *De aeternitate mundi.* Belief in the eternity (i.e. ἀφθαρσία) of the cosmos does not amount to a denial of God's ultimate power over it. It must be admitted, however, that a severe problem is presented by Philo's train of thought at *Prov.* I 34–6, 89–92. These passages appear to be in direct contradiction to the thesis of the *De aeternitate mundi* (and the rest of Philo's works) in that Philo contemplates the end of the cosmos when God will lose his patience with man's impiety and will convert his providential care into retributive punishment. Possibly a solution could be found in the distinction made by Wolfson in the remark quoted above in n. 126. But much remains unclear in both text and translation of the imperfectly preserved treatise.

[130] *Her.* 23, 188, *Migr.* 220, *Conf.* 166, *Somn.* I 241, *QE* II 89 etc.

[131] *Opif.* 26, 60, *Leg.* I 2, *Leg.* II 3, *Sacr.* 65, *Her.* 165, *QE* I 1 etc.

[132] *Deus* 31.

[133] Cf. Baltes 32; Wolfson (*op.cit.* n. 126) I 317–22.

[134] *Ebr.* 42, *Conf.* 114, *Aet.* 14, 53, 118, *Prov.* I 6 etc.; from Plato, *Tim.* 28b6.

[135] *QG* II 17, *QE* I 1, *Spec.* II 150–2, *QG* I 1. I must disagree with Nikiprowetzky when he deduces from ἀόριστον χρόνον in the last-named text that Philo considered the cosmos from all eternity ('Problèmes du 'récit de la création' chez Philon d'Alexandrie' *REJ* 124 (1965) 272 n. 6). Philo means that man is not in a position to determine how long ago creation took place; cf. *Mos.* II 263, Plato, *Tim.* 22e.

[136] At *Opif.* 26 he says that there was no beginning of the cosmos κατὰ χρόνον and that to venture to say that time is older than the cosmos is ἀφιλόσοφον. In a different context at *Decal.* 58 he affirms καὶ ἦν ποτε χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἦν (ὁ κόσμος). Perhaps he means here the distinction between the time of the cosmos and God's time (usually αἰών, cf. *Deus* 31–2, *Her.* 165, based on Pl., *Tim.* 37d), but he is certainly not being careful. On the whole I believe that one should make another distinction, between

ἀρχὴ γενέσεως κατὰ χρόνον and ἀρχὴ γενέσεως σὺν χρόνῳ, and that Philo prefers the latter position.

[137] The genuinely Aristotelian position found at *Aet.* 53 that the nature of time is ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος (cf. Ar., *Phys.* VIII 1 251b25) is nowhere else to be found in the *Corpus Philonicum*.

[138] *Plant.* 175, Plut., *Mor.* 975B (cf. above p. 113–4). Note in both sentences τὸ ἐναντίον.

[139] With respect to the dispute concerning the interpretation of the word παρειλήφαμεν, Bousset is closer to the right interpretation than Leisegang (cf. above p. 108, 111). παραλαμβάνω often has the connotation, also in Philo, of 'receiving from report or tradition' (cf. LSJ *ad loc.* I 4, *Aet.* 145, *Leg.* 232), which fits in well with the method of the θέσις.

[140] Arnaldez 68.

[141] Bernays (1882) 35 n. 2; Leisegang (1937) 156; Pohlenz 417; Weiss 24. The fact that no fragments of the missing part have ever been identified is not an argument in favour of this solution, because it is probable that some of Philo's writings were lost very early on.

[142] Cf. Th.-H. Martin, Review of Bernays' edition, *Revue critique d'Histoire et de Littérature*, 1877, 277–8; Leisegang (1937) 174–6. Both scholars call in as support the puzzling title of the treatise in the *Codex Mediceus*, Φίλωνος Περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως.

[143] Colson IX 177, "The word προτέρους instead of πρώτους in 20 suggests that the only subject treated in either half of the essay was the controversy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, any third hypothesis being ignored for the occasion".

[144] Cf. our parallel above on p. 114, where at *Plant.* 175–7 the arguments against the proposition are not presented independently but refuted directly.

[145] Cumont xiv; Wendland (*art.cit.* n. 53) 1891 1030–1, cf. *Jahresber.Fort.klass.Alt.* 98 (1898) 129; Bousset 135–6; Nock (*art.cit.* n. 23) 78; Weiss 24; Arnaldez 68–9.

[146] See above n. 51.

[147] πρὸς ἕκαστον can be interpreted as meaning 'against each argument' or 'in relation to each point made'.

[148] Cf. above p. 106 and n. 3 and 4, but also n. 68.

[149] *Opif.* 8, Μωυσῆς... φιλοσοφίας ἐπ' αὐτὴν φθάσας ἀκρότητα.

[150] Cf. above p. 127.

[151] Leaving out the possibility that God himself could destroy the cosmos by means of his powers or ministers, thus contesting the celebrated argument from Aristotle's *De philosophia* at *Aet.* 39–44 (cf. above n. 126). On the basis of the doxography it seems most unlikely that Philo would have presented such an argument in the *De aeternitate mundi*.

[152] An Aristotelian doctrine, cf. *De caelo* I 11–12.

[153] Who appeals to *Tim.* 32c–33a at *Aet.* 25–7, Aristotle (in the *De philosophia*), Philo or an intermediary source? The question has as yet not been resolved.

[154] Compare the procedure at Plut., *De facie* 927A–D, where Plutarch, as an orthodox Middle Platonist, refutes Aristotle's doctrine of natural place (cf. *Aet.* 28–34) by appealing to the doctrine of providence and alluding to *Tim.* 41b.

[155] Cf. Wendland (*op. cit.* n. 16) 1892 4–8; but he is definitely in error when he suggests at 12 that Philo accepts a periodic cycle of cosmic generation and destruction "was ein

ganz neues Licht auf Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας und den Inhalt des verloren zweiten Teiles dieser Schrift wirft".

156 Cf. *Prov.* I 21, where a Stoic definition of the cosmos is attributed back to Plato.

157 Bousset 143.

158 The difference in emphasis between the doxography in *Aet.* and the passages at *Prov.* I 34–6, 89–92 (see above n. 129) argues against it.

159 See above p. 133.

160 In the philosophical treatises the Divine Logos is only alluded to once, at *Prov.* I 23.

161 Arnaldez 69 (my emphasis).

162 Arnaldez 61.

163 Pohlenz 427;

164 Daniélou 71.

165 Thus Sandmel also (*op. cit.* n. 1) 76 errs when he classifies the *De aeternitate mundi* among the treatises in the *Exposition of the Law*.

166 Cf. especially the rigorously argued thesis of Nikiprowetzky in his study *Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie*.

167 We would strongly disagree, therefore, with the way that philosophy is 'bracketed' in the ambitious programme of B. L. Mack, 'Exegetical methods in Alexandrian Judaism : a program for the analysis of the Philonic Corpus', *Studia Philonica* 3 (1974–5) 71–115, esp. 103–4.

168 Until recently the same neglect has attended the study of Philo's *Quaestiones in Genesim et Exodum*, also preserved for the most part only in Armenian. But see now the splendid philological labours of F. Petit, *L'ancienne version latine des Questions sur la Genèse de Philon d'Alexandrie*. I Édition critique II Commentaire TU 113–4 (Berlin 1973), *Quaestiones in Genesim et in Exodum : fragmenta graeca. Les œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* (ed. Arnaldez-Mondésert-Pouilloux) 33 (Paris 1978).

169 Prof. A. Terian is about to publish a text, translation and commentary on the *De animalibus* and is preparing a similar edition for the treatises *De Providentia I* and *II*.

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SATAN, ÈVE ET LE SERPENT CHEZ THÉOPHILE D'ANTIOCHE

PAR

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À la fin de son commentaire sur l'hexaméron (*Aut.* 2,28), Théophile précise en quelques lignes rapides les rôles respectifs des acteurs mis en scène dans le récit de la chute : Satan, Ève et le serpent :

Ταύτην τὴν Εὔαν[a] διὰ τὸ ἀρχῆθεν πλανηθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄφεως καὶ ἀρχηγὸν ἁμαρτίας γεγονέναι, ὁ κακοποιὸς δαίμων, ὁ καὶ Σατὰν καλούμενος, ὁ τότε διὰ τοῦ ὄφεως λαλήσας αὐτῇ, ἕως καὶ τοῦ δεῦρο ἐνεργῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυσιαζομένοις[b] ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώποις, Εὐὰν[c] ἐκκαλεῖται[d]· δαίμων δὲ καὶ δράκων καλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἀποδεδρακέναι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἄγγελος γὰρ ἦν ἐν πρώτοις. Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τούτου πολὺς ὁ λόγος· διὸ τανῦν παραπέμπομαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν διήγησιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέροις ἡμῖν γεγένηται ὁ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγος[1].

a. Εὔαν V : Εὔαν V^2 B || b. ἐνθυσιαζομένοις VB : ἐνθουσιαζομένοις *Frisius* cf. infra, n. 21 || c. εὐὰν V^2 : εὔαν B εὐ ἂν V cf. infra, n. 15–16 || d. ἐκκαλεῖται VB : ἐπικαλεῖται *Nolte* (PG 6, 1759 D *4–5*).

»Quant à cette *Heuan*, du fait qu'originellement elle a erré sous l'instigation du serpent et qu'elle est devenue cause originelle du péché, le démon malfaisant, qui est aussi appelé Satan – c'est lui qui alors lui parla par l'intermédiaire du serpent et qui même jusqu'ici exerce une activité dans les hommes qui sont ses victimes (?) – (ce démon) Eὐὰν ἐκκαλεῖται. Démon, il est appelé, et aussi *drakôn*, du fait qu'il s'est écarté (*apodedrakenai*) de Dieu; au début, en effet, il était un ange. En ce qui le concerne, la discussion est multiple. C'est pourquoi, pour moment, je laisse de côté l'exposé qui les (?) concerne; en effet, dans d'autres (traités ?), nous avons tenu une discussion à ce sujet.«

L'étymologie *drakôn-dedrakenai*, le caractère primitivement angélique du démon ainsi que l'identification et le contenu de l'écrit auquel Théophile renvoie le lecteur mériteraient une étude particulière. Seule nous retiendra la proposition εὐὰν ἐκκαλεῖται, dont les termes sont l'un et l'autre susceptibles de plusieurs sens et ont, de fait, été interprétés diversement par les éditeurs et commentateurs de l'apologiste.

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La construction de la phrase, où ταύτην τὴν Εὔαν précède la parenthèse explicative διὰ τὸ [...] πλανηθῆναι, nous invite, provisoirement du moins,[2] à refuser la traduction passive : »Le démon malfaisant [...] est appelé *Euan*«. Conformément à l'acception la plus courante de ἐκκαλέω/-ομαι,[3] on pourrait dès lors comprendre le verbe au sens actif : »Le démon malfaisant [...] appelle Ève à lui, la fait intervenir« ; ce sens est admissible, mais outre qu'il banalise la phrase au point de lui ôter toute portée réelle, il ne rend pas compte du lien logique qui unit la proposition principale à l'explicative qui précède : »Quant à cette Ève, du fait que [...] elle a erré [...], le démon [...] fait intervenir Ève.« Par ailleurs, on voit mal comment Théophile pourrait dire que »le démon fait intervenir Ève« alors que, dans son exposé, il vient de présenter celle-ci comme ayant déjà accompli son œuvre de mort. Enfin, le terme 'Ève', complément direct du verbe ἐκκαλεῖται et ne désignant pas d'autre réalité que la première femme, aurait exactement le même sens que ταύτην τὴν Εὔαν proposé en tête de phrase, dont il ne serait en conséquence qu'une maladroite répétition. Que C. Clauser (1546) et F. Morel (1615, 1636 et 1686) aient éliminé cette seconde mention dans leur traduction du passage est à cet égard significatif : *Hanc Euam principem et caput peccati* [...] *diabolus non cessat vocare*. Et pourtant, l'orthographe divergente des homophones εὔαν et εὐὰν aurait pu, malgré les fantaisies du copiste de V en matière d'esprits et d'accents, fournir l'indice que les deux termes cités à si bref intervalle désignaient des réalités différentes.[4]

Une autre traduction : »Le démon [...] cite Ève (en justice), l'assigne, l'amène à se défendre« suggérerait que Satan, feignant l'innocence, agit de manière à ce que la responsabilité de l'erreur originelle et l'accusation par Dieu rejaillissent sur Ève seule. C'est dans ce sens que, malgré sa traduction banale : *Daemon* [...] *Evan vocat*, P. Maran (1742 et 1747) comprenait le texte de l'apologiste : *Theophilus* [...] *indicat* [...] *ipsum Satanam* [...] *efficere ut Evan illam peccati incoeptricem vocent.*[5] Le démon serait donc présenté ici dans son rôle d'accusateur, comme il l'est en Jn 12, 10 et fréquemment chez les pseudépigraphes de l'Ancien Testament.[6] Pareille interprétation n'est certes pas incompatible avec le contexte théophilien, mais, outre qu'elle suppose, comme la précédente, la répétition inutile de *Euan*, elle confère au verbe ἐκκαλεῖται un sens non attesté ou tout au plus exceptionnel et enregistré seulement à la voix active.[7]

Proposera-t-on alors : »Quant à cette Ève [...], le démon la séduit,

sc. la viole«? Communément évoquée dans les *midrashim*[8] et les récits qui s'en inspirent,[9] cette interprétation n'est guère plus satisfaisante : elle force le sens obvie de ἐκκαλεῖται ;[10] de plus, il n'est pas concevable que Théophile ait, sans raison apparente, suggéré un adultère entre Ève et Satan alors qu'ailleurs il veille à préciser le sens de chaque verset biblique qui pourrait offrir à son interlocuteur païen l'occasion d'une critique.

Ne convient pas davantage : »Quant à cette Ève, du fait que [...] elle a erré sous l'instigation du serpent [...], le démon lui donne le nom d'Ève.« En effet, dans le récit de Gn 3, 20, que Théophile suit fidèlement, c'est Adam, non le démon, qui donne à la première femme son nom d'Ève ; de plus, ἐκκαλέομαι (moy.) ne signifie pas habituellement »donner un nom (à quelqu'un)«. Ce n'est qu'à l'actif que le verbe est enregistré dans ce sens par les dictionnaires.[11] Encore le seul passage relevé où ἐκκαλέομαι revêt cette signification (*Orac. Sib.* 3, 111 : οὐρανοῦ ἐξεκάλεσσαν, dont le sens est confirmé par le v. 112 : οὔνομα θέντες) n'est-il attesté que par un groupe de manuscrits,[12] sans être davantage confirmé par la tradition manuscrite d'Athénagore, citateur des vv. 108-111.[13] Enfin, contre l'interprétation »donner (ou recevoir) un nom« on fera valoir que Théophile lui-même emploie pour exprimer cette idée, non le verbe ἐκκαλέω/-ομαι, mais bien καλέω/-ομαι ; ainsi précisément par deux fois en *Aut.* 2,28 : καλούμενος (1.*3*) et καλεῖται (1. *5*).

Les différences traductions suggérées ci-dessus étant écartées, comprendra-t-on : »Quant à cette Ève, du fait qu'elle a erré [...] sous l'instigation du serpent [...], le démon [...] l'interpelle (sous le nom d') *Euan*«? Cette interprétation est plausible, mais elle ne l'est que dans la mesure où l'on admet que Théophile, suggérant un jeu de mots entre les deux *Euan*, confère à chacun un sens différent – divergence que l'accentuation Εὔαν et εὐὰν semble favoriser – : le premier *Euan* serait l'Ève de Gn 3, 20, le second, une appellation d'Ève que l'apologiste ferait énoncer par le démon (»le démon l'interpelle sous le nom d'*Euan*«), mais que lui-même justifierait en associant Ève, initiatrice du péché, au serpent instigateur de la faute dans le drame originel.

Que recouvre donc l'appellation Ève-*Euan* que le démon aurait prononcée? Autrement dit, quelle est la portée du jeu de mots que nous soupçonnons dans le texte de l'apologiste entre les deux *Euan*?

La plupart des éditeurs admettent que Théophile explique le nom d'Ève par le cri bachique *Euan* = *Évohé*.[14] La pertinence de ce rapprochement ne manque pas d'arguments. Le premier est que, parallèlement à l'orthographe ordinaire de l'acclamation dionysiaque, εὐοῖ, les variantes εὐάν, εὐά, εὖα et εὐαῖ sont également attestées;[15] on trouve même εὔάν,[16] dont le double esprit rappelle la leçon de V εὐ ἀν. De plus, le rôle funeste d'Ève, souligné par l'apologiste, autorise une comparaison avec l'égarement dont les adeptes de Dionysos sont les instigateurs ou les victimes. Enfin, à peine quelques années après la rédaction des *Livres à Autolycus*, Clément d'Alexandrie associe Ève et *Euan-Evohé*, dans un paragraphe qui fourmille d'allusions aux mystères dionysiaques :

Διόνυσον μαινόλην ὀργιάζουσιν Βάκχοι ὠμοφαγίᾳ τὴν ἱερομανίαν ἄγοντες καὶ τελίσκουσι τὰς κρεονομίας τῶν φόνων ἀνεστεμμένοι τοῖς ὄφεσιν, ἐπολολύζοντες εὐάν, Εὔαν ἐκείνην, δι' ἣν ἡ πλάνη παρηκολούθησεν· καὶ σημεῖον ὀργίων Βακχικῶν ὄφις ἐστὶ τετελεσμένος.[17]

»C'est Dionysos en furie que les Bacchants célèbrent dans (leurs) orgies en menant le délire sacré par la manducation de (chairs) crues; et ils accomplissent la cérémonie initiatoire du partage des chairs (résultant) des meurtres, couronnés de (leurs) serpents, en hurlant : *Euan*, cette *Euan* qui, à sa suite, a suscité l'erreur; et le signe de (leurs) orgies bachiques est (le) serpent consacré.«

Passage célèbre, s'il en est, car, déjà recopié par Eusèbe de Césarée,[18] il semble aussi avoir inspiré Épiphane de Salamine :

Διονύσιοί τε ἕτεροι, οἱ τοὺς Κούρητας καὶ τὴν κρεωνομίαν μυοῦντες, τοὺς ὄφεις ἀνεστεμμένοι, εὐάζοντες τὸ οὐὰ οὐά, ἐκείνην τὴν Εὔαν ἔτι τὴν διὰ τοῦ ὄφεως ἀπατηθεῖσαν ἐπικαλούμενοι [...].[19]

»D'autres (adeptes) de Dionysos (sont) ceux qui initient les Courètes même au partage des chairs, couronnés de (leurs) serpents; criant le *oua*, *oua*, c'est cette *Euan* qu'ils invoquent, celle-là qui fut alors trompée par le serpent.«

La similitude phonétique entre Ève et *Euan-Évohé*, l'égarement dont sont coupables la première femme et les disciples de Dionysos, le témoignage explicite de Clément et de ses compilateurs fournissent, en faveur de l'interprétation Ève = *Évohé* dans le contexte théophilien, autant de parallèles dont on ne peut nier la valeur. Fera-t-on remarquer que Clément et, *a fortiori*, Eusèbe et Épiphane sont postérieurs à l'évêque d'Antioche? Mais ce dernier a pu s'inspirer d'une source qu'il aurait eue en commun avec l'Alexandrin. Prétendra-t-on que, reposant sur une similitude purement phonétique, l'argument

invoqué est sans fondement réel? Mais cette circonstance devait peu peser dans l'esprit de l'apologiste du moment que le jeu de mots pouvait servir efficacement son dessein.

En revanche, on fera valoir avec plus de vraisemblance contre l'interprétation Ève-*Évohé* ainsi prêtée à Théophile que, tranchant en cela sur Clément et ses imitateurs,[20] l'apologiste ne suggère en *Aut.* 2, 28 aucune allusion nette aux mystères de Dionysos. Chez Clément, Eusèbe et Épiphane, c'est même le contexte dionysiaque (*Évohé* et les serpents rituels) qui, par association d'idées, amène l'allusion à Ève, alors que chez Théophile, c'est le récit de la chute qui constitue la trame de l'exposé. Le seul terme susceptible d'évoquer les mystères est le participe ἐνθουσιαζομένοις, mais cette leçon n'est qu'une conjecture des éditeurs. Certes, pareille correction est séduisante en raison de la parfaite adaptation du participe »enthousiasmés« à la remarque théophilienne sur l'*energeia* du démon. De plus, apparemment du moins, elle remplacerait avantageusement la leçon de V ἐνθυσιαζομένοις; le verbe ἐνθυσιάζω n'est, en effet, attesté qu'à l'actif et uniquement dans les sens de »sacrifier (à l'or)« (Si 31,7) et de »sacrifier (des troupeaux)« (*Orac. Sib.* 5, 355),[21] lesquels sont difficilement compatibles avec le contexte théophilien. Toutefois, si minime qu'elle soit, la correction en ἐνθουσιαζομένοις n'en demeure pas moins arbitraire; *lectio facilior* s'il en est, elle n'est nullement confirmée par les habitudes du copiste de V; celui-ci confond parfois les voyelles que la prononciation ne différenciait plus : ι/ει/η, ε/αι (iotacisme ou étacisme), de même que ο/ω et ε/η (brèves et longues), mais on ne trouve dans le manuscrit de Venise aucun exemple de confusion entre les sons ο et ου. Plutôt que de corriger le manuscrit,[22] ne proposerait-on pas de comprendre le participe ἐνθυσιαζομένοις dans un sens figuré : »Le démon malfaisant [...], même jusqu'ici, agit dans les hommes *qui sont ses victimes*«? Refuserait-on même cette interprétation et admettrait-on, malgré les remarques précédentes, la conjecture ἐνθουσιαζομένοις : même alors, il serait abusif de se fonder sur ce terme pour justifier la compréhension de *Euan* dans le sens de *Évohé*. En effet, ἐνθουσιάζω, dès l'époque classique, recouvre un champ sémantique beaucoup plus large que celui du délire spécifiquement bachique; par ailleurs, le contexte où intervient ce verbe dans les *Livres à Autolycus* n'autorise aucunement à en restreindre le sens à l'enthousiasme dionysiaque.

Mais plus encore que l'absence d'un vocabulaire propre aux mystères, s'oppose à l'interprétation Ève = *Évohé* le fait que lorsque

Théophile explique un nom hébreu, il ne se réfère jamais à un homophone grec, mais il propose une traduction de l'hébreu en grec, fondée ou non; ainsi explique-t-il, par exemple, que le nom du Sabbat signifie »sept«[23] et celui de Noé »repos«.[24]

Etant donné cette habitude d'étymologiste, Théophile pourrait avoir interprété le nom d'Ève (*ḥawwāh* hébr.) par une racine sémitique. Si cette hypothèse est acceptable, on est amené alors à chercher, parmi les termes hébreux, araméens ou syriaques homophones de Ève-*ḥawwāh* celui qui, par son sens même, expliquerait le nom de la première femme, agent de Satan, intermédiaire du serpent, instrument de la faute originelle. On exclura donc les noms qui, bien que phonétiquement proches de *ḥawwāh*, expriment les idées étrangères au contexte théophilien de »vie«, de »mère«, de »femme«, de »prosternation«, de »village de tentes«, de »chardon«, de »crevasse«,[25] de »belle apparence«,[26] pour ne retenir que trois racines.

La première, *ḤWH*: »annoncer, renseigner, faire savoir«, attestée dans la plupart des langues sémitiques,[27] rend compte de la mission d'intermédiaire ou d'instructrice que Théophile fait jouer à Ève dans le passage qui nous occupe; elle est, en outre, rapprochée explicitement de *ḥawwāh* (= Ève) dans les *midrashim* sur la *Genèse*: »Elle (*ḥawwāh*) avait été donnée (à Adam) comme (sa) conseillère (*ḥawweh*).«[28] La même association est reprise dans l'*Écrit sans titre* de Nag Hammadi: »La mère (de l'homme androgyne), les Hébreux l'appellent Ève, la vie; c'est l'instructrice de la vie«;[29] et plus loin, dans le même écrit: »Sophia envoya Zoé, sa fille, que l'on appelle Ève, comme instructeur, pour qu'elle éveillât Adam, celui-là en qui il n'y avait pas d'âme.«[30] Ces textes autoriseraient donc à retrouver en l'Ève »théophilienne« l'instructrice d'Adam. S'y oppose toutefois le fait que lorsque les légendes juives ou inspirées du judaïsme rapprochent *ḥawwāh* de *ḥawweh* (*ḤWH*), c'est pour signifier qu'Ève fut la seule personne, outre le serpent, à comprendre le langage des animaux et à le transmettre (le signifier ou l'apprendre) à Adam. Assurément laudatif dans l'exégèse juive, ce mandat confié à Ève contraste avec la manière dont Théophile décrit la première femme dans ce rôle d'intermédiaire.

La deuxième racine qui évoque phonétiquement *ḥawwāh* (= Ève), tout en étant compatible avec le commentaire de Théophile, est *HŌY* (hébr.)[31] = *hāwāy* (syr.) = οὐαί = *vae* = »hélas!«, »ruine«, »catastrophe«. L'apologiste aurait-il suggéré cette équivalence? On peut l'admettre, au moins à titre d'hypothèse. Certes, les auteurs du *Grand*

Midrash sur la Genèse utilisent le terme *`ibbed* (»détruire«) et non *hōy* pour exprimer le caractère funeste d'Ève : »Adam montra (ḥiwwah) (*sc.* à Ève) combien de générations elle avait détruites (*`ibbᵉdāh*).«[32] Mais c'est du parallélisme Ève-*hōy* que les listes chrétiennes des *Onomastica* s'inspirent, semble-t-il, dans l'étymologie *Eua, calamitas vel vae*,[33] séquence qui s'explique par l'homophonie des termes *ḥawwāh* (Ève), *hwwāh* (*calamitas*) et *hōy* (*vae*).[34]

On peut enfin songer au rapprochement entre *ḥawwāh* (Ève) et le terme qui désigne le serpent dans différentes langues sémitiques : *ḥwh* (aram. anc.),[35] *ḥīwᵉyā`* (jud.-aram.),[36] *ḥewyā`* (syr.),[37] autant de mots dérivant d'une racine commune et dont d'autres variantes sont attestées : *ḥewyā* (mand.), *ḥwym* (sud arab. anc.), *ḥewāy* (éth.).[38] Outre l'homophonie entre *ḥawwāh* (Ève) et *ḥīwᵉyā`* (serpent), on rappellera que *ḥawwāh* peut aussi désigner les Hivvites (*ḥiwwī*)[39] et que ces derniers ont reçu traditionnellement une étymologie qui les désigne comme serpents : *Heuei enim serpentes interpretantur*, écrit Philon, commentant Gn 26, 34 (LXX);[40] semblablement, les *Onomastica* (encore!) transmis par les chaînes exégétiques enregistrent les formules : Εὐαίου ὀφεώδους,[41] Εὐαῖος θηριώδης ἢ ὀφεώδης,[42] Εὐαῖοι σκόλιοι ὥσπερ ὄφεις,[43] Εὐαίων σκορπιζόντων.[44] Rappelons aussi les groupes latins : *Avi feri, Evi ferales vel feroces, Euaeum ferum sive pessimum*,[45] *Evim belluinus vel ferinus*.[46] Ces multiples coïncidences invitent à interpréter le texte de Théophile dans le sens de Ève = serpent, interprétation qui serait aussi pertinente que les deux précédentes.

L'apologiste entendait-il donc présenter Ève comme »annonciatrice« (ou dénonciatrice), comme »calamité« ou comme »serpent«? On peut hésiter, car, non contradictoires, ces aspects sont parfois présentés conjointement dans les commentaires juifs :[47] double ou triple jeu de mots, pourrait-on dire. Toutefois, l'insistance de l'apologiste sur la complicité d'Ève, instrument du serpent, nous amène à privilégier le rapprochement Ève-serpent. Que celui-ci soit fondé ou fantaisiste – les exégètes modernes eux-mêmes s'interrogent encore sur la signification réelle du nom de *ḥawwāh* –,[48] Théophile n'avait pas à s'en soucier dès lors qu'il pouvait l'exploiter pour souligner la coïncidence, remarquable, entre les noms des deux agents de Satan.

Mais dès lors la question se pose : s'il est vrai que *Euan* désigne le serpent, ne doit-on pas, par référence au fait unanimement admis que le serpent est un déguisement (σκεῦος ou ἔνδυμα) de Satan,[49] remettre en question le sens actif que nous proposions pour ἐκκαλεῖται : »Le

démon [...] interpelle (Ève) sous le nom de *Euan* (= serpent)« et traduire : »Le démon [...] est interpellé sous le nom de serpent.« Ce que Théophile justifierait serait alors, non pas le terme Ève, mais un des noms du démon. Rappelant la liste johannique : ὁ δράκων = ὁ ὄφις = ὁ καλούμενος διάβολος καὶ ὁ Σατανᾶς, ὁ πλανῶν (Ap 12, 9; cf. 20,2)[50] et traitant lui aussi des »autres« noms du démon, le contexte de l'apologiste favorise cette interprétation : »(C'est lui) qui est appelé *Satan* [...] et aussi *drakôn*« (l. *3* et *5*). Autre argument : parmi les cent vingt-trois noms de démons juifs catalogués par J. Maier, l'un, qualifié de fils d'un ange déchu – ce qui rappelle la parenthèse de Théophile : »Primitivement, il était un ange« (l. *6*) – porte les noms de *Hywwʾ* et de *Hyyʾ*,[51] lesquels suggèrent le serpent (*ḥīwʿyāʾ*). Si les éditeurs des *Livres à Autolycus*, à l'exception de Wolf[52] ont refusé, malgré le contexte, la traduction passive, c'est parce qu'ils la jugeaient incompatible avec la position de ταύτην τὴν Εὔαν en tête de phrase. L'objection entraîne-t-elle la conviction? Selon Wolf lui-même,[53] il serait tout aussi agrammatical de rattacher ταύτην τὴν Εὔαν à πλανηθῆναι que d'admettre l'*anakolouthon immedicabile* consistant à accorder ce même *Euan* au groupe εὐὰν ἐκκαλεῖται. En l'absence d'argument philologique décisif, on conçoit que l'on puisse, – voire que l'on doive – hésiter entre deux traductions qui, pour le sens, sont également satisfaisantes et ne s'excluent même pas l'une l'autre. En définitive, notre option pour le sens actif du verbe repose fragilement sur la constatation suivante : si Théophile avait voulu uniquement justifier le nom de serpent donné au démon, pourquoi n'aurait-il pas écrit ὄφις ἐκκαλεῖται plutôt que εὐὰν ἐκκαλεῖται? Autrement dit, pourquoi, alors que ὄφις eût été beaucoup plus clair, a-t-il recouru au terme *Euan*, sinon pour introduire dans le jeu de mots une référence évidente au nom et à l'intervention d'Ève?[54] Ajoutons que *Euan*, autorisant l'allusion à Ève aussi bien qu'au serpent et par là au démon, pourrait, en raison même de sa polyvalence, avoir été intentionnellement retenu par l'apologiste.

Une autre question serait de préciser le courant exégétique auquel Théophile pourrait se rattacher dans l'interprétation de l'équivalence Ève-serpent que nous lui supposons. L'enquête que nous avons menée dans la littérature néotestamentaire, les écrits pseudépigraphiques et les textes chrétiens du premier et du deuxième siècles, y compris les apologistes, nous fournit certes des indications sur l'identité du rôle joué par Ève et le serpent dans le récit de la chute,[55] mais n'apporte aucun rapprochement phonétique précis entre *ḥawwāh* et *ḥīwʿyāʾ*.

Plus curieusement encore, les représentants de l'école exégétique d'Antioche, Eusèbe d'Emèse, Diodore de Tarse, Jean Chrysostome, Théodore de Mopsueste, Théodoret de Cyr, Procope de Gaza paraissent avoir négligé l'étymologie Ève-serpent au profit de Ève-vie, que dicte le texte biblique;[56] il en va de même des commentateurs syro-orientaux, Aphraate et Éphrem ainsi que des exégètes »nestoriens« qui dépendent de la tradition antiochienne: Narsaï, Théodore bar Koni, Išō'dad de Merv et aussi le commentateur anonyme publié par A. Levene.[57] Si Aphraate signale incidemment, comme d'autres avant lui, qu'Ève et le serpent jouent un rôle similaire[58] et si Éphrem, après avoir qualifié Ève de »terrier« (*sic*) et de »tombeau« (*neq'ā' weqabrā'*) du serpent,[59] unit ces deux intermédiaires de Satan dans l'identité des épithètes qu'il leur attribue: »rusés« (*šenī'e'*)[60] et »instigateurs« (*'ālīle'*),[61] ni l'un ni l'autre n'affirment qu'Ève et le serpent portent le même nom, bien que ce jeu de mots soit suggéré dans le syriaque.[62] En un seul passage, on pourrait admettre qu'Éphrem évoque l'homophonie des deux »coupables«: »Le nom d'Ève (*ḥewā'*), dit-il, (Adam) le lui a donné, et le nom de serpent (*ḥewyā'*), il l'a lui-même déterminé.«[63] Toutefois, ce rapprochement n'est pas suffisamment explicite pour autoriser un parallèle avec Théophile.[64]

Quant aux commentateurs alexandrins de la Genèse, Origène, Didyme l'Aveugle, Cyrille, lorsqu'ils expliquent le nom d'Ève, c'est également en paraphrasant Gn 3, 20. Avant eux, Philon d'Alexandrie, auteur[65] ou utilisateur[66] d'un traité sur l'interprétation des noms hébraïques contenus dans la Loi et les Prophètes, avait délaissé l'assimilation Ève-serpent, bien qu'il l'ait peut-être connue,[67] pour ne retenir que l'étymologie Ève-vie.[68]

Tout aussi négative s'avère l'enquête que nous avons menée chez d'autres commentateurs du récit biblique: Hippolyte, Ambroise, Jérôme, Eucher (ou ps. Eucher), Isidore. La diffusion restreinte du rapprochement Ève-serpent se trouve confirmée, si besoin en est, par le fait que les fragments exégétiques sur l'*Octateuque* que les chaînes nous ont transmis sous les noms de quarante-trois auteurs n'y font jamais allusion.[69] Par ailleurs, les *Onomastica*, quel que soit leur groupe – *Origenesgruppe*, *Laktanzgruppe*, *vaticanische Gruppe*, Jérôme,[70] pour ne citer que les plus anciens –, ne semblent pas davantage avoir accueilli favorablement cette étymologie.[71]

Quelques traces toutefois subsistent de l'interprétation Ève-serpent. La première se lit dans le *midrash* sur Gn 3, 20, que nous signalions

plus haut en raison de l'explication *ḥawwāh* (Ève) = *ḥawweh* (conseillère ou instructrice). À la suite de ce jeu de mots, l'auteur de cette section poursuit : »Mais elle (*ḥawwāh*) écouta indiscrètement, comme le serpent (*ḥiwyāh*).«[72] H. Freedman paraphrase le texte ainsi : »De la même manière que le serpent écouta indiscrètement quand Dieu ordonna à Adam de ne pas manger de l'arbre, de la même manière, Ève écouta le serpent quand elle incita Adam à la désobéissance«;[73] mais il importe également de souligner l'homophonie que l'auteur rabbinique établit dans ce passage entre Ève et le serpent. En douterait-on, il suffirait de citer la suite du même *midrash* où, s'adressant cette fois, et fictivement, à Ève, R. Aḥa déclare : »Le serpent fut le serpent (ou le séducteur) pour toi (= Ève), et toi, tu es le serpent (ou l'Ève) d'Adam.«[74] Plus loin, à propos de Gn 4,1 (»Adam connut Ève, sa femme«), un exégète, que le compilateur midrashique n'identifie pas, explique qu'en réalité, ce que »Adam connut«, c'est la perte de sa tranquillité : »Il connut ce que le serpent lui avait fait.« Le serpent est ici identifié à Ève, car c'est Ève qui éveilla en Adam le désir ; et l'auteur midrashique de se référer à l'opinion déjà citée de R. Aḥa : »Le serpent fut le serpent (ou le séducteur) pour toi (= Ève), et toi, tu es le serpent (ou l'Ève) d'Adam.«[75]

En marge du judaïsme rabbinique, un gnosticisme partiellement influencé par les traditions juives, tel que l'*Écrit sans titre* de Nag Hammadi, rapporte que l'Ève céleste, après avoir éveillé et instruit Adam,[76] poursuit ou répète sur terre l'action du salut sous la forme d'une bête :[77] »Les puissances l'appellèrent la bête (θηρίον) pour qu'elle égare leurs créations«;[78] or, dans ce contexte, le terme »bête« semble une »expression de tabou« pour désigner le serpent,[79] ainsi que la suite du texte le confirme par une allusion au serpent de Gn 3, 1 : »Il (l'instructeur ou la bête) était plus intelligent qu'eux tous.«[80]

C'est une conception analogue que développent les Ophites d'après Irénée et peut-être aussi les Pérates d'après Hippolyte lorsqu'ils identifient Sophia, projection de l'Ève céleste,[81] avec le serpent du récit biblique.[82]

Parmi les auteurs chrétiens, ceux qui, à notre connaissance, proposent l'étymologie Ève = *ḥīw^{e}yā'* = serpent, sont précisément les trois interprètes qui admettent aussi le rapprochement entre Ève et le cri bachique *Evohé* = *Euan* = *Oua*;[83] sans doute jugeaient-ils compatibles ces deux explications du nom d'Ève dès lors que Ève-*Euan*-*Évohé* (contexte bachique), évoquant les serpents dont s'enroulent les initiés,

leur suggérait le serpent de Gn 3, 1. Ainsi Clément écrit-il à la suite de sa description du rite des serpents dans les mystères dionysiaques :

Αὐτίκα γοῦν κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβῆ τῶν Ἑβραίων φωνὴν ⟨τὸ⟩ ὄνομα τὸ Εὐια δασυνόμενον ἑρμηνεύεται ὄφις ἡ θήλεια.[84]

»Ainsi, par exemple, selon le son exact des Hébreux, le nom (de) *Heuia* prononcé avec un esprit rude signifie le serpent femelle.«

Après Eusèbe de Césarée, qui recopie Clément,[85] Épiphane reprend dans un contexte identique la même explication :

[...] ἢ διὰ τῆς δασείας φωνῆς τὸν ὄφιν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑβραΐδος εἰς ἑαυτῶν πλάνην κικλήσκοντες. Εὔα γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ψιλὴν ἀπόδοσιν τὴν γυναῖκα, κατὰ τὴν δασεῖαν εὐῖα τὸν ὄφιν παῖδες Ἑβραίων ὀνομάζουσιν.[86]

»[C'est cette *Eua* qu'ils invoquent, celle-là qui fut alors trompée par le serpent]; ou bien, moyennant le son (prononcé) avec l'esprit rude, c'est, par référence à la (langue) hébraïque, le serpent qu'ils interpellent en vue de leur propre égarement. En effet, (par) *Eua*, selon la transcription dépourvue d'aspiration, c'est la femme[87] que les enfants des Hébreux nomment, mais, selon la transcription pourvue d'un esprit rude, *Heuia*, c'est le serpent.«

Enfin, parallèlement à ces témoignages, les listes onomastiques enregistrent la séquence : Εὖα, ζωή, ὄφις, θηλεῖα (*sic*).[88]

Exégètes juifs et gnostiques (ces derniers selon les écrits de Nag Hammadi), Ophites et Pérates, Clément d'Alexandrie et Eusèbe de Césarée, Épiphane de Salamine et enfin certains témoins de la tradition onomastique : des traditions si éloignées dans le temps et dans l'espace nous dissuadent de chercher à en retracer les possibles influences réciproques. Sans doute, Clément, déjà copié par Eusèbe, a vraisemblablement inspiré Épiphane; peut-être aussi le gnosticisme des textes de Nag Hammadi dérive-t-il, directement ou non, des *midrashim*.[89] Mais ces quelques rapprochements ne suffisent pas à préciser la source de Théophile, d'autant que ce dernier, originaire ou citoyen d'Antioche, pouvait connaître des rudiments d'araméen. Toutefois, s'il fallait se prononcer, c'est en faveur d'une influence rabbinique que, personnellement, nous déciderions, en raison des nombreux parallèles entre l'exégèse théophilienne et la tradition juive des *midrashim*, des *Targumin* et du *Talmud*.[90]

NOTES

[1] A l'exception de la correction mineure de εὐ ἂν (V) en εὐὰν (V^2) (cf. apparat *ad* c), nous citons le texte d'après le Marcianus graecus Z 496, 11e s. (= V). Le Bodleianus MS Auct. E. 1.11, misc. gr. 25, olim 2040, 16e s. (= B) en est une copie vraisemblable-

ment directe. – Abréviations utilisées: *BR* = *Bereshit Rabbah*, trad. H. Freedman and M. Simon, *The Midrash Rabbah*, I (London, Jerusalem, New York 1938, réimpr. 1977); Koehler[2] = L. Koehler und W. Baumgartner, *Lexicon in veteris testamenti libros* (Leiden [2]1958); Koehler[3] = L. Koehler und W. Baumgartner, *Hebräisches und aramäisches Lexicon zum Alten Testament* (Leiden 1967); Kronholm = T. Kronholm, *Motifs from Genesis 1–11 in the Genuine Hymns of Ephrem the Syrian with particular Reference to the Influence of Jewish Exegetical Tradition*, Coniectanea biblica, Old Testament Series, XI (Lund 1978); Heller = J. Heller, Der Name Eva, *Archiv Orientalni* 26 (1958) 636–656; de Lagarde = P. de Lagarde, *Onomastica sacra* (Göttingen [2]1878); Pearson = B. A. Pearson, Jewish Haggadic Traditions in the Testimony of Truth (CG IX, 3) [= NHC IX, 3], in *Ex Orbe religionum*. Studia Geo Widengren oblata, I (Leiden 1972) 457–470; Tardieu = M. Tardieu, *Trois mythes gnostiques. Adam, Eros et les animaux d'Égypte dans un écrit de Nag Hammadi (II, 5)* (Paris 1974); Wutz = F. Wutz, *Onomastica sacra*, TU, 41, 1–2 (Leipzig 1914).

[2] Cf. *infra*, n. 49–54.

[3] H. Stephanus, IV, 431, *22–27* et *39–57*; H. G. Liddell et R. Scott, s.v. ἐκκαλέω, II, 1–3; M. A. Bailly, *ibid.* (moy.), 1–2. – Le seul emploi certain du verbe (moy.) dans la LXX se trouve en Gn 19, 5 dans le sens de »faire intervenir«: cf. E. Hatch and H. A. Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint* (Oxford 1897) s.v. ἐκκαλέω/-ομαι. C'est ce même sens que G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford 1961-1969) propose au verbe dans son emploi en *Aut.* 2, 28. – La portée de ἐκκαλέομαι est d'autant plus difficile à préciser que le verbe, courant et polyvalent dans la prose classique, est très rare chez les auteurs chrétiens du premier et du deuxième siècles: il ne figure qu'en 2, 28 dans les *Livres à Autolycus* et n'est signalé ni dans la *Concordance* de W. F. Moulton, ni dans les dictionnaires de W. Bauer et de E. A. Sophocles, ni enfin dans les *Indices* de E. J. Goodspeed, *Index patristicus* (Leipzig 1907) et *Index apologeticus* (Leipzig 1907, réimpr. 1969).

[4] Telle est la raison pour laquelle on refusera d'unifier l'orthographe de Εὔαν (1.*1*) et de εὐάν (1. *5*); même refus déjà dans I. C. Th. Otto, *Corpus Apologetarum*, VIII (Wiesbaden 1861, réimpr. 1969) 137, n. 4.

[5] P. Maran, 394, n. c (PG 6, 1097, n. 96).

[6] *I Enoch*, 40, 7 et *Jubilés*, 1, 20. – Sur Satan »accusateur«, cf. J. Maier, Geister, B III b, in *RAC*, IX (Stuttgart 1973) 631–632.

[7] H. Stephanus, IV, 431, *12-14*.

[8] *BR* 18, 6; 147; 20, 11; 170 et 24, 6; 203; cf. *Targum du ps.-Jonathan* ad Gn 4, 1, SC 245, 100.

[9] Nombreuses références dans L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, I (Philadelphia 1909) 105–106 et V (*ibid.* 1925) 133–134, n. 3; W. Foerster, ὄφις, C II c, in *TWNT*, V (Stuttgart 1954) 577 et n. 129–132; A. M. Goldberg, Kain: Sohn des Menschen oder Sohn der Schlange?, *Judaica* 25 (1969) 203–221; J. Bowker, *The Targums and Rabbinic Literature* (Cambridge 1969) 136; E. E. Urbach, *The Sages. Their Concepts and Beliefs*, I (Jerusalem 1975) 169 et II (*Ibid.*) 746, n. 33–39.

[10] En Meth. Olymp. *Symp.* 2, 5, 44, par exemple, c'est le complément τὴν ὄρεξιν εἰς μοιχείαν, et non le verbe ἐκκαλέομαι qui exprime l'incitation à l'adultère; construction analogue (εἰς ἔρωτα), mais dans un contexte différent, chez Clem. Alex. *Paed.* 1, 10, 92, 3.

[11] H. Stephanus, IV, 431, *19–22* et M. A. Bailly, s.v. ἐκκαλέω, 4.

[12] J. Geffcken, *Oracula Sibyllina* (Leipzig 1902, réimpr. 1967) 54, n. ad *Orac. Sib.* 3, 111.

[13] Athénag. *Leg.* 30, 1; Otto 156.

[14] Voir les notes justificatives des éditeurs. – Dans son dictionnaire des périodes romaine et byzantine, E. A. Sophocles interprète de même le εὐάν de *Aut.* 2, 28 dans le sens de *évan, évoé*, mais non sans ajouter que cette étymologie est absurde... Soit, mais nous verrons que ce n'est vraisemblablement pas cette étymologie que Théophile entendait suggérer. – Enfin, R. M. Grant, Theophilus of Antioch to Autolycus, *Harvard Theological Review* 40 (1947) 241 classe *Aut.* 2, 28 parmi les passages théophiliens inspirés du judaïsme (cf. *infra*, n. 90) tout en admettant *aussi* que l'apologiste joue ici sur les mots Ève et *Évohé*. Dans le cas où l'on reconnaîtrait en *Euan* le cri des Bacchants, on pourrait traduire, conformément à l'un des sens de ἐκκαλέομαι (Liddell et Scott, s.v. ἐκκαλέομαι, II [= moy.], 2): »Le démon [...] provoque (= suscite) (le cri) *Euan*«; toutefois, la position de ταύτην τὴν Εὔαν en tête de phrase semble s'opposer à cette interprétation.

[15] Cf. les dictionnaires classiques, s.v. εὐά et εὐάν. – La définition d'Hésychius, s.v. εὐάν: ὁ κισσός (= »le lierre«) ὑπὸ Ἰνδῶν suggère, elle aussi, une allusion aux rites bachiques.

[16] Admettrait-on que Théophile joue sur les mots *Euan-Évohé*, on pourrait alors corriger εὐ ἄν (leçon de V, non attestée ailleurs) en εὔάν, que proposent les grammairiens Denys de Thrace et Herodianus, ainsi que leurs commentateurs et leurs scholiastes: cf. les *indices* de G. Uhlig et de A. Lentz, *Grammatici graeci*, I, 1 et III, 1–3 (Leipzig 1883 et 1867–1868). Certes, εὔάν est une correction des éditeurs aux manuscrits de Denys et de Herodianus, mais elle est fondée sur la remarque des deux grammairiens: le cri des Bacchants porte l'esprit rude sur la syllabe finale; les translittérations *Euhan, Euhius, Euhyus* et *Euchius, in* Stephanus, IV, s.v. Εὔϊος confirment cette orthographe. Si nous refusons cette correction de V, c'est parce qu'elle limite la compréhension de *Euan* à un sens qui n'est pas nécessairement le seul ni le meilleur.

[17] Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 2, 12, 2, GCS 12, 11, *14–18*; la suite du texte est citée *infra*, n. 84.

[18] Eus. Caes. *Praep. ev.* 2, 3, 7, GCS 43,1, 79, *16–19, ex Clemente.*

[19] Épiph. Salam. *Exp. fid.* 10, 7, GCS 37, 510, *22*–511, *1*; cf. *infra*, n. 86.

[20] Clément, Eusèbe et Épiphane font du reste état d'une autre interprétation: cf. *infra*, n. 84–86.

[21] Le verbe ἐνθυσιάζω semble avoir été peu courant: Stephanus et Hatch-Redpath ne signalent que son emploi en Si 31,7; Liddell et Scott, Bailly et Lampe renvoient uniquement à *Orac. Sib.* 5, 355.

[22] Le fait que ἐνθυσιάζω soit mal attesté pourrait s'expliquer partiellement par les corrections d'éditeurs; ainsi, dans les seuls passages que les dictionnaires signalent (cf. *supra*, n. 21), ἐνθυσιάζω a été éliminé du texte édité au profit soit de ἐκθυσιάζω (J. Geffcken, ad *Orac. Sib.* 5, 355) soit de ἐνθουσιάζω (Si 31, 7); le choix de cette dernière leçon est particulièrement significatif, car l'apparat critique établi par J. Ziegler (Göttingen 1965) fait apparaître que ἐνθυσιάζω est au moins aussi bien attesté que ἐνθουσιάζω retenu par l'éditeur.

[23] *Aut.* 2, 12; 90, *15* (Otto).

[24] *Aut.* 3, 19; 232, *12–13* (Otto).

[25] Koehler[2] 280b–281a, s.v. I–II ḤWH et les différentes vocalisations de cette racine; Koehler[3] 283b–284b, *ibid.*

[26] Cf. la séquence Εὔα, μήτηρ ζώντων, εὐπρέπεια, de Lagarde 202, *75* et Wutz 364; l'équivalence *ḥawwāh* = εὐπρέπεια (»convenance, belle apparence«) s'explique par la racine *yā'ey* (aram.). – Les racines HWY: »chute« (Wutz 364) et ḤRH: »colère« (de Lagarde 29, *20–21* et Wutz 363), phonétiquement proches de *ḥawwāh* et exploitées, semble-t-il, dans certaines données »onomastiques« (Wutz 363–364), pourraient, elles aussi, justifier l'*Euan* du texte théophilien; s'opposent toutefois à cette hypothèse tant l'emploi assez rare de ces deux racines que l'insistance de l'apologiste sur le rôle du serpent, ce qui suggère un autre jeu de mots: cf. *infra*, n. 35–38 et 72–88.

[27] Koehler[3] 283b, s.v. I ḤWH.

[28] *BR* 20, 11; 169–170; sur ce jeu de mots, cf. H. Freedman, *BR*, p. 170, n. 1; de même J. Theodor and Ch. Albeck, *Midrash Bereshit Rabba. Critical Edition with Notes and Commentary* (Jerusalem [2]1965) 195, note à la l. *1*. La suite du texte: »Adam montra (*ḥiwwāh*) à Ève (*ḥawwāh*) (cf. *infra*, n. 32) confirme ce jeu de mots. – La traduction de A. Wuensche, *Der Midrash Bereshit Rabba* (Leipzig 1880) 94: »Sie wurde ihm gegeben um sein Leben zu verherrlichen« s'explique par référence à la racine *ḥ[e]yā'* (*ḥ[e]yi*): »vivre«, à l'afel: »faire vivre«, mais ne supprime pas pour autant le rapprochement entre *ḥawwāh* et *ḥwh*. – Le Père P. M. Bogaert a eu l'amabilité de nous fournir les photocopies du texte hébreu de ce chapitre midrashique et d'y joindre de nombreuses précisions sur les termes employés par l'auteur. De tout cœur, nous l'en remercions.

[29] *L'Écrit sans titre*, appelé aussi *De l'Origine du monde* (NHC II, 5) pl. 161, *32–34*, trad. Tardieu 317.

[30] *L'Écrit sans titre*, pl. 163, *31–34*; Tardieu 125–129 (commentaire) et 320–321 (trad.).

[31] Koehler[3] 232 a–b, s.v. HŌY et E. Jenni und Cl. Westermann, *Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament*, I (München–Zürich 1971) 474–477.

[32] *BR* 20, 11; 170.

[33] de Lagarde 6, *16–17* et 75, *19–20* et Wutz 363 et 661.

[34] Wutz 363 et 661. – Déjà P. D. Huet, *Demonstratio evangelica ad serenissimum Delphinum* (Paris [3]1690) 81–82 rejetait les interprétations du nom d'Ève proposées par Clément et Épiphane (*supra*, n. 17 et 19 et *infra*, n. 84 et 86) pour ne retenir, par référence à Pr 23, 29, que l'équivalence Ève = οὐαί.

[35] Koehler[3] 284b, s.v. II *ḥawwāh*, d = *ḥwh*.

[36] Koehler[3] 284b, s.v. II *ḥawwāh*, c = *ḥīw[e]yā'*.

[37] Koehler[3], *ibid.*

[38] Koehler[3], *ibid.* – Dans le texte hébreu de la Genèse, le terme *nāḥāš* désignant le serpent rend ce jeu de mots impossible.

[39] Parmi les sens de *ḥawwāh*, on note en effet celui de *ḥiwwī* (Εὐαῖος), Koehler[3] 284b, s.v. II *ḥawwāh*, d (= *ḥiwwī*) et 284b–285a, s.v. *ḥiwwī* (= Εὐαῖος); Stephanus, IV 2171, s.v. Εὔα; Heller 641 et 649–655. – D'après Hatch and Redpath (cités *supra*, n. 3), Supplement (Oxford 1906), Εὐαῖος ou Εὑαῖος désigne non seulement les Hivvites (*ḥiwwī* = sens 1), mais aussi les Hittites (*ḥittī* = sens 2) et les Avvites (*'awwīm* = sens 3); ce dernier sens nous intéresse dans la mesure où les *'awwīm* ont été rapprochés, exactement comme les Hivvites, de *ḥīw[e]yā'*; ainsi en *BR* 26, 7; 217–218: »*'Awwim* signifie qu'ils mirent le monde en ruine [...], ainsi que vous lisez: 'Une ruine, une ruine, une ruine' (*'awwāh*, *'awwāh*, *'awwāh*) [Ez 21, 32], voilà ce que je ferai. R. Leazar b. R. Siméon a dit: »cela signifie qu'ils étaient aussi experts que le serpent dans la connaissance des différentes sortes de terre, car en Galilée, le serpent est appelé *'iweyā'*«.

– Sur le mot *ʿawwah* (*iniquitas*, ἀδικία) expliquant l'équivalence *Evim iniqui* transmises par certaines listes onomastiques, cf. Wutz 661.

[40] Philon, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, 4, 10, éd. Fr. Petit, *L'ancienne version latine des Questions sur la Genèse de Philon d'Alexandrie*, I : Édition critique ; II : Commentaire, TU 113–114 (Berlin 1973) ; pour cette étymologie, cf. I, 73, *22*.

[41] Wutz 661.

[42] Wutz 674, citant Procope de Gaza d'après la chaîne de Bâle, la seule qu'il connaissait ; cette donnée est à compléter désormais par la chaîne de Leningrad, citée par Fr. Petit (cf. *supra*, n. 40), II, 93 et 94, *sub* l. *22*. – Les scolies onomastiques des chaînes sont apparentées à celles de Philon, par exemple *Q.G.* ad Gn 26, 34 ; cf. Fr. Petit, *ibid.* II, 92, *sub* l. *13–27*.

[43] de Lagarde 174, *97* et Wutz 86 ; 661 ; 706, *47–48* et 721, *140* ; cf. 715, *53* : Εὐαῖοι σκόλιοι ... (*sic*). Selon Wutz 661, la formule σκόλιοι (= *ʿawwim*) ὄφεις (= *ḥiwwīm*) pourrait s'expliquer par la racine commune *ʿWH* : »s'enrouler«.

[44] Wutz 694, *141*.

[45] de Lagarde 5, *18* ; 12, *24–25* ; 21, *20* et Wutz 661.

[46] Wutz 743. Cp. *Euaeus coluber*, Wutz 661.

[47] *BR* 20, 11 ; 169-170 : Ève est »vie«, »annonciatrice« (cf. *supra*, n. 28) et »serpent« (cf. *infra*, n. 72–75) ; de même dans l'*Écrit sans titre* de Nag Hammadi, pl. 161, *32–34* et 164, *6–8*, Ève est »vie«, »instructrice« (cf. *supra*, n. 29 et 30) et »animal« (= »serpent« : cf. *infra*, n. 77–80). Ces multiples aspects de *ḥawwāh*, fondés sur la similitude des racines *ḥayā*ʾ (vie), *ḥawā*ʾ (annonciatrice ou instructrice), *ḥēwāh*ʾ (animal) et *ḥīwᵉyā*ʾ (serpent) ont été soulignés par A. Boehlig-P. Labib, *Die Koptisch-gnostische Schrift ohne Titel aus Codex II von Nag Hammadi im Koptischen Museum zu Alt Kairo*, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaft zu Berlin, Institut für Orientforschung 58 (Berlin 1962), 73–74 ; dans le même sens, Pearson 463–464 ; Tardieu 106–107 et J.-E. Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe* (Paris 1967) 158. – L'ambivalence d'Ève, reflétée dans l'ambiguïté de son nom, rejoint le double symbolisme du serpent : comme lui, elle peut être principe de vie ou de mort.

[48] État de la question dans Heller 637–646. – En marge des nombreux commentateurs qui retiennent exclusivement l'étymologie Ève-vie, certains retrouvent en Ève le nom et le symbolisme de la déesse aux serpents et du serpent lui-même ; parmi ces derniers, citons S. Mowinckel, Šaḥal, in *Hebrew and Semitic Studies to G. T. Driver* (Oxford 1963) 101, lequel se réfère à Nöldeke, Lidzbarski, Gressmann, Gunkel, Dietrich et d'autres. Les arguments en faveur de cette interprétation ont été énoncés et refutés par Th. Vriezen, *Onderzoek naar de Paradijsvoorstelling bij de semietische Volken* (Wageningen 1937) 192-193. – J. Fichtner, ὄφις, B 3, in *TWNT*, V (Stuttgart 1954) 573 et n. 89 et Koehler[3] 284a-b, s.v. II *ḥawwāh* notent prudemment que l'étymologie Ève-serpent est incertaine.

[49] Sg 2, 24 et Jn 8, 44. – Sur ce thème dans la littérature rabbinique et pseudépigraphique, cf. L. Strack und P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrash*, I (München 1922) 136–139 ; W. Foerster, ὄφις, C 2 c, in *TWNT*, V (Stuttgart 1954) 577 et Kronholm 93–94 et n. 21–23.

[50] Cf. Just. *I Apol.* 28, 1 : Ὁ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν κακῶν δαιμόνων ὄφις καλεῖται καὶ σατανᾶς καὶ διάβολος. Semblablement, Eus. Caes. *Praep. ev.* 7, 16, 3 ; autres références dans A. Kallis, Geister, C II, in *RAC*, IX (Stuttgart 1973) 702–703.

[51] J. Maier, Geister, B III d, in *RAC*, IX (Stuttgart 1973) 682, N[os] 39 et 40.

[52] I. C. Wolf (Hamburg 1724) : *Cum Eva a serpente* [...] *seducta peccati origo existeret*

et [...], *daemon* [...] *Evan evocatur.* – On ne s'arrêtera pas à la traduction passive, mais très libre de J. Fell (Oxford 1684) : *Haec Eva princeps erat* [...] *peccati (quae seducta est a serpente* [...]*) ideo ei ingeminatur.*

[53] I. C. Wolf 192–195, n.c. – Il est remarquable que Wolf soit le seul éditeur à déceler dans le second *Euan* une allusion au serpent; toutefois, outre qu'il identifie cet *Euan* au démon et non à Ève, il admet *aussi* le jeu de mots *Euan-Evohé-Bacchus*, par référence à Ovide, *Métam.* 4,15 : *Nycteliusque Eleleusque parens et Iacchus et Euhan.*

[54] Rappelons que ἐκκαλέομαι n'est pas attesté au passif dans le sens de »recevoir un nom« : cf. *supra*, n. 11–13.

[55] Par exemple, *Épître de Barnabé*, 12, 5 b et Just. *Dial.* 124, 3; cp. II Cor. 11, 3. Semblablement *BR* 17, 6; 137 : »Aussitôt qu'Ève fut créée, Satan fut créé avec elle.«

[56] Bien entendu, on ne concluera pas de ce silence que ces exégètes connaissaient seulement l'étymologie Ève-vie.

[57] A. Levene, *The Early Syriac Fathers on Genesis* (London 1951) 59, *3–4* et 78.

[58] Aphraate, *Dem.* 6, 3, Patrologia syriaca, I, 256, *25–26* et 257, *25–26*; 14, 12, *ibid.* 597, *23-24.*

[59] Ephrem, *Nat.* 17,6, CSCO 186, 88, *1–2*; cf. *supra*, n. 49 et Kronholm 102.

[60] Ephrem, *Eccl.* 48, 1, 1–3, CSCO 198, 123, *12–14* et *Parad.* 13,12,2, CSCO 174, 57, *14*; cf. Kronholm 87.

[61] Ephrem, *Eccl.* 11, 10, 2, CSCO 198, 30, *7*; cf. Kronholm 103, n. 46, citant *BR* 20, 11 et 22, 2 (cf. *infra*, n. 74 et 75), bien que les commentaires d'Éphrem et des Rabbins ne soient pas strictement parallèles.

[62] La *Peshiṭta* (Gn 3, 1.2.4.13.14) et les commentateurs syriaques désignent presque toujours le serpent par le terme *ḥewyā'* : cf. Kronholm 86–87.

[63] Ephrem, *Eccl.* 47, 13, 3–5, CSCO 198, 122, *23–26.*

[64] Pas même dans son commentaire sur la *Genèse*, Éphrem ne fait état de l'homophonie Ève-serpent : cf. S. Hidal, *Interpretatio syriaca. Die Kommentare des heiligen Ephräm des Syrers zu Genesis und Exodus mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Auslegungsgeschichtlichen Stellung*, Coniectanea biblica, Old Testament Series, VI (Lund 1974). Toutefois, Éphrem rapproche *ḥewā'* (Ève) et *yawnā'* (colombe), peut-être par référence à l'antithèse *ḥewyā'* (serpent) et *yawnā'* (colombe) en Mt 10, 16 : »Montrez-vous donc malins comme les *serpents* et candides comme les *colombes.*« Sur ce passage d'Éphrem, cf. Kronholm 96–97.

[65] Cf. Eus. Caes. *Hist. eccl.* 2, 17, 7 et Jérôme, *Nom. hebr.* (PL 23, 771 A). R. Devreesse, *Les anciens commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque et des Rois*, Studi e Testi 201 (Vatican 1959) 9 et n. 20, suppose que cet ouvrage est la source des compilations onomastiques ultérieures, ce qui expliquerait qu'Origène et les autres alexandrins aient, après Philon, repris l'étymologie Ève-vie. Sur cette tradition alexandrine, cf. I. Opelt, Etymologie, in *RAC*, VI (Stuttgart 1964) 827–829.

[66] P. Nautin, éd. de Didyme l'Aveugle, *Sur la Genèse*, SC 233, 27 : Philon et, après lui, Origène auraient utilisé un petit lexique grec dont le titre serait, d'après Eus. Caes. *Hist. eccl.* 2, 17, 7 : Ἑρμηνεία ἑβραικῶν ὀνομάτων. – Sur la multiplicité des lexiques interprétant en grec les noms hébreux, cf. J. Deconinck, *Essai sur la chaîne de l'Octateuque*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 195 (Paris 1912) 35, n. 1.

[67] Cf. l'expression »le serpent d'Ève« que Philon, *Agr.* 99. 107–108 et *Leg.* 2, 79 oppose au serpent d'airain. En *Agr.* 95, à propos du serpent »conseiller de vie« (σύμβουλος ζωῆς), Philon écrit : Εὔαν πατρίῳ γλώττῃ καλεῖν αὐτὴν ἔθος.

[68] Philon, *Quaestiones in Genesim a versione armenica*, 1, 52, trad. Ch. Mercier (Paris 1979) 118–120. – Même étymologie encore chez Jos. *Ant.* 1, 36.

[69] R. Devreesse (cité *supra*, n. 65). – Fr. Petit, grande exploratrice des chaînes, nous a confirmé que celles-ci ne contiennent pas d'allusion à Ève-serpent.

[70] I. Opelt, Etymologie, in *RAC*, VI (Stuttgart 1966) 827–830.

[71] Une exception cependant : cf. *infra*, n. 88.

[72] *BR* 20, 11 ; 169–170. – Nous reprenons la traduction de H. Freedman : »Elle écouta indiscrètement«, basée sur la leçon *ūmeṣōtetāh*, de *ṣwt* : »écouter«, adoptée par Theodor et Albeck (cités *supra*, n. 28) 195. A. Wuensche (cité *supra*, n. 28) 94 retient la variante *ūmeya'aṣetō*, de *y'ṣ* »conseiller« : »Sie rieth ihm«; même variante dans M. A. Mirkin, *Midrash Rabba*, t. I (Tel Aviv 1956), 155; celle-ci déjà était expressément rejetée par H. Freedman, p. 170, n. 1 ad loc.

[73] H. Freedman *ad BR* 20, 11, p. 170, n. 1.

[74] *BR* 20, 11; 170. R. Aḥa (vers 320) reprend vraisemblablement une tradition antérieure. – Nous adoptons ici comme plus haut (*supra*, n. 73) la traduction de H. Freedman, qui rend compte du triple rapprochement possible entre *ḥawwāh* (Ève), *ḥiweyā'* (serpent) et *ḥiweyīk* (ton serpent ou ton séducteur, ce dernier mot dérivant de la racine *ḤWH* : »montrer«). A. Wuensche (cité *supra*, n. 28) 94, ne restitue que partiellement ce jeu de mots : »Die Schlange was es, die dich verführte, und du warst es, die den Adam verführte«.

[75] *BR* 22, 2; 180; ce thème est lié à celui d'Ève éveillant en Adam le désir : *ibid.* 180, n. 3.

[76] Cf. *supra*, n. 29–30 et 47. Le rôle d'instructrice assigné à Ève dans l'*Écrit sans titre* l'est au serpent dans l'*Hypostase des archontes* (NHC II, 4), pl. 137, *32* et 138, *6*, Tardieu 287, et dans le *Témoignage de Vérité* (NHC IX, 3), pl. 46, *1*–47, *5*; cf. Pearson 460.

[77] Récit commenté par K. Rudolf, *Die Gnosis* (Göttingen 1977) 112–113 et 145.

[78] L'*Écrit sans titre* (NHC II, 5), pl. 161, *35*–162, *2*, Tardieu 317. Selon A. Boehlig et P. Labib (cités *supra*, n. 47) 73–74, c'est en prolongeant le jeu de mots Ève-vie par le terme *ḥēywā'* = »bête« que l'*Écrit sans titre* peut y inclure le mot *ḥawā'* : »instruire«. – Sur les jeux de mots que les *Onomastica* fondent sur la racine *ḥy*, *ḥayyāh* et *ḥeywāh'* (aram.) signifiant »bête«, cf. Wutz 661.

[79] A. Boehlig-P. Labib 74 et Tardieu 106–107.

[80] L'*Écrit sans titre*, pl. 162, *3–4*, Tardieu 317.

[81] Cf. G. MacRae, The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth, *Novum Testamentum* 12 (1970) 86–101.

[82] Irénée, *Haer.* 1, 30, 15 (= 1, 28, 8 W. W. Harvey I, 241) : *Quidam enim ipsam Sophiam serpentem factam dicunt.* Cp. Hippol. *Philos.* 5, 16, 8, GCS 26, 112, *18–19* : Ὁ καθολικὸς ὄφις, φησίν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σοφὸς τῆς Εὔας λόγος.

[83] Cf. *supra*, n. 17–19.

[84] Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 2, 12, 2, *GCS* 12, 11, *18–22*; la leçon ὄφις ἡ θήλεια (GCS 12, 11, *20*) pourrait être corrigée en ὄφις ἢ θήλεια, »serpent *ou* femme«, conformément à Épiphane (*infra*, n. 86–87) et la liste onomastique (*infra*, n. 88). Sur le serpent, symbole de Dionysos, cf. *Protr.* 2, 22, 4, *ibid.* 17, *7*.

[85] Eus. Caes. *Praep. ev.* 2, 3, 8, GCS 43, 1, 79, *19–21*.

[86] Epiph. Salam. *Exp. fid.* 10, 7, GCS 37, 511, *1–3*.

[87] Cp. la formule des *Onomastica*, infra, n. 88.

[88] de Lagarde 164, *64–65* et Wutz 661 ; cf. 363. L'équivalence Εὔα = θήλεια s'explique, selon Wutz 363, par le mot *ḥiyyāh*, qui signifie »femme« et en particulier »femme en couche« ; cp. Koehler[2] 280 b, s.v. II *ḥawwāh*, 3 = *ḥayyāh* = τίκτουσα.

[89] Cf. Pearson 464.

[90] R. M. Grant (cité *supra*, n. 14) 237–241 ; N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, Notes sur quelques aspects judaïsants du Logos chez Théophile d'Antioche, *Actes de la XIIe Conférence Internationale d'Études classiques*, Cluj-Napoca 1972 (Bucarest-Amsterdam 1975) 69–87 et La création de l'homme (Gn 1,26) chez Théophile d'Antioche, *Vigiliae Christianae* 30 (1976) 258–267.

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NOTES ON THE TEXT OF AVITUS

BY

CHRISTOPHER J. McDONOUGH

Avitus 1.76–79 (ed. Peiper *M.G.H.*6[2])

Non aliter quam nunc opifex, quibus artis in usu est
Flectere laxatas per cuncta sequacia ceras
Et vultus implere manu seu corpora gypso
Fingere vel signi speciem conponere massae.

76 quibus *Peiper* cui α 79 signi α segni Fβ massae α (masse LNn[2]) massa β.

Thus begins the comparison which introduces the description of man's creation by God. Commentators have insisted (H. Goelzer, *Le Latin de Saint Avit* (Paris 1909) 73; *T.L.L.* 3.2112.82) that in v. 79 *conponere* governs the dative, yet the phrase is rendered by "compose the likeness of a statue in the lump" (W. Kirkconnell, *The Celestial Cycle* (Toronto 1952) 3–4) and *massae* is claimed to be the equivalent of *ex massa* (A. Schippers, Avitus *De Mundi Initio* (Kampen 1945) 68). The context shows *conponere* to be a variation on the preceding infinitives, *flectere*, *implere* and *fingere*; with the meaning of "to construct" the ablative *massa* would be naturally construed. Whence *massae*? An expansion of *masse*, the result of perseveration after *conponere*. To what does it refer? The mention of two substances, wax and plaster, especially used in antiquity to form casts (*R.E.* 7. 2096; *Supplement* 13.1358) would suggest that *massa* here refers to another such material similarly employed, clay (cf. Pliny *N.H.* 35, 153, 156). *Signi* or *segni*, then? Avitus is fully capable of such a tautology but the notice on the malleability of the wax (*per cuncta sequacia* "pliant in every way"; for *per cuncta* cf. 5.99; 6.362) lends a *prima facie* case for *segni* as a fitting attribute here for *massa* cf. 4.115 *lentoque bitumine*; 4.250. More significant is the recording of *segnius* as *signius* at 4.187 and 6.94 by two manuscripts, L and N, which Peiper ranked foremost among the Gallicani (α). At 1.79 the context offered an effective camouflage for *signi* to escape detection. For a parallel for the use of *conponere* and *massa* as used here by Avitus cf. Prudentius *Apoth.*

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1022f. *Indignumne putat* (sc. Christus) *luteum consciscere corpus/qui non indignum quondam sibi credidit ipsum/pertrectare lutum, cum vas* (sc. hominem) *componeret arvo/nondum viscereo, sed inertis glutine limi/impressoque putres sub pollice duceret artus? ... Dignatur praepinguis humi comprendere mollem/divinis glebam digitis, nec sordida censet/haerentis massae contagia.*

One further problem remains; at 1.76 all manuscripts read *cui.* Peiper's emendation to *quibus* was meant to avoid the hiatus; Schippers p. 66 offered *quis* (= *quibus*) citing in support the occurrence of this form elsewhere in Avitus and explaining the plural as "generaliserend". Yet in view of the singular antecedent, *opifex*, both proposals remain unattractive. The corruption may well reside in *artis* and, given the presence of *flectere* (1.77) I would prefer its completion by reading *carnis in usum*: translate: "for whom it is possible to turn the wax...into the use of a body".

Avitus 2. 162-65

Quis stupor, o mulier, mentem caligine clausit
Cum serpente loqui, verbum committere bruto?
Non pudet, ut vestram praesumat belua linguam?
Et monstrum pateris responsumque insuper addis?

Peiper's second thoughts on the punctuation of these lines are recorded among the *Corrigenda* on p. 376, where the question mark after *bruto* is placed after *loqui.* Yet the sticking point remains the *ut* of v.164, as Peiper recognized in marking the phrase *non pudet ut* as questionable in his index on p. 370 s.v. *ut.* Latin usage, however, would be satisfied by placing question marks after *clausit*, *pudet* and *addis.* The *ut* clause, dependent on *pateris*, is consecutive; translate: "do you allow a beast and prodigy to arrogate your language and, furthermore, are you adding a reply?"

The case of the *ut* in v.157, which Peiper classifies in the same index entry as *quod*, is altogether different:

ut tamen una
Contineat liber dulci super arbore tactus,
Scire velim, quis dira iubet, quis talia dona
Invidet et rebus ieiunia miscet opimis?

With a full stop after *velim*, *ut*, in the sense of *quomodo*, introduces an indirect question. Another example of *ut* = *quomodo* is Avitus 4. 28–31:

Ut vero pecorum ritu permissa voluptas
Et diffusa palam ruptis lascivia frenis
Luxuriaeque forum atque obsceni nundina mundi
Fervuerit, casto fas non est dicere cantu.

Avitus 4. 178–184

Denique quo priscus quondam conscenderat Enoch,
Helias curru post tempora longa sequutus
Scribitur ignitis scandens penetrasse quadrigis,
Cum suspensa leves transmitteret orbita ventos
Ungula vel premeret calcatas pondere nubes
Vallatumque ferens sanctum non ureret ignis
Et motus servans nesciret flamma calorem.

ferens ... ignis survives, no doubt, in the belief that it refers to the fiery chariot which transported Elijah, which has been noted three times before (v.179 *curru*; 180 *quadrigis*; 181 *orbita*). In elaborating the point that the prophet entered the celestial realms unharmed (vv. 176-177 *Nec plus est illum salvi cum corporis usu/Terrenas liquisse domus, intrasse supernas*), *ignis* and *flamma* could refer to the flames of the stars; cf. the fears of Philology before her ascent through the heavens: ... *formae ac substantiae coepit formidare corporeae; quippe perferendos flammarum caelestium globos et ignes ardentium siderum mortalibus adhuc artubus et macilenta gracilitate siccatis non cassum tremebunda formidat. De Nuptiis* (ed. Dick) p. 46 11f. If this is so, I suspect Avitus wrote *furens*.

Avitus 4. 275–278

Vertice submisso blandum licet ille trisulcis
Finxerit abscondens per dulcia sibila linguis
Inmortale odium, numquam tu credulus illi,
Quem nimis expertus vitandum praemonet Adam.

The archangel warns Noah. *nimis expertus* is odd; previous mentions of Adam remark not his wealth, but his lack of experience, cf. Avitus 2. 97–99 (the devil speaks of his intended assault on Adam and Eve): *iam nunc certamine blando/ Congrediar, dum prima salus experta nec ullos/ Simplicitas ignara dolos ad tela patebit*; 4. 149–150 *nec sufficit illud/ vicit inexpertum quod serpens pristinus Adam*. The same point is being made at 4.278 where *nimis* is yet another case of its confusion with *minus*.

Avitus 5.80–84

> Nec divina volens, hominum sed facta putari
> Praecipit, ut quoscumque magos vel carmina doctos,
> Inlicitam diris temptantes fraudibus artem,
> Aegypti longinqua darent hostilia, cogens
> Murmure funereo faciat monstrare minister.

83 hostilia NRF hostilia Ln hastilia β

Pharaoh, having witnessed the transformation of Moses' staff into a serpent, sends for his own wise men. Peiper Index p. 359 s.v. *hostilia* suggested without conviction that the word meant *mansiones*; for this there is no parallel in classical Latin. Dittmann (cf. *T.L.L.* 6.3050.79 f.) cleverly proposed *hos talia*; but there is no reason why *quoscumque* cannot here be taken absolutely. *Aegypti longinqua* ("the distant parts of Egypt") can serve as the subject of *darent*. With a comma after *darent*, the attested readings could then be covering some such word as *magnalia* which could be construed as the direct object of *monstrare*.

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HESIOD AND PARMENIDES IN NAG HAMMADI

BY

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J. Doresse[1] and after him A. Böhlig[2] have suggested that the author of NHC II, 5 knew Hesiod's *Theogony*, was influenced by it, and argued against it. At the beginning of the treatise (II, 5, 97, 24f.) we are promised a demonstration that the common view according to which "nothing has existed prior to Chaos" [cf. *Th.* 116] is mistaken. Ib., 102, 27ff. we are told of an attack upon heaven and of the casting down of the "troubler" [no further identification] "to Tartarus" [cf. *Th.* 617-733]. The most interesting section, perhaps, is that on Eros, II, 5, 109, 1-26 [cf. *Th.* 120-2]. Böhlig argues that this section is an interpolation in the original "Szene von der Séduction des Archontes".[3] "His [sc. Eros'] masculine nature is Himeros" (109, 3); Böhlig compares *Th.* 201, where both Eros and Himeros accompany Aphrodite.[4]

That what we have here reminds one of Hesiod cannot, of course, be denied. Are we, however, to believe that the author of NHC II, 5 had read the whole *Theogony*,[5] and that Hesiod constitutes his main source? The cosmological section of the poem (from *Th.* 104 onwards) was widely quoted in antiquity by a variety of authors, beginning, for us, with Plato (*Symp.* 178b; *Th.* 116–7 + 120).[6] In Christian authors such as Theophilus and Hippolytus substantial chunks of poetry are quoted (Theoph., *Ad Aut.* III 5–6, Hipp., *Ref.* I 26).[7] Quotations of this size from *Th.* 617-733, however, are lacking, and even individual lines are only sparsely quoted. *Th.* 201, which has no organic connection either with the cosmogony or with the theomachy in the *Th.* – and which, moreover, is only a partial parallel to the relevant lines in NHC II, 5[8] – is only quoted in the *Et. Gen.* Consequently, such knowledge of Hesiodic items as the author of the present version may have possessed is likely to be not direct, but tralaticious, although he may have read the cosmogonical section in authors such as Theophilus and Hippolytus (or in the sort of sources or anthologies from which these had derived their quotations).

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The best approach to this problem is by way of two passages in Plutarch, who provides us with much more pertinent parallels than the original text of Hesiod.

At II, 5, 109, 3ff., Eros is androgynous: "his masculine nature is Himeros", "his feminine nature which is with him is a blood-soul, (and) is derived from the substance of Pronoia". Plut., *Fac.* 926 E – 927 A, says that originally the elements were in a chaotic condition, "until desire came over nature from Providence [ἄχρι οὗ τὸ ἱμερτὸν ἦκεν ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐκ προνοίας], for Love and Aphrodite and Eros are among them as Empedocles says and Parmenides and Hesiod". The androgynous nature of Eros cannot be paralleled from Plutarch (although he mentions two female forces besides male Eros), but the conjoining of τὸ ἱμερτὸν and πρόνοια as brought about by Eros etc. strikingly parallels Himeros-Pronoia as the constituent parts of Eros in NHC II, 5. In the related passage *Amat.* 756 D–F, Plutarch mentions in succession Empedocles' Love (quoting *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B17, 20–21 and B151) and Parmenides' Eros (quoting *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13), and he refers to Hesiod as well. Significantly, he presents Emp. B17, 20–1, καὶ φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν κ.τ.λ. as implying that Eros belongs, as an equal, to the company of the gods; this has been called "extreme misrepresentation (or irony)",[9] but it can be paralleled from NHC II, 5, 109, 8f: "when all the gods and their angels saw Eros, they became enamoured of him. But when he appeared *among all of* them, he burned them". "Appeared among all of them" – this is not to be found at Hes., *Th.* 120–2, but squares with Plutarch's interpretation of Empedocles' lines. [Note that Empedocles' lines are about Philotes, which Plutarch, *loc. cit.*, interprets as Eros: ταῦτ᾽ οἴεσθαι χρὴ λέγεσθαι περὶ Ἔρωτος].

Furthermore, at *Fac.*, 926 E, Plutarch accuses the Stoics, who distribute the elements according to their natural locations, of destroying the world; if one follows them, one brings upon things the Neikos[10] of Empedocles and "arouses against nature the ancient Titans and Giants" and longs "to look upon that legendary and dreadful disorder and discord ⟨by separating⟩ all that is heavy and ⟨all⟩ that is light". Bignone[11] believed that the reference to the Titans and Giants derives from Aristotle's lost work *On Philosophy*, where it would have served to characterize the Presocratic philosophers who declare the world to be perishable, for (1): in *De phil.* Fr. 18 Ross (Phil., *Aet. mu.* 10) Aristotle speaks of the δεινὴν ... ἀθέοτητα of those who

destroy the world, and (2): the Epicurean arguments concerned with the perishability of the world found in Lucr. V and which, according to Bignone, are directed against Aristotle's lost work, are introduced with the remark that whoever destroys by his theory the *moenia mundi* is not, for that reason, the equal of the Giants and does not deserve to be punished like them (V 114-9).

Bignone's arguments were accepted by Effe and others,[12] who pointed out, however, that the arguments in Lucretius are also directed against the Stoics.[13] This is correct; Plutarch, too, argues also against the Stoics,[14] and he is especially concerned with their theory (taken over from Aristotle) of the natural locations of the elements: below for what is heavy, up for what is light.[15] Although the possibility that Aristotle in the *De phil.* already spoke of Titans and Giants is not to be excluded, it is, I believe, more to the point to adduce a 'fragment' of Zeno, embedded in *Schol. Hes. Th.* 134, p. 30, 6f. di Gregorio[16]: Ζήνων δὲ Τιτᾶνάς φησι εἰρῆσθαι φυσικώτερον, διὰ τὸ διατάττεσθαι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου τὰ στοιχεῖα. According to Zeno, the Titans are to be interpreted as the elements which have been arranged in the cosmos in an orderly way. The scholia *ad loc.* also preserve interpretations of the names of Titans (some of which, no doubt, are Stoic): Iapetos represents what moves upwards because it is without weight, Hyperion the revolving heavens, Kreios the sovereign principle or, alternatively, separation. Zeno anyhow gave the Titans a place in cosmogonical theory; presumably, because the construction of the ordered universe is to be seen in terms of a disaggregation of an original, pre-cosmic unity. If it was indeed Aristotle who compared those who by their theories destroy (and generate!) the universe with the Titans and Giants of old, Zeno retaliated[17] rather nicely by attributing a constructive role to the Titans. Plutarch, again, stands this Stoic theory upon its head by pointing out that in the world not all things are in their 'natural' places: there is fire below the earth and soul in the body (926 C–D). Such elemental combinations as quite normally exist are there because Love and Aphrodite and Eros (as Empedocles says and Parmenides and Hesiod) brought about affection among the elements in a providential way; things are not "in the state in which, according to Plato [*Tim.* 53 b], everything is from which god is absent".

Obviously, the negative function of the Titans and Giants as opposed to the positive function of Eros etc. is, in Plutarch's exposition, part of a consistent cosmological argument. In Lucretius, the

role of the Giants is related, but different: Giants there are said to be (by the opponents!) those who by their theory destroy the *moenia mundi*. At NHC II, 5, 102, 25ff., again, there is an attack against the world itself: "And the heaven and his earth were *overturned* [cf. Lucr. V 119 *disturbent moenia mundi*] by the troubler who was beneath them".

The passage in Plutarch's *Fac.* can be paralleled by a series of fragments, forming one continuous whole, from Celsus' *Alethes Logos*, ap. Orig., *C. Cels.* VI 42 (where the emphasis is not, as in Plutarch, on Love, but on Battle), which help to elucidate the prehistory of the anonymous troubler cast to Tartarus (NHC II 5, 102, 27f.) somewhat further. Celsus criticizes the Christians because they introduce an adversary of God: Satan (σφάλλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἄττα, cf. Arist. *De Phil.* Fr. 18[18]). He argues that the Christians have misunderstood the real meaning of the ancient Greek authors when these hint at a sort of divine war. He cites Heracl., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 21B80, on universal war, and paraphrases Pherecydes' description of the war between the armies of Cronus and those of Ophioneus (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 7B4, where the part attributed to Pherecydes is too large). Then he says that this is also the meaning behind τὰ περὶ τοὺς Τιτᾶνας καὶ Γίγαντας μυστήρια, θεομαχεῖν ἐπαγγελλομένους, and in those of the Egyptians concerned with Typhon, Horus, and Osiris. [Had he read Plutarch's *De Is.*?]. He adds that Homer agrees with Heraclitus and Pherecydes and "those who introduce the mysteries of the Titans and Giants", as appears from two passages, which he quotes: *Il.* I 590–1, where Hephaestus reminds Hera of what happened to him when he tried to defend her, and *Il.* XV 18–24, where Zeus, speaking to Hera, reminds her how he punished her and how he threw down from heaven to earth whatever god tried to help her. Celsus explains these lines as follows: the words of Zeus to Hera are those of God to Matter, and their hidden meaning is "that at the beginning it (sc. matter) was chaotic and that God took it in hand and bound it in certain proportions and ordered it" [ὡς ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ὕλην) πλημμελῶς ἔχουσαν διαλαβῶν ἀναλογίαις τισὶ συνέδησε καὶ ἐκόσμησεν ὁ θεός] and that "God cast out all demons round it who were arrogant". Next, he argues that this is how Pherecydes understood Homer, and quotes *Vorsokr.* Fr. 7B5, which speaks of the ταρταρίη[19] μοῖρα which is underneath, and which is where "Zeus casts out any of the gods who become arrogant". The same idea, in his view, is behind the decoration on the Panathenaeic *peplos* of Athena (embroidered with scenes from a battle with the Giants).

This fragment calls for some comment. Although Celsus may have added some references on his own account, and although the polemical point of his argument will have influenced his exposition to some extent,[20] the main line of his exposition must derive from an earlier source (not Plutarch, but very much like Plutarch). Celsus' interpretation of Zeus as God and of Hera as Matter is originally Stoic, cf. *SVF* II 1071 (Diog. Laërt. VII 187), 1073 (Theoph., *Ad Aut.* III 8), 1074 (Orig., *C. Cels.* IV 48, not a quotation from Celsus): Chrysippus' cosmology.[21] This Stoic cosmology, however, has been platonized:[22] Celsus' matter in its chaotic condition (πλημμελῶς ἔχουσαν) is that of Plato's *Tim.* 30 a, κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως.[23] Also Plut., *Fac.* 926 E, speaks of ἀκοσμίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν. God orders this chaos by bonds (συνέδησε) and proportions (ἀναλογίαις); cf. *Tim.* 30 c, δέσμων δὲ κάλλιστος ὃς ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἓν ποιῇ· τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστον ἀποτελεῖν (cf. 30 b, συνέδησεν): this is how God creates order among the elements, and φιλία. Likewise, Plut., *Fac.* 927 A, says that after the intervention of God and Love, things were "bound" (ἐνδέθεντα). The parallel between Plato, Plutarch and Celsus is unmistakable. Now God, in the context of Celsus' exposition as a whole, brings about order by casting out the gods and Titans which were "round" matter. Plutarch, as we have noticed,[24] equates chaos with the activities of Titans and Giants, *Fac.* 926 E: ὅρα ... μὴ ... τοὺς παλαιοὺς κινῆς Τιτᾶνας ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ Γίγαντας καὶ τὴν μυθικὴν ἐκείνην καὶ φοβερὰν ἀκοσμίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν ἐπιδεῖν ποθῇς.

Hence Celsus' Titans and Giants belong with a cosmological context, the same as that encountered in Plutarch. In Plutarch, their role is minimal: he emphasizes that of love and order. In Celsus, on the other hand, the role of the Titans and Giants is a major, that of 'order' on the whole a minor one. These divergencies can easily be explained in terms of the respective and divergent aims of these authors. It cannot be denied, however, that the passage in *Fac.* and the Celsus fragment illuminate each other.

In this context, it is important to note that Alexander of Lycopolis, p. 8 Brinkmann, says that the Manichaeans referred to the battle with the Giants as described in Greek poetry, "which to their mind proves that the poets were not ignorant of the insurrection of matter against God".[25] Alexander is a near contemporary of the author of NHC II, 5. It is possible that he turns an earlier anti-Christian argument against the new Manichaean enemy,[26] but it is equally feasible that Greek

Manichaeans at Alexandria justified the doctrines of their sect by referring to Greek parallels. However this may be, Manichaean matter interpreted in terms of Giants certainly provides an excellent parallel with what is found in NHC II, 5. If a plurality of sources is involved here, there was consistency in what they had to offer, and this agreement in its turn can be explained by a descent which, to a considerable degree, is a common one. That Alexander mentions the Giants only is no objection: Hipp., *Ref.* I 26, p. 31, 13f. Wendland (after his quotation of *Th.* 108ff.) says Giants where he should have said Titans.[27]

We have noticed that, in Plutarch, Parmenides' cosmogonic[28] Eros plays an important part and that he also says that Parmenides spoke of a cosmogonic Aphrodite. This is Plutarch's name for the anonymous goddess who in Parmenides *creates Eros* (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13, quoted *Amat.* 756 F[29]). The activities of this goddess are described in some detail in a fragment of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius only (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B12), and in a non-verbal quotation by the same Simplicius (*In Phys.*, p. 39, 20–1, cf. *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 28B13).

Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the hymnic description of Eros in NHC II, 5, is strikingly parallel to these Parmenidean passages:

NHC II, 5, 109, 16ff.	Parmenides B12, 1–3; 4–5.
	αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πλῆντο πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο,
Just as Eros appeared out of	αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα·
the mid-point between light and darkness, (and) *in the midst*	ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ·
of the angels and men[20]	πάντων[30] γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει,
the *intercourse of Eros* was consummated, *so too* the first sensual pleasure sprouted upon the earth.	
⟨The *man followed*⟩ the earth,	πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν
The *woman followed* ⟨*the man*⟩,	τό τ' ἐναντίον αὖτις
And *marriage* followed the woman	ἄρσεν θηλυτέρῳ·
And *reproduction* followed marriage,	(Simpl.):
And *death*[25] *followed reproduction.*	καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν.

The Parmenidean parallel explains why, at NHC II, 5, 109, 16f., Eros appears *out of the mid-point of light and darkness*:[31] in Parmenides,

the cosmogonic goddess who created Eros [cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13] and who is called Aphrodite by Plutarch, resides in the midst of rings partly filled with night, partly with bright flame. She holds sway everywhere and reigns over all beings (πάντα in line 3 and πάντων in line 4), i.e. both in heaven and upon earth; this parallels the "just as" – "so too" at NHC II, 5, 109. "Marriage" and "reproduction" are paralleled by "coupling" and "birth". If the additions to the text of II, 5, 109, 22f. are accepted [I cannot pretend to be a judge], the parallel with Parmenides is striking: the goddess sends the female to couple with the male and the male with the female, and at NHC II, 5, 109 the woman follows the man because, of course, Eros is omnipotent. Finally, the words "and death followed reproduction" sit somewhat awkwardly in their context, a hymn upon the productive powers of Eros. One can understand their being where they are, however, if in a source originally followed the life-giving power also was in charge of death.

Both individually and as a body, these parallels are impressive. The same order is roughly followed in both texts, and points which remain difficult in the Gnostic text can be illuminated from the Greek.

Yet I am not going to argue that the author of NHC II, 5 had read Parmenides, any more than he had read Hesiod. Above, I have suggested that the person responsible for the Gnostic treatise in the form in which it has come down to us was influenced by Greek literature comparable as to its contents to passages in Plutarch. I can now add the complementary suggestion that this source not only, just as Plutarch, quoted Parm., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13 ["first of all the gods she created Eros" – this, too, is paralleled in NHC II, 5, 109, 1f.: "Out of the *first* blood, Eros appeared ..."], but also *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B12 and something corresponding to what we know in the form preserved by Simpl., *In Phys.*, 39, 20f. The background of NHC II, 5, as far as the 'Greek' sections are concerned, is not to be sought in Hesiod, but in the context of late Hellenistic cosmological discussion (and its aftermath), where not only Hesiod, but also other literature was quoted.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The above had been sent to the editor when the first fasc. of *Vig. Chr.* 34 (1980) arrived in the library of the Theological Institute, containing the paper *On the Origin of the World (CG II,5): A Gnostic*

Physics, by Ph. Perkins (p. 37ff.). I was delighted to see that Professor Perkins' argument concerned with Eros in this treatise (p. 38f.) partly coincides with my own: we both cite Plut., *Fac.* 926 Ef. Moreover, her remarks on Stoic cosmological theory as a background to that of the Gnostic treatise supplement and are supplemented by what I have said at p. 178.

NOTES

[1] *Les livres secrets des gnostiques d'Égypte* (Paris 1958) 196. For Eros, he also refers to Aesch. Fr. 44 Nauck.

[2] A. Böhlig-P. Labib, *Die Koptisch-gnostische Schrift ohne Titel* (Berlin 1962) 47f. (Titans), 61f. (Eros); A. Böhlig, *Die griech. Schule* (in: A. Böhlig-F. Wisse, *Zum Hellenismus in den Schriften von NH*, Wiesbaden 1975, 9ff.) 20–1.

[3] 1975, 20.

[4] Ib., 21. – For the text of II, 5, I have used the translation in *The NH Library in English* (Leiden 1977).

[5] Böhlig, ib. 20, suggests that he had read Hesiod at school; I think this presupposes an anthology.

[6] Presumably, Plato already used a learned anthology, viz. that of Hippias, cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. 86B6. See B. Snell, *Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales*, Phil. 1944, 170ff., repr. in: C. J. Classen (ed.), *Sophistik* (WdF 187, Darmstadt 1975) 478ff., and W. von Kienle, *Die Berichte über die Sukzessionen der Philosophen* (Diss. Berlin 1962) 40ff.

[7] See further the apparatus in M. L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony* (Oxford ²1971). – It is of some importance to note that all except one of Zeno's allegorical interpretations of the *Th.* refer to lines 116–35 (D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, Ohio St. Univ. Pr. 1977, 235 n. 26). See also N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, *Les citations des poètes grecs chez les apologistes chrétiens du II^e siècle*, Louvain 1972, 38f.; 111f. (on *Ad Aut.* II 5–7).

[8] In Hesiod Himeros is not, moreover, an aspect of Eros.

[9] *Mor.*, Loeb ed. vol. IX, 349 n. *c*.

[10] At 926 E, Emp., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B27 is quoted from memory (weak variant at end of first line) and mistakenly applied to the dominion of Neikos instead of to Sphairos. I have dealt with this question in a paper to appear in the *Festschrift Quispel* (EPRO series, 1981).

[11] E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, II (Firenze ²1973) 77ff. See also B. Effe, *Stud. z. Kosmologie u. Theologie d. Arist. Schr.* "*Üb. d. Phil.*" (München 1970) 14f.

[12] E.g. P. Boyancé, *Lucrèce et l'Épicurisme* (Paris 1963) 214f.

[13] The *hominum causa*-argument (Lucr. V 156f., cf. Aët. I 7, 7–10) pertains to the Stoics.

[14] Cf. H. Görgemanns, *Unters. z. Plutarchs Dialog De facie* (Heidelberg 1970) 98f.

[15] See P. W. van der Horst-J. Mansfeld, *An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism* (Leiden 1974), 24f. A few passages: *SVF* I 99; II 527 and 580; Aët. I 12, 4.

[16] Von Arnim, *SVF* I 100, prints the wrong text, viz. a scholium (T) which sum-

marizes and paraphrases the various pieces of information contained in R2WLZ; cf. *Scholia vetera in Hes. Theog.* rec. L. di Gregorio (Milano 1975) 30. The T scholium attributes everything it gives to Zeno, who however is only cited in R2WLZ for the information I have printed. In R2WLZ, alternative (Stoic, I would say) interpretations of the individual Titans are also listed, and apart from the nominatim reference to Zeno also one to Acusilaus (*FGrH* 2 F 7, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 9B4) is given.

[17] For Zeno against Aristotle see my paper *Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought*, in: M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic Religions* (EPRO 78, Leiden 1979, 129ff.) 144ff.

[18] See above, p. 175f.

[19] Pherecydes, of course, echoes Hesiod. On the other hand, the term Tartarus may have become known to our author through a source quoting Pherecydes, not Hesiod.

[20] Strictly speaking, Homer's Zeus does not throw Hephaestus and others into Tartarus, but to the earth: the parallel with Hesiod has been forced.

[21] Cf. EPRO 78, 180f.

[22] Such platonizing cosmologies have been splendidly studied by W. Spoerri, *Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter* (Basel 1959) 1–131; for the passage in *Fac.* see p. 75 (and my comments in the paper mentioned above n. 10, viz. n. 104); he has not, however, noticed that the Celsus fragment provides us with a parallel account.

[23] Cf. *An Alexandr. Plat.*, 21 and n. 66. H. Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge 1953), 359 n. 2 and M. Borret, *Origène. Contre Celse*, t. III (Paris 1969) 283 n. 3 wrongly refer to *Tim.* 37 a.

[24] Above, p. 175.

[25] Cf. *An Alexandr. Plat.*, 57 and n. 209.

[26] Ib., 58 n. 212.

[27] Cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin [4]1976) 575, *ad loc.*

[28] Cf. Arist., *Met.* A 984 b 25, before Fr. B 13: κατασκεύαζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν; Plut., *Amat.* 756 F ἐν τῇ κοσμογονίᾳ γράφων (Fr. B 13 follows). Both passages quoted in *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 28B13.

[29] The identification is understandable, but not acceptable for *Parmenides.* See further H. Martin Jr., *Plutarch's Citation of Empedocles at Amat. 756 D*, GRBS 1969, 57ff., and the paper mentioned above, n. 10.

[30] For the correct reading see D. Sider, Phoenix 1979, 67f. (*Vorsokr.* has πάντα γὰρ ⟨ἦ⟩).

[31] Böhlig, 1975, 21, refers to Acusilaus (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 9B3 = *FGrH* 2F6c): "it is not clear whose son he [sc. Theocritus] says Eros is; Hesiod [sc. says that he is the son] of Chaos and Earth, Acusilaus of Night and Aether [Νυκτὸς καὶ Αἰθέρος]". But there is no reference to a "mid-point" here. Note that Plat., *Symp.* 178 b, cites Hesiod, *Acusilaus* and Parmenides on Eros; for this passage see above, n. 6.

[32] *NH Libr. in Engl.*, 161.

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REVIEWS

J. Rius-Camps, *The four authentic Letters of Ignatius the Martyr.* A critical study based on the anomalies contained in the textus receptus (ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ, 2). Roma, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1979. 414 pp.

After the two articles he published on the Ignatian problem in 1977 (*Revista Catalana de Teologia* 2, 1977, 31–149 and 285–371) Rius-Camps has now elaborated his revolutionary views on the Ignatian epistles in more detail. He has based this study on the *textus receptus* of the seven Ignatian letters making up the Middle recension. A preliminary comparative study of the vocabulary of this recension and the Long one had convinced him of the correctness of the generally accepted view that the Long recension must be derived from the Middle one.

The theory developed by the author is quite spectacular indeed: he claims that there must have been an interpolator at work in the seven letters of the *textus receptus*. After analysing the greater and lesser anomalies to be found in this recension R.-C. tries to construct an interrelation and to trace passages that may have belonged together. The interpolation theory has its point of departure in the conviction that *Smyrn.* is the second half of *Eph.*; so the present two letters must originally have formed one single letter. But it is on this essential point that the evidence is decidedly meagre. Although it is true that at the beginning of *Smyrn.* the same theme occurs as at the end of *Eph.*, which can easily be explained as a transition from one text to the other, this does not decisively prove that the two letters originally belonged together. In R.-C.'s view a forger must have written the intervening clauses to soften the breaks, invented new community adresses and composed suitable conclusions. Moreover, pursuing his inquiries on the same lines, R.-C. tries, on the basis of certain anomalies in the present text, to show that the patterns and tactics of the forger

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also occur elsewhere. So he claims that the forger also divided the original *Magn.* into two letters: he concludes that *Philad.* must have formed the second half of *Magn.*

Unfortunately, these conclusions are too far-reaching. It is not surprising that the same key-expressions should occur at the end of *Magn.* and at the beginning of *Philad.* After all they deal with the same subject. So it is with much hesitation that one follows the otherwise very acute investigations of the author resulting in the conclusion that there are only four original letters: *Rom.* (with his own ms.-tradition), *Eph.*, *Magn.* and *Trall.*, letters which, as R.-C. has it, in the *textus receptus* have reached us in an interpolated form. The interpolator is believed to have added the letter to Polycarp and to have constructed four letters using materials contained in the two authentic letters dividing each letter into two halves. However, it is doubtful whether so much importance should be attached to the anomalies R.-C. notes in the openings and endings of *Smyrn.*/*Philad.* and *Eph.*/*Magn.*, respectively (*Smyrn.* has no opening section, *Philad.* an anonymous allusion to the bishop, without mentioning names of community leaders; *Eph.* 20 and *Magn.* he considers as transitional clauses inserted to soften the breaks).

According to R.-C., Ignatius (ἐπίσκοπος τῆς Συρίας) was the religious supervisor or coordinator of the province of Syria. But it seems very questionable whether such a function existed at the time. As for the adduced analogy (Polycarp as supervisor of Asia) the appeal to εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν in Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 3,3,4 does not seem valid as it is more probable that it is a specification of Smyrna ("in Asia"). On the other hand, the argument that in the letters the deacons are named Ignatius' "fellow-servants" (σύνδουλοι) is used by R.-C. (171 ff.) to argue that the interpolator considers Ignatius as deacon of Antiochia.

It seems very doubtful if the interpretation of ἀπόστολος in *Rom.* 4,3 is correct. The term, according to R.-C., does not have the technical meaning "Apostle" here, but has a wider meaning ("a person who has the charism of apostolate"), so it could be also used for the ἐπίσκοπος/supervisor "in his capacity of founder of new communities and of educators and inspectors of those". However, it would seem preferable to adhere to the sense "apostle" *sensu stricto.*

Another remarkable departure from tradition is the hypothesis (140f.) whereby Ignatius is not the victim of a persecution unchained in Antiochia but of internal quarrels (it is equally possible, however,

that εἰρηνεύειν, which normally in the early christian literature signifies "to be at peace with one another", was used to express the cessation of persecution). *Smyrn.* 4,2 is cited as evidence that Ignatius gave himself up to the authorities as the person responsible for the uproar (τί δὲ καὶ ἑαυτὸν δέδωκα τῷ θανάτῳ; "And why then have I delivered myself over to death?"). But this text can be explained in another way: as an expression of the attitude of Ignatius, who is willing to sacrifice his life.

The author proposes a new dating of the four letters he considers to be authentic. Whereas commonly it has been held by scholars that Ignatius died during the persecution of Trajan (so already Origen), R.-C. proposes a dating between 80 and 100. But his arguments are weak (Ignatius' silence about the apostle John implying John was not yet in Ephesus when Ignatius passed through; his silence about Polycarp in the not-interpolated letters, another *argumentum ex silentio* the little importance given to Smyrna would imply that Polycarp was not yet bishop of Smyrna; as to the argument of the stress on the imminence of the parousia one can remark that even in later times similar statements can be found). As for the interpolator, the author places him in the beginning of the third century. He is even more specific: it must have been a bishop of Philadelphia (this the author infers from the existence of the letter to the Philadelphians and the data derived from it), and a young man (on account of *Magn.* 3: νεωτερικὴ τάξις).

In trying to separate the original from the interpolations R.-C., applying a very consistent analysis of the text, concludes that the attitudes and conceptions of the authentic Ignatius and those of the interpolator are clearly different. He believes that the interpolator corrects Ignatius' archaic ecclesiology by presenting a more developed one, replaces the single bishop/supervisor and coordinator of all the communities of a Roman province by the monarchical bishop as the head of each of the important communities and speaks of the unity around the bishop, whereas for Ignatius the unity is a defence against heretics and schismatics. Though it is generally believed that the *Didascalia* depends on Ignatius, R.-C. tries to prove that the interpolator used the symbolism in the *Didascalia* concerning the ecclesiology inconsistently by attributing to the presbyters a rank superior to the deacons (this would, however, place the Apostles above Jesus Christ, with whom the deacons are compared). However, even the author admits that there is an anomaly in *Didascalia* II 34.

The reliance on differences in vocabulary between the authentic parts and the interpolations is not very impressive. Once one has separated certain parts that contain specific ideas, one should not be surprised to find this reflected in the vocabulary. On the other hand, to claim imitation by the interpolator when there is similarity in vocabulary strikes one as too simple a solution. There is no clear proof that the author is right in remarking (217): "The sentence κατὰ πάντα με ἀνεπαύσατε is typically Ignatian", "the interpolator imitates it in *Sm* 12,1".

The book ends with the concrete result of the study: an edition of the four letters R.-C. considers authentic, from which the interpolations (edited in brackets and in small print) have been eliminated.

Clearly, the author has pursued his study with considerable skill and ingenuity, which results in a consistent theory. But on account of the weak arguments on essential points one hesitates to accept his conclusions. Developed by a scholar who has proved to be fully conversant with every detail of Ignatius' work, the theory presented in the book under review rests too much on speculation and conjecture.

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Claude Rambaux, *Tertullien face aux morales des trois premiers siècles*. Avec appendice chronologique, bibliographie, indices (Scripturae, Tertullianeus, auteurs juifs, auteurs »chrétiens«, auteurs païens, analytique). Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1979, 520 p.

L'attitude de Tertullien face à la morale a été diversement appréciée, mais, pour la plupart des critiques, elle est essentiellement négative. Certains certes la trouvent profondément imprégnée de l'idéal chrétien mais l'opinion générale n'y voit aucune des vertus majeures du Nouveau Testament: la foi, l'espérance et l'amour.

Dans sa thèse de doctorat d'Etat C.R. a voulu reprendre le problème dans son ensemble et selon une optique entièrement nouvelle: resituer toutes les attitudes morales de Tertullien par rapport à l'ensemble de l'œuvre et les opposer, pour pouvoir mieux en saisir l'originalité, aux morales des trois premiers siècles.

Pour Tertullien l'ensemble de la vie morale oscille entre deux pôles, l'un positif, le souci de pureté et de rigueur, l'autre négatif, le refus de

démission devant le mal. En bref, c'est une morale de »consécration à Dieu« (407). Morale dont il ne faut sous-estimer ni la force, ni l'originalité face aux autres éthiques contemporaines.

Originalité vis-à-vis du Nouveau Testament : pour Tertullien, les seules vertus à retenir sont moins le pardon, la bonté, le dévouement que la prière, le secours aux pauvres et ... le paiement des impôts. On peut donc affirmer, comme le fait C.R., qu'il trahit l'essentiel du message de Jésus. D'autant plus que sa soif d'absolu et sa volonté de rompre avec le monde cadrent mal avec l'éthique chrétienne de son temps, sauf, peut-être, celle du *Pasteur* d'Hermas.

Par ailleurs, si le moraliste se nourrit parfois de l'Ancien Testament, il s'en écarte souvent, ne serait-ce qu'en prônant un ascétisme qui lui reste étranger. Certes on retrouve chez Tertullien des réticences à l'égard de la nourriture, de la vie sexuelle ou familiale que ne désavoueraient pas un néo-pythagoricien et un platonicien de l'époque impériale. Certes, sur bien des points touchant au jeûne ou au martyre, il est plus proche des religions de Cybèle, d'Isis ou de Mithra que du Nouveau Testament. Certes sa pensée a des convergences avec celle des rabbins de son temps. Mais toutes ces ressemblances ne touchent que des points de détails et négligent l'essentiel, à savoir la profonde originalité d'une morale »tertullianiste« au premier chef, avant même que d'être montaniste et, somme toute, en accord »avec les conceptions populaires de son temps« (414).

Voilà donc, sommairement esquissée, la thèse de C.R. Il faut en louer la force de la démonstration, la minutie du détail et la clarté de l'expression. L'A. a su, avec talent, ordonner ses recherches et les reprendre, point par point, face aux éléments de comparaison dont il disposait. Peut-être est-ce dans cette minutie que cet énorme travail de compilation trouve ses limites : une telle enquête ne risque-t-elle pas d'être un peu trop »réductrice« et, à trop le voir par le menu, n'a-t-on pas un peu perdu de vue la dimension d'un écrivain comme Tertullien? Comprendre sa morale c'est pénétrer de l'intérieur (tentative d'ailleurs faite avec finesse par C.R., p. 421, note 34) l'implacable combat qu'il mène tout à la fois contre les autres, païens, Juifs, chrétiens, et contre lui-même.

Mais c'est surtout sur un autre point qu'il y aurait des réserves à exprimer : sur les rapports de Tertullien et du judaisme, rapports que, sans les nier, C.R. ne privilégie pas particulièrement. Aux deux questions que pose C.R. sur ces rapports : pourquoi Tertullien a-t-il subi

l'influence juive de manière si sélective et pourquoi lui échappe-t-il au moment où elle devrait lui permettre de comprendre le Nouveau Testament (412)? il n'est pas difficile de répondre. Si Tertullien avait subi complètement l'influence du judaisme, il se serait converti à ce dernier ou, si l'on accepte la thèse développée dans notre *Tertullien et le Judaisme*, Paris, 1977, il ne l'aurait pas rejeté. Par ailleurs, il n'est pas certain que le judaisme des IIème et IIIème siècles, et tout particulièrement le judaisme africain, ait particulièrement préparé ses adeptes à la compréhension du Nouveau Testament.

Mais C.R. fonde toutes ses affirmations sur une source unique, l'ouvrage du Père Bonsirven : le *Judaisme palestinien au temps de Jésus-Christ*. Certes nul ne songerait à lui reprocher un accès aux textes rabbiniques nécessairement de seconde main (encore qu'il cite du même Bonsirven les *Textes rabbiniques* ...). Pourtant on est en droit de se demander pourquoi C.R. n'a pas suivi plus souvent l'*Histoire d'Israël* de S. W. Baron (qu'il cite d'ailleurs dans sa bibliographie) ou d'autres sources plus récentes, plus directes, moins partiales peut-être que le Père Bonsirven dont la sympathie ne semble pas acquise au sujet qu'il traite (n'est-ce pas lui qui présente ses *Textes* comme un »fatras«, p. VI?). Il aurait ainsi évité çà et là des affirmations hâtives souvent, inexactes parfois. Ainsi dire (202) que la pratique du jeûne aurait été restreinte par les rabbins, c'est oublier qu'elle restait tellement en usage chez les Juifs que le concile de Laodicée en prenait ombrage et que, au IVème siècle, le pouvoir impérial tentait de l'empêcher. C'est aussi trancher un peu vite sur la polygamie juive, si controversée (cf. Baron, II, 764). Même chose sur le martyre, qui devient, dès le IIème siècle, un élément majeur de solidarité communautaire (cf. Baron, II, 882). Répéter, après Bonsirven, que le judaisme permet de tuer un agresseur, c'est forcer les textes talmudiques et oublier que, pour les rabbins, un homicide est un péché capital (cf., entre mille citations, *Sifra sur le Lévitique*, XVI,16,81c). On pourrait multiplier les exemples. Ces réserves faites, on se doit, en définitive, de souligner l'intérêt de l'ouvrage de C.R., non seulement pour les »tertullianistes« mais encore pour tous ceux qui se penchent sur la vie morale des trois premiers siècles de notre ère.

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Robert Joly, *Le Dossier d'Ignace d'Antioche* (Université Libre de Bruxelles. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres, LXIX). Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1979. 144 pp. 400 FB.

L'étude de M. Joly veut s'opposer à une certitude quasi unanime qui règne par rapport aux lettres d'Ignace d'Antioche. Tandis qu'on admet aujourd'hui presque universellement que sept lettres, selon la soi-disant version moyenne, sont authentiques, l'auteur veut rouvrir le dossier, bien que dans son Avant-propos il avoue que son étude n'a pas l'illusion de pouvoir vaincre en un tournemain la doctrine régnante. »Elle a plutôt pour but de relancer une discussion indispensable qu'on souhaite le plus possible philologique et rationnelle« (7). M. Joly veut prouver que les lettres, issues du milieu smyrniote, sont de la main d'un faussaire et qu'elles sont à dater d'après la mort de Polycarpe (environ 168). Selon lui les lettres s'insèrent mal dans le christianisme du début du deuxième siècle : »qu'il s'agisse de la condamnation aux bêtes, de l'épiscopat monarchique, du vocabulaire chrétien ou gnostique, etc., les *Lettres* sont, sur toute une série de questions, radicalement isolées et peu compréhensibles si l'on s'obstine à les dater de 110« (106).

On sait que la question de l'authenticité des lettres, débattue pendant des siècles, depuis les recherches de Zahn et de Lightfoot vers la fin du XIX^e^ siècle, dans le monde scientifique est considérée généralement comme tranchée. De temps en temps des voix de contestataires se sont élevées (entre autres Voelter, Schwartz, Turmel et Weijenborg), mais leurs thèses étant souvent aussi téméraires que divergentes, ils ne réussirent pas à convaincre et à changer l'opinion reçue. Il faut relever ici qu'en ce qui concerne la tradition manuscrite des textes ignatiens, M. Joly rejoint l'opinion reçue selon laquelle la version moyenne est le texte original (la version longue interpolée date vraisemblablement de peu après 360; de plus il y a une version brève de trois lettres, conservée en syriaque).

L'argument principal de M. Joly en faveur d'une datation d'un demi-siècle plus tard que la date attribuée traditionnellement, c'est qu'à ses yeux (ce en quoi il a certains devanciers) il y a une disparate entre les chapitres 9 et 13 de la lettre de Polycarpe de Smyrne aux Philippiens. Du texte du ch. 9 il veut conclure qu'Ignace n'est pas originaire d'Antioche, mais de Philippes. Mais je ne peux pas partager son avis. Rien n'empêche de considérer τοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν comme complé-

ment de ἄλλοις, tandis que Joly veut que ce soit le complément de tout ce qui précède, de sorte qu'on pourrait considérer Ignace comme Philippien.

Les arguments de M. Joly sont souvent très subtils et ingénieux, mais on ne voit presque pas d'arguments qui convainquent vraiment. Voici quelques exemples. En ce qui concerne le lexique des lettres ignatiennes, je ne crois pas que certains termes discutés par M. Joly soient impossibles au début du deuxième siècle. Notre connaissance des textes de la plus ancienne période est très lacuneuse de sorte qu'il y a dans le lexique plusieurs sauts et qu'on peut relever plusieurs mots d'abord isolés qui ne sont devenus fréquents qu'après un certain temps. A mon avis χριστιανισμός chez Ignace pourrait être un de ces termes (cf. pp. 61–63; Antioche est d'ailleurs aussi la ville où le mot χριστιανός a pris naissance). M. Joly doute que ὁμιλία dans *Ad Polyc.* 5,1 ne soit possible au début du deuxième siècle (μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ τούτων ὁμιλίαν ποιοῦ). Il parle ici (69) du »sens tout à fait technique de *homélie*, *sermon*«, tandis qu'on pourrait penser plutôt au sens plus général de »discours«, »conférence« (»parle plutôt de ces choses«), sens qui se rencontre chez plusieurs auteurs profanes contemporains. Je ne vois pas bien pourquoi il faudrait considérer l'emploi du singulier comme »extrêmement typique d'un sens technique«.

La même chose vaut pour certaines autres données des lettres ignatiennes, qui restent plus ou moins isolées. Mais qu'un témoignage isolé ne soit pas exceptionnel, Joly lui-même le fait remarquer à propos de la recommendation d'Ignace de contracter le mariage avec l'avis de l'évêque (*Ad Polyc.* 5,2): »Les plus anciennes attestations après Ignace sont chez Tertullien, qui reste lui-même isolé au troisième siècle dans notre documentation«. Ce dernier fait ne plaide-t-il pas, à lui seul, contre la théorie de M. Joly, pour qui isolement équivaut à invraisemblance?

Pour prouver l'influence de *II Clément* sur Polycarpe, M. Joly emprunte à Voelter quelques rapprochements entre *II Clément* et la lettre de Polycarpe aux Philippiens, qui selon lui méritent attention, (p. 36): »L'expression κριτὴς ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν est commune aux deux œuvres«. Mais il n'est pas exact de dire qu'on trouve ici une formule de *II Clément* chez Polycarpe, puisqu'il s'agit d'une tournure biblique (*Act.* 10,42).

M. Joly analyse aussi (99ss.) les témoignages les plus anciens où les épîtres d'Ignace sont mentionnées ou citées. Il suggère qu'Irénée, en citant un court passage d'Ign. *Rom.* 4, préfère rester dans le vague

en ce qui concerne le personnage d'Ignace (*Adv. haer.* 5,28,4). Mais ce caractère assez vague appartient à toute une catégorie de citations chez les auteurs chrétiens. Puis M. Joly veut conclure de deux citations chez Origène que celui-ci parlerait consciemment d'Ignace d'une manière fort évasive, comme s'il ne pouvait le situer exactement (p. 99). Dans *Hom. VI sur Luc* (éd. Rauer, p. 34–35), après un début assez vague, on trouve ensuite »une grande précision«, ce qui donne à M. Joly »l'impression d'une surcharge imposée au texte«. Cependant le fait de voir percer la précision après un début plutôt vague, n'est pas si étonnant que Joly veut le faire croire.

Qu'Ignace ne soit pas mentionné dans une lettre de Polycrate, évêque d'Éphèse, adressée à Victor, évêque de Rome, ne dit pas grand-chose, puisque l'auteur de cette lettre ne mentionne que des évêques de l'Asie Mineure : Antioche n'y appartient pas.

M. Joly s'efforce de tirer un argument de l'influence du IVe livre des Macchabées sur les lettres d'Ignace, influence qui a été rendue très vraisemblable par une étude de Mgr. O. Perler (1949). Mais, contrairement à M. Joly, je ne crois pas que la dépendance de *Macch.* IV en ce qui concerne le vocabulaire, nous contraigne à admettre qu'Ignace avait ce texte à sa disposition en composant ses lettres. M. Joly va trop loin en éliminant l'élément de spontanéité, qui semble caractéristique des lettres, et en supposant que le style asianiste fait penser plutôt à un auteur originaire d'un centre de l'asianisme tel que Smyrne.

M. Joly consacre un chapitre à la question de l'épiscopat monarchique que les *Lettres* d'Ignace nous montrent établi dans les communautés d'Asie auxquelles elles s'adressent. Pour lui ce n'est qu'après 140 que l'épiscopat monarchique s'est développé. En vue d'étayer son argumentation il propose entre autres une interprétation de l'adresse de la lettre d'Ignace à Polycarpe, qui me semble peu probable; il y voit une hésitation, mais ne fait que souligner que l'évêque est le représentant du Christ, le vrai *episkopos*.

La thèse de M. Joly, qui a le mérite d'avoir écrit un livre clair et concis, ne m'a pas convaincu. Il est vrai que les lettres ignatiennes présentent certaines énigmes comme c'est le cas de plusieurs autres textes paléo-chrétiens. L'auteur du *Dossier* a eu le tort de vouloir les résoudre par des hypothèses qui, pour le moins, sont très douteuses. De toute façon, il est inévitable que, faute de données, certaines incertitudes doivent rester.

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Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 20–23*. Introduction, Texte critique, Traduction et Notes par Justin Mossay, avec la collaboration de Guy Mafontaine (Sources Chrétiennes, 270). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1980. 324 p.

Après la parution des *Discours 1–3*, édités par J. Bernardi (compte-rendu, *Vig. Chr.* 33, 1979, 301-4) et des *Discours 27–31*, édités par P. Gallay (compte-rendu, *Vig. Chr.* 34, 1980, 199-201) voici les *Discours* 20–23. Quant aux discours publiés maintenant, trois d'entre eux datent de l'épiscopat de Grégoire à Constantinople. Le *D.* 20 a un caractère théologique et est qualifié par une partie des manuscrits comme une introduction aux »Discours théologiques«. Le *D.* 21 est un panégyrique d'Athanase d'Alexandrie. Le *D.* 22, intitulé »troisième discours irénique«, exhorte les fidèles de Constantinople à la concorde. Le *D.* 23 intitulé »deuxième irénique« semble avoir été composé à Nazianze, où Grégoire, avant son départ pour la capitale, assistait son père qui était évêque de cette localité.

Quant aux principes de l'édition, l'éditeur présent se joint à ses prédécesseurs. Elle est fondée sur les mêmes dix manuscrits, dont six font partie du groupe »des 52« ou »groupe N« et quatre du groupe »des 45« ou »groupe M« (c'est le classement proposé par Th. Sinko). Dans son introduction l'éditeur prête beaucoup d'attention à la tradition du texte. On ne doit pas avoir une idée trop simple de cette tradition. L'existence de deux groupes de manuscrits ne veut pas encore dire que les manuscrits appartenant à un de ces groupes auraient eu la même histoire.

Le texte grec, avec traduction française, de chaque discours est précédé d'une introduction, où l'éditeur discute les questions pertinentes : situation historique, analyse des discours, les particularités du texte dans les dix manuscrits, etc. Le texte est accompagné d'un nombre restreint de notes.

Grégoire, on le sait, écrit un grec difficile avec beaucoup de raffinements stylistiques. La tâche d'un traducteur est lourde. Le présent éditeur s'en est bien quitté.

Dans les remarques suivantes je parlerai seulement du *Discours* 20, et spécialement des rapports entre ce discours et les autres écrits de Grégoire. Plusieurs savants ont déjà fait remarquer que dans ce discours Grégoire ne semble faire autre chose que répéter ce qu'il a dit ailleurs. Les chapitres 1–4 se composent d'une série de textes qu'on retrouve souvent mot à mot dans d'autres discours. Dans son introduction

l'éditeur distingue, à l'instar de J. Sajdak, entre doublets et passages parallèles, et il dit : »Mis à part les deux doublets de dix et de dix-neuf lignes (dans la Patrologie Grecque de Migne), les formules répétées mot pour mot se réduisent à fort peu de choses dans les passages parallèles relevés par J. Sajdak« (p. 42). Cette observation m'a surpris. En comparant les textes de ces quatre chapitres avec les passages parallèles, j'ai constaté que, pour la plus grande partie, ils ne contiennent que des formules répétées mot à mot (p. 42, ligne 21 il faut lire *D* 2, 93–94 au lieu de *D* 2, 3–4).

D. 20, 5 commence par les mots suivants : Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνεκαθήραμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὸν θεόλογον (φέρε τι καὶ περὶ Θεοῦ ὡς ἐν βραχεῖ διελεχθῶμεν). M. Mossay traduit : »Dans la première partie du Discours, nous avons précisé ce que doit être le ‚théologien'«. Dans une note il qualifie cette formule comme »une cheville littéraire de transition que l'auteur emploie encore dans *D.* 28, 1 et 39, 11«. Cela me semble être une sous-estimation de cette formule. Dans tous ces cas Grégoire a en vue une vraie purification. En *D.* 39, 9 il dit d'abord : Διὰ τοῦτο καθαρτέον ἑαυτὸν πρῶτον (texte parallèle de *D.* 20, 4, 8ss.) et il poursuit en *D.* 39, 11 : Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνεκαθήραμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ θέατρον, φέρε τι περὶ τῆς ἑορτῆς ἤδη φιλοσοφήσωμεν. (Le θέατρον semble être ici l'image de la réunion des Chrétiens dans l'église).

Le caractère sérieux de cette formule devient plus clair encore, quand on étudie le texte vraiment parallèle de *D.* 28, 1. Grégoire commence ce discours ainsi : Ἐπειδὴ ἀνεκαθήραμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὸν θεόλογον ... Par ces mots il renvoie le lecteur au discours précédent, dans lequel il a exposé quelle doit être la disposition du théologien pour être à la hauteur de sa tâche. Dans ce dernier discours (27, 7) on trouve une métaphore très proche de celle que nous discutons ici. Grégoire dit : πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἴδωμεν, καὶ ξέσωμεν εἰς κάλλος, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα, τὸν θεολόγον : »portons notre regard sur nous-mêmes et amenons à sa perfection le théologien comme on polit une statue«. Polir le théologien, le purifier, c'est le but du *Discours* 37. C'est aussi le but de *D.* 20, 1–4. Mais il y a encore plus de rapprochement entre ces deux textes de Grégoire. Dans tous les deux il s'oppose aux mêmes adversaires, les Eunomiens. Ce sont les gens qui se sont chargés témérairement (θρασέως, *D.* 20, 4, 6, cf. 20, 12, 1, où Grégoire demande confiance à lui-même comme τῷ μὴ θρασεῖ θεολόγῳ) de s'occuper de la parole de Dieu ; le rapprochement s'impose encore plus dans la phrase initiale du *D.* 20.

Grégoire commence ainsi : Ὅταν ἴδω τὴν νῦν γλωσσαλγίαν καὶ

τοὺς αὐθημερινοὺς σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς χειροτονητοὺς θεολόγους, οἷς ἀρκεῖ τὸ θελῆσαι μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σοφοῖς, ποθῶ τὴν ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαν ... καὶ ἐμαυτῷ μόνῳ συγγενέσθαι βούλομαι. Et voici maintenant que dit Grégoire dans *D.* 27, 9: Τί καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους αὐθήμερον πλαττεῖς ἁγίους καὶ χειροτονεῖς θεολόγους, καὶ οἷον ἐμπνεῖς τὴν παίδευσιν ... Ici on trouve ces »sages (ou saints – dans ce contexte ce sont des équivalents) dont la sagesse (sainteté) est le résultat de l'activité d'un seul jour« et ces »théologiens, qui sont devenus théologiens par élection (ou ordination?)«. C'est-à-dire, ce sont des gens qui ne se sont pas préparés par une ascèse stricte à cette tâche élevée. Le résultat de leur activité est la γλωσσαλγία, qui est mentionnée aussi dans le *D.* 27, 7, où Grégoire parle du théologien dont l'activité n'a pas encore été purifiée: Ἐκεῖνο δὲ πρῶτον λογισώμεθα, τίς ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ τὸν λόγον φιλοτιμία καὶ γλωσσαλγία; τίς ἡ καινὴ νόσος αὕτη καὶ ἀπληστία; ce texte montre comment on doit interpréter cette ‚glossalgie'. On pourrait dire que c'est une loquacité morbide. Dans son édition du *D.* 27 M. Gallay le rend par »démangeaison de parler«. Le traducteur présent se restreint à »glossalgie«.

Il est évident qu'on ne peut interpréter ce commencement du *D.* 20 que dans la lumière du *D.* 27. Il est remarquable que M. Mossay ne réfère ici aucunement à ce discours.

Autre chose remarquable: bien que ce *Discours* 20 contienne plusieurs passages qui sont strictement conforme à des textes dans des discours édités dans cette même série, spécialement à *D.* 2, on ne trouve aucune référence à ces éditions-là. Parfois cependant une comparaison entre les deux textes pourrait jeter quelque lumière. En *D.* 20, 2 on lit: καὶ ὅθεν εἰς τοῦτο ὑπήχθην τὸ δέος ἵνα μή με τοῦ δέοντος δειλότερον ὑπολάβητε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαινῆτε τῆς προμηθείας, ἀκούω μὲν αὐτοῦ Μωϋσέως ... La construction de cette phrase n'est pas très simple. M. Mossay traduit: »Pour que vous ne me soupçonniez pas de pusillanimité excessive à cause du fait que j'en étais arrivé à redouter une telle charge et pour qu'au contraire vous me sachiez gré de ma prudence, voici l'histoire qu'on racont de Moïse lui-même«. Il fait donc dépendre ὅθεν ... δέος du verbe ὑπολάβητε ce qui me semble être impossible. Il doit d'ailleurs forcer la signification de ὅθεν. La solution de ce problème est donné par le texte parallèle en *D.* 2, 92, où on lit: Καὶ ὅθεν εἰς τοῦτο ὑπήχθην τὸ δέος, ἵνα μή με τοῦ δέοντος δειλότερον ὑπολαμβάνητε, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα ἐπαινῆτε τῆς προμηθείας, φράσω καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Ἀκούω μὲν αὐτοῦ Μωϋσέως ...

Ici il apparaît que ὅθεν ... δέος dépend d'une proposition capitale (φράσω ... ἡμᾶς), qui a été omise par Grégoire dans le *D.* 20. Le résultat est une phrase qui a un caractère anacolouthique.

Il me semble que, surtout dans le cas du *D.* 20, une plus grande collaboration avec les éditeurs de discours contenant des textes parallèles aurait enrichi la valeur de cette édition qui, du reste, est d'une très bonne qualité.

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Cosmas Indicopleustès. *Topographie Chrétienne*. Introduction, Texte critique, Illustration, Traduction et Notes par Wanda Wolska-Conus. Band 1, Bücher 1–4 (Sources Chrétiennes, 141), 570 S., Paris 1968; Band 2, Buch 5 (SC, 159), 374 S., Paris 1970, und Band 3, Bücher 6–12. Index (SC, 197), 488 S., Paris 1973.

Wenn ein Rezensent erst nach jahrelanger Benutzung einer Textausgabe sein Urteil darüber abgibt, so mag das dem Editor gegenüber nicht sehr höflich erscheinen; tatsächlich bot schon der bereits 1968 erschienene erste Band der *Topographie Chrétienne*, durch die gediegene Einleitung und Editionsarbeit, genügend Anlass, den längst ersehnten 'neuen Kosmas' mit dem höchsten Lob zu begrüssen. Ihm ist dies glücklicherweise vielerorts auch zuteil geworden.

Der wichtigste Grund, der zur Verzögerung dieser Besprechung geführt hat, war mein Wunsch, nach meinen aus dem ersten Band gewonnen Eindrücken den ganzen Kosmas als Material für Seminarübungen zu verwenden. Als 1970 und 1973 der zweite und dritte Band vorlagen, konnte ich diesen Plan verwirklichen: die Vorzüge der Edition haben sich, durch allmähliches Vertrautwerden nicht weniger als durch kritische Fragen und Bemerkungen der Studenten, erst in der gemeinsamen Betrachtung richtig herausgestellt. Die angenehm lesbare, immer genaue und trotzdem klare Übersetzung hat uns dabei über manches Hindernis im Originaltext hinweggeholfen.

Davon überzeugt, dass allen, denen die Probleme der *Chr(istlichen) T(opographie)* fremd sind, damit gedient ist, möchte ich zuerst die in der Einleitung zur Textausgabe (I. Band) erörterten Forschungsergebnisse von Frau Wolska kurz zusammenfassen, um zum Schluss etwas ausführlicher eine Anzahl kritischer Bemerkungen vorzubringen:

diese wollen keineswegs den Wert der Edition schmälern; sie sollen auf der einen Seite nur erläutern, wie anregend die intensive Beschäftigung mit einem kritischen Text sein kann, andererseits darauf hinweisen, dass auch die sorgfältigste Gestaltung eines kritischen Apparates den Herausgeber nicht der Pflicht enthebt, den Apparat für den Benutzer ausserdem völlig durchsichtig zu machen.

Der anonyme Nestorianer, der zwischen 547 und 549 die *Chr.T.* schrieb, hat erst im 11. Jh. den Namen Kosmas Indikopleustes erhalten. Seine Augenzeugenberichte bestreichen den Raum zwischen dem Nilgebiet und dem Roten Meer: was er über 'Indien' erzählt, hat er demnach aus zweiter Hand. Von seinen verschiedenen Schriften ist uns nur die *Chr.T.* in zehn Büchern erhalten geblieben: es ist möglich, dass die Bücher 11 und 12 Fragmente seines verlorenen Werkes über die Geographie darstellen. In der thematischen Aufgliederung seiner Weltanschauung nach einem kosmologischen, anthropologischen, prophetischen und christologischen Aspekt, sowie im theologischen Gehalt, ist die *Chr.T.*, wahrscheinlich nicht ohne einen Vermittler, verbunden mit der theologischen Schule von Antiocheia, insbesondere mit dem durch das 5. Ökumenische Konzil 553 verurteilten Theodor von Mopsuestia und dessen dyophysitischen (warum *diophysite* S. 40f.?) Ansichten. Die Benutzung der Schrift als eine Art 'Parteihandbuch' durch die Dyophysiten dürfte mit verantwortlich sein für das Bestehen einer überarbeiteten Kopie des Werkes. Die zehn Bücher werden S. 19–36 in ihrer Reihenfolge inhaltlich analysiert: in einem mehr detaillierten systematischen Inhaltsverzeichnis am Ende des 3. Bandes (S. 395–416) werden alle aus dem Text gewonnenen Daten über Kosmas, seine Theorien und deren Voraussetzungen, knapp, aber aufschlussreich zusammengetragen.

Eine der wichtigsten Bedingungen für die Textgestaltung ist die naheliegende, von den früheren Herausgebern (Montfaucon und Winstedt) jedoch völlig unberücksichtigt gebliebene Forderung, Text und Bilder als eine untrennbare Einheit zu behandeln; allein schon die folgerichtige Durchführung dieses Prinzips hebt die Ausgabe weit über ihre Vorgänger hinaus. Die drei wichtigsten Zeugen (Vat.gr. 699 = V, Laurent. Plut. IX 28 = L, und Sin.gr. 1186 = S) werden ausführlich gewertet. Die zur Aufstellung von zwei Hauptwegen der Überlieferung führenden Argumente überzeugen: die beiden Hss. aus dem 11. Jh., L und S, gehen auf das, nicht mehr vorhandene, überarbeitete Exemplar (*copie remaniée*) zurück, das seinerseits eine, eben-

falls verlorene, revidierte Kopie (*copie révisée*) vom Original als Vorlage hatte. Der zweite Überlieferungsweg setzt, mit V als seinem Hauptvertreter, bei dieser Kopie an.

Mit der gleichen Akribie wird die textkritische Methode auf die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Bilder angewandt. Ein auf dem ersten Blick heikles, denn neuartiges Unterfangen, wird hier zu einem guten Ende geführt; wir verzeichnen das wohlbegründete, mehrfache Resultat:

1. Die wissenschaftlichen, eigens für die *Chr.T.* angefertigten Illustrationen, müssen anders beurteilt werden als die aus zahlreichen anderen Quellen entnommenen biblischen Zeichnungen.
2. Es gelingt der Herausgeberin, eine annehmbare Liste der Zeichnungen, die im Original vorhanden waren, aufzustellen.
3. Das überraschendste Ergebnis dieser Untersuchung ist, dass zwar auch für die Bilder das gleiche Stemma gilt, dass dabei jedoch der relativ späte Zeuge S durch Stil und Komposition der Bilder als getreuester Spiegel vom Original herauskommt.
4. Die Lösung, die Bilder in der Ausgabe von ihren Vorlagen zu abstrahieren, d.h. in der Reproduktion, unabhängig von Stil, Grösse, Blattspiegel usw. in den Hss., auf ihren Kern zurückzudrängen, kann als vorbildlich angesehen werden. Dass die in der gleichen Weise behandelten Bild-Varianten in der Einleitung S. 186–231 gesammelt dargeboten werden, könnte man bedauern: keine Alternative aber wäre sinnvoller oder eleganter.

Eine kurze Betrachtung der Sprache des Kosmas verbindet sich in der Einleitung schliesslich mit der Ausführung der bei der vorliegenden Edition gehandhabten Kriterien (S. 232–236). Hier möchte ich einige kritische Bemerkungen ansetzen.

Dass der kritische Apparat vom Ballast nichtssagender Quasivarianten befreit wird, ist selbstverständlich nur zu begrüssen, wird in der neueren Textkritik auch immer mehr eingesehen; allein, der Benutzer dieses Textes hätte in vielen Fällen doch gerne einen klareren Einblick in das gegenseitige Verhältnis von Hss. und Drucken bekommen. So führt der an sich gerechtfertigte Ausgangspunkt LS = LSm in den Fällen, dass Montfaucon LS folgt (S. 233), im kritischen Apparat zur Ungereimtheit, dass die Bezeichnung LS ohne nähere Angabe dort ständig als LSm interpretiert wird, obwohl es eine nicht geringe Anzahl Fälle gibt, worin LS bedeutet, dass m (Montfaucon) dem Vaticanus – oder dem eignen gesunden Verstand – gefolgt ist: es handelt sich nur

selten um "lectures arbitraires qui ne trouvent pas de justification dans les manuscrits" (S. 233). Ich vermerke hier, auszugsweise: I, 2,8; 9,7; 10,1–2; 12,3; 12,14; II,96,6; III, 42,7; 48,1; 49,3; V 22, 5; 28, 11; 32,1; VIII, 9,8. Es ist diese Ungereimtheit umso unverständlicher, weil für L die Varianten L und Lm, bzw. L'm (= L correctus + m) durchwegs angegeben werden (obwohl auch hier dem Editor ein paar Fehler unterlaufen sind, denn z.B. IV, 20, 12 und 16 müsste Lm verzeichnet sein statt L), während auch zwischen V und Vwin unterschieden wird, damit der Leser weiss (was er auch wissen will), wann Winstedt sich, gegen V, für L oder LS(m) entscheidet. Es könnte die einzige von mir gefundene Bezeichnung LSm (V, 220,18) andeuten, dass der Editor auf einen früheren Plan, die gängige Übereinstimmung von m mit seiner Vorlage (L) zu vermerken, verzichtet hat, ohne sich zu realisieren, dass dadurch das Verhältnis Montfaucons zum Vaticanus ernstlich getrübt wird. Mir ist es ebenso unverständlich, warum manchmal Varianten, die durchaus nicht als einfache Kopistenfehler abgetan werden können, im Apparat keine Aufnahme gefunden haben. Sprechen wir dabei nicht von der "lecture fantaisiste" von m (I, 9,5) ἐπίδοσιν statt ἐπὶ δύσιν (wenn auch nicht ohne Interesse, weil die Variante einen Sinn hat; in der lat. Übersetzung wird sie wiedergegeben mit *progressum*), sondern beschränken wir uns auf eine Auswahl 'besserer' Beispiele: II, 99, 14 εἴ τις (Vmwin): ἥτις LS (ebenfalls II, 102,6); III, 35,15 καὶ ἀκάρπων ξύλων (V): om.m, καὶ ἀκάρπων om.LS; III, 36, 7 μὲν (LSmwin): μετὰ V (oder ist dies eine Fehllesung von Winstedt?); III, 37, 7 ἀλόγου (Vwin): om.LSm; III, 46, 7 ἀνυμνῶσιν (Vwin): ἀνυμνοῦσι VL'S, ἀνυμνῶσιν μετὰ λόγου Lm; VIII, 1, 4 ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς (Vmwin): ἐξὼν αὐτὸς LS; X, 19, 7 προστάται (Vwin): πρὸς ταῦτα LSm.

Jeder Editor hat mit der Gewissheit zu leben, dass auch die sorgfältigste Prüfung der Hss. und Beurteilung der Varianten letzten Endes oft *ihm* die Entscheidung über eine Lesart überlassen: es liegt in der Natur der Sache, dass die eine Lösung der anderen widerspricht, sie jedoch selten ausschliesst. Selbst wer die besseren Argumente hat, muss daher nicht immer recht haben; nichtsdestoweniger möchte ich doch ein paar Fälle registrieren, wo zumindest die besseren Argumente auf meiner Seite sind. Im zweiten Buch 97, 4 wird der hss. Überlieferung (VSL) ὅλων gefolgt, wofür m und win korrigieren: ὅλως. Man kann gegen ὅλων nichts einwenden, allein, wenn τούτων ὅλων μὴ χρῄζειν übersetzt wird mit "n'en auront aucunement besoin", fragt man sich doch, ob es nicht besser gewesen wäre, mwin in ihrer Korrektur

beizupflichten. Wir finden II,100,4 καταλιπεῖν nach LSmwin gegen καταλείπειν in V. Nun wissen wir allerdings, dass V orthographisch unzuverlässig ist, aber wäre, neben ἐπιστηρίζεσθαι im gleichen Satz, ein Aorist hier wirklich unentbehrlich? Ähnlich steht es mit X, 24, 2 κατέλιπεν, wo das Imperfekt der Vorlage (V!) wesentlich besser die 'Bestandsaufnahme' andeutet. Kehren wir zum zweiten Buch zurück: 102, 6 wird der zweite Korintherbrief 5, 17 zitiert als εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, καινὴ κτίσις ἀνακαινίζεται (Vwin). Wenn man diese Stelle mit II, 99, 15 vergleicht, wo ἀνακαινίζεται fehlt, möchte man sagen, dass sich gerade hier in der 'copie révisée' eine Glosse eingeschlichen hat (denn om. LSm), die genau das bedeutet, was es heisst, 'im Christo' zu sein. In III, 35, 8 wird, mit V, gewählt für die Form διαπεροῦσιν, die nach der Grammatik von LSmwin, m.E. mit Recht, durch διαπερῶσιν verbessert wird. Wie ungenau V mit Endungen umgeht, ersieht man bald aus III, 38, 11 δυσφορῶσιν, wo die Edition, mit Recht, die korrekte Form δυσφοροῦσιν aus LSmwin aufnimmt. Ich habe, dies zu III, 45, 9, ἐπ᾽ ὕψος, bei Kosmas keine anderen Beispiele für Psilosis gefunden: wäre da doch nicht die Lesart εἰς (LSmwin) vorzuziehen gewesen? Buch VII, 37, 11 finden wir die, immerhin für Kosmas, ungewöhnliche Form γενήσωνται, wie sie von m und win gegen codd. γενήσονται vorgeschlagen wurde. Hier würde ich behaupten, dass dieser grammatische Notsprung überflüssig ist: der Aufbau des Satzes ist solcherart, dass ein späterer Indikativ nach vorausgegangenen Konjunktiven durchaus verständlich wäre: καὶ ... σημεῖα .... γενήσονται könnte ohne weiteres als ein Zwischensatz gelesen oder zumindest gedacht werden. Bedenken habe ich auch gegen das Substantiv ζητημάτια VII, 42, 4. Es wird weder vom Bibeltext noch vom Sprachgebrauch des Autors gedeckt. Dass Kosmas VII, 4, 16 ποιημάτιον schreibt, hat einen besonderen, ebendort ausgesprochenen Grund.

Es kann, wie schon oben betont wurde, nicht meine Absicht sein, mit noch mehr kleineren Notizen den Eindruck zu wecken, dass mein Gesamturteil am Ende etwas nuancierter ausfällt. Dem ist nicht so. Ich habe nicht den leisesten Zweifel: der 'Indienfahrer' Kosmas hat mit dieser Edition seine endgültige Gestalt bekommen. Dass Frau Wolska sich Jahrzehnte hindurch bemüht hat, den Autor zu verstehen und für andere zugänglich zu machen, verpflichtet die gelehrte Welt und alle anderen Interessierten zu höchstem Dank.

2215 PB *Voorhout* Linnaeuslaan 26 H. HENNEPHOF

Luigi Franco Pizzolato, *La dottrina esegetica di sant'Ambrogio* (Studia Patristica Mediolanensia, 9). Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1978. XXI, 359 pp.

Among the Latin Fathers Ambrose is the first to have received a thoroughly Christian education. In this Scripture obviously played a prominent part and Ambrose's well-trained memory completely absorbed the biblical material, easily producing examples and textual quotations or reminiscences, whenever the subject he was dealing with gave opportunity. But often he dealt explicitly, too, with parts of the Bible, having a predilection for the Old Testament, especially the Pentateuch and the Psalms, and many of his treatises are adaptations of sermons on biblical passages. Reading these treatises at first one gets the impression of a quite arbitrary, even chaotic, use of biblical texts; on the other hand the reader at times is taken in by the aesthetic qualities of this exegesis, which more than once shows a decidedly poetic touch (cf. G. Lazzati, *Il valore letterario della esegesi ambrosiana.* Milan 1960), reminding one of the great hymns which in the end proved to be the most lasting and influential part of Ambrose's literary work.

Now on reflection his handling of Scripture cannot simply be termed arbitrary, there must be some sort of system, some doctrine guiding this exegesis. Unfortunately Ambrose no more than other patristic authors has given a systematic elucidation of his exegetical doctrine. A reconstruction of this doctrine is, however, worth while: no less a person than Augustine was strongly impressed by Ambrose's explanation of Scripture: *gaudebam etiam, quod uetera scripta legis et prophetarum iam non illo oculo mihi legenda proponerentur, quo antea uidebantur absurda, cum arguebam tamquam ita sentientes sanctos tuos; uerum autem non ita sentiebant* (*Conf.* VI 6).

A complete outline of Ambrose's exegetical methods and ideas was lacking up till now. Prof. Pizzolato has taken up this challenge; carrying on the work which produced his small book about the exegetical methods in Ambrose's *Explanatio Psalmorum XII* (Milan 1965) he has now written a full study on the subject in the whole of the corpus Ambrosianum.

One of P.'s methodological starting-points is his refraining from any arrangement based on chronological points of view. Apart from the uncertainties about the chronology of Ambrose's works P. is convinced of a "sostanziale staticità concettuale" (9) in his way of

thinking. This seems reasonable enough, for although thanks mainly to Courcelle's studies we now know Ambrose was not just a practitioner with a merely superficial knowledge of theological and philosophical problems, no sweeping changes in his ideas have been shown. In any case there is no such change in the unshakable principle that God is the author of Scripture and that reading the Bible one actually meets Him : *et nunc deambulat in paradiso Deus, quando diuinas scripturas lego* (*Ep.* 33.3 Faller). Scripture is a *sermo operatorius*, for there is a "presenza continua del verbo all'interno delle parole" (273). Therefore the true exegete cannot be content with the technical methods of the grammaticus. Ambrose does not depreciate these tools, but in his eyes *diligentia* "non può esaurire la ricchezza del testo, se manca la *fides* nel verbo, che è autore di ogni conoscenza" (301). The Milanese bishop was not a philologist, but first of all a theologian, who studied the Bible with pastoral aims.

The most important chapter of P.'s book is the eighth, entitled "I sensi esegetici" (223–262). There are three exegetical levels, which must not be confused with literary genera or with the contents of a certain paragraph or book : "la presenza nel *medesimo* testo di *vari livelli* ermeneutici" (223) is the all-important axiom. These levels are : 1. *littera*, *simplicitas*, *historia*, 2. *moralis*, 3. *mystica*, *spiritalis*, *plenior*, the last-mentioned above all taking the form of a Christocentric treatment of the biblical text. P.'s whole book, but especially this eighth chapter will prove to be valuable for the composition of the *Lexicon Ambrosianum*, if ever Faller's 400.000 filing-cards will pass the stage of L. Kristan's *Wortindex zu den Schriften des heiligen Ambrosius* (Vienna 1979), useful in itself, but of course not more than a *Vorarbeit*, as the author states herself. Let me give one example of the lexicological implications of this study. P. distinguishes two different contents of the exegesis *secundum litteram*. The first has a negative colouring, it denotes the purely 'carnal' way of reading the Bible, over against the understanding *secundum spiritum*. The Jews are guilty of this, with the inevitable result : *habent illi libros, sed sensum librorum non habent* (*Exp. ps. CXVIII* 21.12). The second, however, denotes the legitimate first stage in the three-level-interpretation : *etiam secundum litteram pie intellegentibus expositio religiosa non deest* (*Exp.Ev.sec.Luc.* VII 136). Although I am not satisfied that Ambrose always made these distinctions so clearly as they are now presented in different chapters of P.'s study, this is of course a highly important point.

Succinctness is not one of the virtues of this book; in fact P. has a definite tendency to prolixity. But this is amply made good by other qualities: P. provides a rich bibliography, most of the texts on which the argument is based are printed in extenso at the foot of each page, which makes this well-printed book an extremely useful store-house of primary material, and there is a summary in English.

There is one chapter I really missed: an *explicit* comparison of Ambrose's principles and practice with those of both patristic predecessors, as Origen, and pagan authors as Macrobius. May I express the wish that Prof. Pizzolato will some time write such a study, for which he so clearly possesses the expertness?

Leiderdorp, van Effendreef 15 J. DEN BOEFT

Ch. Munier, *L'église dans l'Empire romain (IIe–IIIe siècles). Église et Cité* (Histoire du Droit et des Institutions de l'Église en Occident, publié sous la direction de G. Le Bras (†) et J. Gaudemet, tome II, volume III). Paris, Éditions Cujas, 1979.

This volume deals with the place of the Christian church in pagan society in the pre-Constantinian period 100–300 A.D. It consists of two parts: on pp. 3–169 M. discusses Christian family-life and esp. the Christian views about and practice of marriage, the attitude of the Christians towards slavery, work and property, charity, the pagan world of games and recreation and culture (paideia), and the relations between Jews and Christians. Pp. 169–285 are devoted to a study of the relations between the Church and pagan political authorities, both the positive (i.e. the question to what extent the Christians participated in public life, the army and the emperor-cult) and the negative (i.e. the persecutions).

In such a dense book the reviewer cannot do more than pick a few points which caught his attention. In his chapter on slavery (73–81) M. writes that Roman imperial society was an open society up to the 3rd century A.D. and that social mobility "tend ... à estomper les aspects les plus choquants de l'esclavage" (76). He supports this statement with a reference to P. R. C. Weaver's article on 'Social Mobility in the early Empire' in *Past and Present* 37 (1967) 3–20. This will not do. Occasional upward mobility of descendants of freedmen does not

alter the fact that the vast majority of slaves, esp. those working in the agricultural sector and in 'industrial' ateliers, hardly had any prospects at all. It was only some imperial slaves – an élite among slaves! – who managed to marry free women and thereby to rise in status. Imperial society was not a society of endogenous castes but to call it an *open society* – Popper reserved this term for 5th–4th century B.C. Athens and its democracy – is a lack of appreciation of its truly hierarchical nature, marked by a deep gap between the social 'trinity' of decurions – knights – senators and the plebs with all its (admittedly interesting!) internal hierarchy.

M. believes in "une amélioration notable de la condition servile" (75) during the Principate. Next to an economic factor – a rise in the price of slaves resulting into better treatment (but see M.I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, 1980, 129, who refutes the theory about rising prices) – M. resorts to the humanitarian trend in Stoic philosophy, strengthened by early Christian writings, and to the integration of the slave into the Christian congregations. The latter point may be valid (cf. E.R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, 1965, 136–138). As to the former, "the *humanitas* of Seneca and Pliny, like the occasional piece of imperial legislation ameliorating this or that brutality with respect to slaves, which no doubt helped individual slaves in their personal relations (in so far as the laws were enforceable and enforced), served to reinforce the institution itself, not to weaken it" (Finley, *op. cit.*, 121).

There is little solid evidence for attempts to ameliorate the actual life of the slaves, apart from the usual exhortations in authors. Constantine – and that is after M.'s period – may have ordered that slaves condemned to work in the mines should be branded on the hands or legs rather than on the face (*C.Th.* 9.40.2; not mentioned by M.; cf. Finley, *op. cit.*, 127), but this is hardly a significant increase in *humanitas*! The *Christian* archdeacon Felix, from Sardinia, "turned to inscribed bronze collars instead" (*ibidem*, 127). M. does not mention *C.Th.* 9.12.1,2 in which Constantine protects masters who had beaten wicked slaves to death.

In short, M. seems to have been influenced unduly by modern authors who tend to play down the harshness of ancient slavery and to overestimate the exhortations of individual authors, pagan and Christian alike. It is useful to realize that Christians forbade the manumission of slaves who were the property of the church or its

ministers: "Church property ... must be preserved" (Finley, *op. cit.*, 128).

Writing about "Le monde du travail" (83–95) M. emphasizes the positive attitude of the Christians towards the "travail personnellement accompli, ... activités agricoles ou pastorales, ... l'exercice des métiers" (92) but at the same time, though of course knowing about the contempt for manual labour in pagan circles, he maintains that the latter had not forgotten "la loi divine du travail". I doubt whether pagan authors ever conceptualized 'labour' in that way. Banausic labour has been despised consistently as such and as to agriculture one should not forget that, in spite of the enkomia on the farmer, the social elite was not enthousiastic about the actual work in the fields: "the work of the georgos is the work of a slave" (with P. A. Brunt's comments in *Proceedings Cambridge Philological Society* 1973, 11–12). Pagan philosophers like Dio of Prusa and Musonius Rufus went so far as to consider a number of banausic activities "the free man worthy". In this respect they anticipate Christian value-judgments. However, the essential point is that neither they nor the Christians managed to get their doctrine accepted by the pagan and Christian social elite: the estate-owner remained the social ideal for centuries to come. Just as in the case of slavery one gets the impression that M., perhaps misled by the lofty slogans of Christian ideology, does not seem to be fully aware of the misery of many manual workers in antiquity, witness his words: "Heureuse époque, où ce n'est pas le temps qui mesure la tâche, mais où, à chaque type de travail, correspond un juste délai" (88)!!

As to the problem of the participation of Christians in public life (179–184) one gets the impression that M. adopts von Harnack's view according to which in an early stage the Christians were recruited from all strata of ancient society (M., 180, 183). However, W. Eck, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 381–406; 9 (1979) 449–464, has successfully challenged this view, as far as the *ordo senatorius* and *ordo equester* are concerned (cf. for the senatorial class in the same sense P. A. Brunt, in: C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* I (1979) 505–506).

Needless to say that in many other matters this book will be a useful guide, the use of which will be facilitated by the excellent bibliographies, mentioned in the footnotes at the beginning of each section, and by helpful indexes.

2341 EH *Oegstgeest*, Willem de Zwijgerlaan 47 H. W. PLEKET

Eugen Rose, *Die manichäische Christologie* (Studies in Oriental Religions, 5). Wiesbaden, Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1979. XVI, 199 Seiten, brosch. DM 98,–.

In 1937 the Marburg Faculty of Theology accepted a dissertation by Eugen Rose, in which he tried to show that Manichaism was a Christian heresy, for which Christology was of central importance. In 1942 eight type-written copies were deposited at this faculty, so that the work was made public. Neither then nor later was it possible to have the book printed: sometimes it was disreputable to write about Christology, at other times it was even dangerous to opine that a Gnostic religion was Christian, though it admitted the trinity and the divinity of Jesus.

The Cologne Mani Codex made it clear that Manichaism originated as a reaction against a Jewish Christian milieu. From now on it cannot be denied any more that there were two great Christian churches in Asia for more than a thousand years: a. the Aramaic Church centered in Edessa and Seleucia-Ctesiphon, which was "nestorianised" only in 485 by Barsauma and b. the Manichaean Church which persisted in China until modern times. In these circumstances the Orientalist and expert on Manichaism in Bonn Hans Joachim Klimkeit encouraged and stimulated Rose, now retired after an active life as parson in Wuppertal, to update his old dissertation. The result is admirable.

First an introduction is offered, in which recent publications are discussed and a survey of the existing Syriac, Greek, Latin, Arabic, (Chinese), Turfan and Coptic sources is given.

Then the author shows that Mani considered himself in the first place as *the* apostle of Jesus Christ. His concept of Christ was thoroughly Gnostic. On the one hand He is "Jesus the Splendour", the bearer of revelation to Adam and ever since, who makes man conscious of his divine Self; on the other hand He is *Jesus patibilis*, Life suffering innocently in the world. This paradoxical polarity is found in sources both Eastern and Western and must go back to the founder of the church himself. The historical Jesus manifested himself in Palestine without really suffering, a parallel to Buddha, Zarathustra, ... and Mani, the seal of the prophets. He will come back as the eschatological judge, but also comes at the hour of death to lead the faithful to eternal life.

It is plausible that this complicated doctrine goes back to Mani

himself. It seems even possible to indicate the sources from which this Jewish young man took these views to develop them in his own way.

.Erik Peterson has shown long ago that the splendid youth who manifests himself to the faithful according to the *Acts of Paul* and in the *Acts of Thomas* contributed to the Manichaean view of "Jesus the Splendour" (*V.C.* 3, 1949, 142–162). On the other hand it is taught in the *Acts of John* (103) that Jesus suffers in all who suffer innocently. The *Acts of John* were known to Mani and must have inspired the impressive "mythologeme" of *Jesus patibilis.* The stress on the eschatological judgment, a *corpus alienum* in a Gnostic religion, may come from the milieu of Mani's youth, Jewish Christianity, which was millennarian, and certainly was confirmed by Tatian's *Diatessaron*, Mani's only Gospel text. And finally in Judaism, Jewish Christianity and Aramaic Christianity the guardian angel is the image and counterpart of man, who comes to fetch man in the hour of death (*Gnostic Studies* I, 140–157): this corresponds to the "*morphé* of Light, whom the elect and the catechumenes receive, when they renounce the world" (*Kephalaia* 36, 2–11) and who comes to meet them, when they are dying.

For this reason Rose's book deserves very serious attention from every scholar who wants to be informed correctly about the great Christian Church launched by Mani.

Bilthoven, N. Houdringelaan 32 G. QUISPEL

Patrologia Vol. III. Dal Concilio di Nicea (325) al Concilio di Calcedonia (451). I Padri Latini a cura di Angelo Di Bernardino con presentazione di Johannes Quasten. Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum – Roma. Torino, Marietti Editori Ltd., 1978. 602 S. Pr. 15.500 Lire.

Johannes Quasten hat bekanntlich drei Teile einer gross angelegten Patrologie vollendet, von denen der erste (Utrecht-Brussel 1950) führt von dem Anfang zu den griechischen Apologeten und den Anfängen der Ketzerei und der Ketzereibestreitung und der zweite (1953) die vornicänische Literatur zum Gegenstand hat, während der dritte (1960), der mit Theodoret von Cyprus schliesst, den Titel "The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature" hat.

In einem Vorwort erklärt Quasten, dass es ihm nicht länger möglich

ist diese gewaltige Arbeit fortzusetzen, und zwar zunächst weil die Literatur über das goldene Zeitalter des christlichen lateinischen Schrifttums in den letzten Dezennien so stark angewachsen ist, dass ein einziger Patristiker sie nicht mehr übersehen, geschweige denn beherrschen kann. Ausserdem ist die Arbeit durch eine lange Krankheit des Verfassers verzögert worden.

Die Aufgabe der Darstellung dieser *aurea aetas Christiana* ist nun übernommen worden von einer Arbeitsgruppe von Dozenten des Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum. Es ist erwünscht, die Titel der Kapitel sowie die Namen der jeweiligen Verfasser hier zu erwähnen:

I. Adalbert Hamman, "La svolta del IV. secolo. Quadro politico, geografico, sociale e dottrinale del secolo".
II. Manlio Simonetti, "Ilario di Poitiers e la crisi Ariana in Occidente. Polemisti ed eretici".
III. Grazia Mara Maria, "Ambrogio di Milano, Ambrosiaster e Niceta".
IV. Jean Gribomont, "Le traduzioni. Girolamo e Rufino".
V. Angelo di Bernardino, "La poesia cristiana".
VI. Agostino Trapé, „S. Agostino".
VII. Vittorino Grossi, „Avversari e amici di Agostino".
VIII. Adalbert Hamman, „Scrittori della Gallia".
IX. Basilio Studer, „Scrittori dell' Italia fino a papa Leone I Magno".

Die Kapitel sind alle mit der grössten Sorgfalt und auf Grund von hervorragenden Kenntnissen der einschlägigen Literatur bearbeitet worden. Jedes Kapitel hat einen ausgesprochen persönlichen Charakter, wie das auch im Vorwort nachdrücklich hervorgehoben wird. Besonders erfreulich ist indessen, dass die als äusserst hilfreich für die patristischen Studien erprobte Methode Quastens meistens gehandhabt bleibt, und zwar, dass von allen wichtigen Schriften ausführlichere Inhaltsanalysen geboten werden als man üblicherweise in Geschichten der antiken christlichen Literatur vorfindet; das gilt besonders für die Kapitel über Hilarius, Ambrosius, und die christliche Dichtung.

In dem Augustin gewidmeten Kapitel sind diese Analysen beträchtlich kürzer ausgefallen; dafür kommt hier der Gedankeninhalt dieses fortwährend sich entwickelnden Riesenwerks gut zum Ausdruck.

Wir können schliessen mit der Bemerkung, dass die Krise, die diese ausgezeichnete Patrologie bedrohte, in glücklicher Weise abgewendet und dass auch für die Fortsetzung der richtige Weg gefunden worden ist.

2215 NB *Voorhout*, Sportlaan 3, Flat 311. J. H. WASZINK

Theognosti *Thesaurus*, ed. Joseph A. Munitiz (Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca 5). Turnhout-Leuven, 1979. pp. CXXIII + 269.

The Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, begun in 1977, presents us with a fifth volume the hitherto unedited *Thesaurus*, unknown even in the reference books, of the hieromonachus Theognostus, the author of the Κεφάλαια νηπτικά. Composed in the first half of the thirteenth century in the Eastern Empire and incorporating extremely dissimilar chapters, the *Thesaurus* is intended to be a kind of catechism for adults, aiming at the edification of the laity. In practice, however, as can be deduced from the tradition, it came to be used as spiritual reading for monks. The work consists of a résumé of the Old Testament, followed by a short outline of the history of Christianity, a dogmatic section in which, for example, Christian belief is defended against Judaism and Islam, an extended exhortation, and an introduction to the devout life.

If it seems that this volume of the SG lies outside the scope of this journal, it should be noticed that Theognostus wove into his work all kinds of sources, without always naming them. In the hortatory chapters 15 and 16 the hieromonachus draws copiously on partly unpublished sermons of ps. Amphilochius, which can be dated to the eleventh century. In his comprehensive and lucid introduction Munitiz gives an outstanding analysis (pp. XLIV–LXXXVI) of the complicated transmission of these sermons and their connection with Theognostus' work. In the last chapters of his work Theognostus refers to his sources always by name, because he adopts them without revision. Only eleven of these sources could not be located by the editor. The authors most often cited by Theognostus are Anastasius the Sinaite, ps. Athanasius (Questiones ad Antiochum), John Chrysostom, John of Damascus and John Climacus. In addition he draws extensively on the Apophthegmata Patrum.

Presented in exemplary fashion by Munitiz, this volume, rooted in patristic literature as it is, clearly has its place in this series. We look forward to seeing a new volume appear each year.

1007 MC *Amsterdam*, Vrije Universiteit C. DATEMA

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CORPORA VITIORVM MATERIES

UNE FORMULE-CLÉ DU FRAGMENT SUR JOB D'HILAIRE DE POITIERS INSPIRÉ D'ORIGÈNE ET TRANSMIS PAR AUGUSTIN (*Contra Iulianum* 2,8,27)

PAR

J. DOIGNON

De l'adaptation que, selon Jérôme,[1] Hilaire aurait faite des *Homélies sur Job* d'Origène nous n'avons plus que deux témoignages irrécusables[2] procurés par Augustin. Le plus long, transmis par le *Contra Iulianum Pelagianum* dans la foulée d'un dossier de textes hilariens,[3] n'a encore fait l'objet d'aucune étude. Rappelons en le texte d'après l'édition du CSEL, t. 65 suivie intégralement, sauf sur un point où la concurrence des deux leçons que nous donnons en appendice ne nous paraît pas devoir aboutir au choix opéré par l'éditeur Feder :

Tanta enim et tam admirabilis, inquit, in nos misericordiae Dei bonitas est, ut, per quem in Adae offensa generositatem primae et beatae illius creationis amisimus, per eum rursum id quod amisimus obtinere mereamur; tunc enim diabolus inuidens nocuit, nunc autem cum nocere nititur uincitur. Mouet enim per infirmitatem carnis nostrae omnia potestatis suae tela, cum ad lasciuiam accendit, cum ad ebrietatem illicit, cum ad odia stimulat, cum ad auaritiam prouocat, cum ad caedes instruit, cum ad maledicta exacerbat; sed cum per firmitatem animi horum omnium subrepentia incentiua reprimuntur, emundamur a peccato per huius uictoriae gloriam; dictum enim ita est: »Aut quomodo se emundabit natus ex muliere?« (*Job* 25,4), quia non extante hoste non erit bellum, cessante deinde bello uictoria deerit, collidentium autem aduersus nos uitiorum uictoria non adepta, non erit emundatio ulla uitiorum, quia his insidiis corporis nostri pirata uicto (cf. *Job* 25,3 LXX) conluctantium aduersus nos passionum concertatione purgamur. Memores igitur, inquit, et conscii illa ipsa corpora nostra omnium uitiorum esse materiam, pro qua polluti et sordidi nihil in nobis mundum, nihil innocens obtinemus, gaudeamus nobis esse hostem, in cuius concertatione quodam concertationis nostrae bello dimicemus.

15 pro qua *A B G K M P p R S s T U V*[4] *Era. Lov.*[5] : per quam *F L N O Q*[4] *Ame. Mau. Fed.*[5]

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I. Schèmes dans la tradition africaine :

L'extrait précité porte indubitablement la marque d'Hilaire. Le raisonnement y recourt à des procédés tout à fait caractéristiques de certaines argumentations de l'*In Matthaeum* ou des *Tractatus super Psalmos*.

Un parallélisme avec antithèse dans la première phrase (*ut per quem in Adae offensa generositatem primae et beatae illius creationis amisimus, per eum rursum id quod amisimus obtinere mereamur*) est typique de la manière dont Hilaire présente l'histoire du salut dans le Christ comme pivotant autour de l'affrontement entre Satan et l'homme : si, dans l'Éden, le premier était venu à bout du second, lit-on dans l'*In Matthaeum*,[6] au désert, la chair de l'Homme-Dieu résiste victorieusement à la faim par laquelle le diable le tente. Ce renversement de situation s'appuie, dans le *Tractatus in Psalmum* 51, sur une paraphrase de *Gal.* 2,19,[7] où Hilaire souligne que »l'établissement de la loi de la mort ne supprime pas celle de la résurrection ..., et que la mort qui n'a trouvé sa force que dans la loi de celui qui l'institue (= Satan) ne peut trouver en elle assez de force pour se garder de subir le changement en loi de la vie en vertu de la loi qui institue le renouveau de la vie«.[8] C'est une *commutatio* antithétique de ce type que Tertullien avait déjà adaptée à l'*exemplum* de Job[9] et qui, dans notre fragment des *Tractatus* hilariens *in Job*, est le point de départ d'une *amplificatio*, où l'emprise mortelle du diable est évoquée par une accumulation de métaphores relatives aux passions agressives comme des »traits« (l. 4–7), accumulation – inspirée de Cyprien[10] – tout à fait semblable à l'énumération des pressions psychologiques des *inimicae infestaeque uirtutes* déroulée dans le *Tractatus* d'Hilaire sur le Psaume 118 : »... cum in peccatum impellunt (inimicae infestaeque uirtutes), cum in gloriam inflant, cum in iram accedunt, cum in odium exacerbant, cum ad lasciuiam illiciunt, cum ad auaritiam prouocant« (*In psalm.* 118,16,6).

Ensuite, par un paradoxe familier à l'exégèse hilarienne, développé dans l'*In Psalmum 118* surtout et illustré comme chez Cyprien par l'exemple de Job,[11] les passions sont justifiées pour la raison qu'elles fournissent l'occasion de remporter sur elles une victoire qui les expurge (l. 7–14); par là se trouve légitimée, dans la ligne du *De paenitentia* de Tertullien,[12] l'ascèse qui nous purifie des *uitia*, comme elle l'était déjà par ailleurs chez Hilaire : ainsi à la faveur de l'interprétation de

l'»humiliation« évoquée dans *Ps.* 118,67 comme une *emendatio uitiorum*[13] ou encore dans la page du *Tractatus in Psalmum* 118,11 célébrant la résistance aux entreprises de l'iniquité à l'égal d'une »victoire« qui »couronne« l'homme »trempé«.[14]

Enfin une conclusion oratoire exhortant au combat spirituel, comme en présentent plusieurs *Tractatus* d'Hilaire sur les Psaumes,[15] exalte la guerre livrée aux vices, dont le »potentiel« (*materies*) attaché à notre corps est tel qu'»en fonction de lui nous ne gardons en nous, étant souillés et salis, rien qui soit pur, rien qui soit innocent«. *Memores igitur et conscii illa ipsa corpora nostra omnium uitiorum esse materiem, pro qua polluti et sordidi nihil in nobis mundum, nihil innocens obtinemus.*

II. *Vitiorum materies* : l'influence d'Origène et ses limites :

La définition du corps comme *uitiorum materies*, c'est-à-dire comme offrant prise aux vices, l'enjeu qu'à ce titre il représente dans l'affrontement avec Satan portent la marque spécifique d'Hilaire, comme le laisse voir une comparaison de notre fragment d'homélie avec un passage du *Tractatus in Psalmum 62* relatif aux rapports de l'âme et du corps. La première, précise Hilaire, garde en elle l'empreinte de son origine divine, mais sur elle retombent les tares du second, que sa »constitution« voue à être un »potentiel de vices« (*terrena haec corpora quae ad uitiorum concreta materiam sint*).[16] En précisant que ce rôle n'entraîne qu'une »retombée« (*redundo*) des vices sur l'âme, l'exégète signifie que, s'il y a alignement de l'âme sur les tares de la chair, celles-ci jouent le rôle, non d'un agent, mais d'une catalyseur du péché plaçant l'âme dans des conditions favorables à une »communication« (*consortium*) des vices du corps.

De ce *consortium* le *De Trinitate* éclaire la portée en appliquant le terme à la transmission au corps des passions et des joies de l'âme.[17] Vocable juridique, comme chez Tertullien,[18] *consortium* vise chez Hilaire une *societas* mutuelle,[19] qui fait que, dans la relation du corps et de l'âme,[20] le premier n'est pas réduit à l'état de matière inerte,[21] mais que s'associant par voie de mélange à la seconde,[22] il devient pour elle une *materies pro qua*, selon la formule de notre texte restituée d'après la tradition manuscrite la meilleure,[23] et non une *materies per quam*. De cette leçon, conservée pourtant par tous les éditeurs, une phrase de l'*In Psalmum* 118,11,5 souligne en effet le manque de

convenance et éclaire par ricochet la portée de la »iunctura« *materies pro qua*: »Temptatur (propheta) enim undique, cum ei per naturam corporis uitiorum inest connata materies eamque diabolus conatur ardore genuinae cupiditatis accendere«. Il ressort de ce texte que la *materies uitiorum* ne se confond pas avec la *natura corporis*: elle est l'aptitude aux vices qui »naît avec et par le corps«[24] pris dans son »état naturel« et qui nous »expose à la loi du péché et de la mort«.[25]

Ainsi l'alliance du fragment sur Job *corpora uitiorum materies*, régime d'un *pro*, qui fait de la *materies* une condition, non une cause de péché,[26] ne tranche pas avec l'usage des *Tractatus* hilariens sur les Psaumes. Ne serait-ce pas parce que ceux-ci, comme les *Homélies sur Job*, dépendent d'un modèle commun, Origène?

Sans doute *materies*, pour désigner un »potentiel« de biens comme de maux est-il bien attesté dans la latinité philosophique, par exemple chez Sénèque[27] ou Lactance,[28] avant de le devenir chez des Pères latins tels qu'Hilaire[29] ou Augustin.[30] Mais d'autre part *materies* accouplé à *peccati*, comme il l'est à *uitiorum* dans notre texte d'Hilaire, forme une locution donnée comme origénienne dans la traduction procurée par Rufin du Commentaire de l'Alexandrin sur le *Cantique des Cantiques*.[31] De même la caractérisation par *pro qua* de la *materies uitiorum* chez Hilaire pourrait bien avoir trouvé une caution dans une tournure similaire d'un passage de tonalité ascétique également de l'*Homélie 8* d'Origène sur le *Lévitique*, où est commentée la plainte de Jérémie (*Jer.* 20,14): »Jour de malheur où je suis né!« en liaison avec celle de Job (*Job* 3,1): »Périsse le jour qui me vit naître!« Ces imprécations, explique en substance Origène, viennent de ce que le prophète »savait qu'il y avait dans la naissance corporelle d'ici-bas quelque chose qui parût mériter ces malédictions et en fonction de quoi (*pro quo*) le législateur dénonçait tant d'impuretés qu'en conséquence il imposait des purifications adéquates«.[32]

Ainsi, au cœur de la désespérance qui monte par endroits de l'Ancien Testament, Origène perçoit la conscience d'un péché de naissance qui »se paie« (*pro quo...*) et, illustrant par la souffrance de Job celles que Paul assigne au temps présent (*Rom.* 8,18–22),[33] il montre que le »gémissement« dont parle l'Apôtre – la plainte de Job – témoigne du sentiment qu'il est soumis à la »matière corruptible de son être« (*materialis et corruptibilis substantia*)[34] et que recevant par sa naissance une »matière charnelle« (*materia corporis*) son »âme est salie par la souillure du péché«.[35]

Origène assurément ne néglige pas d'éclairer, à côté des profondeurs où s'enracine la souffrance, l'autre aspect de la figure de Job, celui de l'héroïsme valeureux purifié par la douleur : plusieurs fragments de Chaînes sur Job attribués à Origène en portent témoignage, fragments sur Job héroïque,[36] dont Hilaire, dans le passage d'homélie qui nous occupe, est partiellement tributaire.[37]

Nous n'en dirons pas autant de la conception philonienne d'origine de l'*hylè*,[38] dont Origène, nous venons de le voir, trouve une illustration dans la désolation de Job et en vertu de laquelle le corps soumet l'âme à la corruption inscrite en lui par la naissance.[39] En effet, même si Hilaire donne à Origène, inspirateur de ses *Homélies sur Job*, un gage de fidélité en associant à son instar *materies* à *uitiorum*, il s'abstient d'envisager, sur les traces de l'Alexandrin, une autre acception pour le premier des deux termes que celle de »potentiel« ou de »capacité«, ainsi que le montre sa corrélation avec la préposition *pro*, laquelle n'indique qu'une proportionnalité[40] entre le conditionnement du péché (*uitiorum materies*) et l'incapacité où, selon une formule déjà ébauchée dans l'*In Matthaeum*,[41] ce qui en nous est souillé se trouve de s'attacher à ce qui est pur. Hilaire a donc rompu avec la tradition origénienne prêtant à ὕλη/*materia* le sens défavorable de »substance charnelle«.[42]

III. L'insertion du »témoignage« d'Hilaire sur Job dans le dossier antipélagien d'Augustin :

S'il découle de ce qui précède qu'Hilaire ne situe pas dans le corps et sa »matière«, qualifiée de »milieu« (*incolatus*), comme il le dit à propos de Job notamment,[43] la source des péchés, laquelle doit être cherchée dans les sollicitations du diable visant notre chair »faible de nature«,[44] force est de constater qu'Augustin présentant dans un chapeau introductif le fragment d'homélie sur Job, qu'il attribue – à bon droit, nous l'avons vu – à Hilaire, n'a pas su donner un écho fidèle de la pensée de ce dernier sur le mal. N'impute-t-il pas à l'autorité du Pictave l'affirmation que le »mal est en nous«,[45] l'action du diable étant la cause occasionnelle de notre purification? : »In quadam uero homilia de libro sancti Iob, écrit en effet Augustin dans le *Contra Iulianum Pelagianum* 2,8,27, adtende quid dicat (Hilarius), quemadmodum ipsius diaboli aduersus nos indesinens bellum ex hoc fieri adserat, cum *ea mala quae in nobis sunt* excitat contra nos, quod in

nostram fieri utilitatem uult docere, conuertente scilicet diuina misericordia malitiam diaboli ad purgationem nostram«.

La raison de ce durcissement des contours de la problématique hilarienne du mal revue et corrigée par Augustin doit être cherchée, croyons-nous, dans la nécessité où se trouvait l'adversaire de Julien d'Éclane de combattre l'exégèse pélagienne de la condition de Job. Pélage et Julien voyaient dans les versets 14,4 et 15,14 du Livre de Job le témoignage d'une grandeur triomphant de la »fragilité« de notre nature.[46] Jérôme quant à lui commentait ces mêmes versets en rendant à la déploration de Job toute sa valeur[47] et Augustin faisait d'elle l'expression de la conscience du péché qui, selon Paul (*Rom.* 7,19–23), »habite« et »agit« »dans nos membres«.[48]

Alors que déjà dans ses *Adnotationes in Iob* il donnait ce sens à l'expérience jobienne de la souffrance,[49] Augustin affronté à Julien d'Éclane n'était-t-il pas confirmé dans son point de vue en lisant qu'Hilaire, dans le fragment d'homélie sur Job recueilli pour le *Contra Iulianum*, traitait nos *corpora* de *uitiorum materies*? Ce faisant, l'évêque d'Hippone prêtait à Hilaire un blocage des concepts de chair et de vice reflétant la problématique d'Origène, dont Jérôme et Augustin pouvaient s'inspirer pour alimenter leur exégèse antipélagienne de Job,[50] mais vis à vis de laquelle, nous l'avons dit, Hilaire avait pris ses distances.

Le pivot en effet de l'analyse hilarienne de la »patience« de Job, développée dans des textes de l'*In Psalmum* 119 qui éclairent notre extrait d'homélie, se trouve dans l'expiation par la souffrance des péchés qui ont le corps pour cible,[51] puisque là réside leur *materies*, selon la formule-clé de la page d'homélie, mais qui sont nourris par l'»environnement« (*incolatus*) des »maux du monde« et des »faiblesses« de notre condition.[52]

IV. Conclusion :

L'éloge de Job, dans l'extrait d'homélie rapporté par Augustin, a certainement été inspiré à Hilaire par la lecture de pages d'Origène sur Job. La preuve en est fournie par un emprunt, dans l'ordre de la terminologie, qui est fort révélateur : l'alliance du groupe de mots *corpora ... uitiorum materies* et de la préposition *pro*, alliance qui a une saveur origénienne, du moins dans la traduction de Rufin. Mais ce noyau emprunté à Origène a été ensuite incorporé à une thématique

tout à fait conforme aux habitudes de pensée et de style d'Hilaire et à une anthropologie où le corps se présente seulement comme un »potentiel« de vices tout à fait éloignée de celle d'Origène.

De cette originalité d'Hilaire Augustin ne s'est guère aperçu, qui a tenté d'intégrer la page qu'il cite de l'évêque de Poitiers sur Job à une vision antipélagienne de la conscience du péché qui s'était alimentée chez Jérôme de textes d'Origène. Est-ce par ce biais qu'Hilaire vu par Augustin est devenu plus origénien qu'il n'est?

NOTES

[1] Cf. Hier. *uir. ill.* 100: »Est eius (Hilarii) ... et Tractatus in Iob quos de graeco Origenis ad sensum transtulit«.

[2] L'un commençant par les mots: »Quas Iob litteras legerat ...« cité dans Aug. *nat. et grat.* 62(72) et étudié par G. Folliet, Le fragment d'Hilaire »Quas Iob litteras«. Son interprétation d'après Hilaire, Pélage et Augustin, dans *Hilaire et son temps* (Paris 1969) 149–158. L'autre fragment est celui que nous analysons ici. Un troisième fragment consigné dans les Actes de 4e concile de Tolède en 633 est rapporté par A. Feder, dans CSEL 65, p. 231 aux *Tractatus in Iob.*

[3] Extraits surtout des *Tractatus super psalmos* (1,51,118) et amassés surtout dans *Contra Iulianum* 2,8,26–29. Nous leur avons consacré une étude de caractère critique: »Testimonia« d'Hilaire de Poitiers dans le *Contra Iulianum* d'Augustin: les textes, leur groupement, leur »lecture«, dans *R Ben* 91(1981).

[4] Sigles des manuscrits suivants tous antérieurs à 1200: A = Paris, Bibl. de l'Arsenal 477, s.XII; *B* = Bourges, Bibl.mun. 83, s.XI; *F* = Orléans, Bibl.mun. 162, s.IX; *G* = Grenoble, Bibl.mun. 99, s.XII; *K* = Kobenhavn, Gl.Kgl.Saml. 32, s.XII; *L* = London, British Library Add. 23944, s.; *M* = Avranches, Bibl.mun. 91, s.XII; *N* = Oxford, Bodleian Library Bodley 134, s.XII; *O* = Oxford, Bodleian Library 145, s.XI; *P* = Paris, Bibl.nat.lat. 2101, s.XII; *p* = Paris, Bibl.nat.lat. 2102, s.XII; *Q* = Oxford, Bodleian Library Add. C 181, s.XII; *R* = Rouen, Bibl.mun. 115, s.XII; *S* = Salisbury, Bibl.capit. 65, s.XII; *s* = Salisbury, Bibl.capit. 138, s.XII; *T* = Troyes, Bibl.mun. 528, s.XII; *U* = Manchester Univ.Libr. 5089, s.XII; *V* = Vatican, Vat.lat. 503, s.XII.

[5] Sigles des principales éditions: *Ame.* = éd. d'Amerbach, 8, Basileae 1506; *Era.* = éd. d'Erasme 7, Basileae 1531; *Lov.* = éd. des Theologi Lovanienses, 7, Basileae 1576; Mau = éd. des Mauristes, 10, Parisiis 1690; *Fed.* = éd. d'A. Feder, CSEL 65, Vindobonae 1916.

[6] Cf. *In Matth.* 3,1: »Adam enim pellexerat et in mortem fallendo traduxerat. Sed ita dignum nequitia eius et scelere erat, ut in eo cuius morte et calamitatibus gloriabatur homine uinceretur«. Nous avons étudié la place de ce parallélisme antithétique dans l'exégèse de la Tentation: cf. J. Doignon, L'»argumentatio« d'Hilaire de Poitiers dans l'»exemplum« de la Tentation de Jésus (*In Matthaeum* 3,1-5), dans *VChr* 29(1975)299–300.

[7] Verset cité partiellement par Hilaire, *In psalmum* 138,42: »Ego enim per legem *mortuus sum legi, ut uiuam Christo*«. En italique, le lemme hilarien.

[8] Hil. *in psalm.* 51,18: »Sed lex constituta moriendi legem non adimit resurgendi...

neque mors quae non nisi per legem decernentis inualuit potest per se in id inualescere, ne per decernentem renouandae uitae legem demutabilis sit lege uiuendi«.

[9] Cf. Tert. *patient.* 14,6 : »Itaque operarius ille (Iob) uictoriae Dei, retusis omnibus iaculis, temptationum lorica clipeoque patientiae et integritatem mox corporis a Deo recuperauit et quae amiserat conduplicata possedit«. On notera l'antithèse »amiserat... possedit« qui annonce celle d'Hilaire, *fragm. in Iob* : »amisimus... obtinere«.

[10] Cf. Cypr. *mort.* 4 : »Ceterum quid aliud in mundo quam pugna aduersus diabolum cotidie geritur, quam aduersus iacula eius et tela conflictationibus adsiduis dimicatur, cum auaritia nobis, cum impudicitia, cum ira, cum ambitione congressio est, cum carnalibus uitiis, cum inlecebris saecularibus adsidua et molesta luctatio est? Obsessa mens hominis et undique diaboli infestatione uallata uix occurrit singulis, uix resistit; si auaritia prostrata est, exsurgit libido; si libido compressa est, succedit ambitio; si ambitio contempta est, ira exasperat, inflat superbia, uinolentia inuitat, inuidia concordiam rumpit, amicitiam zelus abscidit«. Plusieurs traits de la rhétorique de Cyprien sont passés chez Hilaire : les images guerrières (*tela*, *dimico*), les isokola avec homéotéleutes.

[11] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 118,14,7 : »Numquid iniuste Deus in Iob filios dedit diabolo potestatem? Damna nostra tamquam inique accidentia dolemus. Numquid egere solum illum perfectum uirum Deus sine iustitiae ratione permisit? Cruciamur doloribus et contra Deum impatientiae nostrae querelis increpamus. Anne incerto concilio exesus uermibus, sanie defluens, perfossus ulcere fuit? Certe haec omnia ad documentum fidei et ad praemium gloriosae patientiae profecerunt. Infirmitas nostra effecit, ut malum esse id quod patimur existimemus, ceterum Dei semper uoluntas est ut patientia passionum probemur«. Rapprocher l'argumentation de Cyprien, *mort.* 12, à partir de l'exemple d'un malheur qui ne peut être que celui de Job : »Sit licet rei familiaris amissio, sit de infestantibus morbis adsidua membrorum et cruenta uexatio, sit de uxore, de liberis, de excedentibus caris funebris et tristis auulsio, non sint tibi offendicula ista sed proelia nec debilitent aut frangant christiani fidem, sed potius ostendant in conluctatione uirtutem, cum contemnenda sit omnis iniuria malorum praesentium fiducia futurorum bonorum; nisi praecesserit pugna, non potest esse uictoria«.

[12] Cf. Tert. *paen.* 9,6 : »Cum igitur prouoluit (exomologesis) hominem, magis releuat; cum squalidum facit, magis mundatum reddit«.

[13] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 118,9,4 : »Ait enim : *Priusquam humiliarer, ego deliqui; propterea eloquium tuum ego custodiui* (*Ps.* 118,67). Non prius tribulatio passionum ingruit quam delicta praecedant... Docet itaque propheta humiliationem suam emendationem esse delicti«. »Purification« par l'assaut des tribulations dans *in psalm.* 118,10,11.

[14] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 118,11,8 : »Graues enim meminit (propheta) has esse persecutorum molestias, sed quia iusto utiles sint, non putat amouendas... Bellis autem exercitatum uirum non cito doli capient et glorioso certamine opus est, ut corona uictoriae deferatur«.

[15] Invitation à la joie en conclusion d'un *tractatus* dans *in psalm.* 58,12; 60,7; 63,11; exhortation au combat spirituel dans *in psalm.* 59,14 en guise d'épilogue.

[16] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 62,3 : »Et quidem uniuscuiusque mens ad cognitionem spemque aeternitatis naturali quodam fertur instinctu, quia ueluti insitum impressumque omnibus sit, diuinam inesse nobis animarum originem opinari, cum non exiguam caelestis in se generis cognationem mens ipsa cognoscat. Porro autem terrena haec corpora quae ad

uitiorum concreta materiam sint, dum his quibus quasi naturaliter delectantur, infecta sunt, desperant se consequi posse consortium munusque caeleste, quasi non et animae naturam uitia corporis quibus oblectatur inficiant aut, cum delectatio corporis redundet ad mentem, non et mentem secum corpus retrahat ad oblectationis adfectum«.

[17] Cf. Hil. *trin.* 10,44: »Nam cum per transfusae in corpus animae consortium sensus animati corporis uiuat et ipsum ad illatorum dolorem corpus anima corpori permixta uiuificet..., sui quoque sensus ac spiritus corpus efficitur in dolore«. Ce *consortium* implique également l'idée de mélange dans la représentation qu'Hilaire en donne dans *in psalm.* 118,4,2: cf. *infra* n. 22.

[18] Cf. Tert. *nat.* 2,4,6: »Docete etiam qualitatis inter illos (deos) esse *consortium*, ut *iure* consistat collegium nominis communione substantiae«.

[19] Rapport d'idées très classique: cf. Aulu-Gelle 1,9,12 à propos des confréries pythagoriciennes: »Et coibatur *societas* inseparabilis tamquam illud fuit antiquum *consortium*, quod *iure* atque uerbo romano appellabatur ercto non cito«.

[20] Appelée *societas* dans Hil. *in psalm.* 118,4,1.

[21] Cf. Hil. *trin.* 10,14: »Ea enim natura corporum est, ut ex consortio animae in sensum quendam animae sentientis animata non sit hebes inanimisque materies«.

[22] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 118,4,2: »Sed quia meminit ex *consortio* eius (corporis) nonnullam se labem contraxisse peccati, orat ut per uerbum Dei, quamuis *admixta* terrenae mortalique naturae anima eius sit, ipse tamen in uitam uitae caelestis animetur«. Cette *admixtio* constitue ce que Tertullien, *anim.* 12,6 appelle l'»agrégation« (*concretio*) d'un *officium*, non d'une *substantia*. L'idée est stoïcienne: cf. Cic. *nat.deor.* 2,26: »aquae... admixtum calorem« ainsi que la terminologie: cf. *ibid.* 2,117: »ardorem... nulla admixtione concretum«.

[23] Le »consensus« du groupe de mss *A T V* (cf. *supra* n. 4), témoin de leçons »difficiles« (cf. J. Doignon, Un adage de *De finibus* de Cicéron passé inaperçu dans le *Contra Iulianum* d'Augustin, dans *WS* N.F. 14, 1980, p. 152–157) en faveur de *pro qua* semble un gage de crédibilité. Au contraire, avec le groupe *F L N O Q*, support de la leçon *per quam*, nous avons affaire à une tradition particulière rarement fiable du moins dans la transmission des textes du *Contra Iulianum* relatifs à Hilaire: cf. l'apparat critique des extraits de *C.Iul.* 1,7,32 et 2,8,26 publié dans notre article: »*Testimonia*« d'Hilaire de Poitiers dans le *Contra Iulianum* d'Augustin: les textes, leur »lecture« dans *R Ben* 91(1981).

[24] *Connascor* se dit, dans *trin.* 7,14, à propos de la conception de l'homme ou de l'animal, des *proprietates* (»virtualités propres«) qui sont facteurs de nouveauté, non la nouveauté même inhérente à la *natura natiuitatis*: »Intelligentiae istud humanae sensus excludit, ut aliquid a natura originis suae nascendo diuersum sit, nisi forte quod ex naturarum diuersitate conceptum nouum aliquid in se – et ita sit generis utriusque quod neutrum sit – ueniat in uitam, quod in pecoribus ac bestiis usitatum est. Sed ea ipsa nouitas non inest nisi ex *connatis proprietatibus* sub diuersitate naturae et diuersitatem eorum natiuitas non intulit, sed accepit«.

[25] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 118,3,3: »Habemus autem etiam nunc admixtam nobis materiam quae mortis legi et peccati obnoxia est«.

[26] Cette spécificité de *materies peccati* ou *uitiorum* ressort nettement de la distinction que fait Bachiarius, *De reparatione lapsi* 13, à propos du péché d'Amnon (*II Rois* 13,15) entre son *crimen* – la flamme coupable pour sa sœur – et la *materia peccati*, sa sœur,

qu'il se mit à haïr : »Imitare illum Amnon Dauidis filium, qui cum in sororis suae stuprum illicita flamma caluisset, postmodum eam magis exosus est quam antea amauerat, et pro hoc facto occisus est a fratre, quia, agnita culpa erroris, non mansit in *crimine*, sed *materiam* ipsius *peccati* uehementer exosus est«.

[27] Cf. Sen. *epist.* 98,2 : »materiam dat (fortuna) bonorum ac malorum« ; *dial.* 7,21,4 : »maiorem uirtuti suae materiam subministrari uult« ; cf. aussi *dial.* 2,9,2 ; *ben.* 4,19,4.

[28] Cf. Lact. *inst.* 3,27,4 : »Immo uero inlatus corpori dolor materia uirtutis est« ; 4,24,4 : »Et si maxime possit, summam tamen uirtutem capere nequeat et omnibus uitiis resistere, quorum materia in uisceribus continetur«.

[29] Dans l'*In Matthaeum*, *materia*(*-es*) = »potentiel, capacité« est appliquée à des biens matériels : cf. 19,9 : »impertiendi et communicandi materia« ; 27,7 : »indefessi luminis copiosa materies«.

[30] Cf. Aug. *in Iob* 1,3 : »in dolorum materia, hoc est in peccatis«.

[31] Orig.-Rufin. *in cant.* 2 (GCS 33, p. 129) : »... haec quae infuscata est, quia despexerit eam sol, quod utique ostenditur ibi accidere, ubi peccatorum causa praecedit et ibi infuscari uel aduri sole, ubi *peccati materia* subsistit«.

[32] Orig.-Rufin. *in lev.* 8,3 : »Videturne tibi haec grauia et tam onerosa imprecari propheta (*Jér.* 20,14–15) potuisse, nisi sciret esse aliquid in ista natiuitate corporea, quod et huius modi dignum maledictionibus uideretur et *pro quo* legislator tot immunditias accusaret, quibus congruas purificationes consequenter imponeret... Sed et Iob non sine spiritu sancto loquens maledicebat diem natiuitatis suae dicens : Maledicta dies in qua natus sum et nox in qua dixerunt : Ecce masculus ; nox illa sit tenebrae et non requirat eam Dominus denuo neque ueniat in dies anni nec numeretur inter dies mensium (*Iob* 3,1-6)«.

[33] Cf. Orig.-Rufin. *in Rom.* 7,4 : »Etiamsi quis illa sustineat quae de Iob scripta esse memorantur... intelligere potest quomodo Paulus altius ista considerans dicit : Existimo enim quoniam non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae reuelabitur in nobis (*Rom.* 8,18)«.

[34] Cf. *ibid.* : »Nunc repetentes discutiamus intentius quae est ista uanitas cui creatura dicitur esse subiecta et quae est ista corruptio de cuius seruitute liberandum se sperat (cf. *Rom.* 8,20-21). Mihi uidetur quod de hac materiali et corruptibili substantia ista dicantur. Neque enim corruptio alii cuiquam nisi corpori dominatur«.

[35] Cf. Orig.-Rufin. *in lev.* 12,4 : »Omnis qui ingreditur hunc mundum in quadam contaminatione effici dicitur. Propter quod et Scriptura dicit : Nemo mundus a sorde nec si unius diei fuerit uita eius (*Iob* 14,4-5). Hoc ipso ergo quod in uulua matris est positus et quod *materiam corporis* ab origine paterni seminis sumit, in patre et matre contaminatus dici potest« ; *in lev.* 8,3 : »Audi Dauid dicentem : In iniquitatibus, inquit, conceptus sum et in peccatis peperit me mater mea (*Ps.* 50,7), ostendens quod quaecumque anima in carne nascitur iniquitatis et peccati sorde polluitur et propterea dictum esse illud quod iam superius memorauimus, quia nemo mundus a sorde nec si unius diei sit uita eius (*Iob* 14,4–5)«.

[36] Cf. *Origenes in beatum Iob.* 40,5 dans *Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmiensi...*, (ed. J.-B. Pitra 2 : *Patres antenicaeni*), Typis Tusculanis, 1884, p. 386 : Ἀνάλαβε δὴ ὕψος καὶ δύναμιν, δόξαν δὲ καὶ τιμὴν ἀμφιάσαι· στεφάνωσαι, ἔνδυσαι δόξαν, ἔνδυσαι τιμήν, ἔνδυσον εὐπρέπειαν. Ὁ ὑβριστὴς ἐστρατεύσατο κατὰ σοῦ· σὺ δὲ τὸν ὑπερήφανον ἐταπείνωσας καὶ μακρὰν μετ᾽ αἰσχύνης ἀπέστρεψας τὰς αὐτοῦ φάλαγγας;

Catena Graecorum Patrum in beatum Iob collectore Niceta..., opere et studio Patricii Iunii, Londinii 1637,386 : Ὑγιὲς ἐνθάδε δόγμα ὁ Ἐλιφαζ λέγει· οἴεται γὰρ τὸν Ἰωβ διὰ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα πάσχειν καὶ ὅτι ὑπομείνας καθαίρεται δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ καθαιρόμενος ὥσπερ χρυσὸς ἐν χρυσωτηρίῳ δόκιμος ἀποδείκνυται πᾶν τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποθέμενος καὶ πάσης κακίας ἀμιγὴς γεγονώς.

[37] Comme le montre le déploiement d'images militaires où le diable a les traits d'un ennemi, d'un pirate d'après *Job* 25,3 (LXX), Job celui d'un vainqueur : cf. texte *supra* p. 19, l. 4–14.

[38] Cf. Philon, *De fuga et inuentione* 35 : Τῶν γαστρὸς καὶ μετὰ γαστέρα ἡδονῶν ἐπιμορφάζοντες ἀλογεῖν, ἡνίκα τὰς εἰς ταῦτα ἀφθόνους ὕλας εἴχετε, ἐμετριάσατε. Sur la parenté de la métaphysique de la perdition dans la matière chez Philon et Origène cf. J. Laporte, La chute chez Philon et Origène, dans *Kyriakon* (*Festschrift J. Quasten*)1, Münster 1970, 320–335.

[39] Cf. dans le texte cité *supra* n. 34 : »Neque enim corruptio alii cuiquam nisi corpori dominatur«.

[40] Comme il ressort d'occurrences de *pro materia* dans la littérature classique : Ov. *met.* 3,333–334 : »... grauius Saturnia iusto/Nec pro materia fertur doluisse...«; Mela 2,60 : »Roma quondam a pastoribus condita sunt, si pro materia dicatur alterum opus«.

[41] Cf. Hil. *in Matth.* 4,7 : »Nihil enim pollutum et sordidum ad occursum diuinae claritatis insistit«.

[42] Telle est la valeur des locutions *materia corporis* dans Orig.-Rufin. *in lev.* 12,4 (cf. *supra* n. 35) et ὕλη καὶ σῶμα dans Orig. *in Ioann.* 1,17,97 appliquée au démon en guise de commentaire, notons le, à *Job* 40,19. Locutions parallèles chez Hilaire *in Matth.* 4,14 : »materiem corporis«; 10,19 : »terrenam materiem«; *in psalm.* 65,20 : »terrae materie«, sous l'influence de l'usage de Tertullien plutôt que de celui d'Origène : cf. Tert. *bapt.* 3,5 : »adsumpta est de terra materia«; *resurr.* 4,2 : »in materiam... eius (carnis)«.

[43] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 119,19 : »Iob sanctus et testimonio Dei dignus non solum corporis istius incolatum congemescit, sed...«; *in psalm.* 118,4,1 : »anima... ut tamquam peregrina incolatu eius (corporis) utatur«.

[44] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 118,1,8 : »Quin etiam ipsum illum diabolum, per quem ipsa illa uitiorum nostrorum incentiua praebentur...«; 118,16,6 : »Adsunt enim inimicae infestaeque uirtutes quae fidei propositum conturbent, quae timorem Dei obliterent, quae in terrenas cupiditates et desideria sollicitent, quae infirmam corporis naturam quibusdam blandimentorum aculeis in uitia commoueant«; 118,16,7 : »calumniantur (spiritalium nequitiarum ministri) enim, quia, cum ipsi peccati incentiua subpeditent, calumniam nobis ante Deum peccati quod per eos gesserimus intendunt«. Le rôle du diable et la mise en œuvre de ses *incentiua* sont présentés de la même manière dans le fragment d'homélie sur Job.

[45] Augustin énonce cette thèse sous des formes diverses dans ses ouvrages contre Julien : cf. *c.Iul.* 2,9,32 : »Hoc faciamus multa in nobis peccatum nobis reluctantibus operari« (commentaire de *Rom.* 7,18); *c.Iul.op.imperf.* 4,116 : »Itane es incipiens ut putes in natura non esse peccatum, cum omnino peccatum nisi in natura esse non possit?«. Exposé diachronique de cette thèse dans A. Sage, Le péché originel dans la pensée de saint Augustin de 412 à 430, dans *REAug* 15, 1969, 75–112, particulièrement 92–93.

[46] Cf. Pelag. *Demetr.* 6 : »Quid de beato Iob dicam, famosissimo illo athleta Dei, qui post direptas opes et funditus deleta patrimonia, post filiorum ac filiarum unum subito interitum ad ultimum proprio contra diabolum corpore dimicauit? Auferebantur omnia quae extrinsecus possidebat et extranea bona repente decidebant, ut magis propria clarescerent. Omnibus prorsus uelut indumentis exuitur, ut expeditius ac fortius nudus triumphet et hostem quem ferendo damna ante superauerat rursus tolerando supplicia deuincat«; Iulian. Ecl. *in Iob* 14,4 : »*Quis potest facere mundum*? Purgatio est sancti Iob accusatio naturae. Nam si illa pro insita sibi fragilitatis condicione conferri auctori suo non potest, quomodo culpae id quod est sanctus uir Deo inferior poterit applicari?«; *ibid.* 15,14 : »*Quid est homo ut immaculatus sit*? Bene sanctum Iob de hominis natura sensisse Eliphaz reprehensione conuincitur, qui accusando naturam hominis non culparet sanctum Iob, si eadem et non diuersa dixisset. Vult Eliphaz ob hoc quod passibilis est natura hominum, sit etiam ad peccandum procliuis ac prona«.

[47] Jérôme, dans son *Dialogue contre les Pélagiens* 2,4, proteste contre la représentation donnée par Pélage d'un Job victorieux qui n'aurait pas besoin de Dieu et contre les chicanes de Pélage voulant minimiser la portée du verset *Job* 15,14 : »Ridiculamque illam expositionem Demosthenis uestri non dixisse Iob : *Quis erit mundus a peccato*, sed *quis erit mundus a sorde*? praetereo, qua probare conatur sordes pannorum significari in infantia, non uitia peccatorum«.

[48] Cf. Aug. *pecc.mer.* 2,12,17 : »Quantus quidem Iob fuerit ignoramus, sed nouimus iustum, nouimus etiam in perferendis horrendis tribulationum tentationibus magnum, nouimus non propter peccata, sed propter eius demonstrandam iustitiam illa omnia fuisse perpessum. Verumtamen haec uerba quibus a Domino laudatur possent etiam de illo dici qui condelectatur legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem, uidet autem aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae, praesertim quia dicit : *Non quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum hoc ago. Si autem quod odi malum hoc facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum* (*Rom.* 7,19–20)«.

[49] Cf. Aug. *in Iob* 1,3 : »*Vt quid enim datur eis qui in amaritudine sunt lux*? (*Job* 3,5) Peccatorum honor. *Et uita animabus quae sunt in doloribus*? In dolorum materia, hoc est in peccatis«.

[50] Origène, sans concevoir la notion d'un péché d'origine (cf. H. Karpp, *Probleme der altchristlichen Anthropologie = Beiträge z. Förderung der christl. Theologie* 44, Gütersloh 1950, p. 197–198; G. Teichtweier, *Die Sündenlehre des Origenes = Beiträge z.Gesch.d.kath. Moraltheologie* 7, Regensburg 1958, p. 98–99), reconnaissait, à la lumière du dossier testimonial constitué par *Job* 14,4–5 et *Ps.* 50,7, l'existence d'une contamination de l'homme à sa naissance (cf. *supra* n. 35) qui n'avait exclu que le Christ (*in leu.* 12,4). Ces données serviront à Jérôme à soutenir contre les Pélagiens la thèse du péché originel (cf. *adu.Pelag.* 3,18). Le dossier testimonial exploité par Origène se retrouve d'autre part chèz Augustin dans des écrits antipélagiens : cf. *pecc.mer.* 1,24,34; *c.Pelag.* 4,4.

[51] Cf. Hil. *in psalm.* 119,13 : »Sed et beatus Iob hostem suum quo confixus fuerat ignorans cruciatus corporis sui et dolores sagittas Domini esse dixit dicens : *Sagittae enim Domini in corpore meo sunt, quarum indignatio ebibit sanguinem meum* (*Iob* 6,4). Et forte has quoque ultricium poenarum sagittas aduersus labia iniqua et linguam dolosam imprecetur propheta (cf. *Ps.* 119,3), quibus confixa cum lingua dolosa uniuersa labia perurantur«.

[52] Cf. *ibid.* 119,19: »Iob sanctus et testimonio Dei dignus non solum corporis istius incolatum congemescit, sed ipsam illam natiuitatis suae diem maledicit dicens: *Pereat dies in qua natus sum et nox in qua dixerunt: ecce masculus* (*Job* 3,3); et Hieremias similiter: *Maledicta dies in qua genitus sum; maledictus nuntians patri meo et dicens quia natus est tibi masculus* (*Jér.* 20,14–15). Atquin idem a Domino audierat: *Priusquam te formarem in utero, noui te, et priusquam exires de uulua, sanctificaui te* (*Jér.* 1,5). Quid ergo? Maledicit coepisse se qui antequam esset, et Deo cognitus et sanctificatus a Deo est? Absit istud. Non enim hoc in se quod sanctificatus est odit, sed ea quae in sanctificationem consecuta sunt, maledicit, prouectum se scilicet per incrementa corporis in has molestias corporei incolatus. Formatus enim intra matris uuluam et per uirtutem creatoris sui in substantia animae ad Dei imaginem figuratus non conceptus et figurationis suae ortum, sed eum qui ex incremento accessit profectum editi corporis congemescit, in quo sibi in malis saeculi et infirmitatibus carnis uitiisque uiuendum sit«.

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JOB AS MORAL EXEMPLAR IN AMBROSE

BY

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For a variety of reasons, Job occupies an important place in patristic biblical exegesis. As a virtuous man who experienced suffering, Job became a type and prefiguration of the crucified and resurrected Christ.[1] As a righteous gentile, he symbolized all saintly pagans who formed a part of the true Christian community, even if they lived before the birth of Jesus.[2] And as man who bore his cruel sufferings patiently, Job became a model of Christian fortitude and faith. Among the Church Fathers who find Job a moral exemplar of particular interest is Ambrose. A study of Ambrose's comments on Job illuminates not only that Father's view on the role of suffering in achieving salvation, but also one instance of his rejection of exegetical typology in favor of tropological models.

James 5: 7–11 established for Christianity the tradition of Job's great patience in adversity. It is to this passage that most patristic writers refer when they speak of the saintly Job. James advises the Christian reader to take as his models of virtue the prophets of the Old Testament, among whom is Job: *As an example of suffering and patience, brethren, take the prophets who spoke in the name of the Lord. Behold, we call those happy who were steadfast. You have heard of the steadfastness of Job, and you have seen the purpose of the Lord, how the Lord is compassionate and merciful* (James 5:10–11). Certainly, the rebellious and blasphemous Job of the biblical book has been forgotten. In fact, James saw in Job a special order of patience, one that was predicated completely on trust in God and his purposes. "In the Christian view", Jean Daniélou has written, "it is not a question of stoical patience, of pure resignation bearing witness to the greatness of the soul. It is patience linked with hope, founded on the certainty of the happiness promised by Christ; and this certainty gives strength to endure the trials of earthly life. This is a new picture of Job, bound up with the faith in eternal life."[3]

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Following the example of James, many patristic writers exalted Job for his special patience. The First Epistle of Clement, § xvii, refers to Job as the "righteous and blameless true worshipper of God", whose piety and humility the faithful should imitate. He is placed in the company of Abraham and Moses, Elijah and Elisha, Ezekiel and the other prophets who were "heralding the coming of Christ." Likewise Tertullian, in his *Treatise on Patience*, says of Job:

> "Oh, happy also he who met all the violence of the devil by the exertion of every species of patience; for by all his pains [Job] was not drawn away from his reverence for God; but he has been set up as an example and testimony to us, for the thorough accomplishment of patience as well in spirit as in flesh, as well in mind as in body; in order that we succumb neither to damages of our worldly goods, nor to losses of those who are dearest, nor even to bodily afflictions. What a bier for the devil did God erect in the person of that hero".[4]

In the *Apostolic Constitutions*, § VII.8.7, the example of Job is exalted as well: "Accept undisturbed the misfortunes which come to thee and bear contradictions without vexation knowing that recompense will be given thee by God, as it was given to Job and Lazarus". Later Gregory would summarize these lessons in his *Moralia* when he wrote of the biblical pagan saints: "Abel came to exhibit innocence, Enoch to give a lesson in the integrity of morals, Noah to teach perseverance in hope, and Job to exhibit patience in the midst of trials."[5]

Ambrose, however, is unique among patristic writers in that he interprets Job solely as a moral exemplar. Although he wrote no full-scale commentary on the biblical book of Job, references to Job's edifying qualities are scattered throughout Ambrose's tractates, sermons, letters and commentaries on other biblical books. Ambrose, of course, was a diligent student of the Greek Fathers; his own religious and exegetical works often show their influence. He was also much influenced by the allegorical writings of Philo. In the case of Job, however, neither the Greek Fathers nor Philo had pursued the directions he wished to follow. Ambrose seems to have proceeded much on his own into new territory. For Job offered Ambrose the opportunity to preach the insurmountable impediment of wealth to salvation, and the glorious spiritual treasure awaiting the steadfast sufferer. Ambrose's interpretation of Job is original not so much for what he says, as for what he doesn't say. Job as righteous gentile and prophet to the nations is of no concern to Ambrose. More importantly, Ambrose contra-

dicts patristic tradition in his denial of Job as a type of Christ. For Ambrose, no human experience is comparable to the Incarnation, Passion and Resurrection of the Savior. Rather, it is as a human exemplar that Job is important, and perhaps as an exemplar whom Ambrose himself, an escetic and sometimes beleaguered man, would wish to emulate.

As is well-known, Ambrose also drew upon classical writers, such as Cicero, in his religious writing. The bishop's famous work, *On the Duties of the Clergy* (*De Officiis Ministrorum*), in fact, is directly evocative of Cicero's *On Duty* (*De Officiis*), which discusses the art and science of correct living. Cicero wrote this book for his son; Ambrose, accordingly, dedicated his *Duties of the Clergy* to his spiritual sons, the priests of the Church: "And just as Tully wrote for the instruction of his son, so I for the informing of my sons. For I love not less those whom I have begotten in the Gospel than if I had reared them in wedlock. For nature is not more strong to love than grace".[6]

Ambrose's plan in *Duties of the Clergy* was to take the scheme of the pagan virtues and the pagan definitions of decent conduct, and show that such excellent precepts are abundantly illustrated not only in the Old and New Testaments, but in the history of the Christian Church, from its inception to the moment when the bishop was writing. Yet, the main purpose of *De Officiis Ministrorum*, as E. K. Rand says, was not "to reconcile ancient theory with Christian truth, but to show the pagans that the new faith had as many exemplifications of their best virtues as they themselves have".[7] It is, in its way, a new sort of apology. "Let us return to Moses", says Ambrose, having recounted the chivalrous conduct of Pyrrhus to the Romans, "and cull examples as superior in point of nobility as they are in point of time".[8]

Job is one of Ambrose's examples of a biblical figure whose ethics were more than equal to those of a Pyrrhus or Socrates. In a chapter on the virtue of fortitude, Ambrose links this pagan virtue with spiritual faith to give it a new Christian coloration. Job is the example of one who teaches this lesson: "His virtues had no point of contact with any vices, but stood firm on their own ground. Who, then, was so brave as holy Job? How can he be put second to any, on whose level hardly one like himself can be placed?"[9]

Elsewhere, in order to explain some disturbing words of Job's, Ambrose maintains that Job had taken upon himself the role of a devil's advocate in order to discover the truth:

"For those three royal friends of Job declared him to be a sinner, because they say that he, after being rich, became poor; that after having many children, he had lost them all, and that he was covered with sores and was full of weals, and was a mass of wounds from head to foot. But holy Job made this declaration to them: *If I suffer thus, Why do the wicked live? Reach old age, and grow mighty in power? Their children are established in their presence, and their offspring before their eyes. Their houses are safe from fear, and no rod of God is upon them* (Job 21:7–9)".[10]

Ambrose remarks that the faint-hearted man might hear Job's words and disturbed in mind turn away from God, but we must understand that when Job prefaces his remarks as follows: *Bear with me, I also speak; then laugh at me, for if I am found fault with, I am found fault with as a man. Bear, therefore, the burden of my words* (Job 21:3–4),[11] what he really means is, "Now I am going to say what I do not approve; but I shall utter wrong words to refute you." As is his wont in *Duties of the Clergy*. Ambrose shows how the actions of a biblical figure have anticipated those of a classical exemplar. He notes that Plato has been greatly praised because in the *Republic* he made the person who undertook the part of objector against justice ask pardon for his words, which he himself did not approve of; according to Plato this character was only assumed for the sake of finding out the truth, and to investigate the question at issue. "Yet", Ambrose writes:

"how many years before these did Job live! He was the first to discover this, and to consider what excuses had to be made for this, not for the sake of decking out his eloquence, but for the sake of finding out the truth. At once he made the matter plain, stating that the lamp of the wicked is put out, that their destruction will come; that God, the teacher of wisdom and instruction is not deceived, but is a judge of truth. Therefore, the blessedness of individuals must not be estimated at the value of their known wealth, but according to the voice of their conscience within them".[12]

And yet, for all his virtue, Job was not perfect. One of Ambrose's themes in the *Duties of the Clergy* is the corrupting effect of riches. According to Ambrose a rich man is unable to live a blessed life; only through poverty and suffering can a man be brought close to God:

"Riches, then, give no assistance to living a blessed life, a fact that the Lord clearly shows in the Gospel, saying, *Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the Kingdom of God, blessed are they that hunger and thirst now, for they shall be filled. Blessed are ye that weep now, for ye shall laugh* (Luke 6:20–21). Thus, it is stated as plainly as possible that poverty, hunger, and pain, which are considered to be evils, not only are not hindrances to a blessed life, but are actually so many helps toward it."[13]

Elsewhere, Ambrose writes that Luke 6:24–25. *Woe to you rich, for ye have received your consolation! Woe unto you that are full, for ye*

shall hunger, and to those who laugh, for they shall mourn! is eloquent biblical testimony of the fate that will surely befall the rich man. Only those who are poor in material possession can live a truly rich and blessed life, for such a life depends not on external goods but on virtue alone. Ambrose's disdain for the possessions of this world reflects his general philosophy. Ambrose's religion was radically other-wordly. In Peter Brown's words, "For him, a man was his 'soul'. His body was merely a 'tattered garment' : 'We ourselves are different from what we merely own'."[14] Ambrose believed that by opposing his soul a man ceased to exist, for in returning to God the soul must cast off everything else, "like washing the mud off gold". All of these attitudes are evident in Ambrose's comments on Job.

As we have seen, one way a man may attain blessedness is to overcome bodily suffering, to endure temporal pain with head unbowed. Among the examples of biblical figures who endured bravely, Ambrose includes Job :

> "What can we think of as more wretched than holy Job, either in the burning of his house, or the instantaneous death of his ten songs, or his bodily pains? Was he less blessed than if he had not endured these things whereby he really showed himself approved?"[15]

Ambrose implies here that Job was approved only through his suffering; the pious and God-fearing hero of Job 1 was, in Ambrose's eyes, corrupted by wealth and possessions. Through great ordeals Job was, in effect, purged of his evil and able to enter a state of blessedness. Ambrose's concern seems to be to justify the extent of Job's sufferings, to prove that God acted justly and with a saving purpose in afflicting him. This is perhaps an extreme reading of James 1:13–14, *No one under trial or temptation should say, "I am being tempted by God"; for God is untouched by evil, and does not himself tempt anyone. Temptation arises when a man is enticed and lured away by his own lust; then lust conceives and gives birth to sin; and sin full-grown breeds death.*[16] Job's torments, in effect, arose from his own faults.

The notion that Job's wealth justified the extent of his suffering is further developed in Ambrose's *Commentary on Psalm CXVIII.* This treatise, one of his most carefully planned writings, consists of twenty-two addresses to the faithful, each address taking as its theme one division of the psalm. Ambrose inquires if God was not unjust in depriving Job of his children, and handing them into the power of the devil. "On the contrary", he writes,

"rather he was just, because he was about to prove his justice by testing [Job's] patience, that he might prove his great worth. Who would question the justice of God knowing that if Job had not parted with all his possessions, he would not have found such grace? God wished to anoint his athlete uncovered, stripped and penitent... Nothing, therefore, is able to be hard which is just. It did not seem to be hard to him who could say, *Naked I came from my mother's womb, and naked shall I return; the Lord gave and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord* (Job 1:21).

"Truly", Ambrose concludes, "the just man blesses God when he suffers, the sinner only when he is abounding in riches."[17] Job, then, was proved by God to be righteous even in suffering, and through his fortitude in extremity was ensured of his eternal reward.

Ambrose repeats this theme in his commentary on Luke, once again comparing the spiritual states of the rich and poor man:

"The rich man, who has not experienced an ordeal in this world is in suffering in hell; the poor Lazarus who was afflicted and overwhelmed by poverty and suffering to the point where his wounds were licked by dogs, won by these pains of that miserable life, a crown of eternal glory, for *Numerous are the tribulations of the just* (Psalm 33:20). Likewise, those whom the Lord loves, he often chastises, as it says, *For the Lord disciplines him whom he loves, and chastises every son whom he receives* (Hebrews 12:6), and *For the Lord reproves him whom he loves, as a father the son in whom he delights* (Proverbs 3:12)".[18]

The consolatory intent of these words, directed towards a beleagured Church, is clear. They gain in power when Ambrose resists the further, typological comparison of Job and the divine sufferer. Ambrose absolutely rejects the notion that the suffering Job was a prefiguration of the suffering Christ. For Ambrose, Job is and must be an exemplar unalterably human, an immediate model for all human sufferers. Speaking of the various ways in which the devil tormented Job, he makes this cleavage between the human and divine explicit:

"This is why our Lord did not wish to have what is perishable, and if He came poor into this world, it was so that one devil would have nothing to take from him. This is the import of John 14:30, *The prince of this world is coming, and in me he will find nothing*. Besides, Christ did not want to be the father of a small number, as was Job, but to be the father of all. As for bodily wounds, it would be vain to test him by those – he who took all bodily sufferings upon himself – and to show that he had right to a victory without blemish, which would defeat the enemy of the body. [Job] was a man who was tempted in his human possessions, [Christ] was tempted in the kingly domain. One lost his patrimony, to the other the kingdom of the world was offered... Job accumulated wounds, but this courageous athlete [Christ] did not have a troubled soul".[19]

Even though Ambrose denies a similarity in situation between Job and Christ, he does believe Job prophesied the Messiah's coming:

> "When [Job] cursed his day saying, *Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night which said "A manchild is conceived"* (Job 3:3), this belongs to prophecy, in the sense that the devil, monster of the world of temptations, was crushed by our Lord, Jesus Christ, and if Job desired that the day of his birth would perish in the flesh, this was so that his day would be achieved in the resurrection: "Perish", he said, "the day of this world, so that the spiritual day might arise". Thus, in his testing, the holy man Job spoke of mysteries, for he saw Christ, the Victor of the World".[20]

Ambrose was one of the few patristic writers who felt it necessary to try to justify Job's seemingly blasphemous remarks. Here he interprets Job's anguished denunciation of the day of his birth as a condemnation of the life of the flesh, and a desire for the eternal life which Christ would bring to all men. Through his suffering, then, Job remains a human exemplar. He sees farther than most, perhaps, yet continues as an inspiring emblem of a condition which yearns for and merits the mercies of salvation.

An eloquent testimony to the worth of the moral example of Job in his own life, and that of his congregation, is found in one of Ambrose's letters. Here he describes the sermon he preached to his flock in Milan while his basilica was surrounded by the Emperor's troops. In February, 386, the Emperor's mother, Justina, had ordered Ambrose to surrender a church in Milan for use by Arian members of the court: Ambrose flatly refused. As Brown writes, "It became an issue of 'court' against 'city', with Ambrose making little effort to check the hatred of the Milanese for their Gothic garrison. The leading courtiers were placed under a curfew lest they join this 'usurper', and as the Gothic troops surrounded the basilica in which Ambrose stood with his congregation, it seemed as if a general massacre might ensue. But the court lost its nerve and gave way".[21]

In the sermon that he preached Ambrose compared each of his congregants to Job: "In each of you Job lives again, in each the patience and valor of that saint has shone forth again. For what more resolute could have been said by Christian men, than what the Holy Spirit has today spoken in you?"[22] He continues:

> "You see that permission is given to the devil, that the good may be tested. The evil one envies all progress in good, he tempts us in diverse ways. He tried holy Job in

> his possessions, in his children, in pain of body. The stronger is tried in his own person, the weaker in that of another. And he was desirous of carrying off my riches which I possess in you, and wished to dissipate this patrimony of your tranquility. And he strove to deprive me of yourselves also, my good children, for whom I daily renew the sacrifice, you he endeavoured to involve in the ruin as it were of a public disturbance. I have then already been assailed by two kinds of temptation. And perhaps because the Lord our God knows me to be weak, He has not yet given him power over my body. Though I myself may desire it, though I offer myself, He deems me, yet it may be, unequal to this conflict, and exercises me with diverse labors. And Job did not begin with that conflict but finished with it".[23]

Thus, Ambrose identifies himself and every true Christian with the tormented Job, and translating a biblical situation into present reality, encourages his congregation to forebear, and remain firm in their opposition to the Emperor. Through suffering, the good will prevail.

In his comments on Job, then, Ambrose stresses Job's patience and the steadfast example he provides for all human beings in times of extremity. He ignores any typological parallels between the situation of Job and that of the Redeemer, preferring to keep Job on a human plane. For Ambrose, a man strongly drawn to mysticism and the ascetic life, the human, suffering Job who yearned for the dawn of a new spiritual day, and found God through divesting himself of worldly burdens must have had a strong and individual appeal. It is this attraction which must account for Ambrose's frequent references to Job and that biblical figure's emergence as a tropological ideal in Ambrose's writings.

Notes

[1] Among others, Zeno, Bishop of Verona, established the parallels between Job and Christ in his Tractate II.15: Job rich in the goods of this earth, and then reduced to poverty, prefigures Christ, "leaving for love of us the goods of heaven, and making himself poor to make us rich". Job's temptations prefigure those of Christ, who "by taking flesh takes upon himself the blemishes of all humanity". Job is insulted by his friends, and Jesus is insulted by the priests. Job upon his dunghill represents Christ in the aftermath of sin. Gregory the Great speaks in the same vein in his exhaustive *Moralia on Job*, Preface, 14: "It was necessary, therefore, that the blessed Job, who foretold the greatest of the mysteries, the Incarnation, should prefigure by his life Him whom he described in words".

[2] Augustine writes in the *City of God*, 18.47, of the "holy and wonderful man, Job, who was neither native nor a proselyte, that is a stranger joining the people of Israel, but being bred of the Idumean race, arose there, and died there too, and who is so praised by the divine oracle, that no man of his time is put on a level with him as regards

justice and piety"; and continues, "And I doubt not that it was divinely provided, that from this one case we might know that among other nations also there might be men pertaining to the spiritual Jerusalem, who have lived according to God and pleased Him". And Gregory, in the *Moralia*, Preface, 5, notes: "It is not without cause that the life of a just pagan is set before us as a model side by side with the life of the Israelites. Our Savior, coming for the redemption of Jews and gentiles, willed also to be foretold by the voices of Jews and gentiles".

[3] Jean Daniélou, *Holy Pagans of the Old Testament* (London-New York 1957) 97.

[4] Tertullian, *Treatise on Patience* XIV.

[5] Gregory, *Moralia*, Preface, 3.

[6] Ambrose, *Duties of the Clergy* I.I.4.

[7] E. K. Rand, *Fathers of the Middle Ages* (New York 1928, 1957) 82.

[8] Ambrose, *Duties* III.III.15.

[9] Ambrose, *Duties* I.XXXIX.204. Ambrose commented frequently on Job's fortitude, and the example he presented to all men. In his *Commentary on Luke* IV.41, he writes: "We others then should not fear tests, but rather should be proud of ordeals, and say *For the sake of Christ, then, I am content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities: For when I am weak, then I am strong* (2 Corinthians 12:10); it is thus, in fact, that the crown of justice is woven".

[10] Ambrose, *Duties* I.XII.41.

[11] The version of Job 21:3–4 quoted by Ambrose differs significantly from both the Hebrew and Greek texts. The relevant portion is rendered by the *RSV: As for me, is my complaint against man?/Why should I not be impatient?* Here, as elsewhere, Ambrose has attempted to blunt any seeming blasphemy or complaint against suffering on Job's part.

[12] Ambrose, *Duties* I.XII.44.

[13] *Duties* II.IV.15.

[14] Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo. A Biography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969) 84.

[15] Ambrose, *Duties* II.V.20.

[16] There is possibly an echo here of one of Origen's comments on Job. In his treatise, *On Prayer* XXIX.17, Origen writes that the usefulness of temptation is to make clear what we are: "The usefulness of temptation is this: through temptations those things which our soul had admitted, and which are unknown to all except God, unknown even to ourselves, become manifest, that we may no longer be unaware of what manner of men we are, but recognizing them, may perceive, if we will, our own evils, and give thanks for the good that has been shown to us through the temptations... And this is shown by what is said by the Lord to Job, *Dost thou think that I have answered thee otherwise than that thou shouldst appear righteous*? (Job 40:3) [Septuagint rendering], and by what is written in Deuteronomy 8:3, *And he humbled thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, and led thee in the wilderness, where there was the serpent that biteth, and the scorpion and drought, that what was in thy heart might be made known*". Certainly, both Ambrose and Origen maintain that Job's suffering, as all divinely ordained suffering, was not in vain.

[17] Ambrose, *On Psalm CXVIII* (PL. 15, col. 1397).

[18] Ambrose, *Exposition on Luke* IV.38.

[19] Ambrose, *On Luke* IV.39.

[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Brown, *Augustine*, pp. 81–82.
[22] Ambrose, *Letter* XX.14.
[23] *Letter* XX.15.

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NEITHER A PELAGIAN NOR A MANICHEE

BY

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In 421, in the second of his four books *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* (ii.2), Augustine drew up a table of comparisons and contrasts in the hope of clarifying the differences between Pelagian and Catholic, Catholic and Manichee, Manichee and Pelagian. The Pelagians do not admit that God is the saviour of a fallen mankind; the Manichees do not admit that God is the Creator of all natures; the Catholic cannot associate himself with either position, for both these views diminish the Deity. The Pelagians regard the lust of the flesh as a natural good; the Manichees think that it has been an evil thing from all eternity; the Catholics date the evil in it from the fall of Adam. The Pelagians say that even a wicked man can do good by his own free will; the Manichees deny that it is from a man's free will that evil takes its beginning; the Catholics maintain that each man is the source of his own evil (in his will) and that noone can do good of himself. The Pelagians say that the soul is without sin, because man's nature is wholly good; the Manichees say that the soul is a particle of God, made sinful by the admixture of an evil nature; the Catholics deny that the soul is a particle of God, but they do not agree with the Pelagians that it is without sin in this life. Manichees and Pelagians agree in rejecting the notion that man's salvation depends upon the grace of Christ; they are alike in undervaluing baptism, the Manichees denying its usefulness to anyone, the Pelagians its usefulness to infants, who are without sin. They agree doing dishonour to the flesh of Christ, the Manichees by their blasphemies concerning his birth, and the Pelagians by considering the flesh of those he redeemed equal to his own, in its freedom from original sin. As a statement of current positions on these issues of common concern, as Augustine saw them, this list is of considerable importance. But it hints at something else: a sense of incipient confusion in the minds of others, if not in his own mind, which made it necessary for him to take stock. He speaks later

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in the treatise (III.vii.24) of the 'clouds' of extraneous questions the Pelagians use to confound the issues, the mistaken emphases which cause the Pelagians to value the right things (created natures, marriage, law, free will, the saints) but for the wrong reasons, that is, without a due sense of God's excellence and man's shortcomings: in marriage, for example, we must distinguish the evil of shameful lust from the excellence of marriage; human nature was created good, but is now flawed (IV.i.1).

He was already aware that the Pelagians were calling the Catholics 'Manichees' (IV.i.1). But the accusation had not yet struck home. This stock-taking exercise reviews Catholic, Pelagian and Manichean positions with a magisterial command of their similarities and differences. Augustine is anxious for the peace of mind of his Catholic readers, but he is not troubled on his own account. Julian of Eclanum was to make him think again, to force him to take stock of his own position, to open up a question far larger than any he envisages here: was there indeed any truth in the notion that he who was not a Pelagian was by implication in some sense a Manichee, that there was no intermediate position such as Augustine allocates to the Catholics in his table?

It has been suggested that when Julian of Eclanum accused Augustine of 'being a Manichee' and of 'preaching fatalism', these were merely 'conventional bogeys'.[1] It certainly seems that in some circles 'Manichee' and 'Pelagian' had become general terms of abuse by the second or third decade of the fifth century. Yet Julian was pointing to a recognised antithesis between the 'Pelagian' and the 'Manichean' standpoints upon a complex of fundamental philosophical and theological issues. In this sense, Julian had presented Augustine with no empty challenge, and he succeeded in making him take stock of his position in the light of the idea that in taking up a position opposed to that of the Pelagians Catholic Christians had somehow identified themselves with the Manichees.

Julian calls Augustine a Manichee, not because he believes him to be still a follower of the sect, nor because he believes him to be consistent in his Manichean views on every point, but because, as he argues, the tendency of Augustine's thought is 'Manichean'. This is Manicheism by implication, not by conscious commitment, a Manicheism into which a man may slide unawares, and above all a discreditable decline. Neither 'Manichee' nor 'Pelagian' could have been used as an epithet so loosely twenty years earlier.

In the case of 'Pelagian' some distance had first to be travelled before the term had currency at all, before it could be broadened and debased. Writing in 415, Jerome had encouraged a tendency to identify 'Pelagianism' with other views in which he saw a departure from orthodoxy which especially troubled him: he held that the Pelagians were Origenists, or followers of Jovinian. But Augustine did not yet see clearly that any such thing as 'Pelagianism' existed three years earlier when he found himself 'compelled' to write against the teaching of Pelagius. In 427, when he looked back upon the episode in compiling his *Retractationes* he was able to put a name to the movement and call it a heresy: *Venit etiam necessitas, quae me cogeret adversus novam Pelagianam haeresim scribere.*[2] But, as Robert F. Evans has pointed out, in the treatise *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins* to which Augustine refers, there is remarkably little direct reference even to Pelagius himself, let alone to a school of thought which may be called by his name. The treatise was written for the tribune Flavius Marcellinus who had run into difficulties in conversations with Catholics troubled by some matters which had been raised at the synod of Carthage of the previous year. There, Caelestius, who brought the Pelagian problem to Africa as a live issue, had been questioned on his opinions. African Christians were disquieted by the implications of his views for the belief that it is necessary to baptise infants. Augustine mentions neither Pelagius nor Caelestius in the first two books. Pelagius' name appears in Book III because Augustine had been reading Pelagius' Commentary on the Pauline Epistles, and had discovered there some points he now wanted to discuss. R. F. Evans has shown convincingly that Augustine did not come to group the elements of the 'Pelagian' heresy together, or begin to think 'Pelagian' an appropriate name for the heresy, for some time.[3]

The same difficulty did not arise in the case of the term 'Manichee'. The sect was established; indeed Augustine had called himself a Manichee for several years as a young man. The innovation of the first quarter of the new century was to loosen and broaden the sense of the term until it was possible to speak as Julian does of Augustine the 'Manichee', despite the considerable body of his anti-Manichean writings, and his known hostility to all things Manichean.

How, then, did 'Pelagian' come to be opposed to 'Manichee' in the slanging-match Julian of Eclanum provoked by his attacks on Augustine? Was the sense of both terms so vague by then that we can

dismiss these as 'conventional bogeys' and nothing more? It seems not. Augustine, at least, tried to redefine the terms, to give them a precision they had begun to lose, and Julian, too, rested his case partly upon accuracy of definition. Augustine found there was a case to answer, although he was confident that Julian was misrepresenting the Catholic position.

An important contributing factor to this process of enlargement of the sense of the terms 'Pelagian' and 'Manichee' was the growing contemporary awareness that there was a common ground of subject-matter on which both schools of thought touched. Augustine sent his anti-Manichean works to Paulinus of Nola,[4] no doubt so that he could make them available to any members of the local Manichean community in Rome who might be persuaded to study them. There is every probability that Pelagius read them in Paulinus' library.[5] Julian of Eclanum, too, certainly knew Paulinus. Paulinus' wrote him a wedding-song.[6] Julian was well-born; Pelagius something of a *parvenu*. Nevertheless, Pelagius was well thought of by the best families in Rome.[7] Indeed, the Pelagians in Rome seem to have been something of an élitist group, and close-knit, so much so that, even if Pelagius was not 'protected' as Julian had been by an unconscious alliance of influential Roman families,[8] the social standing of the movement created a free-masonry which supported him, too, indirectly. Pelagius was not, then, an isolated figure, a Martin Luther who could do no other, standing against society. The world, at its most wordly and powerful, was not against him. He and his followers saw themselves as *integri Christiani*.[9]

Julian took up a case which had been entirely respectable until Augustine began to write against Pelagius and the African bishops questioned the orthodoxy of Caelestius. And he wrote, as Pelagius had done, with every means of access to Augustine's early writings, with a knowledge of the Manichean position, and, no doubt, recollecting many conversations in which these issues had been discussed. Pelagianism was, to a greater extent than Augustine perhaps realised, the product of a community's way of life, the united effort of a group of like-minded and articulate people. And it grew up at a time and in a place where Manicheism provided stimulating contrasts, for members of the Manichean sect in and near Rome were sufficiently numerous for Augustine to see the need to provide Paulinus with missionary textbooks. Ironically, Augustine's own writings, lodged with Paulinus, may have provided a further impetus for discussion, and so helped

along the process of clarification of similarities and differences which encouraged Julian to feel that he stood on solid ground when he called Augustine a Manichee.

Pelagius himself can have been only partly responsible for these developments. His mind was not naturally of a speculative cast. There is some evidence that he drew on the texts available to him in Latin in writing his Pauline commentaries: Ambrosiaster (c. 375), Augustine himself, *On Romans*, Rufinus' rendering of Origen (c. 405).[10] He takes from Ambrosiaster, for example, a number of thoughts on law and grace in which, perhaps, lay the seeds of future developments of his thinking.[11] Even his use of the questionable Origen does not seem to have caused him disquiet. He simply wanted to provide a practical Bible-study aid for his circle. His comments are brief and commonsensical.

Even when he was actively engaged in polemic, he does not appear to have given the Manichean threat as prominent a place as Julian does. The anti-Manichean current is there, but it is heretics of another kind who concern him most. In some fragments which survive of his writings against the Apollinarians he takes issue with heretics who have been raising Christological questions.[12] There can be no doubt that Pelagius saw himself as a defender of the faith, exactly as Augustine did. Indeed, he adopts much the same attitude as Augustine to unorthodoxy, and accuses the heretics of practices which Augustine points to in the teaching of the Manichees. The Apollinarians, says Pelagius, bring together Scriptural testimonies to defend their error. Their arguments are shrouded in the darkness of obscurity.[12] It may even be that Pelagius modelled his style as a polemicist upon Augustine's early works.

It was not until Julian took up the cause that further implications became clear. Both Pelagians and Catholic Christians distinguished themselves from heretics, and especially from the Manichean heretics, but they understood very well the nature of the common ground of interest between them. It is also to be supposed that the Manichees were equally familiar with these matters, but they are not our immediate concern here; their presence is of interest for our purposes because they acted as a catalyst, sharpening and intensifying the contest between Julian and Augustine when it began, and giving Julian a convenient epithet of opprobrium to apply to Augustine.

The realities of the Pelagian position, in outline and in details,

quickly became submerged in the controversy. Augustine defined Pelagius' terms for him. (One of the difficulties in determining what Pelagius intended, is that the Augustinian material far outweighs the Pelagian in quantity.) And it is not Julian's business to speak for Pelagius, so much as to destroy the credibility of Augustine's position by showing him to be a Manichee unawares. We are dealing, in the controversy between Julian and Augustine, not with 'Manichee' and 'Pelagian' worn proudly as badges, but with 'Manichee' and 'Pelagian' used as terms of abuse. It is to these secondary usages that we must now turn.

Enough has been said perhaps to indicate that Pelagius thought of himself not only as orthodox, but as a protagonist for orthodoxy;[13] at the same time, as Bohlin has suggested, there was perhaps a current of anti-Manichean thinking in Pelagius all along.[14] There was some foundation for Julian's claim that if Augustine was opposed to Pelagius, he must be identifying himself with an old enemy of Pelagius' circle: the Manichee.[15] The roots of the problem lay in Rome, and Augustine in Africa certainly did not perceive as he took up his pen against 'the Pelagian heresy' that in the minds of some of his Roman readers he was in danger of falling back into Manicheism. It was Julian of Eclanum who brought the fact forcefully to his notice.

Julian of Eclanum's polemic has the style of a man who sees the issues involved largely, as well as in detail. He saw the implications as neither Augustine, nor a puzzled and defensive Pelagius, had done at the beginning of the affair. Julian was the son of a bishop in southern Italy, and a supporter of the Pelagians as a young man. When the movement was condemned, he refused to change his opinions, and he brought together a group of sympathetic Italian bishops to resist the condemnation. As a result he was forced into exile, and in 419 he went to the East, where he took refuge with Theodore of Mopsuestia in Cilicia. He and Caelestius remained friends. From 419 he composed a series of works, several volumes directed specifically against Augustine.

Augustine had already said against Pelagius much of what he now had to say against Julian, and it may be that he wrote merely out of a sense of duty, to reassure Christians who were disturbed by the violence of Julian's outpourings, and for whom it was important that Augustine should be seen to have the last word. But there was a new colour in the challenge, in two respects, which gives a certain freshness to Augustine's replies. Not only did Julian accuse Augustine of being a Manichee, a

challenge which was bound to bring him up short, especially if he saw a grain of truth in the accusation. But Julian also accused Augustine of muddled thinking, in very much the terms Augustine had used against the Manichees. His view had always been that they could not think clearly because their minds were cluttered with 'bodily images'; that is, because they thought in material terms, they were incapable of conceiving of spiritual truths as requiring a different mode of thought. In Julian's eyes, Augustine's defence of original sin showed exactly this blindness. "It is improbable; it is untrue; it is unjust", says Julian, of the very notion that God would allow a flaw to remain in the nature of man as a result of Adam's sin.[16] So a second accusation, of technical and intellectual inadequacy, is added to the first. Augustine's methods as a polemicist are turned back upon him in a manner beyond the powers of the less sophisticated Pelagius. Julian was a natural dialectician, with a bent for speculative thought that Pelagius did not possess.

To take the first of these challenges first: What, then, did 'Manichean' mean for Julian? What are the 'Manichean' aspects of Augustine's thought to which he points? The principal problem, perhaps, lay in the notion of fatalism. Robert F. Evans picks out "the combating of Manichean fatalism" as "one of the chief theological interests of contemporary Christians".[17] Augustine's writings against Pelagius had certainly brought him some way towards a 'fatalism' which lent itself to identification with the Manichean view. Again, in defending the value of virginity Augustine might be said to have moved towards a Manichean position on marriage; here, the position was less clear-cut, for in his treatises on marriage Augustine clearly takes a stand against the Manicheans in maintaining that marriage is a good. (This is the ground of the Jovinian arguments, against which Jerome took such vigorous exception in writing his two books *Adversus Jovinianum*. Jovinian had argued that the Catholics were Manicheans in their preference for celibacy.) The problem of marriage was closely linked in contemporary thinking with the question of the nature of evil, and here we are on Augustinian ground indeed. The connection is made early in the *Contra Julianum*; Jovinian had brought a charge of Manicheism against the Catholics on the grounds that their doctrine that Mary remained a Virgin after giving birth to Christ implied that Christ was a phantasm, and not a real man with a material body. In marriage and procreation bodies are inescapably involved, and to take

the view that marriage is an evil, or that it was impossible that Christ should have had a real physical body, was entirely in keeping with the Manichean view that matter is evil. The doctrine of original sin seemed to Julian to involve the acceptance of the idea that human nature is intrinsically sinful, and the concomittant view that that sinfulness lies in the material nature of man, that the body is evil because it is a material thing.[18]

All this smacks of Manichean thinking sufficiently strongly to encourage Julian to feel that he has solid grounds for his accusation. Equally, however, these arguments are so vague that Augustine is confident they can be used to show it is Julian, not Augustine, who is the crypto-Manichee, the Manichee by implication. "You say that any connection with the Manichees would overcome you", he says to Julian, "but you have so strengthened them that you and they stand or fall together".[19]

Thus the two fall into an exchange of definition and counter-definition. Julian defines a Pelagian like this:

> If anyone says that there is free will in men, or that God is the Creator of those who have merely been born [i.e. not 'reborn'] he is called a Pelagian or Caelestian.

Augustine defines a Pelagian differently:

> A Pelagian or Caelestian is he who does not attribute to the grace of God the freedom to which we have been called, and who denies that Christ is the deliverer of infants.[20]

It was clear to Augustine that what was required was an orderly redefinition of the issues; if this very serious charge against the Catholics was to be shown to be without substance he must make it plain to his readers that these were vague accusations, not exact and specific, and that any resemblance between Manichean and Catholic teachings on these points was illusory. Accordingly, he adopts an orderly approach in his preface. He proposes first to show how many "great doctors of the Catholic Church" – men from whom Julian would not wish to dissociate himself – have taken up the positions Augustine himself has adopted.[21] He will make it clear to Julian that if Augustine is a Manichee, so are many of the Fathers. Secondly, he proposes to show that the vagueness of Julian's accusations is such that Julian himself can be shown so to "support the damnably and abominably impious error of the Manicheans that they cannot find such a defender even among their own adherents". Thirdly, he intends

to refute Julian's arguments point by point by adducing the authority of the Fathers. Fourthly, he will show by argument that it is the Pelagians, not the Catholics, who have slipped unawares into Manicheism. He intends, in other words, to bring these increasingly large and capacious terms within bounds, to show methodically what are the points of irreconcilable difference between Catholic and Manichee, Catholic and Pelagian, and to counter Julian's tendency to heap all together under a loose heading.

The Manichees "teach that there are two natures, one of good and the other of evil, coming from two different, mutually hostile and coeternal principles".[22] In opposition to this, the Catholic faith teaches that the nature of God is the only nature without a beginning, Augustine's approach is along the lines of that of the books *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*. These are the five arguments, says Augustine, by which Julian imputes Manicheism to him: He argues that by asserting the existence of original sin, Augustine is saying that the Devil is the creator of all men born, for he implies that all men are born of the wound the Devil inflicted on human nature when it was first created. Augustine is said to condemn marriage, for it generates something damnable in producing children born in a state of sin. Augustine denies that in baptism all sins are forgiven, for he holds that there remains in baptised parents the evil by which their children are born in original sin. Augustine convicts God of injustice, for how can it be just to condemn new-born infants. Augustine makes men despair of perfection, for they can never eradicate their inborn fault.[23]

But something further is now required. Julian, like Berengar of Tours when he challenged Lanfranc, or Roscelin of Compiègne when he challenged Anselm in the eleventh century, had tried to make out a case for the ineptitude of his enemy in rational argument. Accordingly, Augustine attacks Julian for his failings as a dialectician,[24] just as he had done with the Manichees. Augustine was a dialectician, too, at least sufficiently skilled to point out technical faults in his enemies' arguments. He sets out an argument of Faustus the Manichee thus, in a syllogism:

> If evil does not exist, God is infinite.
> Evil certainly exists.
> Therefore God is not infinite.[25]

He himself uses a syllogism to demonstrate that Faustus is deliberately trying to mislead:

Faustus uses an argument which is either deceitful or stupid.
Faustus is not stupid.
Therefore he intends to mislead the careless reader.[26]

In the cases of another argument of Faustus', that:

If these things are not written of Christ
And if you cannot show any others,
It follows that there are none at all.[27]

Augustine acknowledges that the form of the argument is valid, but he points out that the two premisses remain to be proved true. To prove the second false is easy, and then the whole argument breaks down. He finds in the case of evil the sole exception to the rule that the logicians have laid down, which states that two contrary attributes cannot be predicated at the same time of the same thing.[28] (No body is simultaneously black and white, but something may be simultaneously good and evil. Indeed it must be, if there is any evil in it at all, because evil cannot exist without good.) The Manicheans, then, are muddled thinkers. The eyes of their minds are so clouded that they do not understand the inconsistency of their position. In the *De Moribus Manichaeorum* Augustine takes pleasure in showing them how their arguments can all be turned back upon them,[29] how inconsistent their statements about evil are,[30] "What a confusion of ideas! What an amazing fatuity!"[31] there is in everything they say.

To be attacked in the same terms by Julian was evidently galling to Augustine's pride. He rounds on his attacker, matching insult to insult. Julian insults his reader as well as Augustine when he "tries to teach how dialecticians construct syllogisms, a question noone has asked". Moreover, his renderings of Augustine's arguments bear no resemblance to the arguments Augustine has actually put forward: "You pretend that I say what I do not say, that I conclude what I do not conclude, concede what I do not concede, and you draw conclusions which I reject".[32]

Julian's dialectical weapons are like leaden darts, says Augustine. He is confident of his skill, and yet he makes no sense at all. "You see how logically you have said nothing"; "You do not see that what you have called a necessary argument does not follow".[33] "Since you cannot refute my view," says Augustine, "you try to create confusion for the unskilled by means of dialectic, claiming that you do not know in what system of logic I could have found the 'convertibility of all contraries'".[34] The mark of Julian's dialectic is its "incautious use"

of such procedures as division and definition.[35] The level of Julian's technical skill seems to have been much the same as Augustine's. They knew the same range of elementary technical terms and they were probably well-enough matched. Augustine has to resort to mockery often enough to show that he could not always prove Julian an incompetent dialectician by argument alone.

It may be that Julian had put his finger on a tendency of which Augustine had not been aware, and that Augustine had really been moving back towards a position on certain issues close to that which he had occupied as a Manichee. It may be that arguments put forward by Augustine in his anti-Pelagian writings had not shown the same attention to dialectical technicalities as the works of an earlier period, when Augustine had been closer to his own days as a philosopher, and when he had been adressing himself to a readership which prided itself on its command of reason. The anti-Pelagian writings had a more general readership in view. Yet in the *Contra Julianum* Augustine seems if anything more sure of his ground, more trenchant, less open to self-doubt and given to exploratory digressions than ever before. We may perhaps take this new tone of assertiveness as evidence of real disquiet. But the interest of the terms in which the exchange took place perhaps lies elsewhere, in what it reveals of the interconnectedness of the whole complex of 'Manichean' and 'Pelagian' issues in the minds of many contemporaries. Because there was recognised to be so much common ground of subject-matter here, the developments of the first quarter of the century in enlarging the reference of 'Pelagian' and 'Manichee' are of more importance than we give them if we gloss over the epithets as 'conventional bogeys'.

NOTES

[1] P. Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of St. Augustine* (London 1972) 202, cf. P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (London 1967) 369–71.

[2] *Retractationes* II.38.

[3] On the process by which Augustine came to think of the heresy as 'Pelagian', see R. F. Evans, *Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals* (New York 1968) 70–89. On Jerome, ibid. p. 6.

[4] Paulinus of Nola, *Letters* 4, 6, 45, 50, are to Augustine, *Letter* 3 to Alypius, Augustine's old friend, now Bishop of Thagaste. *Letter* 4.v, of 395, mentions a gift of some of Augustine's works to Paulinus; these would seem likely to have been anti-Manichean pieces. Paulinus remarks (.ii) that he has been provided "with sufficient armour against the Manicheans". In *Letter* 6.ii he says that he feels that, through Augustine's anti-Manichean writings, he has come to know him.

[5] P. Brown, *Religion and Society*, 212, suggests that Augustine may have wanted to make copies available to members of the Manichean sect in Rome and Campania. In *Contra Secundinum* xi (399), Augustine tells Secundinus the Manichee that he can read the *De Libero Arbitrio* in Paulinus' library.

[6] *Carmen* XXV, ed. G. de Hartel. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 30 (Vienna 1894), and cf. P. Walsh' Introduction to his translation of *The Poems of Paulinus of Nola*. Ancient Christian Writers, 40 (New York 1975).

[7] P. Brown, *Religion and Society*, 185.

[8] Ibid. 218.

[9] Ibid. 192.

[10] A. J. Smith, 'The Latin Sources of the Commentary of Pelagius on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans', *Journal of Theol. Stud.* 19 (1918) 162–230, compares Ambrosiaster and Pelagius at length, but his comparisons should be revised by comparing modern editions of the texts: H. J. Vogels' edition of *Ambrosiastri qui dicitur Commentarius in Epistulas Paulinas*, C.S.E.L. lxxxi.i–3 (Vienna 1966) and A. Souter, *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul. Texts and Studies* IX.2 (Cambridge 1926).

[11] Ambrosiaster, *ed. cit.*, and Pelagius, *ed. cit.* on *Romans* 1.7; 2.12; 2.15.

[12] *Ambrosiaster: De Auctore, Operibus, Theologia*. Ed. P. C. Martin (Rome 1944) 207.

[13] J. Rivière, 'Hétérodoxie des Pélagiens en fait de rédemption', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 41 (1946) 5–43, points out that Pelagius has some perfectly orthodox views, emphasising the death of Christ as an unmerited sacrificial offering for men's sins and free justification given to the man of faith through baptism.

[14] Torgny Bohlin, *Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis* (Uppsala und Wiesbaden 1957).

[15] G. I. Bonner develops Bohlin's thesis and suggests that Pelagius has two adversaries steadily in mind: Arianism, which denies the Godhead of Christ, and Manicheism, which denies the humanity of Christ – and especially the latter. 'How Pelagian was Pelagius?' *Studia Patristica* IX.iii ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin 1966) 353.

[16] *Contra Julianum* II.x.37.

[17] Evans *op. cit.* p. 22.

[18] *C. Jul.* I.ii.4; I.vi.12.

[19] *C. Jul.* VI.xxvi.83.

[20] *C. Jul.* VI.xxvi.83.

[20] *C. Jul.* III.i.2.

[21] *C. Jul.* Prologue.

[22] *C. Jul.* I.viii.36.

[23] *C. Jul.* II.i.2; all these points are met in what follows, II.i.3–viii.30.

[24] F. Refoulé, 'Julien d'Éclane, Théologien et Philosophe', *Recherches de science religieuse* 52 (1964) 82–4; Pelagius, too, according to Bonner, *op. cit.* p. 353–4, had been a dialectician in his approach.

[25] *Reply Faust.* XXV.1.

[26] *Reply Faust.* XVI.26.

[27] *Reply Faust.* XVI.26.

[28] *Enchiridion* XIV.1.

[29] *De Mor. Man.* VIII.11.

[30] *De Mor. Man.* IX.14.

[31] *De Mor. Man.* XVI.51.

[32] *C. Jul.* III.vii.14.
[33] *C. Jul.* III.vii.16.
[34] *C. Jul.* VI.xix.60.
[35] *C. Jul.* VI.xviii.54.

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THE DATE OF COMPOSITION OF THEODORET'S CHURCH HISTORY

BY

GLENN F. CHESNUT

The histories of Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret are all written at roughly the same time and cover almost exactly the same period of history in closely parallel fashion. The verbal resemblances are so close that the problem of literary dependence must naturally arise. In this regard, it has been customary to consider Theodoret's *Church History* as in some sense dependent upon the histories of Socrates and Sozomen, principally because of the later date usually given to the bishop's history. The normal date of composition given now in works like Quasten, and Altaner and Stuiber, is 449/50.[1] This seems to be based mainly on the calculation made by Parmentier and Scheidweiler in the introduction to the GCS edition of Theodoret's *Church History*: The reference to Theodosius II in Theod. *H. E.* V.36.1 as ὁ νῦν βασιλεύων, "the present emperor", gives one clear terminus, July 28, 450, the date of Theodosius' death. The other terminus is given by Theodoret's letter to Pope Leo the Great after he had been condemned at the Robber Council of Ephesus in August 449 (Theod. *Epist. Sirm.* 113). Theodoret gives a list of his writings which could be used as proof of his orthodoxy, and the *Church History* is not among them. Therefore, the argument goes, Theodoret must have written the history in less than a year, in the latter part of 449 and the first part of 450, while he was exiled to the monastery of his youth, at Nicerte, a village near Apamea.[2]

But one must ask whether that letter to Pope Leo in 449 listed all of Theodoret's works, as Parmentier and Scheidweiler believed. The key portion of *Epist. Sirm.* 113 reads as follows:

> For I am the author of works, some written twenty years ago, some eighteen, some fifteen, some twelve years ago; some against the Arians and Eunomians, some against the Jews and the pagans, some against the Magi in Persia; others concerning universal providence, others concerning the divine generation of the Logos and the

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> divine Incarnation. I have written commentaries, by the grace of God, both on the apostolic writings and the prophetic oracles. It is easy to learn from these works whether I held unswerving to the rule of faith, or deviated from its unbending standard.[3]

As can be seen, the letter did not list the *Church History per se* but it also did not list Theodoret's collection of the life stories of thirty-one monks, the so-called *Historia religiosa*. Theodoret referred to this hagiographical work in his *Church History* (see for example *H.E.* IV.25.5) so it was already written when he was working on his *Church History*. (Quasten in fact dates the *Historia religiosa* at 444, five years before the letter to Pope Leo was written.)[4]

Futhermore, though this is an uncertain and subjective mode of argument, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine Theodoret turning out two works (the *Historia religiosa* and then the *Church History*) in less than a year while simultaneously trying to write letters, establish contacts in the West, and otherwise maneuver politically to save his whole career. But this would be required by Parmentier and Scheidweiler's theory. Surely Theodoret was not greatly interested in historiography in that crucial few months when his whole life as a theologian of the Church seemed to be at stake!

One must remember that Theodoret did not need to list all his works in the letter to Leo, only those works which established his orthodoxy with respect to the issues of 449. The *Church History* would not have been especially relevant to those issues (and neither for that matter would the *Historia religiosa*). One could hardly run through the *Church History* and make much of a decision as to whether its author held a doctrine of two sons, or denied the *Theotokos*, or supported a genuinely heretical "Nestorian" notion of the union between the divinity and the humanity in Christ.[5] It is easy to understand how Theodoret could have left the history off his list of proof-texts, and he did not say in the letter to Leo that he was listing *all* his works. As an example of the way in which Theodoret clearly at times did not give full lists of his works when defending his orthodoxy in letters of this sort, one should compare *Epist. Sirm.* 82, dated December 448 by Azéma. As Theodoret admitted at the end of a very similar list there, he nevertheless left out, not just a few works, but ἕτερα πολλά from his list of writings.[6] Letter 82 is clear proof that Letter 113 should not be relied on for an argument from silence.

But the argument can be taken even further. Letter 113 not only

did not say that it was listing all the works written by Theodoret up to that point, it spoke specifically of those written twelve to twenty years previously, that is, those written before 437. It was his long-standing orthodoxy which was at stake, not the writings of the immediate past. Since the *Church History* was clearly and unmistakably written after 438 at the very least,[7] then the actual wording of the letter gives no cause to expect Theodoret to mention it anyway.

Moreover, the basic presupposition of all the preceding arguments may be completely incorrect, namely, the assumption that Letter 113 does not mention the *Church History*. The letter speaks principally in categories, not specific titles. It says that he had written works "against the Arians and Eunomians". There is no extant dogmatic work of Theodoret's corresponding to that characterization – but why could it not be an excellent description of the *Church History* itself? The attack on Arianism in all its forms was the chief point of the whole work.

It has in fact long been known that *Epist. Sirm.* 113 should be used with great caution in dating Theodoret's works. As G. Bardy warned in 1946, this letter and the others from that period (82, 116, and 146 [145]) were designed by Theodoret to show "*qu'il n'a pas eu à changer d'opinion et qu'il a toujours fidèlement suivi l'enseignement de l'Église*". For this reason, the lists he gave of his works were incomplete : "*ne se préoccupe-t-il pas de citer tous ses ouvrages*", nor did he list them in chronological order.[8] Bardy's judgment was quoted with approval by Martin Brok in 1949, in the latter's discussion of the date of Theodoret's commentary on the book of Psalms[9] (a matter closely connected with the dating of the *Church History*).

Finally, perhaps the most damaging argument of all against the presently accepted date for the writing of the *Church History* (that is, the attempt to date it between August, 449 and July 28, 450) comes from *Epist. Sirm.* 146 (145). This is a letter to the monks of Constantinople, which is dated in Azéma's edition to the first half of 451, just after Theodoret had triumphantly returned from exile to regain his see. Theodosius II would now be dead, and Pulcheria and Marcian would be reigning; hence the *Church History* would already have been written by this time, as is recognized by all modern scholars.[10] But Letter 146(145) also gives one of these typical lists of Theodoret's works, against the Jews, the pagans, the Arians, the Eunomians, and so on, and again, the *Church History* is not mentioned explicitly by name. The list in Letter 113 cannot be used to prove the

nonexistence of the *Church History* in the autumn of 449 if the almost exactly similar list written in 451 also fails to mention it by name. Any failure, by Theodoret, to mention the *Church History* explicitly in a list of his writings, is clearly of no significance at all. He leaves it out of such lists even after we know the work has already been written.

It has thus been shown that there are a number of reasons why it is impossible to accept Parmentier and Scheidweiler's dating of the *Church History*, with their insistence that it had to have been written after Theodoret's letter to Leo (*Epist. Sirm.* 113) in 449. To summarize the evidence once again: (1) Letter 113 did not mention the *Church History* but also did not mention one other work (the *Historia religiosa*) which is normally considered to have already been written by then. (2) The few months between August, 449 and July 28, 450 would have been a very short period in which to compose both these historical works, and one in which Theodoret had far more pressing concerns to occupy his time. (3) Letter 113 would not necessarily have mentioned works in which Theodoret's Christological dogmas were not discussed. (4) An almost exactly similar list of Theodoret's works in Letter 82 (December 448) explicitly says that the list is only partial: "and in addition to these, so many others that I cannot cite them one by one". (5) Letter 113 specifically said that it was listing works written twelve to twenty years previously, which means that it provides as a *terminus post quem*, not the year 449, but the year 437. (6) When Letter 113 speaks of works written "against the Arians and Eunomians", the only surviving work by Theodoret which fits that category is the *Church History*, so that it may in fact be completely incorrect to say that Theodoret does not mention its existence in the letter. (7) Scholars such as G. Bardy and Martin Brok have found, in attempting to date other writings of Theodoret (such as his commentary on the Psalms), that the list in Letter 113 should be used only with great caution, and can lead one astray. (8) To further support the contention that Theodoret's letters give only partial listings of the works he has written, Letter 146(145), written in 451, also fails to mention the *Church History* by name. If the failure to mention the *Church History* in a list written in 451 does not deter Parmentier and Scheidweiler from saying that the work had already been written by July of 450, how can the failure to mention the *Church History* in a list written in 449 (Letter 113) be used by them as proof that the work had not been

written at that time? The lists of works given in Theodoret's letters are therefore of only limited value. If they mention a specific work it can be used as positive evidence that the work was already in existence by that time, but failure to mention titles of other works is completely valueless as negative evidence.

In consequence, it is necessary to go back to earlier work done on Theodoret to find other ideas for dating the History. Valesius,[11] who produced the great seventeenth-century editions of all five of the major early church historians, made a few statements in this regard. He pointed out that Theodoret's work mentioned the return of John Chrysostom's remains to Constantinople (Theod. *H.E.* V.36.1-2), an event which took place with great ceremony in 438.[12] Therefore with certainty Theodoret's history had to have been written after this date. But Valesius tried to show further that the work was written even after 448, because he believed that Theod. *H.E.* V.3.8 referred explicitly to the controversy centering around Eutyches.[13] But the notion of "one nature of the flesh and the Godhead" had clearly been current long before 448, and one is in fact given no real help in dating Theodoret's history from that passage.

Further work was done in the nineteenth century. A. Güldenpenning mentioned the description of the return of John Chrysostom's body to Constantinople in 438,[14] and pointed out further that the incident referred to in Theod. *H.E.* V.37.5–6a was part of a war with Persia which took place in 441 or 442.[15] Several years later, Blomfield Jackson argued that the latest datable event in Theodoret's *Church History* was the reference in v. 39. 6 to the accession of the Sassanian king, Yazdgard II, in 438 (or possibly 439).[16] But the Persian war referred to by Güldenpenning was clearly later than Jackson's accession date, so one must take the date of the war as the crucial one, and set a *terminus post quem* of 441 or 442 for the *Church History*.

For the *terminus ante quem*, Güldenpenning showed that early August of 449 (that is, *before* the Robber Council of Ephesus) was the latest the History could have been written. Theod. *H.E.* v. 36. 4 referred to Theodosius II's "sisters" in the plural. The famous Pulcheria outlived Theodosius, but the other three, Güldenpenning pointed out, all died before he did, the last in 449: Flaccilla (June 17, 397–431), Arcadia (April 3, 400–444), Marina (February 11, 403–August 3, 449). Therefore Theodoret could not have spoken of Theodosius II's sisters in the plural after August 3, 449.[17] Güldenpenning then attempted to

specify the date of composition of Theodoret's history even more closely, in 448/49 to be precise, but his arguments do not seem strong here.[18]

One is therefore left unable to specify the exact date at which Theodoret's history was written. One can only say that it must been somewhere between 441 (or 442) and August of 449.[19] This may seem unsatisfactory, but it is necessary to be clear that one cannot say with any certainty whether Theodoret wrote his history *before or after* Socrates' (finished between 438 and 443) and Sozomen's (written not long after the summer of 443).[20] Although it can be proven positively that Sozomen had access to a copy of Socrates' history and used it heavily as an unacknowledged source,[21] one cannot even use the argument of relative chronological priority to suggest the possible literary relationship Theodoret's history bore to those other two histories. This is unless, of course, one accepts the hypothesis that Socrates' history was written as background research for the staff of legal experts who were compiling Book XVI of the Theodosian Code, in which case the history would have had to have been essentially finished well before February 15, 438, when the Code was officially promulgated.[22] That one possibility would give Socrates' history clear chronological priority, by at least three or four years, over Theodoret's work.

Nevertheless, whatever particular solution is chosen to the problem of chronology and literary relationship, it has no effect on the usefulness of Theodoret's *Church History* to the modern historian. Parmentier and Scheidweiler, for example, believed that Theodoret knew and made use of both Socrates' and Sozomen's work, but also argued that even in that event the evidence showed that he had checked all the original sources for himself before writing. Their interpretation was that Theodoret, as a bishop and sophisticated theologian, had simply not trusted two laymen to understand the documentary evidence they had found.[23] As a result, Theodoret must be treated in this sense as an independent witness, and gives the modern historian much valuable material, particularly in the form of documents which he cites which have not been preserved in any other surviving works.[24]

NOTES

[1] Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, Vol. III (Utrecht and Antwerp 1963) 551. Berthold Altaner and Alfred Stuiber, *Patrologie*, 7th ed. (Freiburg 1966) 227.

[2] Léon Parmentier (ed.), *Theodoret Kirchengeschichte*, 2nd ed. rev. by Felix Scheidweiler, GCS (Berlin 1954) xxv-xxvi.

[3] One must also compare the lists in others of Theodoret's letters from the same period, for example, *Epist. Sirm.* 82 and 116.

[4] Quasten, Vol. 3, 550.

[5] The best recent treatment of Nestorius' actual theological position (and the construction of the *Bazaar of Heracleides*) is Roberta C. Chesnut, The Two Prosopa in Nestorius' *Bazaar of Heracleides*, *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S. 29(1978)392–409. See also Luise Abramowski, *Untersuchungen zum Liber Heraclidis des Nestorius*, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium Vol. 242, Subsidia T. 22 (Louvain 1963) and Luigi I. Scipioni, *Nestorio e il concilio di Efeso : Storia dogma critica* (Milan 1974).

[6] *Epist. Sirm.* 82: "And so that no one should imagine that it is out of fear that I now speak thus, it is possible for anyone who wishes, to read my most ancient writings, those from before the Council of Ephesus, and those after it, back more than twelve years ago. For by the grace of God, we have written commentaries on all the prophets, the Psalter, and the Apostle: we have also written of old against those who follow the beliefs of Arius, against those who have contracted the illness of Macedonius, against the over-subtle pedantry of Apollinarius, and against the raging madness of Marcion. And in each of these works, by the grace of my God, I make the orthodox understanding shine forth. A mystical book has also been written by us, and others on providence, and others against the questions of the Magi, and the lives of the saints, *and in addition to these, so many others that I cannot cite them one by one.*"

[7] Theod. *H.E.* V.36.1–2 refers to the return of John Chrysostom's remains to Constantinople in 438.

[8] G. Bardy, Théodoret, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Vol. 15, Part 1 (Paris 1946), cols. 299–325, see espec. col. 303. Bardy did not, however, follow his own warning, and used Letters 82, 113, and 116 (written in 449) to date Theodoret's *Church History* after the time of their writing (col. 314).

[9] Martin Brok, Touchant la date du Commentaire sur le Psautier de Théodoret de Cyr, *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 44 (1949)552–556.

[10] Because, as has previously been noted, Theod. *H.E.* V.36.1 refers to Theodosius II as "the "now-reigning emperor".

[11] There is an interesting short sketch of his life, including his marriage, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., s.v. Henri de Valois.

[12] Henricus Valesius, Praefatio, in *Theodoriti [sic] episcopi Cyri et Evagrii Scholastici historia ecclesiastica* ..., ed. and trans. Henricus Valesius (Paris 1673), p. B iv obverse. Reprinted in Theodoret of Cyrrhus, *Ecclesiastica Historia*, ed. Thomas Gaisford (Oxford 1854), p. x. One of the most recent treatments of Chrysostom's exile and posthumous rehabilitation is in Timothy E. Gregory, *Vox Populi: Popular Opinion and Violence in the Religious Controversies of the Fifth Century A.D.* (Columbus, Ohio 1979), see chapter 3, and espec. p. 66 and p. 79 note 148.

[13] Valesius, p. B iii reverse; reprinted in Gaisford, p. viii.

[14] A. Güldenpenning, *Die Kirchengeschichte des Theodoret von Kyrrhos: Eine Untersuchung ihrer Quellen* (Halle 1889) 21.

[15] Güldenpenning, 21–22. This same event was used by Martin Brok to help establish the possible date of composition of Theodoret's commentary on the book of Psalms, in an article, 'Touchant la date du Commentaire sur le Psautier de Théodoret de Cyr',

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, 44 (1949) 552–556. Brok's article, and the arguments advanced there, were called to my attention by Prof. Jerry Stewardson, for which I am most grateful. Theodoret *H.E.* V.37 gives, first, an account of an invasion of the Huns in A.D. 434 under Rhoilas (V.37.4). It then moves, second, to a description of an invasion by the Persians which was frustrated by divinely sent thunderstorms and hail, which slowed their advance and gave the Romans time to muster a defense (V.37.5–6a). Third, it describes an event during "the previous war" with the Persians (καὶ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ δὲ πολέμῳ), in which the Persian king Vahrām V besieged Theodosiopolis; the war in question occurring in 421-422 (V.37.6b–9). This means that the second incident, with the thunderstorms and hail, had to have occurred as part of a major war with Persia which took place during Theodosius II's reign (401–450) but *after* the war of 421–422. As Martin Brok points out, the only other Persian war of which we have record during this period was the war of 441 or 442. This is therefore the *terminus post quem* for the composition of Theodoret's *Church History*.

Brok (in the article mentioned) dates the war in 441. Arthur Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen and Paris 1944) 283, dates the war in 442. One must also note one counter-interpretation. Otto Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, Vol. 6 (Stuttgart 1966; reprint of the 1920 edition) 86–87, places the incident in which the Persian invasion force was slowed by thunderstorm and hail at the end of the *first* Persian war, in late 422 or early 423. But Theodoret would surely have used "this war" or "the same war", or some such words in his connective phrase (V.37.6b) rather than "the previous war" if it had been meant to be read as Seeck interpreted it. Brok certainly seems correct (p. 555) in rejecting Seeck's interpretation of the passage.

[16] Blomfield Jackson, 'Life and Writings', prefacing his trans. of the writings of Theodoret in the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Second Series, Vol. III (Grand Rapids, Michigan [1892]), p. xiii. Jackson himself dated Yazdgard II's accession to 440, but modern scholarship puts it one or two years earlier. Arthur Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen and Paris 1944) 282, says that Yazdgard II came to the throne in 438 or 439. R. Ghirshman, *Iran* (Baltimore, Md. 1954) 299–300, puts the date at 438, as also does Franz Altheim and Ruth Stiehl, *Ein Asiatischer Staat: Feudalismus unter den Sasaniden und ihren Nachbarn* (Wiesbaden 1954) table 7.

[17] Güldenpenning, 22–23.

[18] Güldenpenning, 23–25.

[19] This dating has already been given, without the full supporting arguments, in Glenn F. Chesnut, *The First Christian Histories: Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius* (Paris 1977) 201 note 34.

[20] *Ibid.*, 167 and 193.

[21] *Ibid.*, 197.

[22] The hypothesis advanced in Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 168–169.

[23] Parmentier and Scheidweiler, p. xxiii, and ff. Quasten, Vol. 3, 551; Altaner and Stuiber, 7th ed., 227.

[24] Parmentier and Scheidweiler, p. xvii.

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DIE VORKONSTANTINISCHE CHRISTLICHE KUNST IN NEUEM LICHTE: DIE CLEVELAND-STATUETTEN

VON

WOLFGANG WISCHMEYER

I

Die im Jahre 1965 vom Cleveland Museum of Art im New Yorker Kunsthandel erworbene[1] und seitdem unter dem Namen Cleveland-Statuetten bekanntgewordene[2] Gruppe von 11 Statuetten, sechs Porträtbüsten und fünf Statuetten religiöser Thematik, darunter vier Jonasstatuetten, ist in mehrfacher Hinsicht aufregend: vom Genus der Rundplastik her, von der ungewöhnlichen ikonographischen Fassung der Darstellungen der Jonasgeschichte wie von der Datierung her, schließlich aber von der Bedeutung der Gruppe im Zusammenhang der Genese frühchristlicher Kunst.

Eine Untersuchung der Statuettengruppe[3] wird von den Porträtbüsten ausgehen (Abb. 1–2).[4] Sie sind wie die übrigen Statuetten mit ihren Basen aus einem Stück gearbeitet. Die Büsten sind unterlebensgroß. Mit ihren Sockeln haben sie folgende Maße: ungefähr 35 cm Höhe, 20 cm Breite und 12 cm Tiefe. Der auf der Vorderseite profilierte Sockel geht in den zentralen Stützpfeiler über. Der eigentliche Büstenkörper ist wie oft bei unterlebensgroßen Statuen hohl.[5] Auf der Vorderseite wird das Pfeilerstück zwischen Büste und Sockel durch eine kleine Inschriftentafel kaschiert. Keine der Büsten trägt eine Inschrift.

Die sechs Büsten zeigen nicht sechs verschiedene Personen, vielmehr erkennen wir in den individualisierten Porträts ein und dasselbe Paar, das dreimal dargestellt ist. Die männlichen Köpfe zeigen einen Mann mittleren Alters. Der Kopf ist nach den natürlichen Proportionen aufgebaut.

Ein individueller Porträtzug ist der runde Oberschädel. Das kurzgeschnittene Haar schließt über der relativ hohen Stirn in einer charakteristischen M-Form ab. Der Backen- und Kinnbart ist flockig, nicht übermäßig stark, der Schnurrbart nur angedeutet. Das Profil zeigt eine

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gerade Nase, von deren unauffällig gearbeiteter Wurzel die wenig geschwungenen Augenbrauenbögen ausgehen. Auch die Brauen sind nur angedeutet. Die Augen zeigen Pupilllenbohrung, sie sind stark zurückgenommen. Die Lider sind schwer. Durch den leicht zur Seite gewendeten Blick erhält das fleischige, polierte Gesicht eine gewisse Lebendigkeit.

Der Aufbau des Frauenporträts ist dem des Männerporträts verwandt. Die Dargestellte scheint etwas jünger zu sein. Ihre Backen sind gerundeter und fülliger. Das runde Kinn hebt sich deutlich heraus. Zu den individuellen Zügen gehören die schmaleren Lippen und die leichte Adlernase. Die Frau trägt die Scheitelzopffrisur. Das in lockeren Wellen mit Mittelscheitel zurückgekämmte Haar läßt die Ohren frei. Der vielsträhnig geflochtene Zopf wird vom Nacken über den Hinterkopf steil zum Scheitel geführt und dort nach innen umgeschlagen.

Die drei männlichen und drei weiblichen Büsten lassen sich einander aufgrund der Blickrichtungen und der Kleidung eindeutig zuordnen. Dabei ergibt sich zweimal die gewöhnliche Stellung eines Paares: der Mann zur Linken der Frau. Einmal hat der Mann dagegen die Frau zu seiner Linken.[6]

Der Mann trägt über der Tunica einen Schultermantel, der auf der rechten Schulter von einer Fibel gehalten wird.[7] Zweimal ist sein Mantel mit summarisch angedeuteten Fransen besetzt. Die Frau trägt über der Tunica eine kunstvoll drapierte Palla, in einem Fall darüber einen langen, trabeaartigen Überwurf, der mit einem sehr ruhigen, reduzierten Rankenmotiv geschmückt ist. Wir kennen diesen Überwurf von Beispielen, die in die Zeit zwischen 200 und 550 n. Chr. gehören.[8] Die am reichsten ausgestattete weibliche Büste gehört der Blickrichtung nach mit demjenigen Männerporträt zusammen, dessen Schultermantel von einer Scheibenfibel gehalten wird.

Zur Datierung der Büsten hat Wixom antiquarische und stilistische Argumente herangezogen. Zunächst zum Antiquarischen. Wixom[9] zeigt überzeugend die Verwandtschaft der weiblichen Haartracht unserer Statuetten mit derjenigen der Ulpia Severina, der Gemahlin Kaiser Aurelians (270–275),[10] und der Magnia Urbica, der Gemahlin des Kaisers Carinus (283).[11]

In denselben Zeitraum läßt sich das Frauenporträt auch stilistisch einordnen. Die besten Parallelen bietet die südkleinasiatische Plastik, wenn man etwa bei Inan-Rosenbaum Frauenköpfe aus der zweiten Hälfte des 3. Jh.s z.B. aus Antalya vergleicht. Wir finden außer der

gleichen Frisur dieselbe fleischige Modellierung, hinter der der Schädelaufbau nicht vernachlässigt ist, weiter diesselbe Behandlung der Augenpartie und des Mundes.[12]

Auch bei dem Männerporträt ist die Körperlichkeit der Darstellung noch nicht geschwunden. Das Porträt steht des Näheren in der Nachfolge des Gallienporträts (252-268), wenn man von der Haartracht absieht. Wir kommen also auch hier in die zweite Hälfte des 3. Jh.s. Und auch hier zeigt der Vergleich mit der südkleinasiatischen Porträtplastik[13] eine deutliche technische und stilistische Verwandtschaft. Bei einem Kopf aus Side[14] aus der Mitte des 3. Jh.s finden wir einen ähnlichen Gebrauch des Meißels für die Haar- und des Bohrers für die Bartbehandlung.[15] Die Art der Augenbohrung ist identisch. Der Porträtierte hat ebenfalls denselben M-förmigen Haarabschluß.

Aus dem Gesagten schließen wir: die sechs Porträtbüsten stammen aus der zweiten Hälfte des 3. Jh.s und finden ihre nächsten Parallelen im phrygisch-pisidischen Raum.[16] Du Bourguet weist darauf hin, daß wir gerade für die Zeit von 240 bis 275 im kleinasiatischen Raum häufig Porträtbüsten-Paare finden.[17]

II

Die eigentliche Überraschung, ja man darf sagen, Sensation, bedeutete der zweite Teil des Fundes. Zu den fünf Statuetten mit religiöser Thematik gehören ein Widderträger und vier Darstellungen aus der biblischen Jonasgeschichte.

Die Statuette des Widderträgers (Ab. 7) ist 50 cm hoch, 26 cm breit und 16 cm tief. Der Hirt[18] steht auf einer unregelmäßig geformten Plinthe. Zu seinen Füßen liegen drei unverhältnismäßig kleine Widder. Ein Baumstumpf hinter dem linken Bein des Hirten dient der Figur als Stütze, desgleichen der knorrige Ast, den der Hirt als Stab in seiner Rechten hält. Der Hirt[19] trägt einen großen Widder auf seinen Schultern. Mit der Linken umfaßt er die Beine des Widders vor der Brust.[20] Der bartlose Jüngling ist mit einer gegürteten Tunica bekleidet.[21] Sein lockiges Haar trägt er in der Mitte gescheitelt und hoch gewellt. Die Rückseite der Statuette ist merklich roher gearbeitet. Auch hier war wie bei den Porträts mit Vorderansicht zu rechnen. Wixom meint, aus der Gedrungenheit des Hirten und seinem übrigen Oberkörper auf einen ursprünglich erhöhten Standort schließen zu können.[22]

Für die stilistische Einordnung sind vor allem die hohe lockere Haarfrisur mit reichlichem Bohrergebrauch[23] und der sogenannte Himmelsblick[24] bedeutsam, die sich letztlich von einem hellenistischen Alexandertypos herleiten.[25] Entsprechende jugendliche Köpfe kennen wir aus dem 3. Jh. aus Kleinasien.[26] Auch eine Hirtenstatuette aus Dokimeion, jetzt in Istanbul, läßt sich im Typos vergleichen.[27] Der Kontrapost unserer Statuette fügt sich überdies in die stilistischen Tendenzen ein, die wir in Kleinasien in der zweiten Hälfte des 3. Jh.s finden.[28]

Bei dem stilistischen Vergleich mit den Porträtbüsten der Clevelandgruppe ist zu berücksichtigen, daß die Formate unterschiedlich sind und daß es sich bei dem Hirten nicht um ein individuelles Porträt, sondern um einen Idealtypus handelt. Doch zeigt die Hirtenstatuette diesselben technisch-handwerklichen Charakteristika wie die Büsten: den Gebrauch des Bohrers im Haar des Hirten und im Bart des Mannes, ebenso die summarische Faltengebung, deren V-Falten zum Teil nur angedeutet sind.

Nun will Schumacher neuerdings in seinen Studien über den Hirten unsere Statuette ans Ende des 4. Jh.s datieren und ordnet sie dem sogenannten „subtilen Stil"[29] zu. Diese Zuordnung vermag aber angesichts der kleinasiatischen Beispiele des 3. Jh.s nicht zu überzeugen.[30] Auch für den Hirten ergibt sich eine Datierung in die 2. Hälfte des 3. Jh.s und eine Lokalisierung nach Kleinasien, und es spricht nichts gegen eine Entstehung dieser Statuette in derselben Werkstatt, in der die Porträtbüsten hergestellt wurden.

Zwei der vier Jonasstatuetten zeigen gleichermaßen vollkommen rundplastische Bearbeitung (Abb. 3–4). Vom Aufbau wie von der Thematik her bilden sie ein Paar. Dargestellt ist Jonas, wie er vom Meerdrachen verschlungen und wieder entlassen wird. Der Seedrache, griechisch Ketos, darf seinem Typus nach zu den kühnsten antiken Meerwesendarstellungen gerechnet werden:[31] ein Eberkopf mit vielen Zähnen, ein gewundener Fischleib mit Löwenpranken, dazu Flügel. Der hochgebäumte Leib des verschlingenden Ketos ist mit 52 cm Höhe bei 16 cm Breite und 26 cm Tiefe die höchste Statuette unserer Gruppe. Das ausspeiende Ketos ist dagegen nur 41 cm hoch, aber 22 cm breit und 38 cm tief.

Von dem verschlungenen Jonas sehen wir noch die Beine von den Hüften abwärts. Jonas ist wie bei der Ausspeiung nackt vorgestellt. Dort entläßt ihn das Ketos mit ausgestreckten Armen aus seinem Rachen.

Der Kopf des Ausgespieenen ist für uns eine Überraschung. Wir sehen nicht den gewohnten jugendlich bartlosen Jonas, sondern das Gesicht eines älteren bärtigen Mannes mit langem, lockigem Haupthaar[32] – ein geläufiger hellenistischer Typus.[33] Haar und Bart zeigen starken Bohrergebrauch.[34] Beide Statuetten haben unverhältnismäßig viele Stützen.

Das gilt auch von der Figur des betenden Jonas (Ab. 5). Diese Statuette ist 47 cm hoch, 14 cm breit und 21 cm tief. Der Beter[35] steht auf einer unregelmäßig geformten, vorn profilierten Basis in Gebetshaltung mit nach vorn erhobenen Armen und nach oben gewandtem Kopf. Er nimmt diesselbe kontrapostische Stellung ein wie der Hirt (Ab. 7) und ist zudem ähnlich wie dieser gekleidet: mit Stiefeln, kurzer, gegürteter Tunika, – hier mit Ärmeln –, hinten hängender Tasche.[36] Auch diese Statuette ist hinten nur roh bearbeitet. Hirt und Beter bilden vom Aufbau und von der Gewandbehandlung her ein zweites zusammengehöriges Paar. Daß dieser Beter nicht eine einfache Orantenfigur, sondern der betende Jonas ist, zeigt sein Kopf, der von demselben Typus wie der des ausgespieenen Jonas ist.[37]

Ebendenselben Typus zeigt der Kopf des ruhenden Jonas (Ab. 6). Diese letzte unserer Statuetten hat, durch das Thema bedingt, ein besonderes Format. Sie ist 46 cm breit, 32 cm hoch und 18 cm tief. Die untere Hälfte der Rückseite ist wieder fast unbearbeitet. Der ältere, bärtige Jonas, bekleidet mit einer ärmellosen, gegürteten Tunica, ruht mit locker übereinandergeschlagenen Beinen auf einer Bodenwelle, über die ein Tuch gebreitet ist.[38] Er stützt sich auf den linken Arm, die linke Hand hängt entspannt vor der Brust herunter. Den rechten Arm hat er in der typischen Schlafgebärde, die er von den Darstellungen des schlafenden Endymion und Dionysos geerbt hat,[39] hoch über den Kopf geführt. Aus der felsigen Bodenwelle, die den Schläfer nach hinten zu überragt, so daß er wie in einer Höhle ruht, wächst der Flaschenkürbis, der dem Ruhenden nach LXX und den altsyrischen Bibelübersetzungen statt des Rhizinus der hebräischen Bibel Schatten spendet.[40] Die durchbrochen gearbeitete Kürbislaube erinnert von der Technik her an Orpheusstatuetten, besonders an die aus Sabratha aus der ersten Hälfte des 3. Jh.s, die einer Werkstatt aus Aphrodisias in Kleinasien zugewiesen wird.[41]

Die stilistische Verwandtschaft zwischen Hirt (Ab. 7) und Beter (Ab. 5) ist evident. Andererseits sind die Köpfe des ausgespieenen (Ab. 4), des betenden (Ab. 5) und des ruhenden Jonas (Ab. 6) fast

identisch. Drittens bildet der Ausgespieene (Ab. 4) mit dem Verschlungenen (Ab. 3) ein Statuenpaar. Alle fünf Statuetten mit religiösen Themen gehören also stilistisch zusammen. Das bedeutet, daß wir die vier Jonasstatuetten wie den Hirten zu den Porträts stellen und in die 2. Hälfte des 3. Jh.s nach Kleinasien setzen müssen.

III

Wenn man nun nach diesem Urteil den Stil der Gruppe näher bestimmen will, stellt sich zunächst die schon genannte Schwierigkeit in den Weg, auf die Kitzinger jüngst ebenfalls aufmerksam macht:[42] bei dem einen Teil des Fundes handelt es sich um Porträts, bei dem anderen Teil um Statuetten, die in der Nachfolge mythologischer und idyllischer Thematik stehen. Verschiedene Thematik bedingt aber verschiedene Darstellungsmodi.

Zu den gattungsbestimmten Zügen der Statuetten gehört aus der genannten Tradition mythologischer und idyllischer Plastik die Politur mit ihren ästhetischen Effekten. Hierher gehört als zweiter Stilzug die weiche Körperlichkeit von Köpfen und Figuren. Drittens zeigt sich im Aufbau der Ketosstatuetten (Abb. 3–4) wie auch bei der Kürbislaube (Ab. 6) eine gewisse späthellenistische Manieriertheit.

Neben diesen nur für die Statuetten geltenden gattungsbedingten Stilzügen stehen nun aber andere Stilmerkmale, die auch für die Porträtbüsten gelten, und dieselbe technisch-handwerkliche Bearbeitung des Marmors bei beiden Teilgruppen. Wir sehen dieselbe Bohrung des Bartes, dieselbe Art der Faltengebung, vor allem aber dieselbe Flauheit der Gesichtsbehandlung, die sich bei den religiösen Statuetten auch auf die Gestaltung der Gliedmaßen erstreckt. Die Porträtbüsten ihrerseits gehören der Stilstufe des „leichten Impressionismus" an, wie l'Orange diesen Stil bezeichnet.[43]

Stilistisch ist die ganze Gruppe noch nicht eigentlich spätantik.[44] Sie ist vielmehr einem kaiserzeitlichen Kunstkreis in Kleinasien zugehörig, der noch durch späte hellenistische Strömungen geprägt ist. Daraus erklärt sich auch der Umstand, daß wir in der zeitlichen frühesten christlichen Sarkophagplastik Roms, die dieselben Themen darstellt, keine stilistischen Parallelen zu unseren Hirten- Jonasfiguren finden.

IV

Hirtenfiguren,[45] Betende[46] und Darstellungen aus der Jonasgeschichte[47] gehören zu den beliebtesten Themen frühchristlicher Kunst – ja, sie sind für die vorkonstantinische Zeit der christlichen Kunst geradezu typisch. In einem zweiten Teil unserer Untersuchung wollen wir nun fragen, in welcher Weise und in welchem Sinne diese Bildthemen in unserer Clevelandgruppe dargestellt werden.

Über den Hirten als Bildthema hat Schumacher in seiner schon erwähnten Studie jüngst umfassend gehandelt.[48] Er zeigt die große Breite der Darstellungstypen des Hirtenthemas auf dem Hintergrund der ländlich-bukolischen Thematik der kaiserzeitlichen Kunst auf. In diesem Rahmen ist der Typus unserer Clevelandstatuette (Ab. 7) zu sehen. Es handelt sich um einen sogenannten Guten Hirten, d.h. um einen Hirten, der einen Widder oder ein Schaf auf seinen Schultern trägt. Das beliebte kaiserzeitliche Motiv stammt aus vorklassischer orientalischer Tradition.[49] Die Bezeichnung „Guter Hirte" trifft erst für späte Beispiele dieses Typus zu, den die Christen sekundär auf Christus deuteten.[50] Unser Darstellungstyp: stabhaltender Widderträger inmitten einer Gruppe von Widdern, ist geläufig. Aber die vollplastische Gestaltung dieses Themas ist im 3. Jh. ganz selten. Schumacher zählt drei Beispiele[51] – ohne die Clevelandstatuette, die er, wie erwähnt, für später hält. Nun zeigen Schumachers Beispiele alle drei den Typus des älteren, bärtigen Hirten. Damit ist unsere Statuette des jugendlichen Widderträgers das älteste uns bekannte Stück dieses Darstellungstypus für die Gattung der Freiplastik. Die Clevelandstatuette des sogenannten Guten Hirten ist also eine wichtige Ergänzung zu Schumachers Katalog, zumal in ihrem excellent guten Erhaltungszustand, den sonst kein Beispiel zeigt.

Anders als die Bildthematik der Hirtenstatuette führen uns die vier Jonasdarstellungen direkt in die Anfänge frühchristlicher Kunst selbst. Die vorkonstantinische christliche Kunst kennt die Bildthemen von Meerwurf, Entlassung und Ruhe des Jonas.[52] Die letzte ist die beliebteste der drei Szenen.[53] Zugleich sind in der vorkonstantinischen christlichen Kunst die Jonasszenen die am häufigsten bezeugten biblischen Bildthemen. Sie begegnen in allen sicher christlichen Grabstätten des 3. Jh.s[54] und auf den meisten Sepulkralreliefs.[55]

Im Vergleich mit den bisher bekannten vorkonstantinischen Jonasdarstellungen zeigen die vier Clevelandstatuetten einen neuen ikono-

graphischen Zug bei den drei bekannten Bildthemen und die neue Szene des betenden Jonas. Die Abweichungen von der bekannten Ikonographie betreffen den Jonastypus: Jonas ist langlockig, bärtig und bekleidet. Nicht der schöne nackte Jüngling ruht in der Laube, sondern der bärtige, ältere, bekleidete Prophet.[56]

Wenn wir nun den Jonasstatuetten nachgehen wollen, müssen wir die besondere Bildthematik unseres vierszenigen Zyklus mit dem bekannten, schon erwähnten dreiszenigen Zyklus der römischen Denkmäler vergleichen (Ab. 10). Dieser römische Zyklus steht, so weit wir wissen, am Anfang der christlichen Kunst überhaupt. Er ist in den sogenannten Sakramentskapellen der ersten römischen Katakombe S. Callisto belegt, deren Malereien um 220 datiert werden.[57]

Vor den Vergleich beider Zyklen stelle ich eine kurze Würdigung des Zyklus in S. Callisto. Denn dieser Jonaszyklus, der für uns am Anfang der christlichen Kunst steht, ist ein Schlüsselbeispiel für die Eigenart der entstehenden christlichen Kunst, bekannte mythologische und bukolisch-maritime Bildtypen zu einem mehrszenigen, erzählenden Zyklus von Darstellungen einer bestimmten biblischen Geschichte neu zusammenzufügen. Die Darstellungen der Jonasgeschichte dürften nicht eigens für diesen Armenfriedhof des Calixt – wie wir diese erste christliche Katakombe zu verstehen haben[58] – erfunden sein. Vielmehr wurde dort ein biblischer Zyklus dargestellt, in dem schon bekannte kaiserzeitliche Bildtypen aus der Malerei – so Nillandschaften[59] und Meerwesen – und aus der Reliefplastik – so Meerwesen,[60] Endymion-[61] und Dionysosdarstellungen[62] – adaptiert und kombiniert waren.[63] Trotzdem liegt bei dieser Katakombenmalerei von Anfang an eine – in ihrer Auswahl selbstverständlich interpretierende – Darstellung des Geschicks des Propheten, also eine biblische Darstellung vor. Träger dieser ältesten Zeugnisse christlicher Kunst in den Katakomben, die die Jonasthematik darstellen, ist die großkirchliche römische Gemeinde.

Zur Zeit der Entstehung der Clevelandstatuetten, also etwa ein Vierteljahrhundert nach dem Zyklus in den Sakramentskapellen von S. Callisto, treffen wir in Rom auf den Beginn erheblicher Modifikationen des dreiszenigen Jonaszyklus. Dabei läßt sich eine doppelte Tendenz feststellen. Einmal zeichnet sich eine Erweiterung ab (Abb. 8–9), zum anderen aber, und das in viel stärkerem Maße und früher, eine Reduktion und Konzentration des ursprünglichen Zyklus (Abb. 11–12). Die sekundäre Erweiterung des Zyklus um die Szene des Jonas irritatus

findet sich nur in der Coemeterialmalerei,[64] wie andererseits die neue Kombinationsszene von Ausspeiung und Ruhe typisch für Sarkophagdeckel wird.[65]

Mit diesem Jonaszyklus aus dem Rom des dritten Jahrhunderts vergleichen wir nun den Clevelandzyklus und seine ikonographischen Eigenarten. Diese Eigenarten bezeugen – ich stelle die These voran – eine besondere Version des Jonaszyklus ein halbes Jahrhundert nach dem ersten dreiszenigen Jonaszyklus in S. Callisto in Rom. Die genannten Unterschiede erlauben nicht, diesen einfach von dem römischen oder dessen Derivaten abhängig zu machen. Denn die mit den Clevelandstatuetten gleichzeitigen Abwandlungen des römischen Zyklus, die ich dargestellt habe, unterscheiden sich grundsätzlich von den Eigenarten des Clevelandzyklus: die vierte römische Szene des Irritatus (Ab. 9) zeigt denselben jugendlich-nackten Jonastypus wie die drei anderen römischen Szenen. Und denselben Typus behält auch die auf Sarkophagen begegnende Reduktion bei (Abb. 11–12). Demgegenüber stellen die vierte Szene der Clevelandstatuetten (Ab. 5) und der andere Jonastypus (Abb. 4–6) nicht derartige Veränderungen des römischen Zyklus dar. Wir verstehen sie deshalb als selbständigen Zyklus und erklären sie mit dem in der Philologie wie in den Kunstwissenschaften gebräuchlichen Modell der Rezensionen. Das bedeutet, daß der römischen Rezension und der Clevelandrezension eine vorgängige zyklische Gestaltung der biblischen Jonasgeschichte zugrundeliegt, deren Archetyp zu Beginn des 3. Jh.s an einem uns unbekannten Ort entstanden ist. Damit darf man nicht mehr, wie bisher üblich, uneingeschränkt von der Entstehung des Jonaszyklus als eines der ältesten christlichen Bildthemen in Rom sprechen.

Wie der Enstehungsort muß auch die Frage offenbleiben, ob es sich bei dem Archetypus um eine illustrierte Handschrift handelt oder aber um ein Musterbuch. Weitzmann postuliert in ganz anderem Zusammenhang ein illustriertes Zwölfprophetenbuch der LXX.[66] In jedem Fall aber verstärkt der um 200 anzusetzende Archetypus des Jonaszyklus die Argumente dafür, daß die christliche Kunst von Anfang an ebenso eine erzählende Art der Darstellung in narrativer Bildfolge kannte wie die sogenannten Kurzszenen. Ja selbst auf Gemmen, die man teilweise einseitig als die eigentlichen Wegbereiter der frühen christlichen Kunst über die Kurzszenen erklären wollte, finden wir narrative Jonasdarstellungen.[67] Auch in dieser für die Diskussion um die Entstehung der christlichen Kunst in jedem Fall

wesentlichen Gattung stehen also neben den Kurzszenen die narrativen Darstellungen. Dabei handelt es sich – das sei schließlich betont – um alttestamentliche Bildthematik, die wir ja überhaupt etwa dreimal so häufig wie die neutestamentliche unter dem „Anfangskapital der christlichen Kunst" finden, wie Klauser formuliert.[68]

Muß der Entstehungsort des Archetypus also offen bleiben, so stellt sich noch die Frage, ob sich die Rezension des Clevelandzyklus ihrerseits nicht lokalisieren läßt. Ich möchte zur näheren Bestimmung dieser Rezension eine Lokalisierung in den Osten vorschlagen. Dieser Vorschlag leitet sich nicht nur aus der stilistischen Einordnung der Porträtbüsten des Clevelandfundes her, sondern aus der speziellen Ikonographie der Jonasstatuetten selbst. Einige bisher ganz disparate Denkmäler der frühchristlichen Kunst des Ostens und entsprechende literarische Hinweise lassen sich nun nämlich an den Clevelandzyklus anschließen, so daß sich eine östliche Jonasikonographie abzeichnet. So ist der bekleidete Jonas neben dem nackten eine ikonographische Form des Ostens.[69] Er erscheint auf Randreliefs christlicher Tischplatten, die aus dem Osten stammen, wie z.B. diejenigen des Louvre.[70] Der bärtige alte Jonas begegnet uns im syrischen Rabbulacodex aus dem Jahre 586.[71] Für das 3. Jh. bezeugt Porphyrius von Tyros die Ruhe des bekleideten Jonas unter der Kürbislaube.[72] Nach Kleinasien, und zwar in die Zeit zwischen 185 und 195, führt uns der Presbyter, der aus Liebe zu Paulus die Acta Pauli und darin den 3. Korintherbrief verfertigte.[73] Dort führt er Jonas als Beispiel für die Auferstehung des Fleisches an: Jonas sei im Bauch des Fisches weder ein Haar noch ein Augenlid verletzt worden[74] – also auch nicht seine Bekleidung. In diesem Zusammenhang ist schließlich eine bei Josephus überlieferte Tradition wichtig, die später von jüdischen und christlichen Exegeten angegriffen wird, daß nämlich Jonas' Gebet nicht im Fisch, sondern erst nach der Ausspeiung stattgefunden habe.[75] Mit diesem Text können wir die Statuette des betenden Jonas (Ab. 5) und Darstellungen auf Gemmen in Verbindung bringen. Der Text, der als anregender oder als illustrierter hinter der östlichen Rezension oder dem Archetypus stand, braucht deshalb nicht der Text der LXX selbst gewesen zu sein, sondern es kann sich um ein auf LXX fußendes Werk gehandelt haben, zumal Josephus selbst verschiedene jüdische Bücher nennt, die sich mit Jonas befassen.[76] So weist auch die Textvorlage zumindest für die Clevelandrezension in den Osten.

V

Wie der Jonaszyklus im Mittelpunkt unserer ikonographischen Überlegungen stand, muß er auch den Ausgangspunkt für die Frage nach dem Sinn und der Bedeutung der Clevelandgruppe bilden.

Auch hier gehen wir wieder von dem römischen Zyklus aus und kommen damit noch einmal von einer anderen Fragestellung her an den Beginn der christlichen Kunst. Nach welchem Prinzip wurden die Szenen unserer Zyklen aus der „didaktisch-ironischen Novelle", wie H. W. Wolff das Jona-Buch nennt,[77] ausgewählt? Für den römischen Zyklus – zum Archetypus können wir hier natürlich nichts Sicheres sagen – ist ausschlaggebend, daß wir ihn in Katakomben und auf Sarkophagen antreffen, also in der Grabeskunst. Von hierher bestimmt sich sein Sinn. Nun hat die Coemeterialkunst der Alten Kirche die Tendenz, Bildtypen aus der nichtchristlichen Coemeterialkunst zu übernehmen und diese möglichst weitgehend einschließlich ihrer Aussageinhalte zu bewahren. Das gilt besonders für die privaten christlichen Grabesdenkmäler. So liegt ein erster Ansatzpunkt für die Auswahl der drei Jonasbilder von Verschlingung, Ausspeiung und Ruhe (Ab. 10) in der engen Beziehung zwischen den Endymion- und Dionysosbildern und dem ruhenden Jonas. Als Sinngehalt dieses Bildes hat Engemann die Privatapotheose bzw. das Hoffnungsbild des christlichen Verstorbenen herausgearbeitet.[78] Das zweite Motiv liefert die Exegese der frühen Zeit, die, wie Yves-Marie Duval gezeigt hat, die Jonasgeschichte vom Jonaszeichen her ganz auf die Auferstehung bezog,[79] was umso mehr für die Volksfrömmigkeit gegolten haben dürfte. Von daher kam es zur Gestaltung der Hoffnungsbilder vom Verschlingen und Ausspeien als dem „Zeichen des Jona". Soweit der römische Zyklus.

Anders steht es bei der Jonasgruppe in Cleveland – über den Sinngehalt der östlichen Rezension im Allgemeinen können wir ebensowenig wie zum Archetypus sagen. Bei der Clevelandgruppe also ist der Kontext von Betendem und Hirten zu berücksichtigen, in dem die drei klassischen Jonasszenen hier stehen. Nun können Hirt und Orantentypus selbstverständlich im coemeterialen Sinne verwendet werden, wie ihr häufiges Vorkommen in Katakomben und auf Sarkophagen zeigt. Andererseits verkörpern Hirt und Meereswesen, zu denen eine Orans treten kann, in zahlreichen Beispielen der nichtchristlichen, nichtcoemeterialen Kunst der Zeit die Idee eines universalen Friedens

terra marique, wie Schumacher dargelegt hat. Daß das Christentum diesen Sinnzusammenhang übernehmen und durch die Jonaskonnotation gleichzeitig in einem biblischen Sinne modifizieren konnte, zeigt exemplarisch das große Fußbodenmosaik in Aquileia aus den Jahren um 325.[80] Hier wurden bei der Adaption des Kaiserpalastes für einen Kirchenraum in ein großes Fußbodenmosaik mit maritimen und bukolischen Szenen – darunter ein sog. Guter Hirt – sekundär Jonasdarstellungen eingefügt, um dadurch die neutralen Motive zu christianisieren. Dabei fehlt jeder sepulkrale Zusammenhang. So kann es sich bei der Auswahl der Szenen für unsere Clevelandstatuetten ebenso um Hoffnungsbilder der Grabeskunst handeln wie um die schöne Friedensidylle biblischer Fassung, dargestellt im Genrebereich. Die Sinnsprache des reinen – auch des biblischen – Bildes bleibt zwei-, besser: vieldeutig.

Wie sich schon andeutete, weist uns die Frage nach dem Sinn unserer Clevelandgruppe auf die Frage nach ihrer Funktion. Denn die Bedeutung des Dargestellten hängt zum Teil von der gewählten Gattung ab, die ihrerseits einer bestimmten Funktion zugeordnet ist. So erhoffen wir uns von einer präzisen Frage nach der Funktion unserer Gruppe weiteren Aufschluß über ihren Sinngehalt.

Zum Vergleich mit unseren Statuetten ziehen wir die zeitgleiche Kleinplastik von etwa 40 cm bis zu einem Meter Höhe heran. Zunächst ist eine Gruppe von Pfeilerstatuetten in unserem Zusammenhang interessant.[81] Die Pfeiler zeigen Darstellungen des Widder- oder Schafträgers, des Orpheus und anderer mythologischer Themen. Diese Plastiken sind mit Lehmann-Hartleben und anderen Gelehrten als Tischfüße zu verstehen.[82] Für einen Teil von ihnen gilt die Interpretation als Füße von Grabmensen.[83] Nun handelt es sich bei den Clevelandstatuetten nicht um solche Tischfüße, trotzdem geben diese einen Hinweis auf Zusammenhänge möglicher Funktionen unserer Gruppe. Denn die Grabmensen weisen auf eine coemeteriale Funktion, die anderen Tischfüße auf eine allgemeine Dekoration.[84]

Zweitens müssen wir eine Gruppe von Rundplastik heranziehen, die in Nymphäen Aufstellung fand, wie wir aus den Fundumständen der Orpheusstatuette aus Byblos wissen.[85] In dieser Gruppe finden wir neben den schon genannten Themen naturgemäß vor allem maritime Sujets wie Flußgötter und auf Delphinen reitende Eroten. Schmuckfiguren für Brunnen sind ebenso überliefert wie funktionale Brunnenfiguren. Die Funktion als Brunnenschmuck käme für unsere

Statuetten nicht nur von der Jonasthematik her in Frage. Denn wir wissen von Euseb, daß es zu seiner Zeit in Konstantinopel auch einen Brunnen mit einem sogenannten Guten Hirten gab.[86]

Drittens konnten freistehende Statuetten unserer Thematik auch in coemeterialem Kontext verwendet werden. So zeigt der Sarkophag des Guten Hirten in Split auf seiner Frontseite die Statue eines Hirten in eindeutig coemeterialem Kontext.[87] Ein Stück in New York, an den Anfang des 4. Jh.s datiert, zeigt Meerwurf und Ausspeiung des Jonas.[88] In Thematik und Gattung ist dieser Cippus aus Tarsus unseren Statuetten eng verwandt.

Damit ist der Umkreis für die gattungsbedingte Funktionsbestimmung unserer Statuetten abgesteckt. Die Frage lautet: Grabesfunktion oder Brunnenanlage?

Für eine coemeteriale Funktion könnten die Büstenpaare (Abb. 1-2) sprechen. Sie könnten zusammen mit den anderen Statuetten in einem Mausoleum aufgestellt gewesen sein. Derartige Arrangements kennen wir von Darstellungen auf Sarkophagen des 3. Jh.s. Hinzu kommt, daß wir auch das Jonasthema in vorkonstantinischer Zeit sonst nur aus der Grabeskunst kennen. Und die Hirtengestalt begegnet ebenso wir Orantenfiguren in verschiedenen Zusammenhängen, so eben auch sepulkral.

Kitzinger dagegen betont die rein ästhetisch-dekorative Wirkung der Gruppe und vermutet daher, ein begüterter Christ habe sich hier seinen Wunsch nach besonders qualitätvoller Brunnenskulptur erfüllt.[89]

So läßt auch die gattungsbezogene Funktionsuntersuchung zwei Deutungsmöglichkeiten zu. Die Aufstellung in einem Mausoleum[90] erscheint ebenso möglich wie eine ursprüngliche Funktion als Brunnenarrangement. Der Sinngehalt unseres Cleveland-Jonaszyklus läßt sich also auch von hierher nicht eindeutig bestimmen.

VI

Eben dieser Umstand erscheint mir nun aber nicht zufällig. Wir haben gesehen, wie uns die Funktionsbestimmung, die der Sinnfrage zugeordnet war, immer wieder auf die Gattung unserer Clevelandstatuetten als auf eine übergeordnete, verschiedene Sinn- und Funktionsmöglichkeiten integrierende Größe führte. So scheint in der Tat die Gattung entscheidend für das Verständnis der Gruppe zu sein.

Auch hier steht noch einmal die Jonasgruppe (Abb. 3–6) im Vordergrund des Interesses. Denn bei diesen vier Statuetten handelt es sich um Rundplastik mit biblischer Thematik. Derartige Rundplastik kennen wir aber in der frühchristlichen Kunst sonst nicht. Eben von daher kommt der Gattung der Clevelandstatuetten besonderes Interesse bei ihrer Deutung zu.

Bisher hatte die Forschung einmütig angenommen, Rundplastik sei in der Alten Kirche verfemt gewesen – ein Umstand, der die frühchristliche Kunst in einen tiefen Gegensatz zur allgemeinen Kunst der Zeit stellte. Neuerdings beginnt die Forschung zwar, die oft beschworene Bilderfeindlichkeit der Alten Kirche auf die Bilderfeindlichkeit maßgeblicher Theologen zu reduzieren, gleichzeitig bleibt man aber bei der These von Rundbildverbot als einer immer neuen Aktualisierung der Verbote des Dekalogs und von Ex 34,7 und aus der Polemik gegen das Götterbild. Damit bleibt die Bilderfreundlichkeit der Alten Christenheit auf die Flächengattungen Malerei und Reliefplastik beschränkt, bei denen noch zusätzlich eine steigende Tendenz zu Flächigkeit und Raumverlust diagnostiziert werden.[91] Diese Argumentation setzt Zweierlei voraus. Erstens sollen theologische Erwägungen direkt stilbildend gewirkt haben. Zweitens soll eine ganze Gattung antiker Kunst einem biblischen Verdikt zum Opfer gefallen sein. Dem schien der bisherige Überlieferungszustand mit seinen ganz wenigen – nichtbiblischen – Zeugnissen christlicher Rundplastik des 4. und 5. Jh.s zu entsprechen. Trotzdem mußten schon immer wichtige innere Gründe gegen dies Bild von der frühchristlichen Kunst sprechen. Ich nenne die Schwierigkeit, generalisierend von „dem" Stil frühchristlicher Kunst zu sprechen.[92] Ich weise weiter darauf hin, daß die Tendenz zur Flächigkeit einer der Stilzüge spätantiker Kunst überhaupt ist, von der die christliche Kunst nur einen Zweig bildet. Unmöglich ist es drittens, die Erwähnung christlicher Standbilder bei Euseb von Caesarea zu übergehen. Euseb selbst war ja einer jener eher bilderfeindlichen Theologen. Und doch erwähnt er an einigen Stellen seiner Werke christliche Standbilder, ohne dabei auf die Frage des plastischen Bildes einzugehen: so die erzene Gruppe der Heilung der Blutflüssigen in der phönizischen Stadt Panäas[93] und die schon genannte Gruppe mit einem Guten Hirten und Daniel zwischen den Löwen auf einem Brunnen in Konstantinopel.[94] Ich merke nur an, daß es sich beidemale um Städte der östlichen Reichshälfte handelt. Daß nun gerade ein Theologe wie Euseb ohne Polemik von diesen

Standbildern berichtet, setzt das unbestrittene Vorhandensein frühchristlicher Freiplastik auch biblischer Thematik voraus. Hier versagt das Postulat eines biblischen Rigorismus gegenüber der Freiplastik. Die bekannte Hippolytstatue im Vatikan zeigt darüber hinaus, daß selbst rigoristische Kreise der ersten Hälfte des 3. Jh.s keine Scheu vor Statuen kannten.[95]

Die vorgetragenen Erwägungen werden nun durch die Clevelandstatuetten in entscheidender Weise bestätigt. Die Bilderfreundlichkeit der Alten Christenheit eröffnete der jungen christlichen Kunst mehr Möglichkeiten als nur Malerei und Reliefplastik, eben auch die von Freiplastik, ja von Freiplastik mit biblischen Darstellungen. Denn nun läßt sich auch Rundplastik ganz sicher unter den ältesten Zeugen christlicher Kunst mit atl. Thematik belegen.

VII

So ist uns die Gattung unserer Statuetten in der Tat hoch bedeutsam und führt zu einigen abschließenden Bemerkungen.

Die Clevelandstatuetten stellen für uns das älteste Zeugnis christlicher Kunst in Kleinasien dar. Darüber hinaus sind sie die qualitätsvollste Arbeit der vorkonstantinischen christlichen Kunst überhaupt, denn ihr stilistisches und darstellerisches Niveau findet in der westlichen gleichzeitigen Kunst nichts Entsprechendes. Dieser Umstand ist einmal im kleinasiatischen Lokalstil begründet. Andererseits läßt sich im Rahmen des stadtrömischen Stils christlicher Denkmäler des 3. Jh.s eben nicht eine derartige Stilhöhe beobachten. Die Erklärung für eine solche Stilhöhe des Clevelandfundes liegt nun einmal in Rang oder Bildungsniveau und einer entsprechenden Auftragsvergabe des Ehepaares, das unsere Statuetten anfertigen ließ. Denn es handelt sich sicher um Mitglieder der oberen Schichten, wie vor allem die Kleidung zeigt (Abb. 1–2). Doch kennen wir auch entsprechende Auftraggeber unter den Besitzern der römischen Sarkophage der Zeit, deren Stilniveau trotzdem geringer ist. So führt uns hier eher der Hinweis auf die unterschiedliche Auswirkung der decisch-valerianischen Verfolgung im Westen und im Osten weiter. Unser Fund stammt ja aus den Jahren nach dieser großen Verfolgung, und Euseb berichtet zu Beginn von Buch 8 der Kirchengeschichte über die große Prosperität gerade des östlichen Christentums während der Jahrzehnte zwischen der valerianischen und der diokletianischen Verfolgung.[96] Der Clevelandfund

bezeugt ein solches blühendes Christentum in der 2. Hälfte des 3. Jh.s in Kleinasien und ist Ausdruck eines christlichen ästhetischen Geschmacks, der seinen Platz in Wohlstand und religiösem Frieden eines ungehinderten Lebens in der allgemeinen Kultur der Zeit hat. Hier haben wir das Ehepaar zu suchen, das ohne Scheu vor paganer Kunstgattung und ohne theologischen Rigorismus eine Plastikgruppe in Auftrag gab, die bruchlos das Christliche mit einem allgemeinen, neutral-religiösen Kunstgeschmack der Zeit verband. So entstand ein ästhetisch nicht unanspruchvolles, thematisch zeitgemäßes Ensemble, das zentrale kulturell-religiöse Vorstellungen der Zeit darstellt: die Selbstpräsentation in den Porträtpaaren und eine bukolisch-maritime Plastikgruppe nach Vorwürfen aus der neutralreligiösen dekorativen Kunst der Zeit, modifiziert durch einen Zyklus biblischer Szenen mit atl. Thematik.

Wie auch immer die genaue Funktionsbestimmung der Clevelandgruppe gewesen sein mag, – diese Selbstpräsentation eines christlichen Ehepaares zusammen mit plastischen Darstellungen von der Hoffnung auf ewigen Frieden und Glückseligkeit unter dem biblischen Bild des Jonas besitzt in jedem Fall größte Bedeutung für die Frage nach der Entstehung der frühchristlichen Kunst.

Anmerkungen

[1] W. D. Wixom, Early Christian Sculptures at Cleveland, *The Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art* 54,3, March 1967, 67–88 k (Wixom verweist p. 72 auf die noch ausstehende Publikation der Statuetten; ders., in K. Weitzmann (Ed.), *The Age of Spirituality. Metropolitan Museum of Art 1977/1978* (New York 1979) 406–411: nr. 362–368 mit Abbildungen.

[2] P. M. du Bourguet, *Art paléochrétien*, (Paris 1970) 105–110; M. Gough, *The Origins of Christian Art* (London 1973) 38f.; E. Kitzinger, *Byzantine Art in the Making* (Cambridge, Mass. 1977) 20f. 27; B. Brenk, *Spätantike und Frühes Christentum*, Propyläenkunstgeschichte Suppl. 1 (Frankfurt a.M. 1977) 35f. und 170 nr. 138a (O. Feld). Jetzt auch Kitzinger: The Cleveland Marbles, in *Atti 9 Congresso Internazionale di Archeologia Cristiana. Roma 1975, 1* (Città del Vaticano 1978) 653–675. – Im Winter 1977/78 wurde die Statuettengruppe der breiteren Öffentlichkeit im Rahmen der Ausstellung des Metropolitan Museum New York „The Age of Spirituality" zugänglich.

[3] Eine genaue Herkunftsangabe des Fundes konnte beim Kauf nicht ermittelt werden. Es wird versichert, der Fund stamme aus dem östlichen Mittelmeerraum, gehöre zusammen und sei in einem pithos gefunden worden. Der feinkörnige kristalline weiße Marmor der Statuetten soll nach J. B. Ward Perkins aus den Brüchen von Dokimeion Synnada in Zentralphrygien stammen. Eine chemisch-physikalische Untersuchung vor allem der Patina und einiger vorhandener Marmorauswüchse hat keine Anhaltspunkte für eine Unechtheit der Statuetten ergeben. Vgl. Kitzinger (1978) 660f; Wixom (1979) 411.

[4] Wixom (1967) vor 67 und 68f.; Kitzinger (1977) fig. 32 und 48, ders. (1978) fig. 1–6. Kitzinger betont ebd. 654: that the same two individuals are represented three times over.

[5] Wixom (1967) 70.

[6] Dieser Wechsel der Blickrichtungen (vgl. Abb. 1–2) dürfte in den Zusammenhang der Funktions- und Aufstellungsproblematik gehören, s.u.

[7] Vgl. Kitzinger (1978) 662A.17, der zu Recht diese Kleidung als die eines „high ranking official, military or civilian" interpretiert und auf die epigraphische Identifizierung eines Chlamydatus in Aphrodisias als praeses von Karien verweist: I. Ševčenko, A Late Antique Epigram and the So-called Elder Magistrate from Aphrodisias, in: *Synthronon*. Bibliothèque des Cahiers Archéologiques 2 (Paris 1968) 29–41.

[8] Istanbul, Arkeoloji Muzerli, nº 1179: Sidamara Sarkophag, weibliche Figur auf dem Klinendeckel: H. Wiegartz, *Kleinasiatische Säulensarkophage*, Istanbuler Forschungen 26 (Berlin 1965) 156f. und Taf. 34 a; die Verstorbene auf dem Sarkophag von Mas d'Aire: Th. Klauser in: J. Märki-Boehringer - F. W. Deichmann - Th. Klauser, *Frühchristliche Sarkophage in Bild und Wort*, Antike Kunst Bh. 3, 1966, 24 und Taf. 5, 1 und 6, 1; Ravenna, S. Vitale, Apsisgewände, 3. und 4. Hofdame zur Linken Theodoras: F. W. Deichmann, *Ravenna III* (Wiesbaden 1958) Taf. 361. Ältestes Beispiel dürfte die akephale Statue einer Kaiserin aus Carnuntum im Museum von Deutsch-Altenburg sein (1.H. 3. Jh.). A. Alföldi, Insignien und Tracht der römischen Kaiser, *Römische Mitteilungen* 50, 1935, 27, und Ab. 1, wieder in: ders., *Die monarchische Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreiche* (Darmstadt 1970) 145. Nach Alföldi 145 f, wäre der älteste Beleg für das goldbestickte Kleid der Kaiserin, also ein Gewandstück, das mit Hängestreifen in Goldstickerei geschmückt ist, v. 8 der Aberkios-Inschrift; zu dem Motiv dort vgl. Verf., Die Aberkios-Inschrift als Grabepigramm, *JbAC* 23(1980) 22–47, 39. – Nach Wixom (1967) 73, bereitet Kitzinger eine Studie speziell zu diesem Motiv der weiblichen Kleidung vor, vgl. auch Kitzinger (1978) 662A.17.

[9] Wixom (1967) 74.

[10] J. P. C. Kent - B. Overbeck - A. U. Stylow, *Die römische Münze* (München 1973) fig. 536: Denar, ca. 270/275 n. Chr. – Zu Severina und Magnia Urbica vgl. jetzt M. Bergmann, *Studien zum römischen Porträt des 3. Jahrhunderts n.Chr.* (Bonn 1977) 180–183, und Münztafel 5. Kitzinger (1978) 656 verweist ferner noch auf Galeria Valeria (gest. 315), die Frau des Galerius.

[11] Kent etc., fig. 560: Aureus, 283 n.Chr.

[12] Wixom (1967) 74, vergleicht zurecht als besonders nahe verwandt einen Frauenkopf aus Alacami im Museum von Antalya: J. Inan - E. Rosenbaum, *Roman and Early Byzantine Portrait Sculpture in Asia Minor* (London 1966), Kat.-nr. 268a und fig. 147: ca. 260–270. Vgl. auch Kitzinger (1978) 661.

[13] Wixom (1967) 73.

[14] Side, Museum, inv. 61: Inan - Rosenbaum, Kat.-nr. 268 und fig. 146, 1–2 (240–250 n. Chr.).

[15] Side, Museum, inv. 75: Inan - Rosenbaum, Kat.-nr. 269 und fig. 146, 3–4 (275–300), die für Haar- und Barttracht besonders auf das Carinusporträt im Konservatorenpalast Rom, W. Helbig, *Führer durch die öffentlichen Sammlungen der klassischen Altertümer in Rom 2* (Tübingen [4]1966) 314f., nr. 1496; Bergmann, Porträt, 118 und Taf. 34,3, verweisen; so auch Kitzinger (1978) 656. – Die männlichen Köpfe aus Cleveland

treffen mit diesem Kopf aus Side gerade in der dem Carinusbild eigentümlichen Bartbearbeitung zusammen.

[16] Bergmann, Porträt, 185–190, kommt zu einer Datierung „mindestens in die siebziger Jahre" (190) für die Frauenporträts in Cleveland, betont gleichzeitig aber den „konservativen Typus der Männerporträts von Cleveland". Methodisch bleibt zweifelhaft, ob die Porträtstatuetten so eng mit den Sarkophagwerkstätten und ihren Produktionen verbunden werden dürfen, wie Bergmann dies tut.

[17] Du Bourguet, 116.

[18] Zur Unterscheidung zwischen älterem bärtigen und jugendlichem unbärtigen „Guten Hirten" vgl. W. N. Schumacher, *Hirt und „Guter Hirt"*, RömQuart Suppl 34 (1977) 104–107.

[19] Vgl. die grundsätzliche Beurteilung des sog. Guten Hirten bei Klauser, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der christlichen Kunst 1, *JbAC* 1, 1958, 20–51, und die Kritik von Kitzinger (1978) 657 A. 10.

[20] Zum Gestus, den auf den Schultern liegenden Widder mit einer Hand zu halten: Klauser, a.a.O. 40.

[21] Ähnlich die Tunika des betenden Jonas und an beiden Statuetten die großen V-Falten oberhalb des Gürtels.

[22] Wixom (1967) 75.

[23] Wixom (1967) 76.

[24] Wixom (1967) 88, nach H. P. L'Orange, *Apothesis in Ancient Portraiture* (Oslo 1947)27.

[25] Eine allgemeine Verbindung zwischen dem sog. Guten-Hirten-Bild und dem Alexanderbild sah zuerst O. Wulff, *Altchristliche und byzantinische Kunst* 1 (Berlin 1918) 107; spez. für unsere Hirtenstatuette sieht sie du Bourguet, 118. Kitzinger (1978) 660, 673f. betont mit Hinweis auf F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy 2 (Washington D.C. 1966) 595ff. die „royal implications" dieser Beobachtung sowohl für die Aufnahme des biblischen Gleichniswortes in der frühchristlichen Literatur als auch für die frühchristliche Kunst. Ohne auf das Alexandermotiv einzugehen, betont H.-I. Marrou, *Décadence romaine ou antiquité tardive?* (Paris 1977)58f., stärker die bukolischen Konnotationen des alten Kriophoros-Motivs, das über die Hermesdarstellung in die sepulkrale Bilderwelt eingezogen und als bukolisch-neutral-religiöses Bild der Güte von den Christen rezipiert sei.

[26] Wixom (1967) 88b.

[27] Schumacher, 104f. und A. 127.

[28] Vgl. B. Brenk, Die Datierung der Reliefs am Hadrianstempel in Ephesus und das Problem der tetrarchischen Skulptur des Ostens, *Ist Mitt* 18(1968) 238–258, bes. 257f. – Unsere Statuette ist noch nicht tetrarchisch, wir sehen aber doch schon vieles angelegt, was dann im tetrarchischen Stil gerade in der provinziellen Erscheinungsform etwa bei den ephesinischen Reliefs deutlich in Erscheinung treten wird.

[29] Schumacher, 103, besonders A. 119. Schumacher argumentiert mit stilistischen und ikonographischen Gründen: ikonographisch stellt die Verbindung vom Stabhirten inmitten einer Herde und dem einarmig sein Tier haltenden Hirten eine sekundäre Form dar. Das hat aber nicht notwendig eine Spätdatierung zur Folge. Stilistisch sieht Schumacher im Allgemeinen eine Verbindung zu den Denkmälern des sog. subtilen Stils (vgl. H. P. L'Orange, Der subtile Stil, eine Kunstströmung der Zeit um 400 n.Chr.,

Antike Kunst 4(1961) 68–75), die aber doch nicht mehr jene „hellenistischen Züge" des „leichten Impressionismus" besitzen, der unsere Statuetten charakterisiert, um einen anderen Terminus von L'Orange zu benutzen, H.P. L'Orange, *Studien zur Geschichte des spätantiken Porträts* (Oslo 1933) 7, A.1; ders., *Art Forms and Civic Life* (Princeton N.J. 1965)110. – Im Besonderen ist zu bemerken, daß die Knochenstatuetten, Washington, Dumbarton Oaks Collection Acc. no. 63.24, deren Bewegungsmotive schon Wixom (1967) 88c, mit dem Guten Hirten in Cleveland vergleicht, und dem Schumacher folgt, jetzt von K. Weitzmann, *Catalogue of the Byzantine and Early Medieval Antiquities in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection 3: Ivories and Steatites* (Washington D.C. 1972) 9–11 n° 3, ins 3. Jh. datiert wird, wobei Weitzmann seinerseits den durch die Porträts datierten Guten Hirten in Cleveland als Datierungsgrundlage für das Stück in Washington nimmt.

[30] Schumacher scheint den Genusstil des Guten Hirten in Cleveland nicht genügend zu berücksichtigen. Der „subtile Stil" findet sich im Zusammenhang der „theodosianisch-arkadianischen Menschenstellung", L'Orange, *Antike Kunst* 4 (1961) 74.

[31] Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ketos: A. Rumpf, *Die antiken Sarkophagreliefs 5,1: Die Meerwesen auf den antiken Sarkophagreliefs* (Berlin 1939) 112–115. Durch seine „Halslosigkeit" fügt sich der Typus des Ketos der Clevelandstatuetten, der als ‚Meereber' bezeichnet werden muß, nicht in die westliche Entwicklung, bei der der Hals des Ketos immer schlanker wird, Rumpf, 115; vgl. auch Schumacher, 258.

[32] Zum bärtigen Jonas s.u.

[33] Zum Asklepioskopf aus Gerasa, jetzt in Amman, den schon Wixom (1967) 83, vergleicht, s. jetzt K. Stemmer, *Annual Dep. Ant. Jordan. Amman* 21, 1976, 33–39. Zu Stemmers These von der Wiederverwendung und Umdeutung der Asklepiosstatue in einer christlichen Kirche vgl. H. Brandenburg, *BZ* 72 (1979) 494. Allgemein zum bärtigen Christusbild, J. Sauer, Das Aufkommen des bärtigen Christustyps in der frühchristlichen Kunst, *Strena Buliciana* (1924) 303–329, F. Gerke, *Die christlichen Sarkophage der vorkonstantinischen Zeit* (Berlin 1940) 227 A. 4 und zuletzt E. Dinkler, *Christus und Asklepios*, SbAWH phil.-hist. Kl. 1980, 2. – Kitzinger (1978) 668.673 betont zu Recht die Bedeutung der „aquatic sphere", in der unter den „bearded denizens of sea or river" die Modelle für die Jonasköpfe der Cleveland Marbles zu finden seien.

[34] Sie sind also mit der Haarbehandlung des Widderträgers zu vergleichen.

[35] Allgemein zur Orans Klauser, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der christlichen Kunst 3, *JbAC 3*(1960) 112-133, dazu die Korrekturen bei Schumacher pass. Zum betenden Jonas s.u.

[36] Ein weiteres Motiv, das die Statuette des betenden Jonas mit derjenigen des Hirten verbindet. Der Beter trägt freilich seine Tasche mehr seitlich. Auch die von Schumacher veröffentlichte Hirtenstatuette aus Fondo Fusco Rosa bei Stabiae aus dem 1. Jh. n. Chr. hat eine Rückentasche, die der des Clevelandhirten sehr ähnlich ist: Schumacher, 106f. und Taf. 24a.b.

[37] Ebenso natürlich auch der ruhende Jonas. Die leichten Unterschiede begründet Kitzinger (1978) 673, nicht mit der einfachen kunsthistorischen Methode der Händescheidung, sondern überzeugend mit der Herleitung von verschiedenen Vorbildern – mit der Konsequenz unterschiedlicher ikonologischer Akzente.

[38] Vgl. Ariadne-Sarkophage, z.B. Alexandria, Musée Gréco-Romain: J. Engemann, *Untersuchungen zur Sepulkralsymbolik der späteren römischen Kaiserzeit*, JbAC Erg.-Bd. 2 1973, Taf. 106.

[39] E. Stommel, *JbAC* 1(1958) 112–115.

[40] H.W. Wolff, *Dodekapropheton 3: Obadja und Jona*, Bibl. Komm. z. AT 14,3 (Neukirchen 1977) 143f.

[41] M. Squarciapino, *Bull Mus Imp Rom* 12(1941) 63ff.; Kitzinger, *Byzantine Art*, fig. 31.

[42] Kitzinger, *Byzantine Art*, 21.

[43] Vgl. A. 29.

[44] Mit „spätantik" bezeichnen wir den Umbruch in der Kunst, der sich in besonderer Weise in der stadtrömischen Kunst seit der Tetrarchie vollzieht, seinerseits aber vorhandene ältere römische Kunstströmungen, besonders den von G. Rodenwaldt sog. „volkstümlichen Stil" in sich aufnimmt.

[45] Klauser, *JbAC* 1(1958) 20–51.

[46] Ders., *JbAC* 2(1959) 115–145.

[47] A. Ferrua, *RivAC* 38(1962) 7–69.

[48] Vgl. A. 18. Siehe auch N. Himmelmann, *AA* 1977, 459-462; ders., *Bonn Jb* 179, 1979, 788-795 und ders., *Über Hirten-Genre in der antiken Kunst*, Abh. Düsseldorf 65, 1980.

[49] Klauser, *JbAC* 1, 27–31.

[50] Schumacher, *Hirt*, 216, vgl. auch – noch zurückhaltender – Klauser, *JbAC* 10(1967) 82–120; (s.o. unsere Anmerkungen 24f.).

[51] Schumacher, 99–110, bes. 105.

[52] O. Mitius, *Jonas auf den Denkmälern des christlichen Altertums* (Freiburg, Br. 1897); H. Leclercq, *DACL* 7,2, 2572–2631; L. de Bruyne, *RivAC* 34(1958) 87–118; Ferrua (A.47); Engemann, *Untersuchungen*, 70–74; Y.-M. Duval, *Le livre de Jonas dans la littérature chrétienne grecque et latine* (Paris 1973) 19–39; K. Wessel, *RBK* 3, 647-655; J. Speigl, Das Bildprogramm des Jonasmotivs in der Malerei der römischen Katakomben, *RQ* 73(1978) 1–15; J. Fink, *Bildfrömmigkeit und Bekenntnis* (Köln-Wien 1978) 71–73. – Zur Darstellung des Jonas irritatus s.u.

[53] Engemann, 70f.; Speigl, 7.12.

[54] Neben den römischen Zeugen der Grabmalerei und Sepulkralplastik vgl. die Fresken in Cimitile, dazu zuletzt Fink, 58A. 238, und Alexandria, H. Brandenburg, Überlegungen zum Ursprung der frühchristlichen Bildkunst, *Atti 9 Congresso Int. di Archeologia Cristiana Roma 1975* (Città del Vaticano 1978) 331–360, 342f.

[55] Beispiele von Sarkophagen sicher nicht stadtrömischer Herkunft: Belgrad, Nationalmuseum, Jonassarkophag aus Singidunum: Schumacher, 175, N. Cambi bei Brenk, *PKG* 308 und Taf. 378,3; Berlin, Frühchristl.-Byz. Slg. Inv. 2704: Engemann (A. 38) 71 und Taf. 33c; London, Britisches Museum: Engemann ebd. und T. 32 und 33a.b.

[56] Zu den Abweichungen in den späten Darstellungen der Buchmalerei s.u.

[57] J. Kollwitz, *Akten 7. Int. Kongr. CA* (Rom 1965) 36–38, dort Abbildungsnachweis.

[58] Vgl. H. Gülzow, *ZNW* 58(1967) 102–121.

[59] A. Hermann, *JbAC* 2(1959) 30–69.

[60] Vgl. A. Rumpf (oben A. 31).

[61] H. Sichtermann, *Späte Endymion-Sarkophage* (Baden-Baden 1966), dazu Engemann, *JbAC* 10(1967) 247–250.

[62] E. Stommel, *JbAC* 1(1958) 112–115.

[63] Die Ursprungsfrage ist schon allein aufgrund der ägyptischen und kleinasiatischen Beispiele nicht a priori für Rom zu entscheiden. Vgl. auch Verf., demnächst in den Akten des 10. Int. Kongr. für Christl. Archäologie.

[64] Nach A. Nestori, *Repertorio topografico delle pitture delle catacombe romane* (Città del Vaticano 1975) insgesamt 17 Zeugen. – Zum sekundären Charakter der Szene des aufgeschreckten Jonas vgl. Speigl, 6–9.

[65] Nach F. W. Deichmann-G. Bovini-H. Brandenburg, *Repertorium der christlich-antiken Sarkophage I* (Wiesbaden 1967) finden sich 53 Beispiele, davon 32 mit der Meerwurfszene kombiniert. Eine Schiffszene ohne Meerwurfdarstellung findet sich zehnmal, Angler-Fischer dreimal. – Verf. bereitet zur Jonasikonographie eine größere Arbeit vor.

[66] Weitzmann, *Münchener Jb. d. bild. Kunst* III 3/4, 1952/53, 96–120, 111f., ders. *The Miniatures of the Sacra Parallela* (Princeton 1979) 138f., 145.

[67] C. Bonner, *HarvThRev* 41(1948) 31–37; Ferrua, *RivAC* 38(1962) 42f.; *Romans and Barbarians. Museum of Fine Arts Boston* (Boston 1976) 124f. nr. 141; E. Popescu, *Inscriptiones intra fines Dacoromaniae* (Bucureşti 1976) 391f. nr. 435.

[68] Klauser *JbAC* 4(1961) 134.

[69] H. Brandenburg, *BZ* 71(1978) 556, betont zu Recht diese ikonographische Faustregel. – In diesem Zusammenhang können wir absehen von den lediglich zwei Zeugnissen der stadtrömischen Sarkophagplastik vorkonstantinischer Zeit, die einen mit Tunika oder Exomis bekleideten Jonas zeigen und bei denen möglicherweise ein östlicher Einfluß vorliegt (vgl. die Gestaltung der Kürbispflanze): 1. Rom, Cimitero di Pretestato: *Repertorium* (vgl. A. 65) nr. 591 und T. 90; 2. Rom. S. Maria in Trastevere: *Repertorium* nr. 750 und T. 119. Das letzte Fragment wird auch erwähnt von Kitzinger (1978) 674 A. 47.

[70] Paris, Louvre, Ma 3047: G. Roux, *Salamine de Chypre* 4 (Paris 1973) 187 nr. 69 (Ausspeien eines bekleideten Jonas, Kopf des Propheten fehlt). C. Metzger, *CahArch* 26(1977) 51f.; vgl. auch die beiden zusammengehörenden Fragmente: Wien, Kunsthistorisches Museum (I 330) und Sirmium (Mitrovica): Roux 185 nr. 55.

[71] C. Cecchelli - J. Furlani - M. Salmi, *The Rabbula Gospels* (Lausanne 1959) 77 zu Ms. Florenz, Bibl. Medicea - Laurentiana Plut. 1 56 fol. 6 a.

[72] Augustin, *ep.* 102, 6 (CSEL 34, 2, 570 Goldbacher), vgl. dazu Mitius, 104; Duval, 17f.

[73] Tertullian, *bapt.* 17 (CSEL 20, 215).

[74] L. Vouaux, *Les Actes de Paul et ses letires apocryphes* (Paris 1913) 268–270; E. Hennecke - W. Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* 2^3 (Tübingen 1964) 260. Vgl. Duval, 29 A. 84, und 174f. – Auf die vorgegebene Heraklesüberlieferung in Lykophrons Alexandra werde ich an anderer Stelle ebenso eingehen wie auf die Jaffa-Ketos Tradition, die Jonas mit Perseus verbindet.

[75] Flavius Josephus, *Ant. Iud.* 9,6 (214), vgl. Duval, 83 A. 73, 323 A. 63, 422. 445. Die Aufnahme des Jonaspsalmes in den liturgischen Odenanhang des Psalmbuches der byzantinischen Überlieferung gibt der Buchmalerei Gelegenheit zur Aufnahme des Jonasthemas. Bei Vollillustrationen finden wir hier das Gebet des Propheten auf dem Land. Das wohl berühmteste Beispiel bringt der Pariser Psalter (10. Jh.), Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Gr. 139 fol. 431 v im Bildtypus der Berufung eines jugenlichen Propheten innerhalb eines vierszenigen Zyklus neben Meerwurf, Ausspei und Predigt im Stadttor. Der jugendliche Prophet ist in allen vier Darstellungen gleich gekleidet. Ode 6 folgt hier auf Ode 3, während Ode 5 sich anschließt. Weitere Beispiele: Kitzinger (1978) 671 A.39. Welche bedeutende Rolle in diesem Stadium neben einer zweifellos vorhandenen Kontinuität gewisser ikonographischer Züge der Jonasbilder

dieses Zyklus (vgl. etwa auch die nur den Meerwurf darstellende Streifenkomposition im Psalter, Leningrad, Staatsbibliothek, MS Gr. 214 (11. Jh.) fol. 313r: V. D. Likhachova, *Byzantine Miniature* (Moskau 1977) T. 22) Innovationen und Adaptationen ursprünglich anderer Bildtypen spielen, wie z.B. die Prophetenberufung, (man kann aber auch etwa an Meerwurfdarstellungen der Märtyrerikonographie denken wie Menologion, Moskau, Staatl. Geschichtsmuseum, MS Gr. 175 (11. Jh.), Likhachova o.c. ohne Folioangabe und Tafelnummer, als Falttafel zwischen Tafel 14 und 15) ist für den Pariser Psalter evident. Noch deutlicher zeigt dies der fünfszenige Jonaszyklus in der Pariser Gregor v. Nazianz-Handschrift von 883-886, Paris BN MS Gr. 510 fol. 3^v, wo unter der Darstellung von χαιρετισμός und ἀσπασμός die Jonasdarstellungen etwa $^2/_3$ der Seite einnehmen. Wir finden dort von links oben ausgehend in Richtung des Urzeigersinns unregelmäßig auf die Bildfläche verteilt: 1. Jonas flieht nach Tarsos und findet dabei vor der Stadtarchitektur von Japho ein Schiff, 2. Meerwurf, 3. Ausspei, 4. Bußpredigt vor Ninive, vor dessen Tor der König auf dem Thron sitzt und sein Purpurgewand zerreißt, hinter ihm zwei reich gekleidete Thronassistenten verschiedener Altersstufen, 5. Jonas schmollt hinter der Stadtarchitektur von Ninive, an die er sich anlehnt, seinen Kopf auf die linke Hand stützend. Der Herkunft der verschiedenen ikonographischen Elemente, die hier zu diesem Zyklus adaptiert sind, kann an dieser Stelle nicht nachgegangen werden. Daß eine solche Adaptierung vorliegt, dürfte aber deutlich sein. Das bedeutet aber doch wohl, daß wir es mit einem neuen byzantinischen Jonaszyklus zu tun haben, dessen einzelne Szenen nicht prinzipiell von vornherein als Bestandteile des frühchristlichen Jonaszyklus postuliert werden dürfen, und daß den damit aufgeworfenen Fragen getrennt für die Bilthemen und für die Ikonographie nachgegangen werden muß. Dies ist richtig von Kitzinger l.c. erkannt: wenn auch die Folgerung, die er zieht, etwas zu weit geht; „Our statuette cannot be claimed to be a direct ancestor of the figure in the Paris-Psalter. It does show, however, that the prophet's prayer had become part of the Jonah iconography at an early date and in a context other than text illustration". Grundsätzlich muß die Frage der Vorlagen der Statuetten auch die Möglichkeit der Buchmalerei berücksichtigen, auch nach der Feststellung, daß die postulierten Vorlagen nicht identisch sein können mit dem Jonaszyklus der späteren byzantischen Buchmalerei. Die Frage muß wohl beim gegenwärtigen Denkmälerstand offengelassen werden, wenn auch eine Reihe archäologischer Gründe gegen einen Archetyp des Jonaszyklus in der Form der Textillustration spricht: Das heitere Idyll der Quelle, des Brunnens, der Nil- oder Meeresszene besitzt in der kaiserzeitlichen Kunst religiöse Konnotationen, die sich bei der Aufnahme der Wasserthematik in der Grabeskunst zu einer neutralreligiösen Aussage aktualisieren, wenn im Akkord von heiterer Wasserszene und bukolischer Thematik die Universalität einer transzendenten Friedensidee *terra marique* zu vernehmen ist, deren Universalität die Bildelemente aus dem Bereich der Jahreszeiten sichern. Die früheste christliche Kunst schließt mit der Jonasthematik an diese neutralreligiöse Kunst an und setzt sie voraus – durchbricht aber auch gleichzeitig diese Ebene, indem sie durch das biblische Bildthema diesen universalen Frieden als christlich bestimmt. – Zum Verständnis des Jonaszyklus in der Pariser Gregor-Handschrift dürfte die Position dieser Illustration wohl nicht gänzlich ohne Bedeutung sein: Fol. 1 beginnt das 1. Werk der Handschrift Greg. Naz., *oratio in pascha et in tarditatem*; fol. 4, also auf der Gegenseite der Miniatur, folgt der *apologeticus de fuga sua*. Die große Weite der neuen byzantinischen Jonasikonographie zeigt

das Gebet im Ketos der Psalter-Handschrift mit Randillustrationen, vgl. dazu Kitzinger l.c.

[76] Zur jüdischen und von jüdischen Traditionen beeinflußten Jonasikonographie vgl. C. Nordström, *Byzantion* 25–27 (1955–1957) 501–508; ders., *The Duke of Alba's Castilian Bible* (Uppsala 1967) 192–196.

[77] Wolff, *Dodekapropheton*, 64.

[78] Engemann, *Untersuchungen*, 70f. Vgl. auch Verf., demnächst in *ZKg* 92 (1981).

[79] Duval, 609–613. Pointierter: E. Dassmann, *Sündenvergebung durch Taufe, Buße und Märtyrerfürbitte in den Zeugnissen frühchristlicher Frömmigkeit und Kunst* (Münster 1973) 386: „Mt 12, 40 und eine an dieses Jesuswort anknüpfende Exegese der Jonasgeschichte spielen in der patristischen Auslegung des 3. Jh.s keine Rolle", vgl. ebd., 222–232 und 385–397.

[80] Vgl. Schumacher, *Hirt*, 253ff.

[81] Zu dieser Gruppe zuletzt G. Koch, *AA* (1978) 121, A. 18.

[82] K. Lehmann-Hartleben, *RM* 38/9(1923/4) 264ff.

[83] So H. v. Schoenebeck, *RM* 51(1936) 332.

[84] Gegen sepulkralen Charakter: Brandenburg, *RQ* 63 (1968) 54.

[85] Ch. Picard, *Orient. Christ. Per.* 13, 1947, 266ff.

[86] Zu Euseb, *Vita Const.* 3, 49 zuletzt Schumacher, 109f.

[87] Schumacher, 81–84.

[88] O. Feld bei Brenk, *PKG* 170 und Taf. 138 b; E. Dinkler, in *Age of Spirituality* 411f. nr. 369.

[89] Kitzinger, *Byzantine Art*, 21. Kitzinger (1978) 662f. begründet seine Ablehnung der sepulkralen These: „It is hard to believe that any tomb decoration could have included such a multiple portrayal of a deceased couple". Zudem brauche man, da der Gesamtfund magaziniert gewesen sei, keine Funktionsverbindung zwischen Porträts und Statuetten annehmen. So kommt Kitzinger unter Beiseitelassen der Porträts zur Funktionsbestimmung: ein kleines Nymphäum oder ein reichgeschmückter Brunnen. Doch ein wiederholtes Porträt in sepulkralem Zusammenhang zeigen nicht nur die Sarkophage der Zeit bei der Darstellung verschiedener Lebenszusammenhänge des Verstorbenen (vgl. N. Himmelmann-Wildschütz, Sarkophag eines gallienischen Konsuls, in: *Festschrift F. Matz* (Mainz 1962) 110-124), sondern auch etwa der Statuenzyklus eines Römers als Krieger, Magistrat und Jäger (um 260): Rom, Villa Doria Pamfili, Runder Gartensaal, vgl. B. Andreae, *Römische Kunst* (Freiburg, Br. ^{2}1973) nr. 574-576. Brunnen- oder Mausoleumschmuck schließen sich zudem nicht aus, so auch Kitzinger (1978) 666 A. 29 unter Hinweis auf W.F. Jashemski, *Class. Journal* 66 (1970/1) 97ff., denn es gab Garten-Gräber mit Brunnenanlagen.

[90] Wenn man eine Rekonstruktion versuchen will, so legt das Zahlenverhältnis von Büsten und Statuetten die Möglichkeit nahe, daß jeweils eine Statuette zwischen einem Büstenpaar geplant war. Nimmt man ferner für die Rekonstruktion einen Rechteckraum an, dessen Eingangsseite frei bleibt, so legt sich folgendes Schema der Rekonstruktionsmöglichkeit nahe:



Vor der linken Wand oder dort in einer Nische bzw. in Nischen der linken Wand standen das Büstenpaar Ab. 2 (unten links) links und Ab. 1 (rechts) rechts, dazwischen eine Statuette, z.B. Ab. 4 (Ausspei); in der Ecke der linken Wand und der Stirnwand eine Statuette z.B. Ab. 5 (betender Jonas); an der Stirnwand v.l.n.r. Abb. 1 (links) und 2 (unten rechts); dazwischen Ab. 6 (Jonasruhe); in der Ecke zur rechten Wand Ab. 7 (Guter Hirte; an der rechten Wand Ab. 2 oben rechts und Ab. 2 (oben links), dazwischen Ab. 3 (Verschlingung). Diese Möglichkeit der Aufstellung hat ihren schwachen Punkt im Büstenpaar der rechten Wand: Die Blickrichtung korrespondiert nicht, doch die kanonische Position der Geschlechter ist bewahrt. Die Blickabwendung kann vielleicht als korrespondierendes Pathoszeichen zur hier postierten Statuette der Jonasverschlingung interpretiert werden. Diese Rekonstruktion hätte den weiteren Vorteil, daß von hier, beginnend im Uhrzeigersinn, ein vierzehniger Jonaszyklus in einer sachgemäßen Reihenfolge vorläge. Gleichzeitig wäre durch die im Affekt sich abwendenden Blicke von Mann und Frau der Zusammenhang mit den übrigen Wänden hergestellt. Eine weitere Möglichkeit – wenn das Prinzip der korrespondierenden Blicke gewahrt werden soll – wäre, den Mann auf dieser rechten Wand links zu postieren, so daß jetzt nicht wie bei der ersten, von uns für eher erwägenswert gehaltenen Möglichkeit, das Männerporträt der rechten Wand dem Frauenporträt der linken Wand gegenüberstände, sondern in einer hierarchischen Staffelung zur Rückwand auf beiden Seitenwänden die Büsten der Frau denen ihres Mannes vorangehen.

[91] P.C. Finney, Antecedents of Byzantine Iconoclasm: Christian Evidence before Constantine, in: *The Image and the Word*, ed. J. Gutmann, 1977, 27–47; Sister Charles Murray, Art and Early Church, *JThSt* NS 28 (1977) 303–345.

[92] Der topographisch orientierte Sammelband von Brenk (s. A. 2) zeigt gerade die große Breite der stilistischen Möglichkeiten.

[93] Euseb, *Hist. Eccl.* 7,16. Die Frage, um was für eine Statue es sich wirklich handelte, muß im Anschluß an die eusebianischen Interpretationen natürlich gestellt werden.

[94] Vgl. A. 86.

[95] Zur Hippolytstatue zuletzt M. Guarducci, *Epigrafia Greca* 4 (Roma 1978) 535–545. – Die Aufarbeitung der christlichen Freiplastik ist ein dringendes Desiderat der

Forschung. Auf eine in diesem Zusammenhang bisher nicht berücksichtigte, 1898 auf der Krim gefundene fragmentierte Gruppe des Isaak-Opfers, vgl. D.V. Ainalov, *Seminarium Kondakovianum* 1(1927) 187ff. und T. 14, 1 weist Kitzinger (1978) 66 A. 27, neu hin. Eine erste Zusammenstellung der Objekte bei O. Thulin, Die Christus-Statuette im Museo Nazionale Romano, *Röm Mitt* 44(1929) 201–259. Neben der Kleinplastik sind hier auch die Zeugen der christlichen Großplastik zu behandeln wie z.B. die Evangelisten in Istanbul, Archäologisches Museum, s. W.F. Volbach, *Frühchristliche Kunst* (München 1958) T. 74; der sog. Paulus aus Athen, Boston MFA, s. *Greek and Roman Portraits Boston 1972* (Boston 1972) nr. 86, und J.D. Breckenridge, in: *Age of Spirituality* 291f. nr. 270; und der fragmentierte Marmorkopf. Bonn, F.J. Dölger-Institut, den E. Alföldi – Rosenbaum, *JbAC* 22(1979) 191–194, jüngst als „Heiligen"-Kopf zu diskutieren vorschlägt.

[96] Euseb, *Hist. Eccl.* 8, 1, 1–6. – Das entspricht dem Bild, das W.M. Ramsay auf Grund seiner epigraphischen Forschungen für Teile von Phrygien im 3. Jh. gewonnen hatte, vgl. etwa zu S.-W. Phrygien und Eumeneia: W.M. Ramsay, *The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* 1,2 (Oxford 1897) 484–513 und 709–716, das aber auch für das Nordafrika der Mitte des 3. Jh.s zutreffend ist: Ch. Saumagne, *Saint Cyprien, Evêque de Carthage, „Pape" d'Afrique* (Paris 1975), bes. 28f., 72f., 78–81. Zuletzt hat E. Gibson, *The „Christians for Christians" Inscriptions of Phrygia* (Missoula, Montana 1978) 141–144 auf die „phanero-christlichen" Denkmäler der 2.H.d.3.Jhs. in der ländlichen Gesellschaft des Oberen Tembris-Tales in N.-W.-Phrygien aufmerksam gemacht, deren Grabdenkmäler eine ähnliche Situation widerspiegeln: „These people tell us all about themselves and what they were proudest of. Like their neighbours these Christians exult in their wealth and their culture. It is natural that they exult in their new religion too". Dazu vgl. Verf., *JbAC* 23 (1980) 166–171. Phrygien ging vielleicht in der Akkulturation zwischen Christentum und hellenistisch-römischer Welt in ihren künstlerischen Ausdrucksmitteln zum Zwecke der Selbstdarstellung im sepulkralen Kontext voraus, wie schon das älteste christliche Grabepigramm am Ende des 2. Jh.s, die Aberkiosschrift, belegt. Vielleicht aber vermittelt uns allein der Zufall der Überlieferung, die gerade für die christliche Epigraphik in Phrygien – neben Rom – so einmalig glücklich ist (vgl. W.M. Calder, Early-Christian Epitaphs from Phrygia, *An Stud* 5, 25–38, und – kritisch, doch i.a. zustimmend – A. Ferrua, L'epigrafia cristiana prima di Costantino, *Atti 9 Congr. Int. di Archeologia Cristiana, Roma 1975* (Città del Vaticano 1978) 583–613, bes. 609–612) auch ein falsches Bild, und wir müssen den kulturellen Reichtum Phrygiens im besonderen und ganz Kleinasiens, das die Clevelandstatuetten nun ebenfalls als Landschaft der bildenden Kunst in vorkonstantinischer Zeit eröffnet haben, auf die Ausstrahlungskraft der östlichen Großstädte zurückführen, was ja auch naheliegt.

Abbildungsnachweise

1–7: The Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland, Ohio.
8: PCAS, Lau E 9.
9: PCAS, Lau G 16. 17.
10–12: F. Gerke, *Die christlichen Sarkophage der vorkonstantinischen Zeit*, Berlin 1940, Taf. 1.1, 28.1 und 2.

D-69 *Heidelberg*, In der unteren Rombach 6a

Ab. 1. Porträtbüsten, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 2. Porträtbüsten, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 3. Jonas wird verschlungen, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 4. Jonas wird ausgespieen, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 5. Jonas orans, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 6. Jonasruhe, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 7. Hirte, Cleveland, Ohio, The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Ab. 8. Decke der sog. Jahreszeitenkrypta, Rom, Catacomba dei SS. Pietro e Marcellino (Nestori, Pietro e Marcellino 67).

Ab. 9. Decke des sog. Susannacubiculums, Rom, Catacomba dei SS. Pietro e Marcellino (Nestori, Pietro e Marcellino 51).



Ab. 10. Città del Vaticano, Museo Pio Cristiano, sog. Jonassarkophag (ehem. Lat. 119, Rep. nr. 35).

Ab. 11. Sarkophagdelkelfragment, Rom, Museo Nazionale Romano (inv. 106174, Rep. nr. 794b).

Ab. 12. Sarkophagdeckelfragment, Rom, Palazzo Sanseverino al Corso (Rep. nr. 996).

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REVIEWS

Irénée de Lyon, *Contre les hérésies*, Livre I. Édition critique par Adelin Rousseau et Louis Doutreleau. Tome I: Introduction, notes justificatives, tables, 409 pp. Tome II: Texte et traduction, 394 pp. Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979.

After Books IV, V and III of Irenaeus, the editors now turn their attention to Book I, with its wealth of historical materials for the history of Gnosticism. The book survives in an anonymous and literal Latin version, now critically restored for the first time and presented along with the Greek quotations, chiefly from Epiphanius, which provide 74 per cent of the text, Armenian fragments, and three short Syriac fragments derived from Severus of Antioch. It is the book in which Irenaeus reports and reveals the system of the Valentinian Gnostic Ptolemy, reserving most of his refutation for Books II-V (see plan and summary in Vol. i, pp. 113-64). The editors make the important point that Irenaeus discusses Simon Magus et al. as the ancestors of the Valentinians, whose immediate parents are viewed as the "gnostics" of *Adv. haer.* i. 28-31 (note the further comments on *Gnostici*, pp. 299-300, and on Barbelo, pp. 296–99).

The text presented here is eclectic, based usually on the old Latin version and the fragments from Epiphanius, sometimes on analysis of various witnesses. The ultimate criterion, it appears, is the coherence of Irenaeus' thought and expression. The consequence is a text intelligible at quite a few points where Harvey left doubts. An appendix on the "Codex Passerati" used by Massuet shows that it is definitely the Vossianus of Leiden (I, 319-27). Another provides a text of Theodoret on the Barbeliotes or Borborians and the Sethians or Ophites (328–35). A third supplies, in Greek or Latin, variants for Book III from the newly discovered Armenian fragments (336–58).

Important notes link Irenaeus' evidence with Nag Hammadi texts: i. 20. 2 with the Gospel of Thomas, i. 21. 5 with the First Apocalypse of James, and i. 29 on the Apocryphon of John. In addition, there are significant discussions of echoes of Homer in i. ll. 4–5, as well as in

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i. 9. 4. In the latter passage, Irenaeus' *hypothesis* is translated as "les récits" (p. 151). This does not seem quite adequate, especially in view of the remarks by Philip Hefner in *Journal of Religion* 44 (1967), 294ff. It might be better to translate "subject" or even "literary plan". In dealing with the Epiphanian version of i. 24. 6 the editors note only one parallel out of several (p. 331, n. 2).

It is hard to tell on just what principle the selection of notes has been made. At i. 12. 2 it was advisable to have a note on Xenophanes, and certainly one need not think that Irenaeus cited him at first-hand (for the use of substantives cf. Diogenes Laertius ix. 19; Pliny, *N. H.* ii. 14). At i. 15. 4 it should be noted that the whole expression *quod dici solet heri et ante*, along with the reference to Palamedes, comes from Plato, *Legg.* 677D. It could be noted with Stieren at i. 15. 6 that the verses against Marcus are "iambic senarii". At i. 16. 2 the passage on the digital computation from left to right (at 100) could have attracted mention of the Gospel of Truth, fol. XVI^{v} (p. 32), lines 4–16 (with Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation*, pp. 517–18). Irenaeus' discussion of delirium in i. 16. 3 must have medical parallels, while at i. 17. 1 the discussion of thirty *moirai* in each hour and each sign of the zodiac is somehow related to statements of the astronomer Hypsicles on "minutes" and "seconds" (cf. I. Thomas, *Greek Mathematical Works*, II, pp. 394–97; also Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* v. 5). It might not be worth noting that Irenaeus was rather fond of vulgar jokes : examples occur in i. 4. 4 and i. 27. 2 (and 4). It might be said, however, that in i. 25. 3 Irenaeus insists upon the immorality of the Carpocratians, while two sections farther on he says he can't believe it.

The valuable *Index scripturaire* works well except in regard to the Gospel of Mark, to which the editors supply only three references for quotations or allusions (Mark 9:2, 10:21, 10:38). The editors note that Mark 10:21 (late manuscripts) appears in i. 3. 5 (I, p. 187) but do not include the verse in the index. It might also have been noted that the Carpocratians as described in i. 25. 5 seem to have been relying on Mark 4:10–34, notably on verses 11 and 34.

The suggestions we have made are essentially supplemental. No one who has worked with Harvey or Stieren will wish to use any edition but the present one, for which we warmly thank the editors once more.

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Tertullien, *A son épouse*. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes de Charles Munier (Sources Chrétiennes, 273). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1980. 210 pp.

Voici le sixième volume de l'édition des œuvres de Tertullien dans les Sources Chrétiennes. La partie la plus personnelle et aussi la plus positive de cette édition se trouve dans la longue et très solide introduction (1–87) qui contient les six chapitres suivants : I L'occasion du traité; II Le remariage après veuvage; III Le problème des mariages mixtes; IV L'originalité de Tertullien; V Manuscrits et éditions; VI Analyse. Surtout cette longue analyse (71–87) mérite d'être étudiée avec le plus grand soin, parce qu'elle éclaire très bien le cours de la pensée (souvent bien compliquée) de Tertullien. On ne peut qu'espérer que l'exemple donné ici par l'éditeur (que dans la suite nous indiquerons par le sigle M) sera suivi par les futurs éditeurs d'œuvres de Tertullien dans cette série.

Le texte, dont la dernière édition avait été faite par Emil Kroymann dans le Corpus de Vienne (CSEL), vol. 70, 1942 (édition reprise avec quelques additions dans le Corpus Christianorum (CC), Series latina, vol. I, 1954) a été fondé sur une nouvelle collation des manuscrits A (l'Agobardinus, Parisinus latinus 1622) et N et F (les deux manuscrits florentins Magliabechianus, conv. soppr. I, VI, 9 et 10), auxquels M a ajouté le Luxemburgensis 75 (saec. XV; sigle X). En outre il a consulté les trois éditions de Beatus Rhenanus (Bâle 1521, 1528 et 1539) qui, comme il fait remarquer p. 69, »ont été soigneusement revues«. Or nous regrettons d'avoir à observer que cette dernière affirmation n'est pas justifiée par les faits : en effet, les collations des éditions de Rhenanus (que nous avons collationnées aussi) contiennent un très grand nombre de fautes; il en va de même pour les données concernant le Codex Agobardinus que nous avons étudiées sur photocopie grâce à la bienveillance de l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des textes à Paris.

A cause de la grande importance de ces deux sources du texte (c.-à-d. l'Agobardinus et les trois éditions du grand maître de critique textuelle qu'était Beatus Rhenanus) nous trouvons nécessaire de donner ici la liste complète des erreurs que nous avons trouvées dans ces sources de la tradition; nous la ferons précéder d'une liste de fautes (en partie fautes d'impression) que nous avons trouvées dans le texte lui-même : I 1,1 (!) dilectissime, l. dilectissima; I 5,4 habeamus, l. habemus; I 7,44 nulla, l. nullo;

II 3,24 mala, l. malae; II 4,20 pereger (avec Kroym.), l. peregre; II 5,16 Latebisme, l. -ne; II 5,28 sciclicet, l. scilicet; II 5,28 arbitrium, l. arbitrum; II 5,29 plereaque, l. pleraeque; II 5,29 ex cruciata, l. excruciata; II 8,11 praeceptis, l. praescriptis; II 8,12 libertatem, l. libertatem suam.

Fautes dans l'apparat critique concernant les leçons de A. (Ici M indique la leçon attribuée à A par l'éditeur, A la leçon de A selon notre collation récente.)

I 1,6 tabulis M : talibus A; I 1,20 (*ad* diem) M *om.* 'die A'; I 1,22/3 illam M : illa A; I 1,29 (*ad* reseruandam) preseruandam M : perseruandam A; I 2,7 M *om.* 'Sane : secre A'; I 3,18 melius M : melius est A; I 4,52 M *om.* 'oro te *om.* A'; I 5,30 M *om.* 'ipsa *om.* A'; I 8,1 M *om.* 'uiduitatus A'; I 8,38 pertracta M : petra tata A; II 2, 35/6 M *om.* 'subdidis& A'; II 2,39 $\overline{\text{xps}}$ M : $\overline{\text{sps}}$ A; II 2,42 $\overline{\text{scs}}$ $\overline{\text{xps}}$ M : $\overline{\text{sps}}$ $\overline{\text{scs}}$ A; II.2,50 destricte M : districte A; II 5,7 conscientiam M : conscientia A; II 6,6 sodaliciis M : solidaciis A; II 6,16 spiritus ubi refrigerium M : ubi spiritus ubire frigerium A; II 6,17 extranea M : extra A; II 7,2 adepti M : adempti A; II 7,14 'dei *om.* AR' M : dei *habet* A; II 8,50 M *om.* : 'Carnisue : Carnis sue A'; II 8,68 M *om.* '*post* si *eras.* et A'.

Nous n'avons pas fait la collation des deux manuscrits de Florence (N et F) écrits à Pforzheim en 1426 par des moines franciscains et du Codex Luxemburgensis (X) qui, autant que nous sachions, a été consulté pour la première fois par J. W. Ph. Borleffs pour son édition du *De paenitentia* (dans *Mnemosyne*, N.S. 60, 1932). Tout de même, nous avons remarqué un nombre de fautes certaines; en outre on trouve dans l'apparat critique de Kroymann (qui donne de A une collation considérablement plus exacte que celle de M) un très grand nombre de leçons qui ne sont pas mentionnées par M. Nous nous limiterons ici à un sondage de dix lignes, sc. II 8,43/52, où nous trouvons quatre passages où l'apparat de M diffère de celui de Kroymann :

II 8,43 'sufficiam NFR' Kr., 'sufficiam R' M; (II 8,43 après 'enarrandum' il n'y a aucun sigle); II 8,45 'obsignatum NFR' Kr., 'R' M; II 8,45 benedictio *om.* NFR' Kr., '*om.* R' M; II 8,52 'et simul NFR^{3}' Kr. 'NR' M. J'ajoute encore II 1,5, où on trouve dans M 'quarundam AN : quorundam θR', ce qui est impossible parce que N fait partie de θ (= NFX).

Quelquefois la leçon de θ (= le consensus des manuscrits N, F et X) a été omise. P. ex., II 2,19 'fuerint A, fuerunt R'; il est nécessaire cependant d'ajouter ce qui se trouve dans θ. Je n'ajoute qu'un exemple remarquable. Dans II 8, 32, où 'habeant' est la leçon correcte, on ne trouve rien dans l'apparat de M, tandis que Kroymann écrit 'habeant $ANFR^{3}$, habeatur R^{1}'. R^{2} aussi, omis par Kroymann, a 'habeatur'. La forme correcte de l'apparat serait donc : 'habeant *codd.* R^{3} : habeatur $R^{1}R^{2}$'.

Il me semble valoir la peine de nous arrêter un moment au travail de critique textuelle du grand philologue qu'était Beat Bild (Beatus Rhenanus) qui, dans ce domaine, était sans doute plus doué que son ami Érasme. Il s'est occupé du texte de Tertullien pas moins de six fois : 1) dans sa première édition (R^1, Bâle 1521), où il a quelquefois incorporés dans son texte des variantes qu'il trouvait dans un manuscrit de Hirsau ; 2) dans la marge de cette édition (R^1*mg*) où il note plusieurs conjectures remarquables ; 3) dans sa deuxième édition (R^2, 1528) ; 4) dans les *Annotationes* de cette édition (R^2 *ann.*), où souvent il donne une motivation de ses conjectures ; 5) dans sa troisième édition (R^3, 1539), où il adopte quelquefois des leçons d'un manuscrit de Gœrz, le Gorziensis ; 6) dans les notes de cette édition (R^3 *ann.*). Il faut ajouter que dans R^2 *ann.* et R^3 *ann.* les notes contiennent ou bien des leçons déjà incorporées dans le texte de l'édition, ou bien des conjectures nouvelles. Je veux ici exprimer le vœu que les futurs éditeurs de Tertullien prendront la peine de noter exactement les détails du travail acharné de Rhenanus qui, pour dire le moins, indique toujours par ses conjectures que dans le texte il y a une corruption ou, en tout cas, une difficulté.

Quant aux fautes concernant les éditions de Rhenanus qui se trouvent dans l'apparat de M je veux mentionner avant tout les cas où dans la même note on trouve deux fois l'abréviation R (qui indique toutes les trois éditions) : une fois après la leçon qu'on trouve dans le texte, et encore une fois après une variante, ce qui crée une situation impossible.

Après la citation de l'apparat de M je donne les leçons se trouvant dans les trois éditions respectives :

I 3,38 'item qui R : itaque R' M – item qui R^1 itaque R^2R^3

I 4,9 'infirmiores NXR : infirmiora R' M – infirmiores R^1 R^2 infirmiora R^2 *ann.* R^3

I 4,21 'formae R : formam *codd.* R' M – formam R^1R^2 formae R^3

I 4,52 'esse AR : est θR' M – est R^1R^2 esse R^3

I 6,33 'boni R : bonis *codd.* R' M – bonis R^1R^2 boni R^3

II 2,57 'dicet R : dicit *codd.* R' M – dicit R^1 dicet R^2R^3

II 2,71 'erunt ac propterea θR : ac propterea R' M – erunt ac propterea R^1R^2 ac propterea R^3

II 7,12 'sit et θR : sciat R' M – sit et R^1R^2 sciat R^3

II 7,13 'experimenta AR : expedimenta θR' M – expedimenta R^1 experimenta R^2R^3

Les fautes suivantes de R^1 ont été omises dans M (j'ajoute les leçons de R^2 et R^3) :

I 3,25 (*ad* qui ualent beata) ue qui negent beati R^1 (Forte id est 'ne qui negent' R^1*mg*) R^2 ne qui neget, beati R^2 *ann.* R^3

I 3,32 Non : Nam R^1 (Non R^2R^3)

I 6,31 ex aequo : ex aeuo R^1R^2 (ex aequo R^2*mg* G R^3)

I 6,33 in *om.* R^1 (R^2R^3)

I 8,30/1 ingerunt : inrepunt R^1R^2

II 3,25 conuictus : conuinctus R^1R^3 (coniuctus R^2!)

II 8,32 habeant : habeatur R^1R^2

Il faut ajouter quelques fautes dans M concernant R^1 :

I 6,32 'continentiam θR^3 continentium R^1R^2' M – continentiam R

II 2,5 'proferret R' M – proferrent R^1R^3 proferret R^2

II 2,39 (Apostolus R^3) 'spiritus $R^{1\text{-}2}$' M – : Christus R^1R^2

II 2,42 (Apostolus R^3) 'sanctus spiritus $\theta R^{2\text{-}1}$ (*sic*)' M – CHRISTVS sanctus R^1R^2 (cf. *infra sub* R^2 *ann.*)

II 5,29 'pleraeque R' – plerique R^1R^2

II 8,19 'cum matrona $\beta R^{1\text{-}2}$' M – commatrona R^1R^2 Alias et matrona R^1*mg* eo matrona R^2*ann.*

II 8,34 're AR' M – rerum R^1R^2

Ensuite il vaut la peine de parcourir les conjectures qui se trouvent dans la marge de R^1 (R^1*mg*), parce que plusieurs ont été reçues dans le texte de R^2 et, ce qui est plus important, parce que pas moins de huit fois elles corrigent une leçon fautive de R^1 :

I 5,19 expeditae R^1*mg. codd.* : expedite R

I 6,4 abiit R^1*mg* R^2R^3 (habiit A) : habuit θR^1

I 6,6 parentant R^1*mg* R^2*ann.* R^3AN : pareant FR^1R^2

I 7,32 illam R^1*mg* R^2(*ann.*) R^3A : illum θR^1

I 7,33 inimicus R^1*mg* R^2R^3A : inimicum θR^1

II 1,28 meo R^1*mg* ('For. meo vel ex meo') R^2*ann.*(*id.*) R^3A : ex eo θR^1R^2

II 2,47 adiecit R^1*mg* R^2R^3 : abiecit θR^1

II 8,34 futuram R^1*mg* R^2R^3A : fugam θR^1

Une faute grave se trouve dans l'apparat *ad* I 1,8–9, où on lit dans M '9. et A : sed R' tandis qu'il s'agit du *et* qui se trouve dans la ligne 8, où il faut lire : 8. et AR^1*mg* R^2(*ann.*)R^3A : sed θR^1.

Nous en venons à la seconde édition de Rhenanus (R^2; 1528) dont, en général, les éditeurs n'ont pas fait grand cas parce que Rhenanus n'y a pas, comme dans la première et la troisième édition, consulté

un manuscrit aujourd'hui perdu; ceci est regrettable, parce que cette édition contient un très grand nombre de notes qui justifient les conjectures faites par l'éditeur. Beaucoup de ces notes sont très intelligentes et méritent une étude approfondie. Nous commencerons par noter, parmi les leçons omises par M, les conjectures justes qui se trouvent dans le *texte* de R^2; nous ajouterons l'abréviation '(*ann.*)' si ces conjectures sont motivées dans les *annotationes*.

I 1,7 atque R^2(*ann.*)R^3 adque A : aeque θR^1
I 3,2 castigatione R^2R^3A (omis par M) : castigationem θR^1
I 7,14-15 Ici il y a une lacune de six mots (ne-matrimonio), à cause d'une haplographie, dans R^2 (aussi dans R^1 et β); le texte correct est ajouté dans R^2*mg* (avec un 'a' devant matrimonio)
II 1,59 quarundam R^2R^3AN : quorundam θR^1
II 2,47 adiecit R^2(*ann.*)R^3A : abiecit θR^1

Dans les cas suivants la leçon correcte se trouve dans R^2*ann.* (aucun de ces cas n'est mentionné dans M) :

I 3,24 comprehensum R^2*ann.*A : compressum θR
I 4,22 sanctitati R^2*ann.codd.* : sanctitatem R
I 5,12 coguntur R^2*ann.* : locuntur θR^1R^2 locantur R^3
I 5,25 alicui R^2*ann.*R^3A : alicubi R^1R^2
I 6,31 ex aequo R^2*mg* GR^3*codd.* : ex aeuo R^1R^2
II 2,14 monitionem R^2*ann.*R^3 : mot(c)ionem $R^1R^2\theta$ mentionem A
II 2,47 legi R^2*ann.*R^3AN : legis $R^1R^2\beta$
II 3,1 si ita sunt R^2*ann.* : tria sunt R^1R^2 *codd.* cum ita sint R^3
II 5,3/4 beneficium R^2R^3*ann.*A : beneficiorum $R^1R^2\theta$
II 5,9 aut *add.*R^2*ann.*R^3A : *om.*$R^1R^2\theta$
II 5,19 uideberis R^2*ann.*R^3A : uideris $R^1R^2\theta$
II 6,13 de scena R^2*ann.*R^3A : dei c(o)ena $R^1R^2\theta$ dei cenans A
II 6,18 saluti R^2*ann.*R^3A : salutis $R^1R^2\theta$
II 7,2 morantur R^2*ann.*AN : moratur Rβ
II 7,21/2 exterminent R^2*ann.*R^3A : exerta eminent $R^1R^2\theta$ (exhorta eminent N).
II 7,22 abripiant R^2*ann.*R^3 abrapiant A : arripiant $R^1R^2\theta$
II 8,63 cantet R^2*ann.*A : canet $R^1R^2\theta$

Comme on voit, un consensus de R^2*ann.* avec A est tellement fréquent qu'on doit se demander si pour cette édition Rhenanus ait pu consulter le Codex Agobardinus; en tout cas cette question mérite une investigation plus profonde.

Restent encore dans R^1*ann.* trente-quatre conjectures qui ne donnent

pas une leçon juste mais qui en tout cas ont toujours le mérite d'indiquer où se trouve une erreur dans la tradition du texte; maintes fois, elles ont le mérite plus grand encore de montrer une voie qui mène à une solution correcte.

Nous arrivons maintenant à la troisième édition (R^3; 1539), pour laquelle Rhenanus pouvait consulter un manuscrit de Goerz (dans les annotations la formule usuelle de l'éditeur est 'ex collatione Gorziensi').

Ici nous avons beaucoup moins à noter parce que la collation de ce manuscrit par l'éditeur est beaucoup plus exacte que ne le sont celles qu'il a faites de R^1 et R^2. Les leçons correctes qui dans les éditions de Rhenanus se trouvent pour la première fois dans R^3 ou R^3*ann.* et qui sont omises ou qui contiennent une faute dans M, sont les suivantes (à part les cas déjà mentionnés):

I 6,15 sanctae R^3*ann.*AN : sancta GRβ
II 4,21 proma GR^3A : poma R^1R^2β(N?)
II 5,29 pleraeque R^3*ann.* : plerique R^1R^2*codd.*
II 7,10 uirtutem GR^3(*ann.*)AN : quae uirtutem R^1R^2β

Comme dans le cas de R^2, nous ne mentionnons pas les leçons fautives de R^3 qui ne sont pas notées dans M.

Quant au travail critique fait par d'autres philologues, on aurait aimé trouver un choix plus généreux des conjectures faites par les grands latinistes des seizième et dix-septième siècles mentionnés par l'éditeur dans l'index siglorum, c.-à-d. par Latinius, Franciscus Iunius, Fulvius Ursinus et, surtout, par Josephus Justus Scaliger. Ensuite il faut ajouter ici les adjonctions à l'apparat critique de la copie littérale de l'édition de Kroymann qu'on trouve dans l'édition de Tertullien dans le Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina I (Turnholti 1954) 373–394; on y trouve, entre autres, des corrections du texte par le grand spécialiste de Tertullien qu'était Gösta Thörnell; il faut ajouter son interprétation exemplaire de II 3,1 ss. dans ses *Studia Tertullianea* 3 (Uppsala 1922) 38–39.

Nous passons à quelques observations générales concernant l'apparat critique. Avant tout il est à remarquer que les variantes qui ne concernent que l'orthographe n'ont pas *locum suum* dans un apparat *critique* mais qu'elles doivent être mentionnées dans l'introduction après la description des manuscrits, parce qu'elles ne contribuent rien à la reconstruction du texte original. Ceci vaut particulièrement pour les variantes qui ne contiennent même pas un mot latin, comme p.ex.: I 1,18 proderis : proderiset X; I 1,32 spurca : spurga A; II 3,8 stuprum :

stripum A; II 5,15 captanda : castanda A. Tout au plus de telles leçons peuvent contribuer à la localisation ou à la datation d'un manuscrit; leur place est dans la *descriptio codicum* dans l'introduction. C'est en effet cette réception d'*orthographica* qui crée des apparats »critiques« d'une énormité entièrement inutile, comme p.ex. l'apparat de l'édition du Monobiblos de Properce par P. J. Enk, obligeant le lecteur à perdre beaucoup de temps à dresser une liste des variantes vraiment importantes.

Egalement inutile est d'inclure dans l'apparat des leçons fautives qui ne se trouvent que dans un seul manuscrit ('Sonderfehler', *vitia priva*) à moins qu'il ne s'agisse d'un manuscrit très ancien ou bien d'un texte qui ne se trouve que dans très peu de manuscrits. Mais il n'est pas du tout nécessaire de noter tous les 'Sonderfehler' des manuscrits du quinzième siècle comme les deux manuscrits de Florence (N et F) et le Codex Luxemburgensis. (Nous devons confesser d'avoir commis cette faute dans l'édition de l'Adversus Hermogenem, Utrecht-Anvers 1956.)

Nous devons protester contre l'habitude de l'éditeur d'employer le signe ⟨ ⟩ dans l'*apparat critique* pour indiquer qu'un manuscrit contient un mot ou plusieurs mots qui ne se trouvent pas dans les autres manuscrits, comme p.ex. I 3,18 'melius : melius ⟨est⟩ R' – il faut écrire simplement 'melius est R'. En effet les *sigla* ⟨ ⟩ et [ ] doivent être réservés pour le *texte* afin d'indiquer des mots (ou bien des parties de mots) qui ne se trouvent pas dans la tradition mais qui, selon la conviction de l'éditeur, appartenaient au texte original et, inversement, des mots qui ont pénétré dans le texte original et qui sont donc à éliminer. Ainsi – quand, en outre, on indique par des types cursifs les lettres que dans la tradition on a corrigées (p.ex. en imprimant dic*at*) – on pourra lire à la fois le texte que l'éditeur regarde comme le texte original et le texte présenté par la tradition. Un excellent exemple de cette méthode est fourni par l'édition des *Silvae* de Stace que M. H. Frère a publiée dans la Collection Budé.

Finalement, nous protestons contre l'habitude de l'éditeur d'ajouter le signe *tr.* dans les cas où l'ordre de deux mots a été changé dans un manuscrit ou une édition, p.ex. I 7,22, où le texte a 'detrahant fidei' et où nous lisons dans l'apparat critique : 'fidei detrahant *tr.*R^3G' : ici l'indication de la leçon de R^3G – ou plutôt de GR^3, parce que Rhenanus a trouvé cette leçon dans le Codex Gorziensis – est entièrement suffisante; il faut réserver le signe *tr.* pour les cas où dans un manuscrit

l'ordre des mots a été changé ou bien par le scribe lui-même ('*tr.m.ead.*') ou par une autre main ('*tr.m.alt.*'),

Nous devons signaler encore deux erreurs assez graves dans l'apparat critique : *ad* II 7,12 on trouve un sigle W qui n'est pas mentionné dans l'Index Siglorum; II 3,20 'aut A : θR'; le mot 'et' a été omis devant θR.

Nous croyons nécessaire de mentionner ces omissions et erreurs qui se trouvent dans l'apparat critique de M parce que, en général, les éditions des traités de Tertullien ont des apparats critiques très inexacts; ceci vaut particulièrement pour les éditions de Kroymann (j'ai déjà montré sa négligence dans son édition de l'*Adversus Hermogenem* dans mon édition de ce traité citée ci-dessus) et de V. Bulhart dans le Corpus de Vienne; on ne peut qu'espérer que dès maintenant les apparats deviendront exacts et dignes de foi, comme l'est au plus haut degré l'apparat de l'édition de l'*Adversus Iudaeos* par M. H. Traenkle. Il faut regretter particulièrement que les éditeurs du Corpus Christianorum ont donné à presque tous les apparats de Kroymann une survivance qu'ils ne méritent pas du tout.

Quant au texte il faut avant tout quelques observations concernant sa présentation. L'éditeur emprunte la subdivision en paragraphes des chapitres qui, si nous ne nous trompons pas, est due à Dom E. Dekkers (dans l'édition du Corpus Christianorum). En général, cette division a été bien faite; M. Munier la rend un peu plus radicale en séparant ces paragraphes l'un de l'autre par une ligne blanche ce qui fait que quelquefois la cohérence d'une argumentation est plus difficile à comprendre. P.ex., I 3,4 Tertullien dit – j'emploie la traduction de l'éditeur –: »le fait qu'une chose soit permise, comporte un doute sur les motifs de cette permission. En revanche, ce qui est meilleur, personne n'a eu à le permettre«; cette pensée est exprimée une fois de plus dans le paragraphe suivant où Tertullien dit: »Ce n'est pas sans une raison pour les désirer, si certaines choses ne sont pas interdites«; on pourrait donc se demander s'il ne vaut pas mieux de regarder §§ I 3,4-5 comme une unité cohérente, c.-à-d., comme un seul paragraphe. Dans I 6,3–4, on trouve une énumération de trois prêtresses païennes (les vierges Vestales, les prêtresses de Junon Achéenne à Aegium et la Pythie de Delphes) dont les premières sont mentionnées au paragraphe 3, les deux autres au paragraphe suivant; or il va sans dire que cette division de l'énumération – Tertullien aime les longues énumérations, cf. p.ex. dans le *De anima* 46 les listes interminables

d'interprètes et d'oracles de songes – n'a aucun sens. En outre il est évident que les mots 'Non tantum uirginibus datum, opinor', qui maintenant se trouvent à la fin de I 8,1, doivent ouvrir le § 2: 'Non tantum uirginibus datum, opinor, licet in illis integritas solida', etc.

Parce que cette recension est déjà beaucoup trop longue, nous ne voulons pas aborder ici la discussion d'un nombre de passages où nous sommes en désaccord avec l'éditeur; nous espérons pouvoir bientôt publier là-dessus un article. Pour le moment nous nous limiterons à observer que I 4,20 la conjecture 'permissis' de de Labriolle au lieu du 'praemissis' de la tradition est sans doute erronée : le passage trouve son explication dans l'emploi de 'praemittere' I 5, 4–5.

La traduction française est élégante, agréable à lire et généralement exacte; néanmoins on fera bien de la comparer, pour les passages difficiles, vec les traductions de H. Kellner (BKV^2, Kempten-München 1912) et W. P. le Saint (Tertullian, *Treatises on marriage and remarriage*, Westminster (Maryland) 1951, 1–36) et, si possible, avec la traduction néerlandaise de Christine Mohrmann (Tertullianus, *Apologeticum en andere geschriften uit Tertullianus' voor-Montanistischen tijd*, Utrecht en Brussel 1951, 329–356). Nous nous limitons ici à quelques menues observations : I 4,3 la traduction de 'in uno sensu' par »dans la même sentence« est sans doute erronée; I 4,30 par 'deputentur' Tertullien ne veut pas dire »elles appartiennent à« mais »elles sont censées appartenir à«.

Le commentaire pouvait être bien succinct, parce que tout ce qui se rapporte à la structure du traité en général et aux argumentations avait déjà été discuté dans l'excellente analyse que nous avons mentionnée au commencement de cette recension. Néanmoins on désire plusieurs fois une discussion plus profonde des passages les plus difficiles de ce traité compliqué.

En récapitulant nous pouvons dire que cette édition marque un progrès parce qu'elle a libéré le texte des dizaines de conjectures et transpositions erronées de Kroymann, et en raison de l'excellente analyse du traité; mais le texte devra être revu avec beaucoup de soin et l'apparat critique est à refaire entièrement.

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Rudolf Lorenz, *Arius judaizans? Untersuchungen zur dogmengeschichtlichen Einordnung des Arius* (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 31). Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979. 228 S. kart. DM 44.–

Dr. Lorenz's new book on Arius must surely be recognized as by far the most impressive and thoroughgoing study of its subject that has yet appeared. It is not written for beginners; it presupposes some knowledge of the Arian controversy; and it sticks closely to its declared purpose of determining the antecedents of Arian theology. But it opens with three chapters which might rank as introductory. The first outlines the progress of research from Mosheim to the present day. The second presents in tabular form the main points of Arius' teaching, as expounded by Alexander and Athanasius, with an added note on the date of the *Thalia*. The third offers a preliminary survey of Arius' doctrinal position, and introduces an important claim which will be developed later, namely that the basic point of Arius' system is not an insistence upon the unique majesty of the Father (which he shared with his opponents) but a distinctive Christology.

From here on (p. 67) three main problems are discussed. First, Arius' relation to Origen, to his predecessors Philo and Clement, and to his followers, which occupies Chapters 4, 5, and 9; though a penetrating account of Lucian in the last-mentioned chapter makes it clear that his theology shows both agreements with Origen and important divergences, especially in denying the eternal generation of the Son. Secondly, Chapter 6 deals with Arius' relations to groups opposed by Origen, including Gnostics, but concentrating on the Adoptionists, together with Paul of Samosata. This is a well-balanced discussion, which at least makes it intelligible that Arius, despite his use of so many of Origen's characteristic themes, should have reproduced some features of adoptionist Christology which are present in Paul. Thirdly, Chapter 8 presents a thorough and well-documented account of Arius' possible debt to Judaism. In view of the title of the book, it should be made clear that the author is by no means disposed to over-emphasize this possibility; he treats it with some reserve, and also notes that some points which might suggest Jewish influence are shared by other members of the school of Lucian; so the question of Jewish influence must be shelved until the latter's theology is examined (cf. p. 179), and we are finally told that though not unlikely in itself, it is not to be compared with the pervasive influence of Origen.

The level-headed approach and the wealth of parallels adduced will make this a standard work for many years to come; and it will be some time before the author's distinctive theses can be properly evaluated. I myself would confess to just a tinge of disquiet at one or two points.

First, it sometimes seems that the author's handling of the evidence inclines to the mechanical; reports of Arius' teaching are collected and processed with the most admirable efficiency, but without always recalling their context and the purpose for which they were uttered. And there does not seem to be an over-all recognition of the contradictions which this evidence affords. Arius, it appears, was prepared to regard the Logos as the chief of all generated beings, as '(a) mighty God'; but also as simply *one* of such beings, 'one of the intelligible natures'; and also as just a man, a fallible personality, preserved from falling only by his own moral decisions. All sorts of explanations can be suggested: Arius may have been simply illogical; he may have changed his mind, either sincerely or deviously; he may have been saddled with opinions current among his supporters which he himself disowned; he may (as Dr. Lorenz occasionally admits) have been successfully caricatured by the Nicene party. I feel there is further work to be done here, for which the present study will be an invaluable aid; but it may be that Dr. Lorenz has assumed too readily that the reports of Arian theology can be made to yield a coherent system.

Sometimes, it seems, indirect reports of Arius' teaching are treated as quotations, or preferred to quotations. Thus I cannot see why the phrases set down by Alexander in his letter Ἑνὸς σώματος (Opitz, *Urk.* 4b, §§ 7–10) should be called "Thaliazitaten"; there is no metrical evidence to suggest direct quotation, nor did Alexander have to wait for the Thalia to find out what Arius taught; it is much more likely that he summarized the objectionable points of his teaching before taking action against him, and that Athanasius was later able to confirm this *syllabus errorum* by quoting from the Thalia. Again, though Constantine's charge of anthropomorphism (Opitz, *Urk.* 34, § 26) introduces an impressively learned account of the imagery of God's throne and place, I am inclined to approve the suggestion thrown out in passing, that it may be no more than a piece of polemical opportunism, "berechnete Schauspielerei", p. 168. Once again, I am less confident than Dr. Lorenz that Arius really taught that the Logos was Son 'by appointment' (θέσει) rather than 'by nature' (φύσει). He

may indeed have done so – catch-phrases of this kind were certainly used in the controversy without too much reflection, though in fact it is hard to see why *divine* appointment is so much less than *created* nature; but then how does one explain the statement that the Son was "not first existing, and subsequently begotten or further established as Son" (οὐδὲ τὸν ὄντα πρότερον, ὕστερον γεννηθέντα ἢ ἐπικτισθέντα εἰς υἱόν, Ath. *syn.* 16 = Opitz, *Urk.* 6 § 3)? There is of course a certain unreality in the whole picture of a pretemporal adoption which Dr. Lorenz seems to ascribe to Arius: God created a being to serve as his instrument in making the world; one who was not predetermined to be perfect, but endowed with free will; could God, *before creating him*, foresee, but not determine, how this free will would operate? But the conflict of evidence still needs to be explained.

The most arresting feature of the book is its claim that Arius' teaching stems from a distinctive Christology. This claim is developed along several distinct lines. The author explains how Arius will have modified Origen's teaching on the soul of Jesus. Arius, like many of his contemporaries, did not assign him a distinct soul; in Jesus, he taught, the Logos took flesh; but some of the adoptionistic features which appear in Origen's treatment of the soul of Jesus were transferred by Arius to the Logos himself, who is thus made to earn his divine status by good works; on the other hand some of the transcendent attributes of Origen's Logos were transferred to a distinct and higher Logos and Sophia, which are intrinsic and personal attributes of the Father. All this is well worked out, and to my mind convincing. But does it amount to saying that, for Arius, Christology was the determining factor? I think there is still some force in the claim that Arius gave greater weight than his opponents to the need to safeguard the Father's uniqueness; he *may* even have thought that the sense of personal dependence on the Father, so evident in the Old Testament, was being eroded by Nicenes like Athanasius, who often seems to treat the Father as an unfathomable mystery disclosed only indirectly by means of his Logos.

And we might ask for some further consideration of the claim (very carefully qualified as it is on pp. 124-5) that Arius stood in the tradition of a "Christologie von unten". It seems clear that he did point to the human limitations of the Logos as proof of his essential subordination to the Father; he did make his dignity in some sense dependent on his freely enacted decisions. But it certainly seems as

if the impression that he taught that Christ was no more than a man was fostered by his opponents; it belongs with the notion that Christ was "merely one of the creatures", which was certainly voiced from the Arian side, but was expressly contradicted by Arius himself. In stressing the importance of Christ's moral decisions, Arius was adverting to problems which could not be adequately treated by the school-book logic of the period; a considered resolve to do right is something that has to be attained and upheld; it cannot be properly described either as a natural automatism or as a mere accident reversible at will. Aristotle had partly seen this (*Eth. Nic.* iii.5, 1114 a 12 ff., b 16 ff.); contrast *c. Ar.* ii.28, where Athanasius cosily remarks that anything learnt can be unlearnt, – as if Adam could forget his knowledge and re-enter Eden! And there is at least something to be said for a theology which attaches importance to the human obedience of Jesus and sees it as part of God's total self-revelation to man. There is an under-emphasis at this point in Athanasian theology which might suggest embarrassment. In his judgements of Arius under this heading Dr. Lorenz is possibly a little too conventional and rather less than equitable.

I have voiced some doubts and reservations. But my concluding word must be an expression of gratitude for a magnificent book.

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Jean Chrysostome, *Sur le sacerdoce* (Dialogue et Homélie). Introduction, Texte critique, Traduction et Notes par Anne-Marie Malingrey (Sources Chrétiennes, 272). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1980, 432 p.

Le dialogue *Sur le sacerdoce* de Jean Chrysostome est une des lumières de la littérature grecque chrétienne. Sa renommée se reflète dans le nombre des manuscrits. L'éditeur en a trouvé quatre-vingt trois qu'elle énumère dans son introduction. Son édition se fonde sur dix d'entre eux datant des IX^{e}–XI^{e} siècles. Dans le cas d'une tradition tellement consciencieuse cela semble être justifié.

L'introduction sobre de cette édition contient, à part une description des manuscrits utilisés, quelques remarques sur l'auteur, sur le plan de l'ouvrage et sur la question si la situation décrite dans le dialogue est historique ou fictive. Elle donne aussi l'histoire des éditions.

On ne peut que se réjouir d'une nouvelle édition critique de cet ouvrage fameux. L'addition de la première homélie sur le sacerdoce du même auteur augmente encore l'importance du livre. Pour ceux qui savent lire le grec cet ouvrage est d'un grand intérêt.

En général le texte grec est bien édité. A part un petit nombre de coquilles peu dangereuses (lire III 6, 65 κτήσασθαι, III 10, 113 ὁμολογήσειας; *Hom.* 173 Κύριος), j'ai noté les fautes suivantes : III 4, 27 lire αὐτόν au lieu de αὐτόν; III 8, 19 il faut ajouter με après ἐκέλευέ; III 12, 258 au lieu de τοὺς τοῦ σωματοφύλακας lire τοὺς τοῦ σώματος φύλακας.

III 13, 19 au lieu de Ὅτε il faut évidemment lire Ὅ τε, c'est-à-dire au lieu d'une conjonction de temps l'article avec l'enclitique τε (cf. Migne). L'éditeur ne semble pas avoir considéré qu'avec ὅτε elle crée une proposition subordonnée temporelle qui ne dépend pas d'une proposition principale.

A ceux qui voudraient se fier à la traduction française, présentée ici, le recenseur doit donner un avertissement très sérieux. A son grand regret il a constaté que cette traduction n'est pas digne de foi. Je m'en rends compte que ce jugement est sévère mais après avoir lu le texte d'un bout à l'autre c'est la seule conclusion possible. A chaque page à peu près on trouve des traductions inexactes et très souvent les erreurs sont tellement graves qu'elles détruisent la cohérence de la pensée.

Pour donner une impression je suivrai la traduction des trois premiers chapitres et après cela j'ajouterai quelques spécimens qu'on trouve dans d'autres chapitres.

Dans l'introduction au dialogue Chrysostome raconte comment il avait un ami, nommé Basile, avec qui il était lié d'une façon très spéciale. Ils faisaient les mêmes études, ils avaient les mêmes intérêts, les mêmes maîtres. Et après leurs études ils avaient les mêmes idées sur la meilleure route à suivre dans le futur. Cependant »le moment venu d'embrasser le vie bienheureuse des solitaires et de vraie philosophie« (évidemment c'était là le choix qu'ils avaient fait), Chrysostome ne suit pas son ami dans la solitude mais il restait dans le monde et passait son temps au tribunal et au théâtre. Sur cette situation Chrysostome écrit : ἡ μὲν φιλία βέβαιος ἔμενε καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἡ δὲ συνουσία διεκόπτετο (I 2, 8). Mlle M. traduit : »A partir de ce moment-là notre amitié resta encore solide comme avant, mais notre intimité était brisée«. A mon avis Chrysostome ne parle pas ici d'"*intimité*" mais d'"existence

en commun'. Ce qui se passe ici est une séparation de lieu, tandis que l'amitié reste solide comme avant.

Après quelque temps Chrysostome se lève »au-dessus des flots agités de la vie« et est accueilli par son ami. Mais, dit-il, malgré nos efforts »nous ne pouvions pas conserver notre ancienne égalité«, et il en donne l'explication suivante : Καὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ φθάσας ἡμᾶς καὶ πολλὴν τὴν σφοδρότητα ἐπιδειξάμενος, ἀνωτέρω πάλιν ἡμῶν ἐφέρετο (I 2, 13–15). Traduction de Mlle M. : »En effet, avec le temps, il nous avait devancé, car il avait montré un zèle ardent : il était de nouveau emporté plus haut que nous«. La construction du grec est évidente. Basile est emporté plus haut que Chrysostome pour deux causes qui sont exprimées par deux participes. Dans la traduction donnée la dépendance de ces participes à l'égard de la pricipale a disparu. D'ailleurs des deux participes la traductrice fait dépendre l'un de l'autre et elle ne voit pas que τῷ χρόνῳ détermine le participe φθάσας.

»Cependant«, poursuit Chrysostome, »comme il était bon et qu'il faisait grand cas de notre amitié ἁπάντων ἑαυτὸν ἀποστήσας τῶν ἄλλων, ἡμῖν τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον συνῆν, ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν τούτου καὶ πρότερον, ὅπερ δὲ ἔφην, ὑπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας κωλυόμενος ῥαθυμίας«. La signification de ces mots est tout simple : »il s'écarta de tous les autres et restait tout le temps chez nous; c'est ce qu'il désirait déjà autrefois, mais, comme je l'ai dit, notre insouciance l'en avait empêché«. La traductrice néglige le caractère inchoatif de ἀποστήσας; elle ne voit pas que ὅπερ ἔφην ne concerne que la dernière partie de la phrase. Elle traduit : »*bien qu*'il *se tînt* lui-même à l'écart des autres, il restait tout le temps avec nous; c'est ce qu'il désirait autrefois, comme je l'ai dit, mais ce dont notre insouciance l'avait empêché«.

Basile ne cessait d'insister chez Chrysostome de quitter sa propre maison, et il réussit à le persuader. Mais alors la mère du dernier intervint. Le texte dit : Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ᾔσθετο ταῦτα βουλευόμενον, λαβοῦσά με τῆς δεξιᾶς, εἰσήγαγεν εἰς τὸν ἀποτεταγμένον οἶκον αὐτῇ καὶ καθίσασα πλησίον ἐπὶ τῆς εὐνῆς ἧς ἡμᾶς ὤδινε ... (I 2,32). Traduction de Mlle M. : »En effet, lorsqu'elle s'aperçut de sa résolution, elle me prit par la main et m'emmena dans la chambre qui lui était réservée; m'ayant fait asseoir auprès du lit où elle nous avait mis au monde...«. Evidemment le pronom 'sa' doit être 'ma'. D'ailleurs καθισάσα n'est pas transitif ici (il faudrait alors avoir ajouté le pronom με), et πλησίον ἐπὶ ne peut pas être pris ensemble (»auprès du«). Chrysostome dit simplement que sa mère s'assit auprès de lui (après

πλησίον on n'a pas besoin d'un pronom personnel; cf. I 3, 41) sur le lit.

Un peu plus loin la mère dit : »il ne m'a pas été donné de jouir longtemps τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ σοῦ«. Cela signifie, à mon avis, »de ton père excellent«, et non pas »de la valeur de ton père«. Et τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποδυρομένη ne signifie pas »en se lamentant *à côté de* nous«. Cela ne produirait pas un accusatif.

Mais alors une situation nouvelle est créée par le bruit que les deux amis vont être promus à la dignité du sacerdoce. Chrysostome se sent indigne de cette élection, mais pense que son indignité ne doit pas priver l'Église d'un homme excellent comme Basile. De son côté Basile insiste qu'ils fassent le même choix. Alors Chrysostome se sert d'une ruse. Il donne à Basile l'impression qu'il prendra la même décision que lui. Mais quand le moment de l'ordination est là, il se cache. Basile, qui ne le sait pas, se laisse ordonner. Chrysostome décrit les événements ainsi : ἔπεισά τε εὐθέως μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τούτων φροντίζειν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ παρέσχον θαρρεῖν ὡς ὁμογνωμονήσοντος, εἴ ποτε συμβαίη τοιοῦτό τι παθεῖν (I 3, 24–27). Mlle M. traduit : »je le persuadai *facilement* de *ne rien décider* à ce sujet, je *promis* d'avoir le courage de choisir le même parti que lui, si jamais il arrivait que nous subissions une contrainte *quelconque*«. Elle force ici l'un mot après l'autre. En effet Chrysostome persuada son ami *aussitôt* de *ne pas avoir de soucis* à ce sujet et *il lui inspira du courage* concernant lui-même (= Chrysostome) qu'il ferait le même choix, si jamais il leur arrivait *une telle chose*.

Le texte poursuit : Χρόνου δὲ παρελθόντος οὐ πολλοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς χειροτονήσειν ἐλθόντος καὶ κρυπτομένου μου, μηδὲν τούτων εἰδώς, ἄγεται μὲν ὡς ἐφ' ἑτέρᾳ προφάσει· δέχεται δὲ τὸν ζυγόν. Traduction de Mlle M. : »Peu de temps s'était écoulé et *le moment* était venu de nous ordonner. Je me cachai, sans qu'il le sût. On l'emmène sous un autre prétexte : il reçoit le joug«. Evidemment elle pense que τοῦ μέλλοντος renvoie à χρόνου. Mais alors Chrysostome dirait que le futur est venu, ce qui me semble être assez curieux. D'ailleurs elle combine μηδὲν τούτων εἰδώς avec ce qui précède, tandis qu'il est évident que ces mots font partie de ce qui suit. Il faudrait traduire : »*Mais* (δὲ) lorsque peu de temps s'était écoulé et *celui qui allait* nous ordonner était venu, moi je me cachai, et Basile *ne sachant rien de cela*, est emmené...« (après προφάσει une virgule me semble être préférable à un haut point).

On pourrait continuer de faire des observations semblables sur toute la traduction. Je me restreindrai à quelques exemples frappants. I 4,7 ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἧς τὴν φιλίαν ἔστερξα τὴν σήν. Traduction : »à partir du jour où j'ai été *privé de* ton amitié«. Mlle M. semble confondre στέργω et στερέω. Mais un verbe comme στερέω prend le génitif!

II 3, 61 ss. Dans un passage qui, en général, est mal traduit, on trouve les énormités suivantes. Οὔτε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐξουσία τοσαύτη παρὰ τῶν νόμων δέδοται : »En effet, nous n'avons pas un aussi grand pouvoir *que* les lois« et ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα καὶ χάριν εἰδῶσι τῆς ἰατρείας αὐτοῖς : »mais pour qu'ils reconnaissent que *s'est la grâce qui guérit*« au lieu de »pour qu'ils leur sachent gré à cause de la cure«.

II 6, 29 ss. Chrysostome a annoncé qu'il va réfuter les mots de son ami par des arguments empruntés aux *mots* et aux *actes* du dernier. Il commence ainsi : Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους τρέψομαι. Traduction de Mlle M. : »Eh bien! je *répondrai aux accusations*«. Chrysostome dit : »Alors, *je passerai à la réfutation*«. Il commence par les actes de son ami, et à la fin du passage il dit : καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔργον τοῦτο ἦν. Mlle M. ne voit pas que c'est une observation finale (»en voilà pour votre activité«) et traduit : »la situation y invitait«.

II 7, 29. Chrysostome dit qu'il a refusé le sacerdoce pour épargner son âme. Mlle M. n'a pas considéré que le pronom ἑαυτῶν s'emploie aussi pour désigner la première personne et elle traduit les mots ὅτι τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐφεισάμεθα ψυχῆς par : »d'avoir épargné *leur* âme« (au lieu de »notre âme«).

IV 4, 13. Chrysostome traitant de la recherche des choses vaines, dit : il y en a beaucoup qui cherchent ἃ μήτε εὑρεῖν δυνατὸν καὶ τὸν Θεὸν παροξύνει ζητούμενα. Cela veut dire »des choses qu'il n'est pas possible de trouver et dont la recherche même irrite Dieu«. Mlle M. traduit : »ce qu'il n'est pas possible de trouver, et que, *une fois trouvé*, irrite Dieu«, ainsi imputant à Chrysostome une contradiction flagrante.

En V 2, 12 elle fait dériver τῶν καλῶν de ὁ κάλως (ou ὁ κάλος), qu'elle rend par 'rêne'. Elle fait une double erreur. L'accent s'oppose à une telle dérivation, et le mot κάλως ne signifie pas 'rêne' mais 'câble', et spécialement le câble d'un navire pour manœuvrer les voiles.

En V 8, 63 ss Chrysostome parle de la δόξα τῶν πόλλων comme une bête difficile à vaincre. Il faut le fouler aux pieds et lui trancher ses multiples têtes (comme d'une hydre) ou plutôt μηδὲ φῦναι τὴν

ἀρχὴν συγχωρεῖν c'est-à-dire »ou plutôt ne les laisser pas du tout croître«. Mlle M. n'a pas remarqué l'usage adverbial de τὴν ἀρχήν et traduit »ou plutôt de ne pas tolérer *son empire*«. La même erreur se rencontre déjà en III 10, 61.

Il va sans dire que de telles erreurs sont désastreuses pour une traduction. Evidemment la traductrice ne possède pas une connaissance suffisante de la langue grecque pour traduire un tel texte.

Je n'avais pas à ma disposition une autre traduction française, mais je suis à peu près sûr que la traductrice aurait pu bénéficier de ses devanciers. En tout cas elle aurait pu profiter de l'excellente traduction allemande dans la *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter* (Kempten-München 1916).

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P. F. Beatrice, *Tradux Peccati. Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale* (Studia Patristica Mediolanensia, 8). Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1978. 332 pages.

Placuit ut quicumque paruulos recentes ... dicit ... nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati quod lavacro regenerationis expietur ... anathema sit (*Conc.Carth.* A. 418.2, CC 149, p. 69-70): this formula put the seal on Augustine's victory over Pelagianism. For the decisions of the Carthaginian council summarize the conclusions Augustine had reached in this controversy and his doctrine of original sin was declared to be the official view of the orthodox Church. Julian of Eclanum did not give up the struggle, but this only meant an even clearer demarcation of Augustine's positions. Indeed he went so thoroughly into these problems that not many people will take exception at the title Gross gave him: 'der Architekt der Erbsündentheologie' (J. Gross, *Entstehungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas.* Band I (München 1960) 368). But where did the materials with which this architect raised his building come from? Augustine himself would have replied that he was only defending the truth of Scripture and tradition. With many quotations from the Bible and the Fathers he tried to show that the doctrine of original sin was firmly founded on, and even present in, the Old and New Testaments and in the writings of the great orthodox authorities. This view is also held by many Catholic theologians of the

present time, although they presumably would readily subscribe to this modified formula of C. Baumgartner in his critical review of Gross' book: "Augustin est le père du dogme du péché héréditaire en ce sens que par lui l'Église a pris explicitement conscience de ce qu'elle croyait réellement, mais implicitement." (*RecSR* 51 (1963) 623).

Diametrically opposed to this conviction of Augustine's strict adherence to orthodox tradition the Pelagianists suggested Manichaeism as the source of his ideas. Julian, their most energetic controversialist, kept harping on this string: ... *ex sententia Manichaeorum traducem peccati id est malum naturale* ... (*Op.imp. contra Iul.* I 1); addressing himself to Augustine he even called Mani *parens tuus* (*ib.* III 171). For this idea, too, support can be found in modern times: "Den philosophischen Untergrund der augustinischen Erbsündentheologie bildet der Neuplatonismus vermischt mit Elementen des von Augustin nie völlig überwundenen Manichäismus." (J. Gross, o.c. 372): a vague phrase indeed, but there it is.

The above is meant to serve as a short sketch of the scene on which Beatrice's book has now arrived to play its part. B.'s working hypothesis is that Augustine was neither the inventor nor the 'fedele interprete della tradizione' (35), but that he found the doctrine "già vitale e circolante in ambienti ecclesiastici italiani o africani" (35). In order to tackle the problem thoroughly B. has deemed it necessary to go once more over the ground already ploughed by many predecessors. His inquiry falls into three parts: 1. a description of Augustine's doctrine, 2. an examination of the biblical passages and patristic texts he refers to, 3. the introduction of texts not mentioned by Augustine. Before continuing and before passing any judgement on the plausibility of B.'s ideas I want to express my admiration of the way which he has organized his study. The three parts mentioned are each divided into relatively short chapters with ample documentation (references to many ancient and modern authors, often full quotations of important Greek and Latin texts) at the foot of every page. The author's clear style facilitates the study of his book even further.

B. makes short work of any Manichaean influence: Augustine made a sharp distinction between *natura*, God's good creation, and *uitium*, the result of Adam's fall, whereas the Manichaeans considered these two as "due realtà coincidenti" (67).

The Pelagian controversy prompted Augustine to elaborate his doctrine and to introduce the problems of marriage and sexuality,

especially in the later stages, when Julian kept posing these problems. B. quotes a number of passages which in his view are sufficient "per attribuire ad Agostino l'identità di fondo della concupiscenza con il peccato originale" (92). Here, of course, the heart of the matter is reached, viz. the concept of the *tradux peccati*, and B.'s conclusion is as follows: "La trasmissione del peccato ereditario è così realisticamente connessa alla sfera sessuale della generazione." (95). Infant baptism is thus an absolute necessity and the liturgical rites provide an additional argument against Pelagius: *ubique omnes baptizandi infantuli ... exsufflantur* (Aug., *De nupt. et conc.* II 18,33). Now according to B. precisely in this respect, concerning the neonati, Augustine differed from other orthodox authorities. Whereas he strongly emphasized their hereditary guilt, all the other patres, above all the Greek Fathers, "in un coro unanime di voci, sostengono ... che i bambini nascono innocenti" (114).

B. next proceeds to deny that original sin with its implications was taught anywhere in the Old Testament, in the Gospels or by Paul (quite a few pages are devoted to the famous *in quo* of *Rom.* 5.12).

In the Latin Fathers, especially Augustine's prime authorities Cyprian and Ambrose there are indeed passages where the idea of original sin is present, but against this in other texts a quite different emphasis is laid, viz. on personal responsibility. Ambrose also held new-born babies to be innocent. B. concludes that there are too many contradictions and incoherences in the views of the Latin Fathers to ascribe to them the doctrine of original sin in the full sense of the word. What about the Greek Fathers? B. is categorical: "La tradizione della teologia greca ... nulla poteva offrire, malgrado la convinzione contraria di Agostino..." (201).

Having thus discarded Scripture and patristic theology as possible sources for Augustin's thought, B. now in ch. 2 of part III nominates his own candidate: the second century Encratite movement, against one of whose leading teachers, Julius Cassianus, Clemens Alex. is polemizing at the end of *Strom.* III. In ch. 100 B. detects the first statement about original sin, when Clement according to him ascribes to his opponent the view that babies are born under Adam's curse. The Encratites strongly depreciated marriage and sexuality and infant baptism sprung up precisely in their circles. (B. thinks *1 Peter* 3.21b about "the putting away of the filth of the flesh" combats the Encratite views on baptism, a very doubtful new exegesis!) All these ideas were

continued by the Messalians, for which sect, too, "il peccato originale coincide essenzialmente con la concupiscenza sessuale" (239). From the East the Encratite movement must have spread to the West, before all to Africa, where it was incorporated in the Jewish Christian tradition, of which i.a. *De centesima* is an important witness according to card. Daniélou, who regarded this work as "a Latin Judaeo-Christian sermon from the end of the second century", and found it "decidedly encratite in character" (*The Origins of Latin Christianity* (London 1977) 92). B. is especially impressed by the expression in par. 2: *delicto primae natiuitatis purgati*, and on page 275 B., whose style on the whole tends to be apodictic rather than prudent or modest, is jubilating: "... finalmente abbiamo trovato l'anello mancante della catena che dall' oriente greco ci conduce all' occidente latino. Esso è dato dall' encratismo giudeo-cristiano diffusosi in territorio africano in data molto antica..." Other people will perhaps be more sceptical, not everybody is convinced by Daniélou's theories (cf. A. Orbàn's remarks in this journal, vol. 30 (1976) 223-235) and it remains to be seen whether the expression just quoted from *De centesima* really "rinvia infatti palesemente all'esegesi encratica del salmo 50.7" (272).

According to B. in the popular faith of African Christianity the Encratite ideas stayed alive and his final conclusion is: "Agostino riecheggia con grande fedeltà un' antichissima dottrina a lui pervenuta attraverso la vivente tradizione popolare." (302). One could call this a modification of Gross' verdict: "Augustinus siegte, weil er einen mächtigeren Bundesgenossen hatte, nämlich das religiöse Gefühl, den Mystizismus der christlichen Massen" (o.c. 293). Augustine's opponent Julian, on the other hand, was "il portavoce della mentalità aristocratica ed umanistica dell'ortodossia greca". (256). Now it is indeed true that Julian could put on a haughty mask: *sed ueror, ne refrageris et, si philosophorum ego senatum aduocauero, tu continuo sellularios opifices omneque in nos uulgus accendas* (*Op.imp. contra Iul.* I 41). But in the heat of controversy people are often tempted to portray their opponents as deceivers of the ignorant; Augustine on his part complained to Pope Bonifacius: *non tamen quiescunt scriptis suis minus cautorum uel minus eruditorum corda temptare* (*Contra duas ep.Pel. I 2*).

In any case I do not think Julian's references to the popular support enjoyed by Augustine really strengthen the theory about encratite influences on his way of thinking.

Before I conclude this review it is perhaps useful to direct the

attention of the readers to an extensive critical note by the distinguished Augustinian theologian A. Trapé O.S.A. in *Augustinianum* XIX (1979) 531–538. The scholarly and polite tone of this note barely disguises the author's annoyance, even his indignation, at Beatrice's study. In the opinion of Trapé B., like other modernists, as a kind of Julianus redivivus has done Augustine scarce justice in reducing his views on original sin to an identification of this sin with concupiscence. In reality Augustine's thinking was much more profound and he again and again defended the goodness of marriage. B. with all his philological erudition has failed in theological respect. Concerning the testimony of Scripture Trapé warns against an exaggerated emphasis on a few isolated texts: the truth is rather that Augustine "sviluppa una tesi di teologia biblica sulla redenzione" (534) and the doctrine of original sin is closely connected with that of redemption. But Trapé's main objection is this: "... non si avverte abbastanza che la dottrina criticata ... non è di Agostino, anche se di Agostino, ma della Chiesa..." (537). The best key to Augustine's thought is the Catholic one, never the heretical. Here we tread on rather dangerous ground and I suppose other scholars will hold a quite divergent view on the relations between Church doctrine and the methods of scholarship, but it must be admitted that B. seems to underrate the contributions of pre-Augustinian orthodoxy. One would also like to learn at which other conclusions Augustine could reasonably have arrived, given his own belief in Christ's overwhelming grace and Pelagius' entirely different anthropology.

All the same I agree with the qualities R. Cantalamessa in his cautious introductory note has ascribed to the author: "vigore e erudizione".

Leiderdorp, van Effendreef 15 J. DEN BOEFT

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BASILE, LE GREC ET LES GRECS

RÉFLEXIONS LINGUISTIQUES

PAR

MICHEL CASEVITZ

Le linguiste peut éprouver, à la lecture du »Propos aux Jeunes Gens« de Basile, un »essaim de plaisirs« (ἡδονῶν σμῆνος selon Platon, *Rép.* 9, 574 d qu'évoque Basile écrivant en 5, 69 πάντα ἑσμὸν ἡδονῆς) tel que, laissant à d'autres l'étude de la philosophie, de la morale, de la religiosité exprimées par l'auteur, il veuille étudier le texte, »lui-même en lui-même«. Certes, l'étude du texte se heurte à des obstacles liminaires : le texte de l'*oratio* n'est pas encore bien établi, malgré la récente édition, pourvue d'un bon commentaire, de Wilson, à Londres en 1975, en même temps que la petite traduction de Mazzel à Turin. Différentes branches de la tradition restent encore à être prises en compte pour établir un texte qu'on puisse dire authentique. Reste que le texte le plus abordable est encore l'édition procurée par Boulanger en 1935 dans la Collection des Universités de France. Autre écueil encore à éviter d'abord : le préjugé. Tout écrivain des premiers siècles de notre ère, quand il est bon, est défini par le terme d'atticiste (Wilson dit même »a typical atticist«). Plutôt que d'enfermer un auteur dans une définition aussi lapidaire que schématique, aussi précise qu'est général le référent, plutôt que de dissoudre l'originalité d'un auteur dans une totalité vague et confuse, il me paraît preférable d'étudier un ouvrage dans sa propre totalité, dans le système linguistique qu'il constitue, spécialement dans le domaine sémantique qui m'importe le plus.

Ce qui apparaît d'abord remarquable dans le »Propos aux Jeunes Gens«, c'est la cohérence de la langue, dont nous donnerons des exemples précis. Cette cohérence est conforme à la cohérence du dessein. Le but de Basile dans l'opuscule, c'est de »conseiller au mieux« : les mêmes termes sont employés au début (1, 2) et à la fin (10,32) : συμβουλεῦσαι ὑμῖν ἃ βέλτιστα εἶναι κρίνω (1, 2) / ἃ κράτιστα εἶναι κρίνω μὲν νῦν εἴρηκα (10, 32). Ces conseils, Basile les énonce

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en parlant le langage de l'*utilité*, qui ponctue comme un refrain chaque étape du raisonnement ou chaque retour au propos après digression. Le propos est de démontrer que toute la culture grecque est profitable : (συμβουλεῦσαι) ἃ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν ἑλομένοις πεπίστευκα (1, 3) »(vous conseiller) ce que je suis sûr qui vous sera profitable si vous le prenez«. Ainsi encore, l'être inapte à concevoir le devoir par soi-même ou par l'enseignement d'autrui c'est l'être inutile pour tout l'idiot (première référence par paraphrase à Hésiode, *Trav.* 297 ὅδ' αὖτ' ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ 1, 19). Au contraire de cet être inapte inepte, l'auteur, lui, affirme avoir trouvé en lui-même quelque surcroît d'avantages (τι λυσιτελέστερον 1, 23), car ce qui passe tout, c'est bien l'utilité (1, 27 ὅσον ἐστὶ χρήσιμον αὐτῶν δεχομένους). Cette variation sur le thème du profit continue : un nouveau terme apparaît (nous négligeons χρῆμα 2, 3, qui doit être interpolé), c'est συντέλεια en 2, 3; n'est pas bien et n'est pas appelé tel ce qui n'apporte *quelque contribution* que pendant la vie humaine (voir aussi 2, 10 ἃ μὲν οὖν ἂν συντελῇ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡμῖν, mais là il s'agit de chérir et poursuivre ce qui est utile à l'autre vie). Or, puisque seules les Saintes Écritures nous enseignent la véritable vie, les auteurs grecs nous seront de quelque secours, ὠφέλεια, comme préparation : 2, 38, il nous faut nous rencontrer avec les poètes, conteurs, orateurs, tous les hommes ὅθεν ἂν μέλλῃ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν ὠφέλειά τις ἔσεσθαι, d'où doit naître quelque secours appuyant l'attention à accorder à notre âme : c'est repris mot pour mot en 10,24). A propos de profit encore, nouvelle variation de l'expression en 3, 2 : la connaissance des deux cultures (la chrétienne et l'autre) peut nous être utile προὔργου ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις γένοιτο. On trouve ensuite la litote οὐκ ἄχρηστον (4, 1) »les disciples externes ne sont pas sans profit pour l'âme« (ainsi pour les poètes qui peuvent apporter ὠφέλειαν, 4, 40; voir 4, 50 l'opposition entre χρήσιμον et βλαβερόν). Passant aux ouvrages des philosophes spécialisés dans l'ἀρετή, il s'agit là encore de tenir le langage du profit, ὄφελος (5, 5), cependant que les actes mêmes des Anciens sont susceptibles aussi de procurer du secours (ὠφελείας 7, 5). Cette idée que l'Antiquité est utile, sans plus, est encore rappelée en 8, 2 (ὅσα χρήσιμα, opposé à βλαβερά encore). Telle est l'unité de la langue qui montre l'unité du propos (on consultera *Hippias Majeur*, pour distinguer avec Platon χρήσιμος, »qui sert à une fin«, de ὠφέλιμος, »qui est avantageux«, mais le sème de l'utilité est présent dans les deux mots).

Ce langage unitaire est aussi un langage hiérarchisé. L'âme et le corps, la vie autre et la vie humaine, le profane et le sacré ont chacun leur langage (cf. 2, 23, corps et âme sont aussi différents que songe, ombre, des choses vraies; le corps c'est la vie humaine, tandis que l'âme est l'autre vie). On peut examiner attentivement le vocabulaire pour montrer que, pour ce qui est du corps, il n'y a que des exercices d'athlètes préparant à l'épreuve cruciale, l'entrée dans la vie de l'âme. Il y a double langage : à l'âme les (ἐκ-)παιδεύματα, les ἐπιτηδεύματα, disciplines qui amènent l'âme à la plénitude et à la maturité, au corps les exercices, disciplines telles que celles que les athlètes pratiquent; la vie humaine n'est qu'un entraînement du physique (γυμνάζεσθαι) qui peut servir à la préparation de l'âme (παρασκευὴ ἑτέρου βίου 2, 9–10). Dès le début de l'ouvrage, τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι (1, 4) prépare l'image, précisée en 2, 30 τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμματι τέως προγυμναζόμεθα et, dans ce même passage, les exercices de l'âme sont exprimés avec le vocabulaire dont on se sert pour les exercices militaires, avec toute une gestuelle (χειρονομίαι, ὀρχήσεις) : il s'agit de se préparer aux vraies épreuves du concours (ἀγῶνες 2, 35), Ce langage du corps est repris en 8, 29 (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν κ.τ.λ., cf. aussi 8, 45) où l'image est devenue comparaison, inspirée de Platon. Tout le centre du chapitre 8 offre au philologue – au sens précis du mot –, un régal : οὕτω διάγοντες ὡς τὸν πρὸ τῆς ἀγωνίας βίον μελέτην εἶναι τῆς ἀγωνίας »se comportant de façon telle que leur vie précédent l'épreuve (ἀγωνία : cf. ἀγών) est préparation de l'épreuve...« (8, 45–50). On pourrait multiplier les exemples montrant que ce qui a trait au corps s'exprime en termes concrets, physiques tandis que l'âme est l'objet de souci, attention, soins (ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς) qui doivent faire mépriser les plaisirs corporels (ἀτιμάζειν τὰς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡδονάς trois exemples de l'expression, reprise de Platon). Dernier petit trait à ce propos : Basile, rappelant au chapitre 7 certaines actions vertueuses des Anciens, met en parallèle l'attitude d'Alexandre qui renvoya les filles de Darius sans vouloir même les voir et les paroles de l'Évangile selon Matthieu 5, 28 πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. Or, Basile transpose et paraphrase ainsi : ὁ ἐμβλέψας πρὸς ἡδονὴν γυναικὶ κἂν μὴ τῷ ἔργῳ τὴν μοιχείαν ἐπιτελέσῃ ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῇ ψυχῇ παραδέξασθαι οὐκ ἀφίεται τοῦ ἐγκλήματος. Basile substitue ψυχή à καρδία. Celui-ci appartient au registre physique, réservé par l'auteur à tout ce qui concerne la vie humaine, sans avenir, celle-là convient à ce qu'il importe de préserver pour l'autre vie.

Nous voilà arrivés, par ce point de détail, à parler de la culture de Basile telle qu'il l'utilise – je veux parler en fait de la culture hellénique –. On a depuis longtemps remarqué que Basile utilise (»remploie«) surtout Platon et spécialement la *République* (vingt-trois »souvenirs«), mais aussi les *Lois*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydème*, *Phèdre*, *Phédon*, l'*Apologie* (cf. l'article de A. M. Malingrey dans les *Mélanges Pellegrino* 1975, p. 159, 1978, insistant sur l'importance du personnage de Socrate chez les auteurs chrétiens du 4e siècle). On ajoutera les références à Xénophon (*Mémorables*), Plutarque; chez les poètes, Homère, Hésiode et Théognis surtout. Nous ajouterons quelques précisions sur les références littéraires; Basile se souvient certainement aussi du *Lachès* (ou »du Courage«) de Platon: quand Lysimaque demande à Socrate ἔχεις ... ἀγαθὸν συμβουλεῦσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν (180 d), on peut penser au début du *Propos aux Jeunes Gens*. De même il faut rapprocher du *Propos* le passage du *Lachès* un peu antérieur (180 c) Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε οὐ παρακαλεῖς ... περὶ τοὺς νεοὺς ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλόν. Là-dessus, ajoutons la désignation de Socrate par la périphrase »le fils de Sophronisque«, certes trouvée aussi dans *Hippias Majeur* 298 b et *Euthydème* 297 e, mais qui dans le *Lachès* apparaît aussi gratuite et hors contexte que chez Basile. Mais il y a plus probant: le vocabulaire de l'exercice chez Basile (cf. *supra*) est à comparer avec l'apprentissage de l'hoplomachie dans le *Lachès*: même »vocabulaire physique« chez Basile, détourné pour être appliqué à l'exercice intellectuel à propos des auteurs anciens.

Autre référence, le *Charmide*: en 154 b Socrate y dit: »Je ne suis, quant à moi, qu'un cordeau blanc (sur une pierre blanche) en matière de jeunes gens«. Il est possible que Basile s'en souvienne quand il parle (5, 54) de la pierre à aligner au cordeau (τὰν σπάρτον), bien que Platon ne mentionne pas le caractère dorien du proverbe évoqué. Mais Charmide qui donne son nom au dialogue platonicien est l'oncle – maternel – de Platon comme Basile paraît être l'oncle des jeunes gens auxquels il s'adresse.

Aux auteurs allégués par les divers commentateurs (voir notamment Léo Sachs en 1922), j'ajouterai aussi Isocrate (voir l'exorde du *Panégyrique* avec la comparaison entre philosophes et athlètes, même si elle est banale), ce qui n'étonne pas, mais aussi le Pseudo-Isocrate auteur du *Discours à Démonicos* (cf. par. 12).

Ce qui est plus intéressant que cette *Quellenforschung*, c'est de voir comment Basile utilise sa culture hellénique, Il cite, paraphrase les

auteurs ou contamine diverses sources, c'est bien connu. Mais un autre procédé est plus subtil, c'est le »détournement«, plein de malice, et qui est mis en œuvre pour montrer sans doute que les auteurs païens peuvent servir mais sans qu'on les révère. Ce procédé, M. Riffaterre (*La production du texte*, Paris, 1979, chap. 6, »Pour une approche formelle de l'histoire littéraire«) l'appelle un exercice de transformation, un cas de conversion (l'exemple que M. Riffaterre prend est la »Vénus anadyomène« de Rimbaud). Au chapitre 5, Basile rappelle l'apparition d'Ulysse à Nausicaa : »Ulysse était bien loin de devoir rougir d'être considéré nu ἐπειδήπερ αὐτὸν ἀρετῇ ἀντὶ ἱματίων κεκοσμημένον ἐποίησε, puisqu'aussi bien Homère l'a représenté paré de vertu en guise de manteau«. Certes, on l'a vu depuis belle lurette, Basile se souvient ici de Platon, *Rép.* 5, 457 a, mais Basile applique à Ulysse... ce que Platon disait des femmes des gardiens de l'État qui devaient se rendre nues aux exercices. Une image devenue banale est ainsi renouvelée et convertie.

L'exemple inverse de conversion apparaît aussi, de telle sorte qu'on peut y voir là un procédé typique prouvant que la culture peut elle-même être utilisée pour peu qu'on la remette à sa place, lot de pensées et d'exemples qui n'acquiert de sens que s'il est dépassé par le souci réel de l'âme. Au chapitre 5, dans le tableau »Vice et Vertu«, on voit la femme »Vice« mener l'essaim des plaisirs (πάντα ἑσμὸν ἡδονῆς...) suspendu après elle. L'image est prise à Platon parlant de ἡδονῶν σμῆνος (le mot est différent, et aussi l'ordre des mots, cependant que le pluriel est devenu un singulier) mais Platon l'appliquait à un homme – non à une femme –, l'homme tyrannique. Il s'agissait auparavant de transposition d'une femme à un homme, ici c'est l'inverse.

On remarquera aussi la transposition d'un être humain à la plante, avec la discrétion de l'érudit : en 3, 5 »comme un arbre a pour vertu de se couvrir de fruits de saison mais tire aussi quelque parure des feuilles qui s'agitent autour de ses branches etc....«, Basile emploie le verbe περισείομαι qu'on ne trouve auparavant que, chez Homère, à deux reprises, dans la même formule (T 382 περισσείοντο δ'ἔθειραι = X 315 περισσείοντο ἔθειραι). Mais chez Homère les cheveux s'agitent autour d'Achille, dans les deux exemples.

Ces trois exemples nous auront prouvé la liberté de Basile quand il puise dans les textes des Anciens. Cette discrète malice, cet humour, on peut au fil des lignes en apercevoir aussi la trace dans les jeux de mots qui sont comme un trompe-l'œil étymologique. Dans le même

passage où nous avons trouvé le dernier exemple, Basile parle du feuillage pareil à la sagesse profane et qui fournit un abri pour le fruit (σκέπην τῷ καρπῷ) et un spectacle qui n'est pas hors saison (ὄψιν οὐκ ἄωρον) : l'adjectif ἄωρος rappelle évidemment le verbe ὁράω (imparfait ἑώρων) qu'évoque ὄψις (cf. ὄψομαι). Par ce rapprochement trompeur (puisque le signifiant amène à un autre signifiant sans égard pour l'exactitude du rapport sur le plan du signifié), Basile évoque des jeux de bon élève : ὄχις/ὄψομαι sont en rapport fondé, alors que ὁράω – ἑώρων mis en rapport avec ὥρα, c'est jeu gratuit. On n'est pas loin ici de Platon (dans *Cratyle*). Il se révèle ici un plaisir aux mots, propre au »philologue« dont on peut trouver d'autres exemples dans le *Propos* (cf. 8, 68 notamment : οὐ ῥᾳθυμητέον ἡμῖν a pour écho ῥᾳστώνης...).

Voilà, entre autres traits de style, ce qui fait du Basile de ce *Propos aux Jeunes Gens* un grand écrivain grec, à lire avec vigilance : impossible à qui veut le goûter de dormir sur ses deux oreilles, ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω καθεύδειν, comme dit le proverbe peut-être inventé par Ménandre.

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CULTE ASTRAL ET CULTURE PROFANE CHEZ S. JÉRÔME*

A PROPOS D'UNE TOURNURE SUSPECTE [*ERRORE COMBIBIMUS*] ET D'ALLUSIONS NON ÉLUCIDÉES DU *COMMENTAIRE SUR AMOS*

PAR

PIERRE LARDET

Dans son *Commentaire sur Amos* de 406, S. Jérôme en vient au chap. 5, v. 8, où Dieu est magnifié en tant que créateur des constellations. Et après avoir évoqué les termes des versions hébraïque et grecques pour lesquels il a choisi comme correspondants en latin les noms d'Arcture et d'Orion, il fait la mise au point suivante :

»Quand nous entendons parler d'Arcture et d'Orion, nous ne devons pas nous ranger aux fables des poètes ni aux mensonges ridicules et monstrueux par lesquels ils s'efforcent de déshonorer même le ciel et de placer le salaire de la corruption[1] parmi les astres en disant :

> '(Il observe) Arcture, les Hyades pluvieuses et les deux Ourses, et il considère attentivement Orion armé d'or.'[2]

Mais nous devons savoir que les noms hébreux qui, chez ce peuple, tirent d'ailleurs leur désignation ont été traduits par des mots empruntés aux fables païennes dans notre langue à nous, qui ne pouvons comprendre ce dont on parle si ce n'est au moyen de ces mots que nous avons appris par l'usage (*quae usu didicimus*) et dont nous nous sommes imprégnés ... (*et ... combibimus*)«.[3]

Ici le texte reçu, celui de l'édition M. Adriaen du *Corpus Christianorum* parue en 1969, porte en fait un mot supplémentaire que nous n'avons pas traduit : »... et *errore* combibimus«. Au premier abord, cette leçon ne paraît pas inacceptable. Ne s'agit-il pas de dénoncer encore les auteurs profanes dont le récit du songe fameux de la lettre sur la virginité avait, quelque 22 ans plus tôt, répudié avec éclat la lecture?[4] Le complément *errore* exprimerait donc à bon escient la réprobation d'un chrétien à l'endroit de la culture païenne inculquée aux jeunes Latins du nombre desquels il fut. Ce que voudrait dire Jérôme, c'est ceci : »Nous avons appris en les pratiquant (*usu didicimus*) ces termes profanes, et ce fut notre égarement que de nous en laisser imprégner (*errore combibimus*).« Voilà qui est assez plausible pour

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que la plus récente édition du *Commentaire sur Amos* continue sans sourciller d'imprimer ce texte.

Qu'est-ce donc qui nous le rend suspect? ... Arrêtons-nous d'abord au parallélisme contenu dans les mots » ... ea uocabula quae VSV DIDICIMVS // et ERRORE COMBIBIMVS«. Alors qu'est patente la symétrie et de forme et de fond entre les deux verbes quadrisyllabiques *didicimus* et *combibimus* (le second redoublant expressivement le premier), en revanche leurs compléments respectifs *usu* et *errore* paraissent compromettre cette symétrie et se laisser malaisément comparer. »Apprendre par l'usage«, »assimiler par erreur« : il y a quelque chose de curieusement factice dans la mise en regard de ces deux ablatifs qui se rapportent si différemment aux verbes dont ils dépendent.[5] L'allure quelque peu forcée de ce parallélisme en guise de clausule ne fait pas précisément honneur au styliste qu'était Jérôme. Si l'on se reporte alors à l'article *combibo* du *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*[6] où notre passage hiéronymien figure tel quel en bonne place,[7] on y peut faire d'intéressantes constatations sur la construction de ce verbe. *Combibere* signifie généralement, au propre ou au figuré, »s'imprégner de«, »se pénétrer de«. Il connaît un double régime : d'abord, à l'accusatif, la matière qui produit l'effet d'imprégnation ; ensuite, assez fréquemment, se trouve précisée à l'ablatif la partie du sujet du verbe soumise à l'effet indiqué par celui-ci. Ainsi chez Horace, à propos du suicide de Cléopâtre :

ut atrum / corpore combiberet uenenum[8]
»(elle osa manier des serpents) pour imprégner tout son corps de leur noir venin«

Ainsi ce conseil d'Ovide à un amoureux :

sicco lacrimas combibat ore tuas[9]
»(tâche que celle que tu aimes) imprègne de tes larmes sa bouche desséchée«

Ou encore cette exhortation de Martial à un certain Domitius, impatient de vacances au soleil :

i precor et totos auida cute combibe soles[10]
»Pars, je t'en prie, et gorge ta peau avide de tous les feux du soleil«

Et, pour passer du rayonnement solaire à la diffusion d'un incendie, citons la *Thébaïde* de Stace :

fulminis haud citius radiis afflata cupressus
combibit infestas et stirpe et uertice flammas[11]
»Un cyprès atteint par les éclairs de la foudre n'a pas plus tôt fait de voir son tronc et sa cime envahis de flammes hostiles«

On peut citer enfin dans la littérature chrétienne deux emplois figurés où l'imprégnation s'exerce dans le domaine intellectuel et spirituel. D'abord chez Novatien :

qui hoc animo ac mente combiberit[12]
»Celui qui se sera pénétré le cœur et l'esprit de cette pensée«

Ensuite cette formulation vigoureuse du *Cathemerinon* de Prudence :

(*pectora*) *postquam combiberint Deum medullis*[13]
»(L'Esprit éternel entre dans les cœurs) après qu'ils se sont pénétrés de Dieu jusqu'aux moelles«

Par rapport à tous ces exemples, le tour repéré dans l'*in Amos* de Jérôme a ceci d'étrange que c'est le seul cas où l'ablatif qui voisine avec *combibere* ne désigne pas le point d'impact de l'opération signifiée par le verbe. Le soupçon naît alors que *errore* pourrait bien avoir été substitué à tort à un autre ablatif, de la partie celui-là, qui s'inscrirait lui de manière cohérente dans la série que nous venons de dégager grâce aux relevés du *Thesaurus*.[13a]

Mais revenons au contexte de notre tournure litigieuse. Jérôme y justifie sa propre version latine de l'Écriture d'après l'hébreu. Or cette version – la *Vulgate* – n'hésite pas à désigner par les noms classiques d'Arcture et d'Orion les constellations évoquées en termes autrement vagues par les traducteurs grecs et par la *Vetus Latina*.[14] D'où le besoin qu'éprouve Jérôme de rendre compte de ce coup d'audace qui consiste de sa part à inscrire jusque dans la Bible les noms de puissances astrales fleurant la mythologie et le paganisme.[15] Il procède pour ce faire en deux temps : un *non debemus* introduit d'abord une mise en garde ; un *non possumus* prévient ensuite une objection. Premier point :

»Lorsque nous entendons évoquer Arcture et Orion, *nous ne devons pas* (pour autant) nous ranger aux fables des poètes ...«[16]

Cet interdit est d'ailleurs une excellente occasion pour Jérôme de braver les esprits chagrins en ornant aussitôt son commentaire d'une citation extraite du corpus poétique réprouvé![17] Après quoi il en vient au second point :

»Mais *nous* ... *ne pouvons comprendre* ce qui est dit (dans l'Écriture) si ce n'est au moyen de ces mots que nous avons appris ... et dont nous nous sommes imprégnés ...«[18]

Autrement dit, Jérôme donne acte du fait que les mots en question peuvent bien être chargés de relents de paganisme, mais c'est pour

passer outre puisqu'il ajoute aussitôt qu'on ne saurait pour autant s'en priver. La traduction exigerait des concessions qui ne seraient pas forcément trahison.[19] Autant Jérôme directeur spirituel s'était voulu intraitable à l'égard de la culture profane en élaborant à l'intention de la vierge Eustochium la dramatique mise en scène de son célèbre songe, autant Jérôme traducteur et exégète ne se laisse plus enfermer dans une intransigeance dont son ex-ami Rufin devenu son adversaire avait eu beau jeu de montrer le caractère tout provisoire.[20] Or précisément ne peut-on suspecter la tournure *errore combibimus* de contribuer à ramener indûment le Jérôme souple et mesuré de 406 au Jérôme pur et dur du songe raconté en 384?[21] Certes, Jérôme continue ici de stigmatiser les »mensonges ridicules et monstrueux« des poètes païens, mais c'est dans la première partie de son argumentation placée sous le signe du *non debemus*. En revanche, la mention d'un *error* inculqué aux Latins avec les mots de leur langue n'intervient-elle pas hors de saison lors du second temps, dans lequel il s'agit pour notre exégète non pas de condamner, mais au contraire de légitimer le recours à ces mots plus inévitables encore qu'indésirables? Le raisonnement se coule ici dans la forme d'un »je sais bien ... / mais quand même«.[22] La leçon *errore* aboutit à reverser du côté du »mais quand même« un élément accordé au registre antagoniste du »je sais bien«. C'est justement là où s'imposerait une sourdine que *errore* ramène en force et rehausse par l'éclat de la cadence finale le thème critique précédemment introduit qui devrait en bonne logique s'estomper désormais à l'arrière-plan. D'où notre hypothèse d'un lecteur plus »hiéronymien« que Jérôme qui aura privilégié le thème au détriment de l'enchaînement, la sémantique aux dépens de la syntaxe. Au fond, la leçon *errore* relèverait de l'hypercorrection édifiante, digne d'un copiste obnubilé par l'image d'Épinal du songe de Jérôme, laquelle avait fixé ce dernier pour la postérité en censeur impitoyable d'une culture profane dont il eût fallu se défaire à tout prix.[23]

Si le passage en question de l'*in Amos* a pu appeler pareille retouche, c'est, croyons-nous, dans la mesure où il aura contrevenu à la légende en soulignant qu'il est impossible de renoncer aux mots de sa langue et de sa culture maternelles[24] à la manière par exemple dont on se débarrasse d'un vêtement. Telle est bien l'objection qu'avait élevée Jérôme au moyen d'autres métaphores, du reste empruntées non innocemment au fonds de la culture païenne mise en cause, lorsqu'il avait dû, cinq ans avant le *Commentaire sur Amos*, faire face aux

attaques de Rufin : »Qui d'entre nous ne se souvient de son enfance? ... Si (toi-même) tu avais appris les Lettres, le vase de ton petit talent respirerait l'odeur dont il eût été une fois empreint. Aucune eau ne peut décolorer les lainages teints de pourpre...«[25]

Ce n'est sans doute pas un hasard si nous retrouvons dans ce passage sur l'éducation tiré de l'*Apologie* de 401, à défaut du mot même *combibere* qu'emploie le *Commentaire* de 406, du moins le thème correspondant de l'imprégnation (*imbuere*). Consultons de nouveau la précieuse notice du *Thesaurus* :[26] Aux »lainages teints de pourpre« que Jérôme a rencontrés chez Lucrèce et aussi, à propos de l'éducation, chez Quintilien,[27] correspond l'usage de *combibere* à propos de la technique du teinturier chez Cicéron :

Qui combibi purpuram uolunt, sufficiunt prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam[28]
»Ceux qui veulent teindre de la pourpre (litt. que la pourpre soit imprégnée), ils traitent auparavant la laine en la soumettant à certains produits.«

Quant au vase de terre auquel son premier contenu laisse une odeur indélébile, c'est là une métaphore rebattue, attestée d'abord chez Horace, et toujours à propos d'éducation :[29]

Quo semel est imbuta recens seruabit odorem testa diu[30]
»Le parfum dont l'argile encore neuve s'est une fois imprégnée, elle le conservera longtemps.«

Or deux vers plus haut dans cette même *Épître* on lit cette exhortation :

Nunc adbibe puro / pectore uerba puer[31]
»Enfant, c'est maintenant qu'il te faut imprégner de ces mots ton cœur vierge.«

Horace use ici d'un composé voisin de *combibere*, à savoir *adbibere*, et il le construit significativement avec un double régime : l'accusatif *uerba* est le même que dans notre passage de Jérôme, mais à la place de notre ablatif suspect *errore*, nous trouvons chez Horace un *pectore* qui précise le lieu de l'imprégnation exactement comme dans les exemples de construction de *combibere* énumérés plus haut.[32] Or une phrase de Cicéron sur le thème de l'éducation fait écho à l'*Épître* d'Horace, mais avec *combibere* là où le poète usait d'*adbibere* :

Quas (artes), si, dum est tener (puer), combiberit, ad maiora ueniet paratior
»Si l'enfant s'imprègne de ces disciplines tandis qu'il est encore dans son âge tendre, il arrivera mieux préparé pour de plus hautes acquisitions.«[33]

Et une allusion à l'*Épître* d'Horace est perceptible dans cette remarque de Columelle qui emploie lui aussi *combibere* :

Quae semel oleum testa combibit alteram gummitionem non recipit[34]
»Le pot qui a été une fois imprégné d'huile ne tolère ensuite aucun autre enduit.«

Or telle est l'image dont Jérôme s'était servi pour se justifier face à Rufin d'avoir été intimement pénétré par une culture devenue chez lui seconde nature. Il n'était pour lors pas question de critiquer un tel acquis sous le vocable d'»égarement« (*error*)! On sait grâce à la malveillance de Rufin que Jérôme, établi à Bethléem, enseignait dans son monastère Virgile et d'autres auteurs profanes à des enfants.[35] Il ne prétendait sûrement pas, ce faisant, les »égarer« (tel était le point de vue de Rufin, non le sien!). Bien plutôt il témoignait ainsi de la conviction qui ressort de son *Apologie* et de notre passage du *Commentaire sur Amos*, à savoir que toute formation sérieuse passe par les Classiques et qu'on ne peut pas – c'est le *non possumus* de l'*in Amos* – en faire l'économie, quitte à devoir se préoccuper en chrétien d'en désamorcer les dangers.[36]

Dès lors, quelle correction suggérer pour rétablir le texte authentique du *Commentaire sur Amos*? ... La série d'ablatifs rencontrés comme compléments de *combibere* dans les exemples précédemment cités nous laisse l'embarras du choix pour déterminer quel est celui qu'il convient de substituer à *errore*. Faut-il préférer *corpore*, *ore*, *mente*, *pectore*, ou – pour en ajouter encore un qui consonne avec les précédents – *corde*? Le »adbibe... pectore uerba« de l'*Épître* d'Horace pourra faire pencher pour *pectore*, en sorte que »uerba... pectore combibimus« constituerait de la part du commentateur d'*Amos* une nouvelle et vraisemblable allusion non encore reconnue (et pour cause) à ce passage du poète.[37] Le complément *uerba*, l'usage en l'occurrence figuré de l'expression, le contexte d'éducation, enfin l'intérêt constaté ailleurs chez Jérôme pour ces vers[38] pèsent en faveur de *pectore*, sans oublier la relative similitude phonétique de ce terme avec l'autre trisyllabe qu'est *errore*. A moins qu'à *errore* ne doive être plus simplement sous-jacent *ore*? Une banale dittographie du *et* précédent suffirait alors à rendre compte de la modification : **et ore* > **et etore* > **et erore* > *et errore*.[39] A l'appui de *ore* joue aussi le fait que ce mot permettrait un parallélisme parfait :

et { *usu didicimus* / *ore combibimus* } (2 membres de 2 + 4 syllabes)

... sauf à juger au contraire cette exactitude un peu trop contrai-

gnante et à lui préférer la légère dissymétrie et le discret effet d'amplification qu'introduirait un trisyllabe dans le second membre.[40] *Ore* serait évidemment le terme juste, s'agissant de »mots« dont la »bouche« est bien l'organe qui les prononce. Mais une telle association va précisément de soi. Un terme comme *pectore* peut dès lors paraître plus suggestif, moins pléonastique (de même que *combibimus* renchérit en expressivité sur *didicimus*). C'est en tout cas à l'un ou à l'autre de ces deux mots *ore* et *pectore* que nous serions tenté de nous arrêter par priorité pour remplacer le très douteux *errore*.

Reste à considérer la tradition manuscrite de ce passage. On peut n'avoir pas trop de scrupules à le mettre en cause dans la mesure où le *Corpus Christianorum* ne prétend nullement donner du *Commentaire sur Amos* une édition critique à proprement parler.[41] Pour la page qui nous occupe, il reproduit le texte même de la *Patrologie* de Migne, l'ayant contrôlé sur la base de deux témoins seulement, mais qui tous deux se trouvent présenter une lacune à l'endroit précis qui nous intéresse.[42] Qu'en est-il de la bonne soixantaine de témoins dont la *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta* de Bernard Lambert nous spécifie qu'ils renferment le *Commentaire sur Amos*?[43] Un sondage dans 15 manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris datés des XI°–XIII° s. donne les résultats suivants: dans 6 d'entre eux[44] notre passage fait défaut; quant aux 9 autres,[45] force est de reconnaître qu'ils appuient unanimement le *errore* du texte reçu. Deux témoins du IX° s., conservés l'un à Berne,[46] l'autre à Saint Gall,[47] confirment eux aussi la leçon *errore*. Même constat dans deux manuscrits d'Oxford (XII° s.)[48] et de Londres (XI°-XII° s.),[49] tandis que le passage manque dans deux autres des mêmes bibliothèques.[50] Enfin, grâce à des sondages effectués obligeamment par Y.-M. Duval, on peut ajouter que 6 autres témoins ou bien s'en tiennent à *errore*[51] ou bien sautent le passage qui nous occupe.[52] Sur les 21 plus anciens témoins (VIII°–XI° s.) répertoriés grâce à la *BHM*, 6 seulement resteraient à interroger.[53] On admettra qu'il y a peu de chances pour qu'on y rencontre une autre version de notre texte que celles déjà constatées dans la tradition manuscrite. C'est dire que, jusqu'à plus ample informé, nos hypothèses relèvent *stricto sensu* de la conjecture d'éditeur ... Quoi qu'il en soit, ce n'est pas le moindre intérêt de ce problème textuel en soi mineur que d'avoir partie liée avec deux données capitales de la complexe personnalité de Jérôme : d'une part, sa manière changeante de se situer par rapport à la culture païenne dont il était

sans conteste »imprégné«; d'autre part, son souci des impératifs conflictuels que sa tâche de traducteur biblique lui imposait de concilier. Si tel est bien en définitive l'enjeu de ce qui est apparu, si l'on ose dire, comme une erreur sur le mot *error*, sans doute valait-il la peine de lui consacrer cette discussion.

NOTES

* L'étude ci-dessus constitue la version revue et complétée d'une communication présentée à Oxford lors de la huitième conférence internationale d'études patristiques en septembre 1979 sous le titre : »Note critique sur un passage douteux du *Commentaire sur Amos* de S. Jérôme«.

[1] *mercedem stupri* : cf. Appendice I.

[2] Verg. *Aen.* 3, 516–517 : Il s'agit de l'examen du ciel par le pilote Palinure durant la nuit précédant un appareillage de la flotte d'Énée.

[3] »Quando autem audimus Arcturum et Oriona, non debemus sequi fabulas poetarum et ridicula ac portentosa mendacia quibus etiam caelum infamare conantur et mercedem stupri inter sidera collocare, dicentes :

'Arcturum pluuiasque Hyadas geminosque Triones
armatumque auro circumspicit Oriona'

sed scire hebraea nomina quae apud eos aliter appellantur uocabulis fabularum gentilium in linguam nostram esse translata, qui non possumus intellegere quod dicitur nisi per ea uocabula quae usu didicimus et *errore* combibimus« (*in Am.* 2, 5, 7–9, CCL 76, 280, 274–283).

[4] Cf. *epist.* 22, 30 (à Eustochium, au printemps 384), avec l'accusation portée contre Jérôme : »Ciceronianus es, non Christianus«, et l'engagement pris par lui : »Domine, si umquam habuero codices saeculares, si legero, te negaui«. Sur ce songe qui aurait eu lieu vers 375-377, voir en particulier J. J. Thierry, The Date of the Dream of Jerome, *VChr* 17 (1963) 28–40; P. Antin, Autour du songe de S. Jérôme, *REL* 41 (1963) 350–377 (repris dans *Recueil sur S. Jérôme*, coll. Latomus, t. 95, Bruxelles 1968, 72–100). Dans notre commentaire (à paraître) du *c. Ruf.*, cf. n. 226 et 228.

[5] Tandis que le premier est un classique ablatif instrumental, le second se laisse malaisément interpréter : rapport de cause à effet? ou de simple concomitance entre l'»égarement« et le fait, pour l'étudiant, de »s'imprégner« d'une terminologie profane? Auquel cas, n'attendrait-on pas *combibendo* (*-entes*) *errauimus*? Notons que, si *errore* est très couramment employé comme ablatif instrumental (le *TLL*, *s. u. error*, col. 819, 29s., ne recense pas moins de 17 *iuncturae uerbales* dans lesquelles il entre), il apparaît beaucoup plus rarement au sens de »par erreur«. Ainsi (cf. *TLL*, *ibid.*, col. 817, 24 et 37) Liv. 45, 8, 5 : »haec siue errore humano seu casu seu necessitate inciderunt«; Vlp. *dig.* 21, 1, 23, 2 : »si quis errore, si quis casu fecerit«.

[6] Cf. *TLL*, *s. u. combibo 1*, col. 1756, 84s.

[7] *Ibid.*, col. 1757, 56–57. Le passage en question est également cité sous la même forme par H. Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers and the Classics*, Göteborg 1958, 220.

[8] Hor. *carm.* 1, 37, 27–28.

[9] Ov. *ars* 2, 326.

[10] Mart. 10, 12, 7.

[11] Stat. *Theb.* 10, 674–675.

[12] Novatian. *trin.* 28, 25, CCL 4, 68, 82.

[13] Prud. *cath.* 4, 18.

[13a] A l'appui du texte reçu, Y.-M. Duval a eu l'obligeance de nous signaler ces vers de Prudence (de peu d'années antérieurs au *Commentaire sur Amos*): »... puerorum infantia primo / *errorem* cum lacte *bibit*« (*c. Sym.* 1, 201–202). L'*error* en question désigne les vaines superstitions païennes inculquées aux enfants. Le rapprochement avec l'*in Amos* où il s'agit aussi de formation reçue et de critique du paganisme est en effet tentant, du moins pour ce qui est du *contexte* – à ceci près toutefois (et c'est important s'agissant du terme litigieux *errore*, ainsi qu'on aura l'occasion de le vérifier par la suite) que la réprobation de Jérôme s'avère beaucoup plus mitigée que celle marquée par Prudence. Mais le fait d'accorder une pertinence relative à ce rapprochement ne doit pas faire minimiser cet autre fait, décisif, que constitue la différence de *construction*: *errorem bibere*, tour transitif parfaitement régulier, contribue précisément à faire ressortir par contraste le caractère selon nous problématique du *errore combibere* attribué à Jérôme.

[14] Cf. Appendice II.

[15] Le geste était loin d'être indifférent: il convient de le replacer dans le contexte de la conviction alors générale selon laquelle les astres auraient représenté des puissances animées. L'engouement pour l'astrologie était tel qu'il avait suscité nombre de réfutations patristiques. Cf. *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, art. »Astrologie« de V. Gundel, t. 1 (1950), col. 589s. et 610s.; »Fatum (Heimarmene)« de H.O. Schröder, t. 7 (1969), col. 828s.; U. Riedinger, *op. cit. inf.*, p. 340, n. *f.* Jérôme s'en prenait à la »ficta scientia« des *mathematici* (*i.e.* les astrologues) dans l'*in Soph.* 1, 4–6, CCL 76 A, 662, 241s. (p. ex.). Or, par le biais de son conflit avec Rufin, s'étaient trouvés encore rapprochés les problèmes posés à la conscience chrétienne par la double propension à, d'une part, s'en remettre au déchiffrement de messages prétendument lisibles dans les configurations astrales et, d'autre part, à céder aux prestiges des représentations mythologiques orchestrées par les poètes. Comment espérer concilier les conceptions cosmologiques véhiculées respectivement par les deux corpus biblique et païen? Mais comment sacrifier l'un à l'autre? Jérôme se réfère aux deux, non sans dévaluer le second au profit du premier, consacré par l'Église »ubi norma est ueritatis« (*c. Ruf.* 3, 29, 1–7). On se souviendra que la traduction par Rufin du *Peri Archôn* d'Origène voulait être un instrument au service de la polémique anti-astrologique chrétienne. Un songe avait comme authentifié ce dessein: cf. Rufin. *apol. adu. Hier.* 1, 11, CCL 20, p. 44. Or la controverse avec Rufin institue un parallèle fort suggestif entre ce songe de Macaire (destinataire de la traduction rufinienne) et celui (évoqué *sup.*, n. 4) qui aurait décidé Jérôme à rompre avec les séductions exercées par la littérature profane: voir *c. Ruf.* 3, 32 (et déjà 3, 29, 11s.; 3, 30, 16s.) ainsi que notre commentaire *ad loc.*, n. 603[e] et 642[a]. On assiste effectivement dans l'un et l'autre cas à la mise en scène onirique de la victoire promise à un christianisme militant sur ces idolâtres que seraient aussi bien les tenants de l'astrologie que les fervents de la littérature profane. L'arrivée prestigieuse du navire chargé des richesses (théologiques) de l'Orient destinées à soutenir le combat de Macaire, l'impressionnante scène de jugement où Jérôme plaide coupable avant de se voir accordé un ultime sursis illustrent un zèle soucieux

de ne pas – de ne plus transiger avec les sollicitations du paganisme ambiant. Il n'est donc pas surprenant de voir Jérôme disqualifier les prétentions rufiniennes appuyées sur le songe de Macaire dans le moment même où il s'efforce de minimiser la portée de son propre songe.

[16] Cf. cit. *sup.*, n. 3.

[17] On observe le même procédé dans le *c. Ruf.* 1, 1, 40s.; 1, 30, 25s.; 3, 28, 8s.; 3, 29, 14s.; 3, 39, 69s. : cf. notre commentaire, n. 25–26; 226[e]; 228–231; 619; 629; 684[d]. Rufin était par excellence l'un de ces chrétiens qui avaient fini par se scandaliser des goûts littéraires par trop profanes de Jérôme : cf. *inf.*, n. 20.

[18] Cf. cit. *sup.*, n. 3.

[19] Cf. Appendice III.

[20] Alors que Jérôme prétendait vers 386 n'avoir pas tenu en mains Cicéron ou Virgile »depuis plus de quinze années« (cf. *in Gal.* 3, *prol.*, PL 26, Val. 485–486), Rufin constatera en 401 que les principaux auteurs profanes continuent d'être cités par son adversaire »à chaque page« (cf. *apol. adu. Hier.* 2, 7, 5s., CCL 20, 88). Voir notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 226; 228[b].

[21] L'attitude nuancée de Jérôme par rapport à la culture profane est celle que traduit l'exploitation d'allure origénienne (cf. Orig. *hom. in leu.* 7, 6) à laquelle il se livre du motif biblique de la »belle captive« : cf. *Deut.* 21, 10–13 où il est admis que les Hébreux puissent épouser sans sacrilège leurs prisonnières païennes à condition de les avoir soumises au préalable à un traitement purificateur. Ce thème est développé dans les *epist.* 70, 2, 5 (en 397) et 66, 8, 4s. (en 398). Mais il apparaissait dès 383 (donc peu avant la fameuse lettre à Eustochium) dans l'*epist.* 21, 13, 9. Voir notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 226[d]. Cf. aussi *inf.*, appendice I.

[22] Étant donné l'attrait fascinant, voire quasi idolâtrique (cf. *sup.*, n. 15 et *inf.*, Appendice I) exercé par cette culture profane dont le lettré chrétien ne saurait plus se déprendre, »imprégné« qu'il est par elle, voire quasiment envoûté (le mot *combibere* pouvant en effet s'employer dans le cas d'un philtre : cf. l'*art. cit.* du *TLL* qui renvoie à Ov. *met.* 7, 287 et 13, 944, où il est question des effets merveilleux de certains »sucs« magiques), il y aurait lieu de réfléchir sur la »magie de la croyance« impliquée par le type de raisonnement que l'on vient de souligner, voire sur le »fétichisme« qui s'alimenterait du rapport *quand même* maintenu en pratique au *thesaurus* littéraire *pourtant* répudié en principe : cf. à ce sujet O. Mannoni, »Je sais bien, mais quand même ...«, dans *Clefs pour l'Imaginaire ou l'Autre Scène*, Paris 1969, 9–33.

[23] On consultera l'abondant dossier établi par P. Antin, *art. cit. sup.*, n. 4. Ce songe a même eu la faveur de l'iconographie : une vignette du XV[e] s. le représente dans le manuscrit *Lat. 920* de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, f. 308[v], où on lit : »Iste agnouit iusticiam et uidit mirabilia magna« (reproduction dans B. Lambert, *BHM*, t. 4 A [1972], planche XX). Un effet persistant de cette »légende« (*legenda* : ce qu'il faut lire) nous semble repérable dans la position quasi inquisitoriale encore adoptée par nombre de critiques modernes qui s'attachent sans en critiquer d'abord les termes à la question de savoir si oui ou non Jérôme est resté fidèle à l'engagement souscrit en songe : voir notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 226.

[24] Jérôme vise ici la particularité de la langue commune au traducteur et au public à l'intention duquel la traduction est destinée. Il y a là tout à la fois une limite indépassable et une spécificité inaliénable – donc une *proprietas*, au sens où cette notion

ne s'applique pas seulement selon Jérôme à la langue de l'original hébraïque, mais aussi à celle du traducteur qu'il est : traduire, c'est effectuer le transfert de sens qui respecte au mieux la double *proprietas* et de la langue »de départ« et de la langue »d'arrivée« (à ce sujet, cf. *inf.*, Appendice II, p. 337). A cet égard, le constat de cette limite inhérente à sa propre langue qui autorise le traducteur à prendre certaines libertés gagne à être rapproché de l'analyse à laquelle se livrait Jérôme au début du *Commentaire sur Amos* quant à la personnalité – et donc à la particularité – de l'écrivain biblique dont il traitait :

> »Naturale est ut omnes artifices suae artis loquantur exemplis, et unusquisque in quo studio triuit aetatem, illius similitudinem proferat. Verbi gratia, qui nauta est... tristitiam suam comparat tempestati... E regione miles (...) In ore philosophorum (...) Poetae (...) Cur haec dicta sunt? Vt scilicet ostendamus etiam Amos prophetam, qui pastor... fuit... in lata eremi uastitate..., artis suae usum esse sermonibus ut uocem Domini terribilem... rugitum leonum... nominaret« (*in Am.* 1, 1, 2, CCL 76, 215, 100–121).

Ainsi, d'après cette page, il est normal que chacun parle d'expérience et que le langage se retrouve modelé par la pratique à laquelle on se sera spécialement adonné. Que l'on soit marin ou soldat, philosophe ou poète, le métier et le cadre de vie sont présentés ici comme non moins influents sur la manière de s'exprimer (s'agissant des comparaisons dont on use) que ce ne sera le cas de l'école dans la page qui nous occupe, de par l'apprentissage qu'elle inculque. De ce point de vue, »in quo studio triuit aetatem« fait pendant à »ea uocabula quae usu didicimus et... combibimus« dans notre passage. Il n'y aurait donc pas lieu de se formaliser si le berger Amos fait rugir Dieu, pas plus qu'on ne saurait en définitive trouver choquant que le lettré Jérôme fasse tenir à l'Écriture un langage empreint de ce dont il aura été redevable à sa formation scolaire classique. Le »zoomorphisme« d'Amos ne ferait en vérité pas plus insulte à Dieu que le »classicisme« de Jérôme ne paganiserait l'Écriture de manière inconvenante ou sacrilège. En rendant compte de pareilles métaphores chez le prophète, Jérôme se prémunissait au fond lui-même puisque sa propre pratique de traducteur s'avérerait justiciable d'une argumentation semblable et que les limites mêmes de sa traduction se trouveraient légitimées par des limites analogues qu'il aurait auparavant fait saillir au sein de l'original. Du même ordre se trouvent être les contraintes de langage auxquelles sont soumis le prophète parlant de Dieu et Jérôme traduisant Amos. Cette homologie de statut surprendra moins encore si l'on ajoute que la métaphore (représentée en l'ocurrence par le rugissement de Dieu) a pour désignation technique en latin *translatio* (cf. p. ex. Cic. *de orat.* 3, 38, 156; *orat.* 25, 85...), mot qui signifie également »traduction«. Il arrive du reste à Jérôme de jouer sur l'ambivalence non fortuite de ce terme à propos des difficultés que soulèvent ces différents »transferts« de sens que sont la métaphore et la traduction (cf. *in Ephes.* 2, 4, 16, PL 26, Val. 620, cit. dans le *c. Ruf.* 1, 27, 17–20 : voir notre commentaire, n. 210).

[25] »Quis nostrum non meminit infantiae suae? ... Si didicisses litteras, oleret testa ingenioli tui quo semel fuisset imbuta. Lanarum conchylia nullae aquae diluunt...« (*c. Ruf.* 1, 30, 30–31. 41–43).

[26] Cf. *TLL*, *art. cit.* [*sup.*, n. 6], col. 1757, 21.

[27] Cf. Lucr. 6, 1074–1077); Quint. *inst.* 1, 1, 5. Sur ce motif et le suivant (la poterie marquée durablement par sa première imprégnation) déjà associés par Jérôme vers 400 dans l'*epist.* 107, 4, 6–7, cf. notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 231.

[28] Cic. *phil. frg.* V 23.

[29] Dans le sillage d'Horace, citons Quint. *inst.* (passage déjà évoqué *sup.*, n. 27). Du poète (par le biais ou non du rhéteur), Jérôme se souvient à deux reprises : d'abord dans l'*epist.* 10, 3, 3 (entre 377 et 381), puis dans l'*epist.* 107, 4, 6–7 (également évoquée *sup.*). Cf. encore Aug. *ciu.* 1, 3. Sur tout ce dossier, voir notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 231. Sur l'usage proverbial de cette image, cf. A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter... der Römer*, Hildesheim 1962 (reprint), 346, complété par R. Häussler, *Nachträge...*, Darmstadt 1968, 65 et 218.

[30] Hor. *epist.* 1, 2, 69–70.

[31] *Ibid.*, v. 67–68.

[32] Cet »adbibe uerba pectore« est en particulier exactement similaire au »corpore combiberet uenenum« dont usait Horace à propos du suicide de Cléopâtre (cit. *sup.*, n. 8).

[33] Cic. *fin.* 3, 3, 9.

[34] Colum. 12, 52, 17.

[35] Cf. Rufin. *apol. adu. Hier.* 2, 11, 15s., CCL 20, 92 : »... illud addatur... quod in monasterio positus in Bethleem, ante non multum adhuc temporis partes grammaticas executus sit, et Maronem suum comicosque ac lyricos et historicos auctores traditis sibi ad discendum Dei timorem puerulis exponebat, scilicet ut et praeceptor fieret auctorum gentilium...«

[36] *i. e.* en prenant les précautions drastiques suggérées par l'exégèse allégorique de *Deut.* 21, 10–13 (»la belle captive«) : voir les passages hiéronymiens sur ce sujet évoqués *sup.*, n. 21.

[37] Or on ne compte pas moins de cinq références à Horace (citations ou allusions) qui ont, elles, été déjà dûment répertoriées dans les commentaires de l'année 406 sur les petits prophètes (cf. H. Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers...*, 216–222). Deux d'entre elles (*sat.* 1, 10, 72s. ; *carm.* 2, 14, 1s.) figurent précisément dans l'*in Am.* (3, *prol.* et 3, 6, 2–6, CCL 76, 300, 50 et 304, 177–178 – la seconde couplée avec un vers de Virgile, ce qui constituerait une analogie supplémentaire avec notre passage), où, de plus, Horace est nommément associé à Pindare comme l'un des poètes lyriques par excellence (1, 1, 2, CCL 76, 215, 114–115 – apparemment sous l'inspiration de Quint. *inst.* 10, 1, 61.96 : cf. H. Hagendahl, *loc. cit.*). Notons enfin que le passage précis qui nous intéresse est déjà particulièrement dense en réminiscences poétiques profanes : en deux pages, on y rencontre deux citations explicites, l'une de Virgile (*Aen.* 3, 516–517), l'autre d'Ovide (*met.* 1, 149–150, CCL 76, 281, 317–318), plus une allusion virgilienne (qui combine *Aen.* 1, 665 et 3, 578–582 [CCL 76, 280, 285s.] : cf. Appendice III, *inf.*, p. 344). Une allusion supplémentaire à Horace n'y serait donc pas pour surprendre...

[38] Cf. *sup.*, références indiquées à la n. 29.

[39] A l'appui de la vraisemblance de ce type de faute, signalons que, dans le *c. Ruf.* 3, 38, 10, la leçon authentique »et meo *errori*« s'est trouvée corrompue en »et meo *ori*« (attestée par le groupe *TVi* qui représente un rameau de l'une des deux grandes familles de la tradition).

[40] Cependant *ore* (du reste tout comme *errore*) permet une excellente clausule finale en crétique + tribraque et *cursus tardus* avec correspondance *ictus*/accent, tandis que *pectore* n'aboutit qu'à un schéma particulièrement médiocre tant au point de vue métrique (dactyle + péon 1°) que rythmique. (Cf. M. C. Herron, *A Study of the Clausulae in the Writings of St Jerome*, Washington 1937).

[41] Cf. la *Praefatio* de CCL 76, p. VII : »Non aliter quam editio 'post Dominicum

Vallarsi confecta' (haec editio) uocetur ... Cui sperare licet... nouam et uere criticam editionem et aggredi et ad finem perducere?...«

[42] Namur, Musée archéologique, *Fonds de la Ville, 16*, s. IX (*N*) : cf. CCL 76, p. VIII et apparat à la p. 280 (où cette lacune est signalée pour les l. 276–288); Kassel, Landesbibliothek, *Theol. Fol. 22*, s. VIII (*C*) : cf. CCL 76, p. VIII et apparat à la p. 280. D'après ce dernier apparat, *C* fournit de notre passage (cit. *sup.*, n. 3) une version très abrégée qui se réduit à la phrase – boîteuse – suivante : »Haec autem apud ebreos aliter appellantur uocabulis fabularum genti^{li}um quae usu didicimus«. Puis le texte, à nouveau écourté, continue : »Vnde in nostra lingua nuncupamus. Iste autem Deus...« (l. 283–288. En fait, le lemme »et *usque* contremiscat« proposé par l'apparat du CCL pour ces lignes est ambigu : c'est de *et*^{1} qu'il s'agit, et non pas de *et*^{2} (dans »Vnde *et*...« qui suit »...combibimus« à la même ligne : je remercie Y.-M. Duval qui a pris la peine de faire pour moi cette vérification). On notera comment l'abréviateur de la version attestée en *C* a purement et simplement éliminé – sans doute comme digression superfétatoire – l'examen auquel se livre Jérôme, références virgiliennes à l'appui, du dilemme qui se posait à lui en tant que traducteur de la Bible, écartelé entre deux langues et deux cultures. Ainsi se trouvent gommés tout à la fois les scrupules (en partie rhétoriques) du chrétien et les raffinements (non exempts de coquetterie) de l'humaniste. L'abréviateur s'en tient à ce qui est à ses yeux l'essentiel. Commentaire et traduction du texte biblique proprement dit dégagés par ses soins de la subjectivité en l'occurrence avouée de Jérôme (aspect qui précisément nous intéresse quant à nous!) s'offriront désormais sous un jour de sobre objectivité, appropriée au crédit qu'avait tendu à s'acquérir l'œuvre hiéronymienne. Celle-ci, de tentative personnelle risquée contraignant son auteur aux précautions et aux justifications dont notre passage est un remarquable échantillon, se voyait ainsi muée davantage encore en le corpus quasi canonique d'un Père de l'Église se prononçant sur l'Écriture avec une autorité indiscutable : dépersonnalisation de l'œuvre au profit des vérités dont elle est censée être le répertoire.

[43] *BHM*, t. 2, Steenbrugge-La Haye 1969, p. 157–189 (et *corrigenda* correspondants au t. 4 A, 1972, p. 192–194). Les témoins de l'*in Amos* sont sûrement beaucoup plus nombreux, mais d'une soixantaine d'autres manuscrits cités par la *BHM* sans précision de contenu dans cette liste qui concerne en général les »commentarii in prophetas minores«, on ne peut savoir a priori s'ils contiennent celui sur Amos.

[44] A savoir : *Lat. 1834* (s. X), *1943* (s. X), *10600* (s. VIII–IX), *12158* (s. XII), *14287* (s. XIII), *17373* (s. X in.). Exception faite pour le *10600*, la lacune rencontrée en l'occurrence dans ces manuscrits s'y trouve délimitée exactement comme dans *N* (cf. *sup.*, n. 42). Il pourrait donc s'agir du même type d'édition abrégée.

[45] A savoir : *Lat. 1830* (s. XIII in.), *1831* (s. XIII in.), *1832* (s. XII), *1835 A* (s. XII), *11630* (s. XII), *15285* (s. XII), *17374* (s. XII), *17376* (s. XII); *Nouv. acq. lat. 1577* (s. X). (Au sein de ce groupe, seul le dernier manuscrit est d'une ancienneté notable).

[46] Burgerbibliothek, *102*.

[47] Stiftsbibliothek, *122*.

[48] Bodleian Library, *E Mus. 26*.

[49] British Library, *Royal 4.C.XI*.

[50] Bodl. Libr., *Laud. Misc. 254* (s. X); Br. Libr., *Harley 1700* (s. XII). (Même lacune déjà évoquée *sup.*, n. 42 – à propos de *N* – et 44).

[51] C'est le cas de Köln, Dombibl., *53* (*Darmst. 2048*) (s. X ex.) et de Troyes, Bibl. Mun., *126* (s. IX–X).

[52] Ainsi de deux manuscrits où la lacune est la même que dans *N* (cf. *sup.*, n. 42) et dans quelques autres témoins déjà évoqués (*sup.*, n. 44 et 50), à savoir : Cambrai, Bibl. Mun., *299* (*281*) (s. IX); Le Mans, Bibl. Mun., *213* (s. IX–X). Ainsi encore dans le cas de Köln, Dombibl., *52* (*Darmst. 2047*) (s. IX) et de Orléans, Bibl. Mun., *60* (*57*) (s. XI).

[53] A savoir :
Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibl., *Aug. Perg. CCLVII* (s. IX in.).
München, Bayerische Staatsbibl., *Clm 3727* (s. XI).
Orléans, Bibl. Mun., *59* (*56*) (s. XI).
Roma, Bibl. Naz. Vittorio Emanuele II, *Sessor. 38* (s. IX–X).
Vaticano, Bibl. Apost. Vat., *Palat. lat. 173* (s. XI).
Vaticano, Bibl. Apost. Vat., *Palat. lat. 174* (s. X).

Appendice I : »Le salaire de la corruption« (*mercedem stupri*)

On notera la couleur scripturaire de l'expression. Elle se réfère certainement à l'analogie vétérotestamentaire entre idolâtrie et prostitution qui fonde l'interdit prononcé en *Deut.* 23, 19 : »non offeres mercedem prostibuli [*VL* : mercedem meretricis] ... in domum Domini Dei tui« (et le v. 18 condamne l'existence de prostituées sacrées). Or on rencontre précisément une allusion à ce passage du *Deutéronome* (signalée cette fois par l'apparat du CCL) un peu plus loin dans le même livre du commentaire de Jérôme : »de mercede... meretricis Deus uota non suscipit« (*in Am.* 2, 5, 21–22, CCL 76, 294, 747–748), et dans un développement qui traite justement de la répugnance divine à l'endroit d'un culte contaminé par des pratiques idolâtriques.[a] Jérôme citera à nouveau ce passage du *Deutéronome* dans l'*in Is.* 18, 66, 3, CCL 73 A, 771, 48. Cf. aussi *Os.* 2, 14; *Éz.* 16, 33; *Mich.* 1, 7 : »omnes mercedes eius [*scil.* Samariae] comburentur igni, et omnia idola eius ponam in perditionem, quia de mercedibus meretricis [*VL* : ex mercedibus fornicationis] congregata sunt...«[b] Qu'il y ait bien, par le truchement de l'expression que nous soulignons, une allusion de Jérôme aux représentations bibliques du culte et de l'idolâtrie, c'est ce que confirme le rapprochement que le commentateur a judicieusement opéré quelques lignes plus haut (CCL 76, 280, 261 s.) entre *Am.* 5, 8 (»Facientem Arcturum et Orionem, et conuertentem[c] in mane tenebras, et diem nocte mutantem«) et *Am.* 4, 13 (»Formans montes et creans uentum ... et gradiens super excelsa terrae : Dominus Deus exercituum nomen eius«). Dans la Création, et au sein de celle-ci par excellence dans le ciel, l'Écriture voit en effet le temple où officient les armées divines, c'est-à-dire les constellations, puissances célestes, dont l'ordre immuable et le mouvement réglé fondent le calendrier (liturgique) et

organisent une célébration (cosmique), modèle archétypal du service qui se déroule au temple de Jérusalem. Sur cette conception sacerdotale et sapientielle, il y a lieu de consulter les analyses très suggestives de P. Beauchamp, *Création et séparation* (*étude exégétique du chapitre premier de la Genèse*), Paris 1969.[d] La même perspective sapientielle régissait de manière fort significative certains développements polémiques du dernier livre du *Contre Rufin* en 402 (§ 28–31), en réponse à un interrogatoire de l'adversaire sur le monde physique.[e] Or, au § 28, l. 9-15, Jérôme illustrait son propos par sept vers de Virgile ayant trait à des phénomènes cosmiques (marées, éclipses, constellations, etc.), parmi lesquels *Aen.* 1, 744 qui se trouve exactement répété en 3, 516, vers précisément cité par notre passage du *Commentaire sur Amos*! Ajoutons que le § 32 du même livre enchaînait sur les développements précédents en reprenant la question du »parjure« dont Jérôme se serait rendu coupable en contrevenant à son engagement pris en songe de ne plus lire les auteurs profanes. Or ce »parjure« avait été également présenté par Rufin comme un *sacrilegium*, terme qui connote l'idolâtrie.[f] Entre le culte idolâtrique des astres (du reste évoqué incidemment dans le *c. Ruf.* 1, 19, 13s. au moyen d'une citation de *Job* 31, 26–28) et l'amour coupable des lettres profanes,[g] l'analogie n'est donc sûrement pas fortuite. »Placer le salaire de la corruption parmi les astres«, comme l'écrit Jérôme, ce serait, au mépris de *Deut.* 23, 18–19 et en accord avec les »monstrueux mensonges« des poètes païens, introduire la prostitution jusque dans le Saint de ce temple de la Création qu'est le ciel. Il est clair qu'une telle problématique ne peut de prime abord qu'imposer un choix résolu entre la Bible et Virgile. Pour l'éclairage qu'apporte à notre passage du *Commentaire sur Amos* la question du songe de Jérôme telle qu'elle avait été reprise dans le *Contre Rufin*, voir *sup.*, p. 324–326, ainsi que les n. 15 et 20, et *inf.*, Appendice III.

[a] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 293, 724s.: »... contra ... eos qui ex Israel ad Dei caeremonias commigrarant, et nihilominus non recedebant de excelsis colebantque idola et ... Dei sacrificia polluebant«.

[b] Voir le commentaire de Jérôme *ad loc.* dans l'*in Mich.* 1, 1, 6–9, CCL 76, 426, 148s.

[c] Le CCL imprime par inadvertance *conuertem*.

[d] DDB (*et. al.*), Bibliothèque de Sciences Religieuses. Voir aussi le passage de l'*in Is.* 6 cité *inf.*, Appendice II, où référence est faite explicitement à *Gen.* 1.

[e] Voir notre commentaire (à paraître) du *c. Ruf.*, en particulier les n. 623; 627; 641.

[f]. Cf. *c. Ruf.* 1, 30, 14s.: »periurium mixtum sacrilegio«. Voir notre commentaire, n. 226[cd].

[g] amour lui-même assimilable au sacrilège qui menace le guerrier juif épris de la »belle captive« païenne – selon le thème déjà signalé (*sup.*, n. 21 et 36) qu'inspirait un passage du *Deutéronome* précisément voisin de celui qui nous intéresse ici. L'analogie chez Jérôme entre plaisir charnel et jouissance littéraire est du reste clairement suggérée par le parallèle (bien mis en évidence par J.J. Thierry, *art. cit.* [*sup.*, n. 4]) qui s'instaure entre les § 7 (fantasmes érotiques de l'ascète : »O quotiens... putaui me romanis interesse deliciis... saepe choris intereram puellarum... mens desideriis aestuabat... et... libidinum incendia bulliebant«) et 30 de l'*epist.* 22.

Appendice II : »Arcture et Orion«. L'imposition de noms aux constellations

Là où la *Vulgate* hiéronymienne écrit »facientem Arcturum et Orionem« pour *Am.* 5, 8, on lit »qui facit omnia et transformat« dans la *Vetus Latina.*[a] Cette dernière tournure est précisément celle que Jérôme présente comme la version des Septante (où on lit effectivement ποιῶν πάντα καὶ μετασκευάζων) en regard de sa traduction *iuxta Hebraeos* lorsqu'il en vient au commentaire des v. 7–9, et, pour évidente qu'elle soit (ainsi qu'il le reconnaît), il éprouve le besoin de souligner d'entrée de jeu la divergence : »Multum in hoc loco ab hebraica ueritate editio uulgata [*scil.* iuxta LXX] discordat, sicut absque commonitione nostra ex his quae proposuimus prudens statim lector intellegit« (*in Am.* 2, 5, 7–9, CCL 76, 279, 244.250–252). Sur le point qui nous intéresse, il précisera plus loin, à l'appui de sa propre traduction, sa critique à l'égard de celle des Septante : »Quod autem dicunt 'faciens omnia atque transformans', uno uerbo Arcturum et Oriona comprehendunt, neglegentes proprietatem nominum in graecum transferre sermonem« (*ibid.*, p. 281, 319s.). La »négligence« des Septante vis-à-vis de la »*vérité* hébraïque« si chère à Jérôme consiste donc à porter atteinte à la *proprietas nominum* en ramassant deux vocables précis (noms *propres*) sous un seul terme vague.[a*] Défaillance significative d'un écart à vrai dire difficilement surmontable entre les langues. Deux ou trois ans plus tard, Jérôme y reviendra, et s'agissant précisément à nouveau de la nomination des constellations :

> »Orionem autem gentilium fabulae dicunt uiginti duas habere stellas, e quibus quattuor tertiae magnitudinis sunt, nouem quartae, rursum aliae nouem quintae, et ab aliis appellantur Bootes. Legimus quoque in Iob [9, 9] Hyadas et Vesperum et Arcturum et thesauros, siue interiora Austri, de quibus in suo loco dicendum est. Nec putare debemus apud Hebraeos has stellas his appellari nominibus quae Graecus sermo resonat et Latinus, sed propria habere uocabula. Sicut enim Deus uocauit lucem diem et firmamentum caelum et aridam terram et congregationes

aquarum maria, sic et singulas stellas suis appellauit nominibus quarum proprietatem nostra lingua non exprimit« (*in Is.* 6, 13, 9–10, CCL 73, 229, 10 s.).

On voit ici Jérôme mettre à contribution à la fois les *gentilium fabulae* concernant Orion et le Bouvier (*Bootes*, également évoqué à propos d'Arcture par notre passage de l'*in Am.*, l. 269) et le texte biblique (*Job* 9, 9 que nous aurons à considérer ci-après en rapport avec *Am.* 5, 8). Or ce parallèle appelle aussitôt de sa part une mise en garde : »Mais nous ne devons pas penser que...«, où le *non debemus* n'est pas sans consonner avec la même injonction telle que nous l'avons répérée dans l'*in Am.* Contre la tentation d'amalgame que le parallèle pouvait suggérer, Jérôme rappelle la distance irréductible entre hébreu d'une part, grec et latin d'autre part. Une *proprietas* est le fait du premier, fondée sur l'acte créateur et sur la nomination grâce à laquelle furent distinguées par Dieu les réalités du cosmos.[b] Cependant le *non possumus* qui, dans l'*in Am.*, prenait la relève du *non debemus* rencontre-t-il ici aussi son équivalent? L'*impossibilité* pour »notre langue« de »rendre la *proprietas*« des noms assignés par Dieu marque en fait, au terme du passage cité de l'*in Is.*, un constat d'impuissance là où le *non possumus* de l'*in Am.* ouvrait au contraire une voie, fût-elle étroite et risquée, et donnait l'*autorisation* de passer outre (»nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement«, c'est-à-dire qu'en fin de compte »nous devons essayer...«). Reste que le rapprochement des deux passages de l'*in Am.* et de l'*in Is.* est éloquent en ce qu'il permet de mieux saisir comment s'articulent dans le discours de Jérôme exégète certaines notions-clefs. La *ueritas* et la *proprietas* y sont couplées à la façon d'un postulat et de son corollaire. La *confiance de principe* à reconnaître au *texte* hébreu en tant qu'il est dépositaire de la *ueritas* doit en effet impliquer le *respect en pratique*, de la part du traducteur, de la *proprietas* de la *langue* hébraïque.[c] Mais la *proprietas* renvoie aussi à la langue du traducteur.[d] C'est ainsi que la »regula boni interpretis« consiste pour ce dernier en ceci »... ut ἰδιώματα linguae alterius suae linguae exprimat proprietate« (*epist.* 106, 3, 2). Idéal malaisément accessible dans le cas de l'Écriture, comme le concède ailleurs Jérôme : »Difficile est idioma linguae hebraeae in latinum sermonem uertere« (*quaest. hebr. in gen.* 22, 2, CCL 72, Lag. 33, 16). Néanmoins, en l'occurrence, d'autres traducteurs grecs s'étaient montrés plus rigoureux que les Septante : juste avant notre passage de l'*in Am.* (l. 268 s.), Jérôme a cité les leçons de Symmaque et de Théodotion. On peut récapituler l'ensemble des traductions au sein du tableau suivant :

Am. 5, 8					
Hébreu	LXX et *VL*	Symmaque	Théodotion	Aquila et *Vulg.*	Modernes[e]
kîmâh	πάντα	Πλειάδες	Πλειάς	Ἀρκτοῦρος *Arcturus*	Pléiades
kesîl	*omnia*	ἄστρα	Ἕσπερον	Ὠρίων *Orion*	Orion

On voit comment, tandis qu'il fait mention explicite des traducteurs grecs dont il s'écarte, Jérôme s'entend à passer sous silence celui qu'il suit, à savoir Aquila, de manière à laisser croire qu'il traduit directement de l'hébreu.[f] Mais ce n'est pas seulement au littéralisme habituel d'Aquila qu'il accorde ici une confiance tacite. On peut penser que sa préférence pour cette version tient au double fait que, non seulement elle est censée avoir le mérite de »coller« à l'hébreu, mais aussi qu'elle présente l'intérêt de »cadrer« avec les vers de Virgile que Jérôme brûle de citer. Quoi qu'il en dise, ses goûts inavoués d'humaniste viennent ici infléchir sa traduction de manière guère moins déterminante que son respect affiché du texte sacré originel! A preuve les variations de la *Vulgate* s'agissant de traduire *kîmâh* et *kesîl* dans les trois passages de l'Écriture qui associent ces deux constellations :

Vulgate[g]	*Job* 9, 9	*Job* 38, 31	*Am.* 5, 8
kîmâh	Hyades (LXX : Pléiades)	Pléiades (= LXX ; Symmaque)	Arcture (= Aquila)
kesîl	Orion (LXX : Arcture)	Arcture (LXX : Orion)	Orion (= Aquila)

On vérifie à quel point Jérôme s'embarrasse peu d'uniformité! Si tant est que l'on puisse assigner des motivations à ses choix, on constatera p. ex. qu'il traduit *kesîl* par Orion là où la *Septante* écrit Arcture (*Job* 9, 9), mais par Arcture là où la *Septante* opte pour Orion (*Job* 38, 31)! C'est là un esprit de contradiction qui s'avère habiter notre exégète à plus d'une reprise[h]... Dans le cas d'*Am.* 5, 8, on se serait attendu à le voir traduire *kîmâh* par Pléiades comme il l'acait fait en *Job* 38, 31 et comme l'invitaient ici à le faire Symmaque et Théodotion. Mais les Pléiades ne figurent pas dans les vers de Virgile qu'il lui importe de pouvoir citer en contrepoint! Du moins aurait-il pu se

rabattre sur les Hyades, constellation voisine, que Virgile cette fois évoque, et qui lui avaient servi en *Job* 9, 9 à traduire *kîmâh*. Mais pour le coup aucun des traducteurs grecs ne l'appuie, et il n'ose apparemment pas passer outre. Reste donc Arcture qui avec Orion encadre superbement la citation de Virgile et dont Aquila vient opportunément étayer le choix insolite. Si Jérôme retient cette leçon, n'est-ce pas parce qu'elle est la seule à concilier ses scrupules de traducteur, soucieux de pouvoir s'abriter derrière l'autorité d'un précédent à alléguer, et ses goûts de lettré, peu disposé à faire le sacrifice des harmoniques virgiliennes qu'il est à sa portée de faire résonner?[i] Ce ne serait pas la première fois que l'on verrait interférer dans son traitement du texte biblique des réminiscences profanes dont le souvenir, conscient ou non, *s'impose* à lui – ce qui illustre et confirme l'aveu formellement marqué dans notre passage de l'*in Am.* par le *non possumus* et par le *combibimus*: nous en avons analysé certains exemples dans notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, p. ex. aux n. 239[g] (influence de Lucrèce sur l'utilisation d'*Is.* 29, 8) et 255[c/i] (souvenirs de Perse affleurant dans une »traduction« de *II P* 2, 18).

[a] Cf. *Bibliorum Sacrorum... Vetus Italica*, éd. P. Sabatier, t. 2, Reims 1743, p. 924.

[a*] Il conviendrait de compléter ce constat en remarquant que, si le couple de substantifs est effectivement réduit à un seul mot, en revanche le verbe précédent se voit quant à lui dédoublé: »facit... et transformat«.

[b] Ce renvoi à l'hexéméron de *Gen.* 1 vient opportunément confirmer ce que mettait déjà en lumière notre Appendice I (*sup.*) quant à la perspective de Création qu'appelle pour Jérôme comme pour le registre sacerdotal et sapientiel de l'Écriture la mention des astres.

[c] Voir notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 174.

[d] A ce sujet, cf. *sup.*, n. 24. Voir aussi H. Marti, *Übersetzer der Augustin-Zeit*, Munich 1974, p. 113–120 (»proprietas und idioma«).

[e] Le consensus semble aujourd'hui s'être fait sur ces traductions. On consultera en particulier E. Dhorme, *Le Livre de Job*, Paris 1926, p. 118–120; R. Mesnard, »Les constellations du *Livre de Job*«, *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 30 (1952), p. 135–146; G. R. Driver, »Two astronomical Passages in the Old Testament [*Job* 9, 9; 38, 31f.]«, *Journal of Theological Studies* 7 (1956), p. 1–11. En ce qui concerne les traductions proposées par les versions grecques (et dont Jérôme fournit dans notre passage des équivalents latins), cf. *Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt...*, éd. F. Field, t. 2, Oxford 1875, p. 913.

[f] C. Estin, dans sa thèse (inédite) sur *S. Jérôme traducteur des Psaumes*, Université de Paris IV, 1977, p. 67s. et 202, a bien souligné comment l'hébreu auquel prétend se référer Jérôme »recouvre en fait« fort souvent »l'une ou l'autre des versions grecques«, et que, dans le Psautier *iuxta Hebraeos*, »le principal témoin de la vérité hébraïque est« pour Jérôme »Aquila, Symmaque servant de *second best*«. Cf. aussi p. 116: »(Jérôme)

voit en (Aquila) le témoin essentiel de la vérité hébraïque«. Le fait qu'en l'occurrence le nom d'Aquila ne soit pas prononcé nous paraît d'autant plus significatif que, tout au long de ce même *Commentaire sur Amos*, Jérôme rend par ailleurs volontiers à Aquila ce qui lui revient (mais précisément surtout, à ce qu'il semble, lorsqu'il ne le suit pas!) : cf. p. ex. 1, 1, 1, p. 212, 8 et 30; 1, 1, 4–5, p. 218, 211; 1, 1, 6–8, p. 222, 327; 1, 3, 13–15, p. 253, 354; 2, 4, 1–3, p. 256, 16. 257, 39 et 56; 2, 4, 4–6, p. 261, 166 et 177... (et plus loin *passim*). Ce procédé a été noté par E. Burstein (»La compétence de Jérôme en hébreu...«, *REAug* 21 [1975], p. 11), qui »consiste à ne nommer les sources que lorsqu'elles sont fautives et à taire leur existence lorsqu'elles sont bonnes«.

Jérôme se souvenait-il par ailleurs de la légende qu'il pourrait avoir connue par Épiphane (*mens. et pond.* 15, PG 43, 261), selon laquelle Aquila, d'abord converti au christianisme, se serait vu rejeter par l'Église à cause de son attachement persistant aux pratiques *astrologiques*? Et c'est le ressentiment qui aurait poussé Aquila, devenu prosélyte juif, à entreprendre ses traductions bibliques dans une perspective anti-chrétienne... Cette fable pourrait avoir été favorisée par la prétention d'»exactitude« commune à ce traducteur prosélyte (cf. Eus. Caes. *dem. euang.* 4, 15, 58 : ... ἣν [= la version hébraïque] πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἑρμηνεύων ὁ Ἀκύλας) et aux astrologues, compte tenu d'une tradition rapportée par le même Épiphane qui attribuait aux Pharisiens des compétences astrologiques. (Quant à Aquila, cf. Epiph. *loc. cit.* : ... τῇ ματαίᾳ ἀστρονομίᾳ ἣν ἀκριβῶς ἐκπεπαίδευτο) : voir U. Riedinger, *Die Heilige Schrift im Kampf der Griechischen Kirche gegen die Astrologie*, Innsbruck 1965, p. 59–61. Ce ne serait pas le moindre paradoxe que de voir cette *acribie* d'Aquila vilipendée en matière astrologique par l'hérésiologue Épiphane, mais canonisée en matière de traductions bibliques par l'exégète Jérome – allié pourtant de l'évêque de Salamine – sous l'étiquette de *ueritas hebraica*... et en particulier lorsque cet amateur d'astrologie que serait Aquila se prononce sur un passage scripturaire concernant les astres! Le rapport entre précision astrologique et minutie exégétique aurait en tout cas l'intérêt de suggérer une homologie entre ces deux espaces à explorer que sont le ciel étoilé et le corpus biblique. Manière de faire resurgir une question de fond impliquée par tout ce débat : celle de savoir à quelles conditions le cosmos peut, même à un autre titre que l'Écriture, être considéré lui aussi comme lieu où s'inscrit une révélation.

g Pour *Job* 9, 9 et 38, 31, à une exception près que signale ce tableau, nous ignorons malheureusement les leçons d'Aquila, de Symmaque et de Théodotion (cf. *Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt* ..., éd. F. Field, t. 2, Oxford 1875, p. 18 et 71).

h Voir p. ex. *inf.*, Appendice III, pour *Am.* 5, 8 et *II Sam.* 5, 18.

i A cet égard, il est vrai que le couple »Arcture et Orion« figurait aussi dans la *Vulgate* pour *Job* 9, 9 où sont énumérées quatre constellations (et non pas seulement deux comme dans *Am.* 5, 8). Donc la réminiscence a pu également jouer, quand bien même Arcture en *Job* 9, 9 (selon la *Vulgate*) se trouve sûrement traduire encore (par erreur : cf. E. Dhorme, *op cit.*, p. 119) un autre terme hébreu que *kesîl* et *kîmâh* – à savoir *'aš*, qui désignerait plus vraisemblablement l'Ourse et que l'on retrouve sous la forme *'ayiš* en *Job* 38, 32.

APPENDICE III : Les »Raphaim« de *II Sam.* 5, 18. Un précédent fourni par la *Septante*?

Aux prises avec la difficulté de traduction présentée par *Am.* 5, 8, Jérôme, aussitôt à la suite de notre passage, allègue, à titre en quelque sorte de couverture diplomatique, l'exemple fourni par ses devanciers grecs, mais à propos d'un tout autre passage pour lequel aucune référence n'est précisée par l'apparat du CCL :

> »C'est pourquoi les Grecs ont également, dans le Livre des Rois, traduit l'hébreu 'Raphaim' par 'Titans' : il y a là une fable très célèbre chez les païens, à partir de laquelle ils écrivent à la louange des dieux des 'Gigantomachies' (évoquant) les javelots de Typhée, ainsi que le mont Etna sous lequel fut écrasé Encelade et dont le mouvement fait trembler la Sicile.«[a]

A quel verset Jérôme fait-il allusion? Sur la dizaine de passages où il est question des »Raphaim« dans l'Ancien Testament, un seul figure dans un »livre des Rois«, à savoir *II Sam.* 5, 18. C'est effectivement lui que Jérôme doit avoir en vue puisqu'on lit à cet endroit τιτάνων dans la *Septante*.[b] Cependant Jérôme se garde bien – et pour cause! – de relever le caractère tout à fait exceptionnel de cette traduction des Septante. Partout ailleurs, en effet, ou bien ceux-ci se contentent de translittérer le terme hébreu qu'ils renoncent à traduire (Ραφαΐν : cf. *Gen.* 15, 20; *Deut.* 2, 11; *Jos.* 15, 8 et 18, 16; *Judith* 8, 1); ou bien ils optent pour la traduction γίγαντες (cf. *Gen.* 14, 5; *Jos.* 12, 4 et 13, 2; *I Chr.* 20, 4). Quant à la *Vulgate*, elle aussi adopte une fois *gigantes* (mais en *Deut.* 2, 11), tandis que, dans tous les autres cas évoqués, elle ne traduit pas, mais transpose tel quel le terme hébreu (*Raphaim*, *Rafaim*, *Rafain*, *Rafoin* : ces diverses graphies ont été retenues selon les cas dans l'éd. critique de R. Weber, Stuttgart 1969), y compris en *II Sam.* 5, 18 où Jérôme »oublie« de rappeler ici qu'il avait préféré ne pas traduire ce mot hébreu plutôt que d'imiter cette audace des Septante dont il se réclame désormais! C'est dire à quel point le cas des »Raphaïm«, si l'on considère l'ensemble des occurrences, semble s'avérer en fin de compte assez peu pertinent au regard du problème posé à Jérôme par *Am.* 5, 8. Notre exégète monte en épingle le cas aberrant de *II Sam.* 5, 18 et passe sous silence l'usage habituel de la *Septante* (qui est aussi – et plus encore – le sien dans la *Vulgate*, à ceci près qu'il fait alors preuve d'un assez cocasse, et peu surprenant esprit de contradiction par rapport à ses devanciers grecs puisqu'il adopte *gigantes* lorsque ceux-ci mettent Ραφαΐν [*Deut.* 2, 11], mais préfère *Raphaim* là où il pouvait lire γίγαντες dans la *Septante*

[*Gen.* 14, 5; *Jos.* 12, 4, etc.]). A s'en tenir à cet usage habituel, il aurait dû, dans le cas d'*Am.* 5, 8, garder tels quels (translittérés) les termes hébreux qu'il avait cités (l. 268 et 270 : »Chima« et »Chasil«). Même s'il ne disposait pas comme nous de concordances qui lui permissent d'avoir commodément une vue d'ensemble de tous les passages concernés et d'unifier les solutions, on reste fondé à s'interroger sur le flair qui l'aura comme infailliblement conduit à valoriser ici l'exception au détriment de la règle. Il était sans doute de bonne guerre de profiter de l'occasion offerte par la *Septante*, quitte à user d'artifice en ne disant rien de sa manière de procéder dans les passages similaires. Tactique éprouvée : se trouvant dans une passe délicate et prévoyant le tollé que son *non possumus* risque de lui attirer – il a déjà eu affaire sur ce sujet à Rufin! –, Jérôme cherche à se prémunir. Non sans malice, il a l'astuce d'enrôler pour la circonstance ceux-là mêmes dont toute son œuvre exégétique tend à restreindre le crédit, mais qui ont l'avantage de ne pouvoir être récusés par ses adversaires potentiels! »Même les Septante que vous révérez«, semble-t-il vouloir dire, »en font autant. Vous ne pouvez donc tout à la fois et sans contradiction me reprocher des concessions au paganisme mythologique et m'accuser d'être infidèle à la *Septante*.« Or tels étaient précisément deux des griefs majeurs qui avaient été formulés par Rufin.[c] Ce que la *Septante* avait osé faire en *II Sam.* 5, 18, pourquoi Jérôme n'en aurait-il pas le droit en *Am.* 5, 8 où elle n'avait pas eu la même audace? Il n'empêche qu'il est frappant de voir les traductions de Jérôme timorées là où la *Septante* est audacieuse (à savoir pour *II Sam.* 5, 18), et vice versa (à savoir pour *Am.* 5, 8) ... Cette propension[d] à se démarquer de la *Septante* rend quelque peu suspect l'intérêt qu'on voit soudain Jérôme attacher à point nommé à l'une de ses leçons.

Or notre exégète était bien placé pour apprécier les ressources d'un tel opportunisme : c'est celui-là même qu'il avait si véhémentement accusé le traducteur du *Peri Archôn*, Rufin (encore lui), de pratiquer vis-à-vis de lui-même, Jérôme, traducteur avant Rufin d'autres œuvres origéniennes. Jérôme s'était alors trouvé dans la position peu enviable où il place ici les Septante : invoqué cyniquement (croyait-il) comme devancier modèle, il s'était vu chargé à son corps défendant de cautionner les douteux procédés d'un autre. Le mécanisme du piège est bien mis en évidence p. ex. par une citation de l'*Apologie à Anastase* de Rufin (§ 7, 17–22, CCL 20, p. 28) telle que la commente Jérôme dans son *c. Ruf.* 2, 14, 1–10 :

»Sequitur in eadem apologia: 'Origenis ego (non)... sum... primus interpres. Alii ante me hoc idem opus fecerant... Si iubetur ne fiat, iussio obseruari solet in posterum. Si culpantur qui ante iussionem fecerunt, culpa a primis incipiat.' Tandem euomuit quod uolebat et omnis animi tumor in nostrae accusationis erupit inuidiam. Vbi interpretatur libros Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, me sequi se dicit; ubi accusatur cur hoc fecerit, meum ponit exemplum. Et securus et periclitans, sine me uiuere non potest.«

Les raisons pour lesquelles Jérôme traducteur de l'Écriture veut pour une fois lier sa cause à celle des Septante ne paraissent guère moins diplomatiques que celles pour lesquelles Rufin traducteur d'Origène se réclamait ostensiblement de sa solidarité avec Jérôme. Mais le comble, dans le cas de l'*in Am.*, c'est que le truchement de la version des Septante pour *II Sam.* 5, 18 est l'occasion pour Jérôme, non seulement de justifier sa propre traduction d'*Am.* 5, 8, mais encore de redoubler son étalage d'érudition mythologique. Pauvre *Septante* entre les mains de Jérôme! La voici deux fois discréditée puisque, déclassée au profit de l'hébreu, elle est exploitée par-dessus le marché en faveur de l'humanisme paganisant, ou plutôt de la vanité littéraire de notre auteur! D'ailleurs Rufin, le champion de la *Septante*, dont le conflit multiforme avec Jérôme continue, ainsi qu'on l'a vu, de s'inscrire en filigrane de toute cette page, subira un sort semblable à titre posthume. En guise d'éloge funèbre, Jérôme l'assimilera à ces Titans dont les dieux eurent raison: »Scorpius... inter Enceladum et Porphyrium [*al.* -rionem^{e}] Trinacriae humo premitur« (*in Ezech.* 1, *prol.*, CCL 75, 3, 20s., en 411).

Quoi qu'il en soit de cette désinvolture dont Jérôme se soucie fort peu pour autant qu'il en est le bénéficiaire et non la victime (comme c'était le cas lors de la controverse avec Rufin), la pertinence n'est pas seulement d'ordre tactique qu'il y a lieu de reconnaître au rapprochement proposé par l'*in Am.* entre le cas des constellations et celui des Titans. Il se fonde également sur la dimension mythico-cosmologique commune aux uns et aux autres. Éruptions volcaniques et mouvement des astres, ces phénomènes physiques avaient traditionnellement relevé d'un même registre d'interprétation mythologique. Or, entre Typhée écrasé par Zeus sous l'Etna (c'est-à-dire enfoncé au plus profond de la terre) et Orion, cet autre géant en conflit avec les dieux, aveuglé sur l'ordre de Dionysios et tué par Artémis avant d'être changé en constellation (c'est-à-dire élevé au plus haut du ciel), l'analogie est assez éloquente pour que Jérôme ait pu ne pas résister au plaisir de l'exploiter. Évidemment cette aisance – et cette complaisance! – à

profiter des ressources ménagées au sein du corpus mythologique par de telles correspondances n'étaient guère avouables par l'exégète chrétien. Jérôme »couvre« donc – cache et autorise du même geste – cette licence sous des dehors édifiants. Les affres du traducteur lui sont un excellent prétexte à recourir à la culture frappée d'interdit.[f] La virtuosité du lettré se donne pour une fois libre cours : sorte de récréation, voire de revanche qu'il s'octroie comme pour se dédommager des tourments subis pour la bonne cause, celle de l'Écriture qui le contraint à se débattre avec une langue obscure et aride.[g] Jeu scabreux donc, mais que Jérôme excelle à jouer et dont le lecteur moderne n'est jamais sûr d'arriver à bien saisir toutes les implications retorses!

Pour en finir avec Raphaim et Titans, précisons que les »tela Typhoea« de notre passage ne sont pas seulement une allusion à Verg. *Aen.* 8, 298s. comme le signale H. Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers...*, p. 220 et n. 4 (référence reprise par l'apparat du CCL), mais bien plus encore une citation littérale de la même *Énéide* (1, 665). De plus, l'apparat du CCL renvoie à *Aen.* 3, 578–579 : c'est 578–582 qu'il faut lire (à la suite de Hagendahl qui cite avec raison tout ce passage) : on y retrouve Encelade, l'Etna et la Sicile (sous la forme *Trinacria*), ainsi que le participe *impositam* (v. 580; *impositum* chez Jérôme) et le verbe *intremere* (v. 581) auquel répond *contremiscat* chez Jérôme. Et il se pourrait bien que le »mouvement« (*motu*) dont est agitée la Sicile chez Jérôme (l. 287) fasse non fortuitement écho, par l'une de ces paronomases dont notre auteur est si friand,[h] au »quotiens *mutet latus*« de Virgile (v. 581).

a »Vnde et in Regum uolumine Raphaim hebraeum Graeci Titanas transtulerunt, quae apud ethnicos celeberrima fabula est, ex qua in laudes deorum scribunt γιγαντομαχίας, et tela Typhoea, et impositum Encelado Aetnam montem, de cuius motu Trinacria contremiscat« (CCL 76, 280–281, l. 283–288 : nous supprimons la majuscule de *Tela*).

b Aquila et Symmaque portent, eux, Ραφαειμ et Théodotion γιγάντων : cf. *Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt...*, éd. F. Field, t. 1, Oxford 1875, p. 554. En disant *Graeci*, Jérôme vise donc en fait les seuls Septante, sans dire pour autant son accord avec certains autres »Grecs«.

c Pour l'hostilité de Rufin aux traductions de Jérôme sur l'hébreu, cf. son *apol. adu. Hier.* 2, 36–41 et la réponse de Jérôme dans le *c. Ruf.* 2, 24–35 (voir notre commentaire, n. 380s.).

d Cf. *sup.*, Appendice II, à propos de *Job* 9, 9 et 38, 31.

e Cf. notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 681[d].

f Pour d'autres exemples de procédés analogues, cf. *sup.*, n. 17.

g Sur les difficultés de Jérôme avec la langue hébraïque, cf. notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 173[b]; 615.

h Voir notre commentaire du *c. Ruf.*, n. 403[d] (et renvois *ad loc.*).

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WHEN DID LEONTIUS, PRESBYTER OF CONSTANTINOPLE, PREACH?

BY

C. DATEMA

Introduction.

A homilist whose work until recently had received little attention is Leontius, presbyter of Constantinople. Although we find two of his homilies printed in PG 86,[1] he has scarcely been accorded a mention, except in reference works and in a single article. Aubineau has the honour of being the first among more recent scholars to highlight Leontius' place in homiletic literature. In 1972 he published in his *Homélies Pascales* two unedited paschal homilies of Leontius, provided with an extensive commentary and preceded by an instructive introduction based on material from the two paschal homilies and the two sermons in PG 86.[2] Aubineau comes to the conclusion that with Leontius we are indeed dealing with a presbyter of Constantinople, who probably lived in the sixth century, like a number of other writers of the same name. His situating Leontius in the sixth century stems partly from his supposition that in one of his homilies Leontius drew on an Easter Sermon of ps. Chrysostom (Aldama 237), which he dates to the fifth century on grounds of internal evidence and its use by Leontius. He characterises Leontius with the words: "ce pourrait être un compilateur de grand talent".[3] In an article written in collaboration with Pauline Allen I have shown that the relationship between ps. Chrysostom and Leontius is precisely the opposite, namely that it was Leontius who was copied by ps. Chrysostom.[4] As a result of this conclusion we lose some supporting evidence for the dating of Leontius' work.

In 1977 M. Sachot published an article concerning the homiletic works of Leontius, in which he attributed twenty-five sermons to our homilist, exclusively on the grounds of stylistic criteria.[5] Eleven of these are ascribed to Leontius in the manuscripts themselves, while the remainder have been transmitted under the names of John Chrysostom,

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Timothy presbyter of Jerusalem, Timothy presbyter of Antioch, Athanasius of Alexandria and Amphilochius of Iconium. Sachot believes that in order to have his sermons included in homiliaria Leontius deliberately gave the name of other authors to works of his own, especially to sermons of which more than one dealt with the same subject. He concludes his article with the words: "Mais, s'il s'agit vraiment d'un faussaire, sommes-nous certains qu'il s'appelait véritablement Léonce, prêtre de Constantinople?"[6] Further investigation will prove to what degree Sachot's position is tenable. To some extent I am personally sceptical about it: to doubt Leontius' very existence seems to me at the present time extremely premature, not least in view of what follows in this article.

In his *Clavis Patrum Graecorum* III 7888-7900, Geerard takes over the suggestions of Sachot, whose article he calls *brevis sed gravis.*[7] The grounds on which Leontius is listed among the homilists of the seventh century is not made clear. In the course of preparing an edition of Leontius' sermons for the *Series Graeca* of the *Corpus Christianorum*, together with Pauline Allen, I have naturally had to consider if in the absence of external evidence there exist in Leontius' homilies internal indications, which would enable us to propose a more precise date than the sixth or seventh century. A more precise date would furthermore give us a firmer footing in determining the authenticity of the homilies attributed, or later ascribed, to Leontius. I hope to show here that a precise date for Leontius is in fact possible, and at the same time to demonstrate how cautious one must be in dealing with homiletic literature.

Leontius' homily on the birth of John the Baptist.

In the manuscripts two homilies on the birth of John the Baptist are attributed to Leontius. One of these (*BHG* 861p; *CPG* III 7908) is also transmitted under the name of Aetius, presbyter of Constantinople, and in an edition of this homily, forthcoming in *Analecta Bollandiana*, I have been able to show that this text has definitely to be accredited to Aetius, and that the sermon itself was preached in the year 453.[8] The second homily has to the present no number in *BHG* and the *Auctuarium*, nor in the *Clavis*. It is transmitted only in two manuscripts, Vallicellianus B.34, ff. 78^{v}–80^{v} and a copy of the same, Vatic. Barb.

gr. 497, ff. 267–268, and begins with a citation from Luke 1,68. The conclusion of the text is unfortunately missing.

However, although this sermon has been transmitted incompletely, and by only two manuscripts, it is of first-rate importance for us. The opening lines run as follows: Εὐλογητὸς ὁ κύριος ὁ θεὸς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ ὅτι ἐπεσκέψατο καὶ ἐποίησε λύτρωσιν τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ· ἐπεσκέψατο γὰρ ἡμᾶς καὶ σήμερον ἀνατολὴ ἐξ ὕψους. Ἐκαθεύδομεν γὰρ τῇ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ διύπνισεν ἡμᾶς τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ· ἐσάλευσε τὰ δώματα ἵνα στηρίξῃ ἡμᾶς ἰασάμενος τὰ τραύματα, ἐμάστιξε τὰ ἄψυχα ἵνα παιδεύσῃ τὰ ἔμψυχα, ἐτάραξε τὴν γῆν ἵνα πληροφορηθῶσιν οἱ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. Ἐσάλευσεν οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν, ἐπεσκέψατο οὐκ ἀπεφήνατο.

Immediately we are forced to consider whether the reference here to an earthquake will enable us to arrive at a date for the homily. Given the subject of the sermon, the annunciation of the birth of John the Baptist, there are two possible periods of the year for the earthquake to have taken place. Until approximately the middle of the sixth century such a homily would have been part of the Christmas cycle, according to which the second Sunday before Christmas was devoted to the annunciation of John's birth to Zachary and the first Sunday before Christmas to the annunciation to Mary. From the second half of the sixth century, the birth of John begins to be celebrated on 24 June. This development is closely connected with the spread of the Mary cycle from the time of Justinian onwards, and in particular with the fixing of the annunciation to Mary on 25 March. The first testimony to this feast among the Greek homilists is Abraham of Ephesus, in the mid-sixth century.[9]

If we make an inventory of the earthquakes known to us there is none in the sixth century which falls in the month of June. We do find, however, an earthquake in December, namely on 14 December, 557,[10] which lasted for 10 days.[11] In the year 557, moreover, the first Sunday after 14 December was the second Sunday before Christmas, or the Sunday devoted to the celebration of the Baptist's birth. We are presented, then, with this Sunday as the day on which Leontius preached his sermon on John the Baptist: 17 December, 557. We should not find it surprising that the citizens of Constantinople should gather in the church under such circumstances. From Chrysostom we know that after an earthquake in Antioch the people there immediately ran to the church,[12] and even gathered there for a vigil on several successive nights.[13]

The relationship between Leontius and BHG 848 (= CPG II 4656)

Now that we have managed to date Leontius' homily on John the Baptist to the very day, and at the same time can state with certainty that Leontius lived in the sixth century, it is useful to investigate the relationship between Leontius' sermon and that of ps. Chrysostom on the birth of John the Baptist, ascribed by Sachot to Leontius. We are concerned here with the text designated as *BHG* 848, *CPG* II 4656, or Aldama 146. In his summary of the homilies to be attributed to Leontius, Sachot refers to these texts as 8A and 8B, in the belief that we are dealing with two versions of one and the same text.[14] There is indeed a connection between the two texts, in the sense that Leontius' sermon, apart from the opening paragraphs, is in large measure to be found in ps. Chrysostom. We find in addition sections from other authors, incorporated by ps. Chrysostom. Bardenhewer has already pointed out that in *BHG* 848 use is made of a homily of Antipater of Bostra on John the Baptist (*BHG* 847).[15] B. Marx, in his "Proclus-mania", believed on the other hand that *BHG* 848 should be ascribed to Proclus of Constantinople, and that it was Antipater who used his sermon.[16] If we take into account the fact that in ps. Chrysostom's text the passage from Antipater occurs between passages from Leontius which form a unified whole in Leontius' text, we have a clear indication that ps. Chrysostom's text is secondary, with respect to Antipater and Leontius. On grounds of internal criteria C. Vona has already made this idea acceptable, as far as Antipater's work is concerned;[17] in this he has been followed by R. Caro.[18] However, Vona sees at the same time the influence of Antipater everywhere in ps. Chrysostom. even in those passages which now appear to be from the pen of Leontius. From this we can make a rule of thumb for homiletic literature: one should only suppose the use of another homily if parallels can be clearly proven.

The assumption that in *BHG* 848 we are dealing with a compilation is finally put beyond doubt by the discovery of a third source of which the compiler availed himself. Four passages appear to have been borrowed from an unedited homily, also by ps. Chrysostom, which I shall publish elsewhere.[19] The sources of the following in *BHG* 848 can be traced:

PG 61, 757,46$^{a.i.}$ — 757,40$^{a.i.}$: *BHG* 843k (Barocc. Auct. T.3.4, f. 260^{r})
758,4$^{a.i.}$ — 759,59 : Leontius

759,59	— 759,71	: *BHG* 843k (Barocc. Auct. T.3.4, f. 260^{v})
759,71	— 760,35	: Leontius
760,36	— 760,52	: Antipater (PG 85,1764 A 13 - C 5)
760,52	— 760,57	: Leontius
760,59	— 760,74	: *BHG* 843k (Barocc. Auct. T.3.4, f. 261^{r-v})
760,74	— 760,75	: Antipater (PG 85,1765 B 9)
761,44	— 762,22	: *BHG* 843k (Barocc. Auct. T.3.4, f. 260^{v}-261^{r})

The question is now whether we can find the unidentified passages of *BHG* 848, namely PG 61,757$^{40\,a.i.}$-758$^{4\,a.i.}$, 760^{78}-761^{46} and 762$^{22-49}$. As far as the last two passages are concerned, it seems possible to make a responsible conjecture. From our analysis it has become certain that the compiler drew on Leontius, among other authors, and indeed the following characteristic Leontian turns of phrase are found in these passages: 761,5 καὶ τούτου μάρτυς; 761,31 ὡς ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰωάννου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος; 761,36 ἄκουε συνετῶς; 761,40 ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν χρόνων. Leontius' homily on John's birth breaks off in the two manuscripts with the words: Ταῦτα τῶν παραλειφθέντων ἡμῖν τῇ προτεραίᾳ κεφαλαίων οἱ τόκοι, πᾶν γὰρ κεφάλαιον τόκον τίκτει. Ὅθεν καὶ τὸ βρέφος τόκος ὀνομάζεται· ὡς κεφάλαιον γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ τὸν σπόρον τῇ γυναικὶ δανείζει — κεφαλὴ γὰρ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ —, τίκτει δὲ τῷ κεφαλαίῳ τὸν τόκον ἡ γυ⟨νή⟩ ... This would form an excellent transition to PG 61, 760$^{70\,sqq.}$, where there begins an exposition of the words ἔτεκεν καὶ ἐγέννησεν (cf. Luc. 1,57). In other words, we have here the lost passages of Leontius' homily – whether whole or in part it is impossible to determine. We can now conclude that the first passage, PG 61,757$^{40\,a.i.}$–758$^{4\,a.i.}$, in any case does not derive from Leontius' sermon, which has been totally reworked. In this conclusion we are supported by the fact that in the passage in question we find no typical Leontian turns of phrase. The source of this section is to be sought elsewhere, perhaps in a homily where the annunciation of John's birth to Zachary is central. PG 61,757$^{31\,a.i.}$–758$^{54\,a.i.}$ contains a long monologue by Zachary, introduced by the words: Εἶπε δὲ Ζαχαρίας εὐθέως κατὰ ψυχήν and closing with Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ζαχαρίας εἰκότως. Gabriel's answer then follows: Ὁ δὲ ἄγγελός φησι πρὸς αὐτόν (PG 61,758$^{54-33\,a.i.}$) to which Zachary reacts in the next section (PG 61,758$^{33-4\,a.i.}$).

In conclusion we can affirm that in view of the borrowings from Antipater of Bostra and Leontius, presbyter of Constantinople,

BHG 848 must be dated to after 557. It should also be noticed that the popularity of this compilation, which began to appear very early in homiletic collections (the oldest witness is the famous uncial manuscript, Scorialensis Φ-III-20), was achieved at the expense of the transmission of Leontius' homily and of the early homily of ps. Chrysostom, Ἀπαραίτητος (*BHG* 843 k).

NOTES

[1] PG 86,1976-1993 *In mediam Pentecostem*; PG 86,1993-2004 *In sanctam Parasceuen.*

[2] M. Aubineau, *Homélies Pascales.* SC 186 (Paris 1972)341–468.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 344.

[4] P. Allen-C. Datema, Leontius, presbyter of Constantinople – a compiler?, *JÖB* 29 (1980)9–20.

[5] M. Sachot, Les homélies de Léonce, prêtre de Constantinople!, *RScR* 51(1977)234–245.

[6] *Art. cit.*, 241.

[7] M. Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum* III (Turnhout 1979)487.

[8] C. Datema, A homily on John the Baptist attributed to Aetius, presbyter of Constantinople (BHG 861p; CPG III 7908).

[9] M. Jugie, *Homélies Mariales Byzantines* II, PO XIX, 297–309.

[10] Malalas, Bonn edition pp. 488–489; Agathias V, 3ff.; Theophanes A.M. 6050 καὶ τῷ Δεκεμβρίῳ μηνὶ ἰδ' γέγονεν ἕτερος σεισμὸς φοβερὸς πάνυ. Cf. Glanville Downey, Earthquakes at Constantinople and Vicinity, A.D. 342–1452, *Speculum* XXX (1955) 596–600.

[11] Malalas, p. 489 ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ φοβερὰ ἀπειλὴ ἐπεκράτησεν ἐπὶ ἡμέρας δέκα; Theophanes A.M. 6050 ἔμεινεν δὲ σειομένη ἡ γῆ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ἡμέρας δέκα.

[12] PG 48,1027.

[13] PG 50,713-716.

[14] M. Sachot, *art. cit.*, 236.

[15] O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchen Literatur* IV (Freiburg im Breisgau, [2]1924) 306, note.

[16] B. Marx, *Procliana* (Münster 1940) 102.

[17] C. Vona, Le due orazioni di Antipatro di Bostra, *Lateranum* N.S. XXXIV, 1968, 144–149.

[18] R. Caro, *La Homiletica Mariana Griega en el Siglo V*, I (Dayton Ohio 1971) 233–234.

[19] As far as I am aware at present, there are four Greek manuscripts of this text: Oxoniensis Bodleianus Auct. T.3.4, ff. 259–261^{v}; Hierosolymitanus S. Sepulcri 134, ff. 392^{v}–395^{v}; Hierosolymitanus S. Sepulcri 135. ff. 128–130; Athous, Koutloumousiou 209, ff. 11^{v}–14^{v}. I refer here to the folio numbers of the Oxoniensis because it is the most accessible. For a Georgian translation cf. M. van Esbroeck, *Les plus anciens homéliaires géorgiens* (Louvain-la-Neuve 1975) 172–173.

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D'«UN ENCOMIO COPTO DI RAFFAELE ARCANGELO» A UN SERMON SUR LA PENTECÔTE ATTRIBUÉ À CHRYSOSTOME

PAR

ENZO LUCCHESI

On sait la part active qu'a prise, au cours des dernières années, le Prof. Tito Orlandi de Rome dans l'effort de recomposition des Manuscrits coptes du Monastère Blanc (près Sohag). Parmi ses nombreux et imposants travaux figure l'édition de ce qui reste (ou plutôt de ce que l'auteur a cru devoir rassembler en tant que matériel dispersé – de fait, d'autres fragments inédits de l'œuvre considérée ont échappé aux soins vigilants de l'heuristique, ainsi que nous aurons à le montrer en temps voulu en même temps que nous reviendrons sur la question codicologique qui nous paraît également avoir été mal résolue) d'un texte qui, depuis Zoëga, passe sous la malencontreuse dénomination de *Relatio Theophili ad Theodosium imperatorem*, et que M. Orlandi rebaptise comme étant une véritable homélie *In laudem Raphaelis archangeli*, prétendûment prêchée, d'après le contenu lui-même, à Alexandrie, et par Théophile précisément.[1]

La question ne sera pas non plus ici de savoir si l'opinion de M. Orlandi rend définitivement justice à ce soi-disant *Encomium de Raphaël* par Théophile – jusqu'ici acéphale, il est bon de ne pas le perdre de vue![2]

Nous ne ferons que nous arrêter très brièvement sur le dernier fragment édité à cette occasion, soit un feuillet partiellement abîmé de la *Papyrus-Sammlung* de Vienne (K. 9547), que l'éditeur, sans l'ombre d'une hésitation, rattache au codex maigrement représenté qu'il appelle B. L'intérêt de ce feuillet, qui porte encore sa pagination intacte (49–50), à supposer évidemment que le recolement se fût avéré exact, eût été considérable, vu qu'il nous fournirait alors le *desinit* de la pièce.

Malheureusement il n'en est rien, car nous ne sommes plus cette fois-ci ni dans le codex B ni dans la *Relatio Theophili* ni dans un

quelconque panégyrique sur Raphaël, mais bel et bien à la fin d'une homélie *Sur la Pentecôte* attribuée, dans les recensions tant copte que grecque, à Jean Chrysostome et que tout le monde peut lire aisément dans la Patrologie de Migne parmi les *Spuria Chrysostomica* (t. 52, coll. 803–808).[3]

C'est dire l'extrême prudence et circonspection que l'on sera amené à adopter dans toute reconstitution de codex, là où le fil conducteur d'un parallèle grec ou arabe fait provisoirement défaut; certaines écritures, outre qu'elles ne sont pas commodes à débrouiller, ne constituent pas à elles seules un critère suffisant.

Les déconvenues qui découleraient alors d'une fausse reconstitution seraient d'autant plus fâcheuses que l'argumentation interne de l'auteur reposerait en fin de compte sur des bases aussi fragiles![4]

NOTES

[1] Voir T. Orlandi, Un encomio copto di Raffaele Arcangelo (»Relatio Theophili«), in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 47 (1974) 211–233. Orlandi dit (p. 211): »Le ricerche da noi condotte ... ci hanno permesso di rintracciare altri frammenti della medesima opera«. De non moins fructueuses recherches avaient permis à Crum, et ce dès 1907!, de rapprocher pour l'essentiel de Zoega CCLVI, Paris 132[1], 5–10 (sic), avec point d'interrogation d'ailleurs: cf. Hagiographica from Leipzig Manuscrits, dans *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology* 29 (1907) p. 306, n. 101; cf. idem, *Der Papyruscodex saec. VI-VII der Phillippsbibliothek in Cheltenham*, Straßburg 1915 (Schriften der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Straßburg, 18), p. XVII et n. 10 (légère, mais substantielle modification par rapport à la notice précédente; il y est renvoyé plus prudemment à Paris 132[1], f. 5,6, le ms. A d'Orlandi). Insuffisante et erronée aussi se présentait l'indication antérieure du même Orlandi, *Storia della Chiesa di Alessandria*, vol. II = Testi e Documenti per lo studio dell'Antichità 31 (Milano 1970) 105–106.

[2] La publication d'une version arabe complète mais encore inédite fera, espérons-le, toute la lumière.

[3] Nous pensons publier prochainement le texte copte de ce sermon dont l'*incipit* se trouve dans Paris B.N., Copte 131[1], fol. 34, et qui compte un second témoin (le Paris 131[6], fol. 123 double notamment le folio de Vienne ci-dessus, lui-même précédé immédiatement de Paris 131[3], fol. 64, p. 47–48).

[4] Voir, dans un contexte strictement analogue, quoique les données soient renversées, P. Devos, De Jean Chrysostome à Jean de Lycopolis *Analecta Bollandiana* 96(1978) 389-403, dont la ressemblance voulue avec notre titre n'est pas sans évoquer l'avatar!

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THE STRUCTURE OF TYCONIUS' APOCALYPSE COMMENTARY: A CORRECTION*

BY

KENNETH B. STEINHAUSER

Although scholars bemoan the loss of Tyconius' commentary on the Apocalypse, they have managed to console themselves with isolated fragments[1] and partial reconstructions[2] on the basis of subsequent authors,[3] who knew the lost commentary and used it in their own writings. Perhaps the most ingenious accomplishment was the recovery of the original structure of the lost commentary. The commonly accepted theory in this regard was first proposed by Traugott Hahn[4] and later enshrined by Paul Monceaux in his monumental literary history.[5] No scholar has ever seriously questioned the theory, which is generally accepted in most quarters as plain and simple fact.[6] Unfortunately the theory is based upon an erroneous presupposition.

The commonly accepted theory

The commonly accepted theory concerning the structure of Tyconius' Apocalypse commentary is profound in its simplicity. On the basis of literary evidence one must, first of all, posit three premises: *First premise*: Gennadius asserts that Tyconius' commentary encompassed the entire book of the Apocalypse.[7] *Second premise*: The Venerable Bede indicates that Tyconius' commentary contained three books.[8] *Third premise*: Beatus of Liebana unwittingly discloses the contents of Book II by mechanically copying Tyconius' title after having written his own title to the same book.[9]

The structure of the lost commentary flows quite spontaneously from these three premises. Tyconius' title of Book II, recorded by Beatus, indicates that his second book encompassed Apoc. 4:1–8:1. Since the lost commentary was complete in three books and since the contents of the second book are known, one may readily conclude that Book I covered Apoc. 1:1–3:22 and Book III Apoc. 8:2–22:21.

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The error

The flaw is not in the reasoning process but rather in the second premise, which is false. The Venerable Bede does not state that Tyconius' commentary contained three books! The pertinent passage is ripe for misunderstanding if one does not read it carefully.

In his *Epistola ad Eusebium*, which serves as the introduction to his *Explanatio Apocalypsis*,[10] Bede proceeds in three steps. First, he presents his opinion that the book of the Apocalypse ought to be divided into seven sections. Second, he expounds on the seven rules of Tyconius.[11] Third, after mentioning Tyconius' commentary on the Apocalypse, Bede goes on to explain the sources and disposition of his own Apocalypse commentary.

The last section of the letter is critical. Although he expresses some reservation in regard to Tyconius' Donatist leanings, Bede does confess that he followed Tyconius in writing his own work: *Cujus quidem auctoris et nos in hoc opere sensum secuti, nonnulla quae extrinsecus posuit, breviandi causa omisimus, plura vero ... superadjicere curavimus.*[12] The tense (*omisimus* etc.) is important. In the *Epistola* Bede is writing about the *Explanatio*, which he had already completed. After considering his chief source and his method of dealing with that source, Bede then presents the structure of his own commentary: *Cumque opus memoratum in tres libellos relevandae mentis gratia findi placuisset, ...*[13] With this sentence the stage was set for the erroneous interpretation. It was generally assumed that the *opus memoratum*, which may be translated "the previously mentioned work", referred to Bede's source, namely Tyconius' Apocalypse commentary. The verb *placuisset* in the pluperfect seemed to confirm the assertion. Most deceptive, however, was the use of the letter as an introduction to the commentary. When the prefatory letter discussed "the previously mentioned work," one would hardly have concluded that "the previously mentioned work" was identical with the commentary which followed. Nevertheless, Bede is clearly referring to his own Apocalypse commentary,[14] which he obviously had completed before he wrote the letter to Eusebius, which he had already explicitly mentioned with the expression *in hoc opere* and which, by the way, does contain three books. Bede even justifies having divided his *Explanatio* into three books by citing Augustine, who says, "for some reason the attention of a reader is refreshed by the end of a book in the same way as the

traveller's labour is by an inn".[15] In the very same sentence Bede further describes the structure of his work indicating that he followed the unbroken series of chapters of the Apocalypse in order to make finding a specific passage easier for his readers. Finally he states that he has written brief and simple sentences because of the *inertia* of the English, who have only recently received the faith in the days of Pope Gregory.

Thus, an analysis of the *Epistola ad Eusebium* reveals that both the specific reference, *opus memoratum*, and the entire context of the passage points to Bede's own previously written *Explanatio Apocalypsis*, which he is subsequently introducing to Eusebius by letter. Bede wishes to show sufficient grounds for the two-fold structure of his work. The division into three books serves the reader's *intentio*, which occasionally must be refreshed, while following the unbroken series of biblical chapters serves the *inventio* of anyone who might be seeking a particular reference. To put it in contemporary terms, Bede is stating that he has written both a commentary and a reference work. This being the case, the passage does not, indeed, cannot refer to Tyconius.

The consequences of the error

With the central premise proven false, the entire theory concerning the structure of the lost commentary crumbles. Although the first and third premises escape unscathed, they can no longer be meaningfully connected. What remains are two disjointed facts: First, Tyconius commented on the entire biblical book of the Apocalypse. Second, one book of the lost commentary, perhaps Book II, covered Apoc. 4:1–8:1. Unfortunately we have sufficient information neither to unite these facts in a cogent theory nor to recover the structure of the lost commentary.

Notes

* This article is respectfully dedicated to the Most Reverend Francis J. Mugavero, Bishop of Brooklyn, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of his priestly ordination.

[1] *The Turin Fragments of Tyconius' Commentary on Revelation*, ed. Francesco Lo Bue. Texts and Studies N.S. 7 (Cambridge 1963); László Mezey, Egy korai karoling kódextöredék (*Ticonius in Apocalypsin*?), Magyar könyvszemle 92 (1976) 15–24.

[2] Traugott Hahn, *Tyconius-Studien: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte des 4. Jahrhunderts*. Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche 6,2 (Leipzig

1900; rp: Aalen 1971) 11–12; Gerald Bonner, *Saint Bede in the Tradition of Western Apocalyptic Commentary*. Jarrow Lecture 1966 (Newcastle upon Tyne 1966) 21–29.

[3] Primasius of Hadrumetum, Caesarius of Arles, Beatus of Liebana and Bede the Venerable borrowed heavily from Tyconius. For literature and a brief summary of the problem see Ildefonso M. Gómez, El perdido comentario de Ticonio al Apocalipsis: Principios de crítica literaria y textual para su reconstrucción, *Miscellanea Biblica B. Ubach*. Scripta et Documenta 1 (Montserrat 1953) 387–411.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 18–19.

[5] *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'a l'invasion arabe* V (Paris 1920; rp: Bruxelles 1966) 201.

[6] For example see Wilhelm Kamlah, *Apokalypse und Geschichtstheologie: Die mittelalterliche Auslegung der Apokalypse vor Joachim von Fiore*. Historische Studien 285 (Berlin 1935) 21.

[7] *De viris inlustribus* XVIII (Sammlung ausgewählter kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellenschriften 11, 68): *Exposuit et apocalypsin Iohannis ex integro.*

[8] *Explanatio Apocalypsis, Epistola ad Eusebium* (PL 93, 134 A): *Cumque opus memoratum in tres libellos...*

[9] *In Apocalypsin* II (Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome 7, 159): *Hic liber continet quattuor animalia et quattuor equos, animas interfectorum, quattuor ventos et duodena milia*; cf. Johannes Haussleiter, Die Kommentare des Victorinus, Tichonius und Hieronymus zur Apokalypse, *Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben* 7 (1886) 248.

[10] PL 93, 129–206.

[11] Cf. *The Book of Rules of Tyconius*, ed. F.C. Burkitt. Texts and Studies 3,1 (Cambridge 1894; rp: Nendeln/Liechtenstein 1967).

[12] PL 93, 133 A.

[13] PL 93, 134 A.

[14] This position is also maintained by Claude Jenkins, Bede as Exegete and Theologian, *Bede his Life, Times and Writings: Essays in Commemoration of the Twelfth Centenary of his Death*, ed. A. Hamilton Thompson (Oxford 1935) 155.

[15] PL 93, 134 A; trans. by Jenkins, *loc. cit.*

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UNE RÉCENTE ÉDITION DU «COMMENTAIRE SUR LE CANTIQUE DES CANTIQUES» DE PHILON DE CARPASIA

PAR

SOLANGE SAGOT

Philon, évêque de Carpasia dans l'île de Chypre au début du V^e^ siècle, composa un Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques. L'*editio princeps* du texte grec parut à Rome en 1772, *Philonis episcopi Carpasii enarratio in Canticum Canticorum*, due à Michelangelo Giacomelli, qui y joignit sa propre traduction latine. Elle fut reproduite par A. Galland dans la *Bibliotheca ueterum patrum*, t. IX, Venise, 1773, p. 713–769, et ensuite dans PG 40, 1858, col. 27–154. Récemment elle fut reprise, avec quelques retouches de peu d'importance, par K. Hadjioannou, dans Η ΑΡΧΑΙΑ ΚΥΠΡΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑΣ ΠΗΓΑΣ, t. III,1, Leucosia, 1975, sans les notes et sans la traduction latine, cette dernière étant remplacée par une traduction en grec moderne.

Avant l'*editio princeps*, on connaissait le Commentaire de Philon par des Chaînes, celle de Procope (PG 87[2], 1860, col. 1545-1754) et celle du Pseudo-Eusèbe (éditée par J. Meursius, *Eusebii, Polychronii, Pselli, in Canticum Canticorum Expositiones graece*, Leyde, 1617; reproduit avec addition d'une traduction latine dans J. Meursius, *Opera omnia*, t. VIII, Florence, 1746). Enfin trois citations de Philon (correspondant à *Cant.* 1,2; 1,4; 7,6–7) figurent dans la *Topographie chrétienne* de Cosmas Indicopleustès, X,57–58 (cf. éd. W. Wolska-Conus, t. III, SC 197, 1973, p. 294–297 et n. 57[1]).

On possède un ouvrage de Stephanus Salutatus, intitulé *Philonis episcopi Carpathii in Canticum Canticorum Interpretatio*, Paris, 1537 (reproduit dans M. de La Bigne, *Maxima bibliotheca Veterum Patrum*, t. V, Lyon, 1677, col. 661–701). Mais, plutôt qu'une traduction de Philon ainsi que le ferait croire son titre, il offre, pour la plus grande partie, des passages abrégés empruntés à Grégoire le Grand (cf. Ceresa-Gastaldo, p. 11, n. 7). En revanche, une véritable traduction

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de Philon fut exécutée, au VI[e] siècle, à l'instigation de Cassiodore, par son ami Épiphane le Scolastique. Cependant Cassiodore attribuait l'original grec, non pas à Philon, mais à l'évêque Épiphane de Chypre. Elle resta longtemps manuscrite, presque ignorée, dans le codex *Vaticanus latinus 5704*, qui fut publié pour la première fois par P. Fr. Foggini, sous le titre : *S. Epiphani Salaminis in Cypro episcopi Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum*, Rome, 1750.

A. Ceresa-Gastaldo vient de nous en donner une édition critique (Filone di Carpasia, *Commento al »Cantico dei Cantici«* nell'antica versione latina di Epifanio Scolastico. Edizione critica con introduzione, traduzione italiana, note e indici a cura di Aldo Ceresa-Gastaldo, coll. *Corona Patrum*, Società editrice internazionale, Torino, 1979, 16×23, 299 pages). Il avait eu tout d'abord l'intention de préparer une édition critique du texte grec pour améliorer celui que Giacomelli avait publié. En faisant l'inventaire de toute la tradition manuscrite directe et indirecte, il fut amené à examiner de près la version d'Épiphane le Scolastique, la confrontant avec le texte grec. Des problèmes divers apparurent, l'édition de Foggini se révéla imparfaite (erreurs commises dans la lecture du codex, omissions de stiques et même de phrases) et il devint évident qu'il fallait d'abord se limiter à une nouvelle édition de cette version (p. 7 et 13). C'est ainsi que cette seconde publication du *Vat. lat. 5704* a vu le jour.

Dans son Introduction, A. Ceresa-Gastaldo a étudié spécialement les points suivants :

1) *L'auteur du Commentaire*. La plus ancienne attestation de ce Commentaire remonte à une mention explicite de Cassiodore dans ses *Institutions* (1,5,4; éd. R.A.B. Mynors, Oxford, 1937 et 1963, p. 24). Il explique qu'il a fait copier à la suite, dans un seul codex, trois commentaires sur le Cantique : deux homélies d'Origène traduites par Jérôme (cf. Origène, éd. Baehrens, GCS 33, et éd. Rousseau, SC 37bis, 1966), le Commentaire d'Origène en trois livres, traduit par Rufin (cf. GCS 33) et le Commentaire attribué par erreur à Épiphane de Chypre : »Post quos Epiphanius antistes Cyprius totum librum Graeco sermone uno uolumine sub breuitate complexus est. Hunc nos ut alios in Latinam linguam par amicum nostrum uirum disertissimum Epiphanium fecimus Domino iuuante transferri.« L'unique témoin de cette version (nous verrons toutefois que depuis le XVII[e] siècle nous disposons d'un second témoin), le *Vat. lat. 5704*, porte en titre au fol. 4v° : *Incipit expositio Epiphanii episcopi Cyprii in Canticis Canticorum.*

Foggini, premier éditeur du manuscrit en 1750, attribue, à la suite de Cassiodore, l'original grec à Épiphane de Chypre. Il mentionne (p. XIII-XIV), tout en la réfutant, la note que J. Garet, éditeur de Cassiodore, avait pris soin d'apposer au texte de Cassiodore cité ci-dessus. Rattachée à »Epiphanius antistes«, elle est ainsi libellée : »Vel potius Philo, ordinatus Episcopus urbis Carpasi in insula Cypro a S. Epiphanio Salaminae antistite, ut in ipsiusmet sancti vita legitur. Vidi hujusce Commentarii textum Graecum in manibus V. C. Em. Bigot cum translatione Latina, cujus hic meminit Cassiodorus. At neutrum hactenus prelo commissum est« (J. Garet, *Magni Aurelii Cassiodori... Opera omnia*, Rouen, 1679, t. II, p. 542 A; et dans PL 70, col. 1117; la note n'est pas reproduite dans l'édition Mynors).

Un peu plus tard, en 1772, Giacomelli publie le texte grec de Philon que Foggini ignorait. Il le compare avec la traduction réalisée par Épiphane le Scolastique et ne peut que constater, dans sa Préface (PG 40, col. 18–22), l'identité substantielle, malgré quelques divergences, entre les deux Commentaires. Il faut donc restituer à Philon de Carpasia l'original grec qui fut traduit par Épiphane le Scolastique, position adoptée désormais par la critique contemporaine.

2) *Le texte grec.* L'auteur fait le point sur l'état actuel des connaissances concernant les manuscrits grecs de Philon utilisés par Giacomelli et ceux que M. Faulhaber (*Catenen*, p. 72) a inventoriés. Le texte grec publié par Giacomelli ne présente pas beaucoup de difficultés; on relève quelques mots d'usage post-classique, des formes iotacisantes. Le style en est simple. W. Riedel (*Die Auslegung des Hohenliedes in der jüdischen Gemeinde und der griechischen Kirche*, Leipzig, 1898, p. 76–77) estime qu'on a affaire à un résumé plutôt qu'à l'original.

3) *Les fragments grecs des Chaînes.* M. Faulhaber (*Hohelied-, Proverbien- und Prediger-Catenen*, Vienne, 1902, p. 64) a distingué, dans les chaînes grecques sur le Cantique, cinq types différents. Philon fut utilisé dans la chaîne C, chaîne de Procope, et dans la chaîne E, celle du Pseudo-Eusèbe (que nous avons mentionnées ci-dessus). L'auteur dresse un tableau complet (p. 15–20) où, prenant le Cantique verset par verset – en omettant toutefois les versets qui sont dépourvus de commentaire philonien dans les chaînes – il indique à chaque fois : 1. la colonne de PG 40 où se trouve le commentaire correspondant de Philon; 2. les références des passages parallèles dans les deux chaînes; 3. le paragraphe de la version d'Épiphane. Les trois citations

de Philon chez Cosmas sont présentes aussi, à leurs places respectives. A chaque fois, le degré de similitude ou de dissemblance entre le texte philonien et ses parallèles est précisé. Voici un exemple :

6,5 : Philon (col. 116 A 11);

Procope (col. 1712 B 1) : extrêmement abrégé;

Pseudo-Eusèbe (col. 205) : semblable à Philon avec additions et divergences;

Épiphane (§ CLXII) : semblable à Philon, avec des variantes.

Ce tableau, clair et précis, fait ressortir les divergences notables qui existent entre les chaînes et le texte philonien. Les chaînes usent d'une extrême liberté envers ce dernier, elles abrègent le plus souvent, amplifient parfois. Leur utilité est donc médiocre pour la reconstitution des passages douteux ou difficiles de Philon. En revanche on perçoit l'identité substantielle entre le texte philonien et la version d'Épiphane. Et puisque le texte de Giacomelli se révèle – on l'a vu plus haut – comme une compilation du texte primitif, la version latine permet de remonter plus près de l'original perdu, d'où son importance considérable.

4) *La version latine d'Épiphane le Scolastique.* L'auteur reprend tout d'abord, en grande partie et souvent textuellement, les p. 40 à 43 d'un article paru précédemment : Da Vivario a Roma. Appunti per la storia del codice Vaticano latino 5704 (sec. VI), dans *Giornale italiano di filologia*, n. s. I, XXII/3, 1970, p. 39–46, dans lequel l'auteur faisait une description détaillée, minutieuse, du Vaticanus, déjà décrit succinctement par E. A. Lowe, *Codices latini antiquiores*, t. I, *The Vatican City*, n° 25, et par P. Courcelle, *Les lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore*, Paris, 1943, 2e éd. 1948, p. 364-365. Il n'est pas possible de résumer cette description. Signalons seulement que l'écriture est une onciale du VIe siècle, que l'encre noire s'est écaillée plus ou moins sur tous les côtés chair du parchemin, ce qui en rend la lecture difficile. Heureusement l'encre rouge, utilisée pour la première ligne de chaque lemme a été plus résistante. Le texte du Cantique est donc bien conservé dans l'ensemble. Les premiers et derniers folios sont en assez mauvais état. Le codex contient 12 quaternions, numérotés de XXVIIII à XL. De cette constatation Courcelle conclut, vérification mathématique à l'appui, que notre codex serait la partie subsistante du codex complet de Vivarium où Cassiodore avait réuni les trois Commentaires sur le Cantique. Qui hésiterait à le considérer comme l'archétype cassiodorien lui-même devrait du moins

reconnaître qu'il en est une copie très proche. Une seconde main qui semble de même époque que la première a laissé de nombreuses traces d'une révision attentive : corrections d'erreurs évidentes, mais aussi modifications non justifiées, pratiquées avec une excessive liberté. Reprenant plusieurs points de l'argumentation de P. Courcelle (*ibid.*, p. 366–367), l'auteur essaie de reconstituer les étapes parcourues par le codex depuis Vivarium jusqu'au Vatican (p. 23–24). Quand, après la mort de Cassiodore, la bibliothèque de Vivarium fut dispersée, le manuscrit serait passé dans celle du Latran. On en a pour preuve la citation d'un passage qu'en fit le pape Adrien I^er^ dans une lettre adressée, en 791, à Charlemagne (p. 10 et 23). Une note marginale, au fol. 48v°, dont la caroline minuscule du IX^e^ siècle est estimée française par Lowe, permet à P. Courcelle de penser que le ms. a séjourné en France. Ensuite, nous n'avons plus de trace de son histoire jusqu'au XV^e^ siècle. En 1447, un *incipit* et un *finit* furent inscrits aux fol. 1r° et 97r° par Luigi Feoli, bibliothécaire de l'*ecclesia maior* de Bénévent (p. 10, 23, 24). Enfin le manuscrit parvint à la Vaticane : »Son numéro 5704 montre qu'il est entré à la Vaticane un peu avant le lot cédé par Bobbio en 1618« (P. Courcelle, *op. cit.*, p. 367, n. 3), mais il n'est pas passé par Bobbio.

Cette version d'Épiphane n'eut pas de diffusion; elle ne fut citée par aucun auteur et ne figure dans aucun catalogue de bibliothèque médiévale. La seule exception est constituée par le petit codex *Parisinus graecus 3092*, qui contient, aux fol. 1–103, une *Expositio Epiphanii episcopi Cyprii in Canticis Canticorum*. A la suite de P. Courcelle (*op. cit.*, p. 367 et n. 2), l'auteur le situe à la fin du XVI^e^ siècle. Il nous faut rectifier cette date, à laquelle s'oppose la chronologie. Ce manuscrit qui appartenait à la riche bibliothèque d'Émeric Bigot, fut, sans aucun doute possible, copié par Bigot lui-même. Or Bigot vécut de 1626 à 1689. Le manuscrit date donc, sans conteste, du XVII^e^ siècle (»XVI« est une coquille pour »XVII« chez P. Courcelle qui nous l'a confirmé au cours d'une conversation). Nous pouvons apporter d'autres précisions. En premier lieu, ainsi que le reconnaissent P. Courcelle (*ibid.*) et A. Ceresa-Gastaldo (p. 25), ce codex est celui auquel faisait allusion Garet dans la note que nous avons reproduite plus haut (§ 1) : »Vidi hujusce Commentarii textum Graecum in manibus V. C. Em. Bigot cum *Translatione Latina*, cujus hic meminit Cassiodorus.« Or l'édition de Cassiodore parut en 1679. Le *Par. gr. 3092* (qui contient aussi quatre petites homélies de

Jean Chrysostome, d'où son classement parmi les manuscrits grecs) est donc antérieur à cette date. En outre, tout porte à croire que Bigot a recopié le *Vat. lat. 5704* dans son petit codex sur place, à la Vaticane. Par conséquent on ne peut acquiescer à l'affirmation suivante de l'auteur (p. 25): »La présence d'une copie de l'ancienne version à Paris confirme ultérieurement que la France fut une étape importante dans son histoire.« De toute façon, même si le codex de Bigot datait du XVI[e] siècle, cette assertion ne serait pas justifiée, puisque le séjour du Vaticanus en France se situe avant son passage à Bénévent, c'est-à-dire avant 1447. Il aurait fallu supposer une seconde étape en France après Bénévent. En revanche, si on admet que Bigot a exécuté sa copie à la Vaticane, notre codex parisien confirme la présence du codex cassiodorien à la Vaticane, au XVII[e] siècle, hypothèse qui s'accorde avec celle avancée par P. Courcelle selon laquelle ce dernier parvint à la Vaticane avant 1618.

En second lieu, contrairement aux propos tenus par Giacomelli (PG 40, col. 16), et ainsi que le reconnaît A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, la Préface de l'*Expositio* n'est pas absente du codex de Bigot. Elle est seulement amputée du début correspondant au fol. 1r° et aux dix premières lignes du fol. 1v° du Vaticanus. Aucune preuve décisive ne permet d'affirmer qu'elle fut ajoutée postérieurement, selon l'hypothèse de l'auteur (p. 24–25). Cette Préface offre, en outre, une particularité qui mérite d'être signalée. Elle est copiée sur une feuille d'un format qui est le quadruple de celui des petits feuillets qui composent le codex, et qui, pour cette raison, se présente pliée en quatre. Nous avons traité plus en détail des problèmes posés par cette Préface et par le codex en général dans notre thèse de 3[e] cycle: *Le* Cantique des Cantiques *dans le* De Isaac *d'Ambroise de Milan. Étude textuelle et recherche sur les anciennes versions latines*, exemplaire dactylographié, Université de Paris IV, 1978, p. 70–73; 91–94 (les p. 297–300 sont des reproductions du fol. A contenant la Préface et des fol. 32 et 36).

Ainsi c'est à Bigot que revient l'honneur d'avoir tiré le Vaticanus de son sommeil multiséculaire et, grâce à la note de Garet, d'avoir permis à Bianchini d'identifier l'*Expositio* qu'il contient avec la version d'Épiphane le Scolastique. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo (p. 27, à la n. 39 qui appartient au § 5 de son Introduction) ne fait qu'effleurer, en citant le nom de Giuseppe Bianchini, un épisode important de l'histoire du Vaticanus, la controverse suscitée à son propos entre Bianchini et Sabatier, dont certains détails ne manquent pas de piquant (et que

nous avons relatée dans notre thèse, p. 48–67). L'auteur passe sous silence l'ouvrage en question de Bianchini. Il s'agit des *Vindiciae canonicarum Scripturarum Vulgatae latinae editionis* ..., opera et studio Josephi Blanchini, Rome, 1740. Aux p. 292–294, Bianchini, chanoine de Vérone, raconte comment il découvrit par hasard à la Vaticane un codex »qui porte la cote 5704«, qu'il identifia avec la traduction exécutée à l'initiative de Cassiodore et qu'il avait la ferme intention de publier. Mais d'autres travaux l'empêchèrent de réaliser son projet, et nous avons vu qu'il appartint à Foggini, dix ans plus tard, de publier l'*Expositio*. Au moment où Bianchini faisait part de sa trouvaille, P. Sabatier avait terminé la préparation de sa *Vetus Itala*. Il avait reconstitué celle du Cantique, faute de manuscrits contenant une ancienne version latine, en se servant principalement des citations du Cantique disséminées dans les œuvres d'Ambroise (*Bibliorum sacrorum latinae versiones antiquae seu Vetus Italica*, Reims, 1743, 2e éd. Paris, 1751, t. II, p. 374–388). L'ouvrage était à l'impression quand il apprit l'existence du *Vat. lat. 5704* et de l'*Expositio* sur le Cantique qu'il renfermait, dont, aux dires de Bianchini, »le texte sacré du Cantique représente la version Itala dans sa pureté«. Il était trop tard pour que Sabatier corrigeât son texte. Il se contenta d'ajouter un paragraphe traitant de ce sujet dans la Préface du t. III (tome consacré au Nouveau Testament). Il y explique qu'en confrontant les lemmes du Vaticanus avec sa reconstitution du Cantique, il a constaté assez peu de différence. Mais il n'a pas travaillé directement sur le Vaticanus, il a utilisé le codex de Bigot auquel finalement il n'emprunta que quelques bribes de versets pour combler des lacunes de son Itala (cf. t. III, p. xi-xiii; voir la publication de la première partie de notre thèse, à paraître dans les Recherches augustiniennes, vol. XVI, 1981).

5) *La technique de traduction d'Épiphane*. Pour apprécier cette technique, il faudrait pouvoir confronter la version d'Épiphane avec l'original grec. Or le texte publié par Giacomelli ne représente probablement pas l'original philonien. Nous avons vu qu'il semble plutôt en être une compilation. On serait alors tenté de considérer la version latine comme un témoin du texte original, surtout pour les parties qui sont plus développées par rapport au texte abrégé que nous possédons de Philon. Cependant il faut tenir compte de ce que nous savons sur la technique de la traduction en usage à l'époque patristique. Un passage de E. Dekkers, Les autographes des Pères latins, dans *Colligere fragmenta*, Festschrift A. Dold, Beuron, 1952, p. 131, nous met sous

les yeux les différentes difficultés matérielles inhérentes à l'action d'écrire. D'autres difficultés sont dues à la multiplicité des collaborateurs qui participent à la réalisation d'une traduction. Un exemple en est donné par Dekkers (*ibid.*, p. 136, n. 81, résumant la conclusion de G. Théry, *Études dionysiennes* 1, *Hilduin, traducteur de Denys*, Paris, 1932, p. 133-134 qui décrit la manière dont travaillait le traducteur du Pseudo-Denys : »Un moine grec lit le texte grec à haute voix, un deuxième moine, qui comprend les deux langues, traduit oralement au fur et à mesure qu'il entend lire l'original grec; enfin, un moine latin écrit le texte latin que lui dicte son confrère bilingue; toute cette équipe travaille sous les ordres de l'abbé de Saint-Denys, Hilduin, auquel la fameuse traduction est attribuée.«

Exécutée dans de telles conditions, il est impossible qu'une traduction reflète très fidèlement l'original. Il est vrai pourtant que le texte biblique, à cause du respect qu'il inspirait, était rendu, dans les anciennes versions latines, avec un rigoureux littéralisme. C'est aussi avec un fidèle littéralisme qu'Épiphane a traduit les citations bibliques, en reproduisant la Vetus Latina.

Quant aux lemmes du Cantique, ils constituent »un précieux exemplaire d'une ancienne version revue antérieurement (à la rédaction de la Vulgate) par Jérôme sur la recension hexaplaire d'Origène« (p. 27). L'auteur auquel on doit cette découverte est nommé en note (n. 39), A. Vaccari, qui dans son *Cantici Canticorum Vetus Latina translatio a S. Hieronymo ad Graecum textum hexaplarem emendata*, Rome, 1959, offre pour la première fois la publication de la révision hexaplaire du Cantique faite par Jérôme, publication que A. Ceresa-Gastaldo qualifie de »magistrale edizione«. Il est vrai que la présence dans notre Vaticanus de cette révision hexaplaire est d'une »extraordinaire importance« (Da Vivario..., p. 45). Il nous semble que l'auteur n'insiste pas suffisamment sur ce point – qui risque d'échapper à un lecteur un peu distrait – très important pour l'histoire des anciennes versions latines, car, avant la découverte de Vaccari, cette révision dont on savait l'existence était considérée comme perdue, n'ayant survécu que par fragments dans des citations de Jérôme lui-même ou d'autres auteurs.

Quant à la technique de traduction d'Épiphane dans le cours du commentaire proprement dit, on peut relever quelques passages abrégés (dans la liste des références qui en sont données, au lieu de LXXXIII, lire LXXIIII?) ou des additions, ou encore de rares omissions dues à

la distraction. Plus nombreux sont les points qui présentent avec le texte grec des divergences telles qu'elles font supposer un texte philonien différent de celui qui est édité par Giacomelli (au lieu de CCXIII, lire CCXIIII?). Ailleurs le texte grec traduit par Épiphane apparaît substantiellement semblable à celui que nous possédons. De nombreuses erreurs peuvent s'expliquer par une confusion due à la dictée, à la différence entre la prononciation et l'orthographe, à la prononciation iotacisante du grec. La caractéristique essentielle est une extrême liberté, procédé courant à l'époque où l'»adaptation« était une voie normale pour la diffusion d'un texte. Ce phénomène expliquerait les trois états actuels du texte de Philon dérivés d'une seule et même édition originale, qui aurait abouti d'une part, moyennant un travail de compilation, au texte grec édité par Giacomelli (position légèrement différente de celle de Riedel, cf. § 2), d'autre part à la libre adaptation des chaînes, et enfin dans le monde latin à la version d'Épiphane.

6) *Le latin de la version d'Épiphane.* Phonétique, morphologie, syntaxe sont dans l'ensemble traditionnelles, cependant nombreuses déjà sont les traces qui révèlent le passage progressif au latin médiéval : changement de voyelles, de consonnes, de genres, de conjugaison, etc. (des exemples précis en sont cités). Au point de vue du style, les figures de rhétorique utilisées par Épiphane sont souvent déjà présentes chez Philon : métonymie, apostrophe, anaphore, antithèse, allitération, homoioteleuton, polyptote, isocolon, parallélisme, chiasme, etc.

7) *L'exégèse biblique dans le Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques.* L'auteur commence par rapporter les jugements peu flatteurs dont Philon fut l'objet de la part des critiques, qui ne manquent jamais de rappeler celui que formulait Riedel : »der geistloseste all der griechischen Exegeten« (*Die Auslegung des Hohenliedes*, p. 77). On lui reproche un réalisme excessif et naïf (par exemple l'identification répétée des seins avec les deux Testaments, source de nourriture spirituelle pour les fidèles). A. Ceresa-Gastaldo prend la défense de Philon, en faisant remarquer que ce réalisme, qui était dans le goût du temps, »donne à l'interprétation allégorique une note constante de caractère concret et l'empêche de tomber dans le danger toujours présent d'un spiritualisme excessif en contribuant, en revanche, à exprimer d'une manière efficace et immédiate de profondes vérités« (p. 32). Voir les exemples de la grenade, figure de l'église, des montagnes et des collines identifiées respectivement aux prophètes et aux apôtres, cette

dernière identification appartenant à l'exégèse traditionnelle. Si l'interprétation allégorique de Philon manque d'originalité, on doit néanmoins reconnaître la sincérité de son inspiration, inspiration vraiment »chrétienne«, née d'un attachement de foi profonde au Christ, dont la présence est pour ainsi dire vivante et diffuse au point d'être perçue dans toute image et parole du Cantique (plusieurs exemples p. 33–34).

L'apparat critique de l'édition est assez abondant. Il contient les leçons fournies par la seconde main du Vaticanus, par la première main (chaque fois que l'auteur modifie l'orthographe ou adopte la leçon de la seconde main, ou quand il apporte une correction) et par l'édition de Foggini; il présente aussi parfois le terme grec (du texte philonien édité par Giacomelli) à l'appui de la leçon adoptée. Il est donc aussi complet que possible et constitue une étape appréciable et nécessaire vers la réalisation du dessein final de l'auteur : l'édition critique du texte grec de Philon. Signalons en passant qu'une rectification serait à apporter à l'apparat p. 150, § CXLVII. L'unité critique, pour la lig. 1, est la suivante :

»fialae *scripsi* : afilia *V* philiae *m2* | phialae *Fogg.* (*cfr. l.* 4)«

Or, à la lig. 4, le cas de *fialae* n'est pas identique à celui de la lig. 1. Une nouvelle unité critique pour la lig. 4 devrait, nous semble-t-il, être rédigée ainsi :

»fialae *scripsi* : afiliae *V* phialae *m2 Fogg.*«

Il faut nous arrêter un instant sur les corrections que l'auteur a cru bon d'apporter au texte du Vaticanus. Épiphane le Scolastique a commis bon nombre d'erreurs que Giacomelli s'est plu à relever et à qualifier de termes comme *absurda* (col. 41, n. 66; col. 58, n. 54), *barbare* (col. 47, n. 90), *monstrosa* (col. 51, n. 8), *absurdissimum* (col. 68, n. 86), etc. En voici un échantillon : au § XVIII qui commente *Cant.* 1,8, on lit sous la plume d'Épiphane l'étrange formule suivante : »Ubi enim puritas est, illic increpatio quoque subsequitur.« Le texte grec porte (PG 40, col. 49, § XVIII) : Ὅπου γὰρ ἀγνοία, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐπιτιμία. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo explique (dans la note p. 219) que *puritas* est une erreur typique de traduction due à la confusion entre -οι- et -ει- par iotacisme. Épiphane a lu ἁγνεία (p. 219, corriger l'esprit doux en esprit rude) au lieu de ἀγνοία terme que Giacomelli traduit par »inscitia«. C'est donc »inscitia« qui remplace »puritas« (rejeté en apparat) dans le texte présenté par l'auteur (p. 78).

Autre cas : au § CXC, après le lemme : »Ceruix tua ut turris eburnea« (*Cant.* 7,5), on lit : »Ceruicem denuo dicit mundissimum diaconorum officium : quia enim caput ecclesiae Christus est, isti uero et corpus et sanguinem baptizant, recte capitis ecclesiae id est Christi ceruix esse dicuntur.« La leçon *baptizant* est une erreur évidente d'Épiphane qui a lu βαπτίζουσι au lieu de βαστάζουσι (cf. PG 40, col. 125, § CXCVIII). L'auteur a donc remplacé l'incompréhensible »baptizant« par »gestant« (p. 170 et cf. note p. 267).

D'autres exemples ne manqueraient pas. On peut se demander si l'introduction, dans le texte, de telles corrections est tout à fait légitime. Si l'auteur avait voulu publier la traduction d'Épiphane contenue dans le *Vat. lat. 5704*, il semble qu'il aurait respecté et conservé les leçons d'Épiphane même fautives, se contenant de signaler l'erreur en note. Mais l'intention de l'auteur, on le sait, est de retrouver le texte philonien se rapprochant le plus possible de l'original. Dans cette optique, les corrections se justifient. Il n'en reste pas moins que leur adoption dans le texte est un peu gênante, car, à une lecture un peu rapide, on ne peut jamais être sûr qu'on a sous les yeux le texte exact d'Épiphane, il faut constamment consulter l'apparat. Peut-être un artifice typographique aurait-il pu avertir le lecteur.

Par ailleurs, quand le contresens d'Épiphane concerne non plus un seul mot, mais plusieurs, l'auteur ne rectifie pas. Par exemple au § LIIII (*Cant.* 2,11), Épiphane, pas plus que Giacomelli, n'a compris exactement la phrase où Philon fait allusion à *Matth.* 7,25. Le texte de Philon signifie : »Il parle des justes qui ont été fondés sur la pierre«, Épiphane a compris : »Il parle de ce qui a été fondé sur la pierre des justes«. Ici l'auteur reproduit, comme il se doit, le texte du Vaticanus ; c'est dans la note, p. 228, qu'on trouve le véritable sens du passage philonien.

Les notes de A. Ceresa-Gastaldo apportent beaucoup de renseignements utiles. Elles expliquent les fautes du copiste, souvent bien corrigées par la seconde main. Par exemple, pour le § CCVIIII,4 : »L'incompréhensible *gaudi* au lieu de *audiui* est l'indice du travail mécanique du copiste qui écrivait sous la dictée, plus attentif au son qu'au sens des mots« (note p. 273 ; cf. aussi §§ CCXI,6 ; CCXXI,3 et 5).

Elles contiennent de nombreuses remarques d'ordre grammatical : philologique, morphologique, syntaxique, stylistique sur la langue d'Épiphane.

Les notes relèvent également, dans les textes bibliques et particulière-

ment dans les lemmes du Cantique, les tournures sémitiques, passées en latin par l'intermédiaire de la traduction très littérale de la Septante. La liste des références en est donnée dans l'Index des »Termini notevoli e particolarità linguistiche«, *s. u.* »semitismo«. Notons que cette liste serait à compléter par l'addition de deux hébraïsmes qui ont échappé à l'inventaire :

— § LIIII,1 (*Cant.* 2,11b) : »discessit sibi«. L'auteur fait remarquer le datif éthique pléonastique (en renvoyant à Szantyr, p. 94, et à D. Norberg, *Manuel pratique de latin médiéval*, p. 24). Mais ce datif ne fait que reproduire celui de la Septante qui elle-même rend fidèlement un hébraïsme (cf. Joüon, *Grammaire de l'hébreu biblique*, Rome, 1947, § 133d). La même tournure héritée de l'hébreu se retrouve au § C,1 (*Cant.* 4,6b) : »Ibo mihi«.

— § CCX,1 (*Cant.* 8,1) : »Quis dabit te fratruelem meum sugentem ubera matris meae?« La formule »quis dabit« traduit exactement une formule hébraïque employée pour exprimer un souhait (cf. A. Robert, R. Tournay, A. Feuillet, *Le Cantique des Cantiques*, Paris, 1963, p. 282, qui traduit : »Ah! que ne m'es-tu un frère ...!«; Joüon, § 163d).

De plus, le cas de »adiuraui uos... si leuaueritis« (§ XLVI,1–3, *Cant.* 2,7; cf. § LXXVIII,1–2, *Cant.* 3,5) pourrait aussi prendre place parmi les sémitismes. L'auteur constate (p. 226) que la conjonction hébraïque *'im*, »ayant ici une valeur négative«, a été rendue avec le simple *si* (= ἐάν); de ce fait, la proposition est devenue affirmative, et le verset, suivi de son commentaire, a pris chez Philon et chez Épiphane un sens différent de son sens original. Or la valeur négative de *'im* est ici normale, puisqu'on a affaire à l'hébraïsme bien connu des propositions d'imprécation et de serment (cf. Robert, p. 108; Joüon, § 165). *Cant.* 2,7, signifie donc : »je vous conjure... *de ne pas* réveiller«. Il est probable que le traducteur grec a bien compris, mais qu'il a rendu trop servilement l'hébraïsme, induisant ainsi en erreur un lecteur non averti comme l'était Philon. Les deux anciennes latines (cf. éd. De Bruyne, dans *Revue bénédictine*, 38, 1926, et Wilmart, *ibid.*, 28, 1911), en décalquant le grec, ont de la même façon déformé le texte : »adiuraui uos... si leuaueritis«, »adiuraui uos... si excitetis« (le contresens se trouve également chez Ambroise, *Expositio ps. 118*, 5,19 et 20, CSEL 62, p. 91,22 et p. 92-93; *De Isaac*, 4,31, CSEL 32,1, p. 661,4). Le lemme du Cantique, emprunté par Épiphane à la révision hexaplaire de Jérôme ne fait que reprendre, pour les mots qui nous intéressent, l'une des anciennes latines. Plus tard, quand il a remis sur

le métier sa traduction du Cantique en la révisant sur le texte hébreu, pour l'insérer dans la Vulgate, Jérôme a heureusement modifié sa première rédaction en écrivant : »audiuro uos... ne suscitetis«, ainsi que le signale l'auteur.

Puisque nous venons de faire allusion à la révision hexaplaire, rappelons que les lemmes du Cantique, qui sont la base de notre *Expositio*, ne sont pas dus, quant à leur teneur, à la traduction d'Épiphane, mais qu'Épiphane s'est contenté de reproduire la révision hexaplaire de Jérôme et, ce faisant, il nous a transmis intégralement (à l'exception des trois stiques 4,9a ; 6,12a ; 7,4 ; l'omission des deux derniers est relevée par A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, p. 264 et 267) cette version que sans lui nous ne posséderions que partiellement, dans des citations disséminées chez quelques auteurs latins, dont Augustin et Jérôme lui-même. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo signale ce fait important (Introd., § 5), mais sans insister. A plusieurs reprises, dans les notes, à propos des lemmes du Cantique il parle de »la version d'Épiphane« (CLII,1, p. 255 ; CLXXVII,1, p. 262 ; CXCV,1, p. 269 ; cf. aussi CL,1, p. 255). Il serait plus exact de dire »la version de Jérôme«, car c'est bien Jérôme et non Épiphane qui est responsable de telle ou telle tournure. En outre, l'auteur aurait pu emprunter à l'étude de Vaccari, qui accompagne l'édition de la révision hexaplaire, quelques notations intéressantes. Par exemple, au § XXVII,1, p. 221, l'auteur attire l'attention sur le mot *fratruelis* de *Cant.* 1,13, traduisant ἀδελφιδός de la Septante (alors que les anciennes latines ont *frater* et la Vulgate *dilectus*), mais il ne rapporte pas l'observation faite par Vaccari (*op. cit.*, p. 13) selon laquelle ce terme est propre à Jérôme. On le retrouve effectivement dans sa traduction des *Homélies sur le Cantique* d'Origène (cf. éd. O. Rousseau, SC 37 bis, p. 112 et n. 1) et dans les citations du Cantique qui forment la trame des chapitres 30 et 31 du premier livre de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* (PL 23, col. 251-254) dans lesquels il cite sa propre révision hexaplaire. Nous serions tentée de dire que *fratruelis* est comme la signature de Jérôme. Ajoutons que Sabatier (t. III, p. xii, § XIX) avait su faire le rapprochement entre le *fratruelis* du Vaticanus et l'utilisation habituelle de ce terme par Jérôme, mais il n'en avait pas tiré la conclusion que la version du Cantique contenue dans le Vaticanus était l'œuvre de Jérôme.

Au § CLXXXII (*Cant.* 7,1 ; Vulg. 6,12), p. 265, pour *Salamitis*, l'auteur signale les différentes formes sous lesquelles ce nom apparaît en latin et en grec. Mais il ne fait pas remarquer que, chez Épiphane,

le commentaire accorde à *Salamitis* une étymologie qui lui est complètement étrangère. En effet, »quae testificatur in aqua« n'a rien à voir avec Salamitis, mais convient fort bien, en revanche, à Ὀδολλαμῖτις (variante rare, conservée dans la version arménienne, en rapport avec la ville Odollam, cf. *Gen.* 38,1 et *I Sam.* 22,1), leçon qui est précisément celle du texte grec (PG 40, col. 121 A, § CXCI). Vaccari (*op. cit.*, p. 12) explique comment le traducteur Épiphane, ayant dans le lemme adopté *Salamitis* – qui lui vient de Jérôme – lui applique dans le commentaire l'étymologie que Philon destinait à Ὀδολλαμῖτις. Une telle manière de faire était, aux yeux de Vaccari, la preuve qu'Épiphane n'élaborait pas sa propre traduction des lemmes grecs du Cantique (autrement il aurait écrit »Odollamitis«), mais qu'il les recopiait sur une version déjà existante, sans se préoccuper des inconséquences qui pourraient en résulter.

Pourtant, de l'avis de Vaccari, Épiphane a su prendre ailleurs l'initiative exceptionnelle de substituer à un terme du lemme hiéronymien un autre mieux adapté pour maintenir la cohérence entre le lemme et l'interprétation. Au § CXLIII,1, le terme *abiecti* (de *Cant.* 5,11) remplace celui d'*abietes*, qui figure dans les citations patristiques. Contrairement à Giacomelli (PG 40, col. 107, n. 74) qui, une fois de plus, qualifie d'absurde la traduction d'Épiphane, Vaccari la trouve ingénieuse (*Scritti di erudizione e di filologia*, t. II, chap. VIII : *Recupero d'un lavoro critico di S. Girolamo*, Rome, 1958, p. 143-144). A. Ceresa-Gastaldo (p. 253), fournit une explication différente sans faire allusion à celle de Vaccari.

Avant de clore ce chapitre, notons encore *similitudo* du § LXXVIIII,1 (*Cant.* 3,6), que l'auteur signale comme la traduction d'une variante d'Aquila. Mais il n'en profite pas pour signaler en même temps que Vaccari voit, dans ce fait un peu insolite, un indice supplémentaire de la paternité de Jérôme sur cette version (cf. *Cant. Cant. Vet. lat.* ..., p. 10–11). Quelques renvois aux ouvrages de Vaccari eussent donc été les bienvenus.

Toujours à propos des lemmes du Cantique, l'auteur a jugé opportun d'indiquer, à plusieurs reprises, les variantes de la *Vetus Italica* de Sabatier (cf. p. 27, n. 39). Ainsi pour *Cant.* 2,6, § XLV,1, p. 225, pour *Cant.* 5,14, § CL,1, p. 255, et ailleurs, il note »in Sabatier, ad. l.«, sans préciser que sous »Sabatier« il faut, en l'occurrence, comprendre »Ambroise«. En effet, comme nous l'avons rappelé plus haut, Sabatier, ne disposant d'aucun manuscrit d'une ancienne version

latine du Cantique, avait cru bon de reconstituer la Vetus Itala du Cantique en mettant bout à bout les nombreuses citations du Cantique qui émaillent les œuvres ambrosiennes. *Cant.* 2,6, de la *Vetus Italica* appartient en fait à *Expositio ps. 118*, 5,13, CSEL 62, p. 88,28; *Cant.* 5,14, à *De obitu Valentiniani*, 62,2, CSEL 73, p. 358; parmi les autres citations mentionnées par l'auteur, la majorité revient à *Expos. ps. 118*, une à *De uirginibus*, une autre à *De institutione uirginis.*

Notre dernière remarque concerne la note LVIII,3, p. 229, pour prendre la défense de Giacomelli accusé d'avoir commis une erreur: »Par erreur Giacomelli (col. 70, n. 99) attribue au codex la leçon *diuersa... eloquia.*« A première vue l'auteur a raison puisque le Vaticanus porte *diuersa... uerba.* Cependant à notre avis, la note de Giacomelli a une portée différente de celle que lui confère l'auteur. Il faut la lire en son entier: »Γλυκεροὺς λόγους. Vet. interp. 'diuersa eloquia.' Videtur codicem habuisse corruptum.« Voici comment nous l'interprétons. Il nous semble, tout d'abord, que »eloquia« est un *lapsus calami* au lieu de »uerba« de la part de Giacomelli (*lapsus* dû à sa propre traduction latine »dulcia... eloquia«), ensuite que la note concerne en réalité »diuersa«. Pour une fois Giacomelli ne fait aucun reproche au »vetus interpres«; il constate seulement que là où le grec de Philon porte γλυκεροὺς, la version d'Épiphane a »diuersa«; il en conclut que le manuscrit grec dont disposait Épiphane était, sur ce point, corrompu.

Dans l'apparat biblique, l'auteur a parfois rectifié et complété ceux que ses devanciers, Foggini et Giacomelli, avaient dressés. On pourrait encore le perfectionner. Au hasard d'une lecture plus attentive sur une page ou l'autre nous avons relevé qu'au § CXIIII, p. 135, où sont indiquées les deux références »cfr. *Ioh.* 19,39; *Luc.* 23,50«, il conviendrait de remplacer la seconde par *Marc.* 15,43. Le texte concerné est le suivant: »corpus quod sepultum est in murra et aloe ab optimo consiliatore Ioseph«. Or Luc rapporte bien la démarche de Joseph d'Arimathie, mais sans mentionner les aromates, tandis que Jean parle expressément de myrrhe et d'aloès. Quant à Marc, s'il passe sous silence comme Luc les aromates, il est le seul à qualifier Joseph de εὐσχήμων βουλευτής, expression qu'on retrouve textuellement dans le grec de Philon (PG 40, col. 98 B, § CXVII) et qui est rendue chez Épiphane par »optimo consiliatore«.

Au § XXXIII, p. 86, apparaît la citation bien connue: »Speciosi

pedes euangelizantium bona«, accompagnée de l'apparat suivant, parfaitement exact: »*Rom.* 10,15; cfr. *Is.* 52,7«. Déjà auparavant une allusion avait été faite (*Praef.* 6, p. 42) avec les mots: »pedibus speciosis«, dotés seulement de »cfr. *Rom.* 10,15«. Il conviendrait d'ajouter: »*Is.* 52,7«. Dans ces deux cas, citation et allusion sont absentes de Philon. De nouveau au § LXX, p. 106, on retrouve: »Quam speciosi pedes euangelizantium bona« (correspondant exactement au texte de Philon, col. 76 B, § LXXI), muni seulement de »*Rom.* 10,15«. Il conviendrait d'ajouter: »cfr. *Is.* 52,7«. Une quatrième fois, au § CLXXXVI, p. 168, le texte revient sous la forme: »Speciosi pedes euangelizantium pacem«, désigné comme »*Rom.* 10,15«. Or la présence ici de »pacem« au lieu de »bona« invite à rédiger l'apparat ainsi: »cfr. *Is.* 52,7; *Rom.* 10,15« (chez Philon, col. 121 C, § CXCIV, la citation est plus longue et se rapproche davantage du texte d'Isaïe).

Enfin une citation, qui est absente du texte grec de Philon, n'a pas été identifiée, au § CCVI,4, p. 182 (cf. note p. 272): »ecce ego et puri quos mihi dedit deus«. La faute en incombe au copiste qui a écrit »puri« au lieu de »pueri«. Avec »pueri« on reconnaît *Isaïe* 8,18, repris en *Hébreux* 2,13. Foggini a reproduit exactement le Vaticanus. Bien que la citation figure sur le côté chair du parchemin où l'encre s'est écaillée, »puri« est parfaitement lisible et n'est surchargé d'aucune correction. Mais sous la plume de Bigot, dans le *Paris B. N. grec 3092*, fol. 89, on lit »pueri«, sans doute possible, malgré l'écriture très fine de Bigot parfois difficile à déchiffrer. Bigot a une façon très particulière de faire les »e«, et la présence du »e« dans le mot en question est indiscutable. In suffit, pour s'en convaincre, de le comparer par exemple avec »diceret« de la ligne précédente et avec »puritate« du fol. 86, lig. 3. Ainsi Bigot, en écrivant »pueri«, a consciemment corrigé l'erreur du copiste qu'il a relevée, ou bien, parce qu'il avait identifié la citation, il a machinalement écrit »pueri«, sans s'apercevoir peut-être que le manuscrit comportait une erreur. En conséquence, il faudrait, dans la version d'Épiphane, écrire »pueri«, en ajoutant l'unité critique »pueri *scripsi*: puri *V Fogg.*«, et corriger la traduction italienne.

Puisque nous en sommes revenue à Bigot, nous voudrions donner un autre exemple de l'utilité que peut présenter la consultation de son petit codex. Il se trouve au fol. 36, § XLVIIII (que Bigot écrit XLIX), à propos d'une étymologie aussi boiteuse que celle relevée plus haut pour Salamitis. Aussitôt après le lemme: »Similis est

fratuelis meus capreae...« (*Cant.* 2,9), on lit : »Caprea animal est habens uisum nimis acutum, unde et feronime uocatur caprea« (»feronime« traduit φερωνύμως »d'une manière significative«). Épiphane a traduit littéralement le grec sans s'émouvoir du fait que »unde uocatur caprea« n'a aucun rapport avec la vision aiguë de l'animal. Or, en regard du second emploi de »caprea«, Bigot, de sa propre main (il ne peut s'agir d'une main différente) a noté : »δορκὰς«. De cette réaction tout à fait exceptionnelle de Bigot on peut avancer deux explications. Ou bien Bigot, connaissant le texte grec du Cantique, savait que »capreae« était la traduction de δορκάδι, et il aurait inscrit le terme grec pour avertir le lecteur que l'étymologie proposée concernait ce terme. Peut-être avait-il déjà rencontré cette étymologie populaire, à propos du même verset du Cantique, chez Origène (*Homélies sur le Cantique*, 2,11 ; cf. SC 37 bis, p. 140 et n. 1 ; Jérôme, conscient de la difficulté, n'a pas hésité à introduire dans sa traduction latine les termes grecs nécessaires à la compréhension : »ab eo enim quod acutius uideat, id est παρὰ τὸ ὀξυδερκέστερον, dorcas appellata est«), ou chez Ambroise (*Expos. ps. 118*, 6,12, CSEL 62, p. 114,11 ; Ambroise aussi insère les termes grecs dans sa phrase latine : »δορκὰς dicitur a uidendo ; δορκατικὸν etenim uisus acutioris est«). Ou bien Bigot avait sous les yeux le texte grec de Philon, celui-là même que Garet affirmait avoir vu entre les mains de son savant ami et qui lui avait permis de reconnaître, dans le Commentaire que Cassiodore attribuait à Épiphane de Chypre, l'œuvre de Philon de Carpasia. Nous pencherions pour cette seconde hypothèse, qui expliquerait du même coup une anomalie que nous avons remarquée dans la Préface du codex de Bigot. Nous avons déjà signalé qu'elle était copiée sur une feuille de grand format. En outre, elle présente, par rapport au Vaticanus, plusieurs variantes (cf. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, Introd., § 4, p. 25), alors que le reste de la version d'Épiphane a été copiée fidèlement. Ces variantes, dont certaines sont soulignées comme pour être mises en évidence, ne peuvent s'expliquer que si Bigot confrontait cette version avec l'original grec et cherchait à l'améliorer. De fait, il semble qu'il se soit efforcé de traduire le grec avec plus d'exactitude qu'Épiphane. Ensuite il aurait renoncé à faire des corrections et pris le parti de recopier tel quel le texte du Vaticanus.

Si Bigot a eu réellement un Philon grec entre les mains, qu'est devenu ce manuscrit ? La Bibliothèque Nationale possède, parmi les manuscrits grecs hérités de Bigot, un petit codex portant la cote 3087,

écrit de la main de Bigot et intitulé *Philo Carpathius in Cantica.* En examinant attentivement ce codex, nous avons constaté d'abord que le titre n'est pas de l'écriture de Bigot, ensuite que son Commentaire sur le Cantique ne ressemble en rien à celui de Philon. Mlle M.-G. Guérard, dont les recherches portent actuellement sur les chaînes du Cantique et particulièrement sur les fragments de Nil d'Ancyre, eut vite fait de reconnaître, dans les premières pages les idées et le style d'Origène. Finalement nous avons identifié la majeure partie de ce Commentaire avec des fragments extraits de la chaîne de Procope, appartenant pour la plupart à Origène et pour le reste à Nil, Grégoire de Nysse, Cyrille, Apollinaire et pour quelques lignes seulement à Philon de Carpasia. Ce codex n'est donc pas celui que Garet avait vu chez Bigot. Cependant le témoignage de Garet, joint à celui d'autres auteurs (Colomiès, Banduri, Oudin; voir notre thèse p. 81–88) nous laisse à penser que Bigot a possédé un vrai Philon de Carpasia, qui par malheur se trouverait égaré et qu'il serait fort intéressant de découvrir.

Nous avons signalé, quand l'occasion s'en présentait, quelques-unes des inévitables coquilles ou erreurs qui affectent une première édition. En voici d'autres qu'il sera facile de supprimer lors d'une seconde édition :

p. 7, lig. 1 : »un des livres plus courts« : lire : »un des livres les plus courts«; p. 24, n. 34, lig. 2 : »Inventaire sommaire de la Bibliothèque ...« : lire : »Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque ...«; p. 186, CCXII,2 : »eius qui« : lire : »eius quae«; p. 209, I,107, lig. 2 : »cfr. la nota alle ll. 23 e 159« : lire : »cfr. la nota alla l. 23 della *Prefazione* e a I,159«; p. 210, I,159, lig. 2 : »le ll. 23 e 107« : lire : »*Pref.*, l. 23 e I,107«.

Nous espérons avoir montré que des domaines très divers sont concernés par la publication de ce Commentaire, en lui-même assez modeste (ainsi que le reconnaît A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, *Da Vivario*, p. 46), que notre analyse et nos observations sont la preuve de l'intérêt que nous avons pris à sa lecture. Nous souhaitons vivement que l'auteur puisse mener à bonne fin la tâche qu'il s'est fixée, à savoir l'édition critique du texte grec de Philon de Carpasia, à moins que l'idée n'en soit déjà venue à un autre chercheur qui aurait déjà mis en chantier le même projet. En effet, selon des échos qui nous sont parvenus du dernier congrès d'Oxford, un compatriote de Philon de Carpasia, le Dr A. Tillyrides, un Cypriote, aurait cette intention. De toute façon

la présente édition de la version d'Épiphane tiendra une place importante parmi les témoins de la tradition indirecte et aura très utilement »déblayé le terrain«. Nous souhaiterions également disposer d'une édition française de l'ouvrage de A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, c'est-à-dire voir la traduction française de l'*Expositio* figurer en regard du texte latin et lire en français la précieuse Introduction et les notes de l'auteur qui sont le complément indispensable de la version d'Épiphane le Scolastique.

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A BISHOP AND HIS LADY: AP 16.19

BY

BARRY BALDWIN

"Εἰρήνη πάντεσσιν," ἐπίσκοπος εἶπεν ἐπελθών.
πῶς δύναται πᾶσιν, ἣν μόνος ἔνδον ἔχει;

Lemmatised vaguely by Planudes as εἰς ἀσελγεῖς, the precise context of this anonymous poem has not been fully elucidated by editors of the Anthology. Beckby, for instance, limits himself largely to the observation (in view of the text, no great feat of percipience!) that it constitutes "Verspottung eines Bischofs."[1] In connecting it with Dioscorus, bishop of Alexandria, Jacobs and Paton were on the right lines, but they do not tell their readers as much as they might.[2] At the third session[3] of the Council of Chalcedon, October 13, 451, Dioscorus was accused amongst many other things of a sexual liaison with Pansophia Oreine, a *femme fatale* said to have been περιβόητος – albeit not now sufficiently so to gain inclusion in the second volume of PLRE![4]

According to the accuser, Ischyrion the deacon, their relationship was the subject of a popular song in wide circulation. Our poem clearly belongs to this campaign, though it is unnoticed by the most recent and best account[5] of the tribulations of Dioscorus. As a poem, it is an accomplished little piece. For illustration of the opening greeting, Boissonade cited John 14. 27 from the NT, and Beckby Luke 24. 36, both of which in fact say "Peace be with you." A much better parallel is John Chrysostom's enumeration[6] of the exact ritual moments when the bishop says "Peace to all." His first utterance will be ὅταν εἰσέλθῃ, which lends point to the ἐπελθών of the epigram. The pun on the lady's name is palpable, and Palladan. Also Palladan is the joke in the second line, being very reminiscent of that poet's well known quip (AP 11. 384) on the illogicality of monks crowding together.

It was presumably these features that tempted Keydell and Beckby into crediting the epigram to Palladas. But this is ruled out by simple

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chronology, since it is now generally agreed[7] that Palladas was born around 319.

NOTES

[1] He also alludes without comment to the not very illuminating view of Preisendanz that the epigram reflects an outcry by the people in pursuit of a quarrel between themselves and their bishop.

[2] Jacobs' view is reproduced in the Didot edition of the Anthology where Boissonade (as does Beckby) adduces the Wechelian scholia. It is worth noting that these latter can point in the right direction, given modern suspicions that they were made up by Musurus; cf. J. Hutton, *The Greek Anthology in Italy to the Year 1800* (Ithaca 1935) 155–8; Alan Cameron, Notes on Palladas, *CQ* N.S. 15 (1965) 221, n. 1. Paton (the Loeb editor) thought that the epigram "probably" referred to Dioscorus, giving no further information.

[3] Text in E. Schwartz, *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum* (Berlin 1914–74) 2, 1, 2, pp. 17–8; cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles* (Paris 1907–49) 2, 695 (3, 324, in the English version of 1883, reprt. New York 1972).

[4] Which admits only by cross-reference to vol. 1 an earlier and infinitely more respectable Pansophia.

[5] T. E. Gregory, *Vox Populi* (Ohio 1979) 176, 198.

[6] *Hom.* 3. 3 *in Col.* (Migne, PG 11. 348C); for this and similar passages, see Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon.*

[7] As worked out by C. M. Bowra, Palladas and Christianity, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 45 (1959) 91–5 (= *On Greek Margins* (Oxford 1970) 253–66, and followed by e.g., Cameron, *art. cit.*, 219–25, and the notice of Palladas in PLRE 1. Even on the older view of A. Franke, *De Pallada epigrammatographo* (Diss. Leipzig 1899), 39, followed by L. Stella, *Cinque poeti dell'Anthologia Palatina* (Rome 1949) 379–83, that he was born in 360, it is virtually impossible that Palladas could have written this epigram around 451.

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LOGOS CHRISTOLOGIES IN THE NAG HAMMADI CODICES

BY

PHEME PERKINS

The Nag Hammadi codices provide a rich source for the study of early Christian theology. Studies of the Jewsih haggadic materials found in these texts have shown that they often preserve and elaborate traditions that are independent of those embodied in canonical sources. Similar claims can be advanced for the traditions of the sayings of Jesus embodied in Gnostic exegesis. Although it has been customary to frame the debate over Gnostic Christology in terms of "pre-" or "post" New Testament developments, detailed investigation will suggest that the same situation obtains. There are some Christologies in the Nag Hammadi material which adapt older images of the revealer to the requirements of NT exegesis. Others seem to forge new patterns from traditions that are not typical of those in the NT. The Logos Christologies in the Nag Hammadi corpus provide an instructive example of the genuine diversity of Gnostic speculation.

Colpe has argued that the so-called "redeemer myth" can only have developed under the influence of Christianity. The Gnostic soteriology of spiritual enlightenment as to the true God and the origin of the inner self does not require the descent of a revealer or his/her identification with a particular individual.[1] Indeed, one of the major objections against Gnostic interpretations of the Johannine prologue was their reluctance to identify the divine Logos with the descending Savior.[2] Armstrong insists that philosophical language is secondary to Gnostic texts. Those systems, such as Valentinianism, which move in the direction of monism do so as a result of Christian, not philosophical, influence.[3] Ireneus' own account of the Logos in Gnostic systems assumes that his opponents have merely perverted the Johannine prologue to suit their purposes.[4] Both Ireneus' objections against his Gnostic opponents and the Nag Hammadi evidence support the conclusion that systems which attempt a direct identification of Christ, Logos and the highest God are influenced by developments in orthodox Christology.[5]

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Logos Christologies in the Nag Hammadi corpus fall into three categories.[6] Some represent the superficial adaptation of Logos terminology that Armstrong has noted in much Gnostic use of philosophy. They have taken the Johannine "Christ is Logos" and attached it to a divine triad, to one of the aeons in the pleroma or to the revealer. It has no role in the speculation of the text in question. Valentinian writings, on the other hand, have a tradition of exegetical interpretation that seeks to provide an account of the varied functions of the Logos in the Johannine prologue. Such speculation is motivated by the concern to give a Gnostic account of the Biblical text. Finally, the Logos speculation of the *Tripartite Tractate* (*TriTrac*) represents an independent Logos tradition. Its ties to other Valentinian writings are not sufficient to account for the unusual monistic system developed in this writing. Rather, it represents an adaptation of Gnostic thought to a tradition of philosophic Logos speculation and an emerging consensus as to the requirements of true Christian teaching.

Logos is added to a Gnostic system

In some writings, the Logos has simply been added to an existing Gnostic system because it forms part of the traditional Christian vocabulary. The *Apocryphon of John* (*ApocryJn*) and the *Gospel of the Egyptians* (*GEgypt*) provide a good example. The system in *ApocryJn* is headed by a divine triad, Father, Mother and Son. This triad is identified with the Gnostic revealer in the introductory epiphany. Later Christ appears as one of the aeons Autogenes whose offspring is Seth (CG II 6,23–9,24). *GEgypt* inserts Logos into this pattern (CG IV 59,20–63,11; III 49,16–51,21). Both writings associate revelation with the threefold descent of a figure from the pleroma: the *epinoia* in the long ending of *ApocryJn* (CG II 30,11–31,25) and Seth in *GEgypt* (CG IV 63,4–64,9). Each identifies the final manifestation of this figure with Jesus. *GEgypt* describes him as "Logos-begotten" (63,10f; 64,1). In so doing, it follows the general trend noted in Ireneus of avoiding statements that would have the Logos become incarnate directly.

The conclusion of *Origin of the World* (*OrigWld*) provides another example of such an adaptation. Its description of the final coming of revelation through the Immortal Man and the Gnostic is interrupted by a brief remark concerning the Logos:

> The Logos who is more exalted than anyone, was sent for this work only (μόνον): to announce (κηρύσσειν) the Unknown One. He said, "Nothing is hidden which will not be revealed and what is not known will be known." (Mt 10:26) [CG II 125,24–19].

Mt 10:26 is used in the *Gospel of Thomas* (*GTh*) logia 5 & 6 to refer to saving Gnosis. This passage could be a simple intrusion of that Gnostic topos into the discussion of the revelation of Gnosis by the Immortal Man.

Given the philosophical interests of the author of *OrigWld*,[7] we think it probable that his use of Logos to introduce the saying is based on his philosophical cosmology rather than on its use as a Christian title. *OrigWld* has taken on the framework of a treatise against false opinions about the origin of the world (CG II 97,30–98,5). The false views are contrasted with the true opinion that the world is a shadow. This form, a catalogue of false opinions, appears in other Nag Hammadi treatises. Both *Eugnostos* (*Eug;* CG III 70,2–71,13) and *TriTrac* (CG I 109,5–110,22) oppose a Gnostic account of the unfolding of the pleroma to false theories of divine providence. *TriTrac* attributes divergent philosophical views to conflict between the lower gods. They are opposed by the Logos and are eventually to be destroyed by revelation. Similarly, *OrigWld* has inserted a saying attributing revelation to the Logos into an apocalyptic description of the destruction of the gods of chaos. A passage in Philo suggests another connection between Logos and the cosmogonic traditions of *OrigWld.* His etymology of "Bezalel", "shadow of God", holds that God's shadow is the Logos, which he made use of like an instrument (*LegAll* iii,96). Thus, Logos may well have belonged to the cosmogonic tradition from which the author of *OrigWld* derived "shadow" as the origin of the lower world, though his own speculation focuses on ordering providence rather than on the instrumental activity of the Logos – which might even be explicitly denied by his introduction to the saying.

The *Trimorphic Protennoia* (*TriProt*) seems to have been influenced by both philosophical and Johannine traditions.[8] It is more precise philosophically in its use of divine triad language than the *ApocryJn*/*GEgypt* tradition, but it may well have reformulated a tradition about the aeons similar to that found in those writings. *GEgypt* presents the Logos as son of Sigē.[9] *TriProt*, on the other hand, has a more properly

philosophical statement that Sigē is the dwelling place of the Logos (and of the Gnostics who come to know God). Similarities between *TriProt* and *Three Steles of Seth* (*3StSeth*) suggest that *TriProt* also assumes that the divine triad which it describes is below the One.[10]

However, the triad itself is not paralleled in philosophic sources. It consists of Thought, Voice and Word. This combination seems to reflect the Gnostic pattern of threefold revelation also found in *ApocryJn/GEgypt*. "Voice" appears to be an epithet of the Mother associating her with the primordial call of awakening to Eve.[11] Typically, the third revelation is associated with Jesus. It seems to allude to the Johannine prologue:[12] "The third time, I revealed myself to them in their tents (σκηνή). I was the Logos (CG XIII 47,14–16)". The author seems to be willing to speak of the Logos as incarnate on the basis of the Johannine text even though it is the third member of the divine triad. *TriProt* seems to simply adopt the language of the Johannine prologue without the philosophical or theological qualms of Ptolemy or Heracleon. The primary attractiveness of expressions about the Logos for the author probably lies in their adaptability to a divine triad formulated to reflect the Gnostic history of revelation. The short phrases and almost credal expressions found in many passages of *TriProt* suggest that this triadic language may reflect developments in Gnostic liturgical style.[13]

When compared with other second century Christian writers, Gnostic Logos Christology is peculiar in its refusal to identify the Logos with the highest God or with an incarnate Christ. However, the tendency to use Logos in contexts in which the author's concern really lies elsewhere is typical of the apologists as well. Daniélou has pointed out that their use of Logos is subordinate to their real interest in Christ as "son" and "*dynamis*".[14] The same situation obtains in Silvanus (Silv). Logos is simply one title for Christ (CG VII 117,8; and in lists of praises, 112,32; 113,14). Origen's discussion of the names of Christ in his commentary on John evidences surprise that Christians seem to refuse to interpret the title Logos. He remarks that they only say that the Christ of God is Logos and do not try – as with the other names – to give the signification of the expression (φωνή) "logos". (*ComJo* I xxi: 125). Thus Origen seems aware that Logos is a matter of rather free floating usage rather than theological reflection. Perhaps the attention that it has received in Gnostic systems as contexted by Ireneus even contributed to the reticence that Origen notes.

Exegesis of the Johannine Prologue

Ireneus points out that some Gnostic reflection on the Johannine prologue created conflict with the common ways in which Christians spoke of the Logos. Such difficulties are increased when a metaphysical substructure suggests that the function of the Logos is above that of "logoi" which belong to lower levels of reality. Valentinian schools had a tradition of interpretation of the Johannine prologue which is represented in striking fashion by the *Gospel of Truth* (*GTr*). *GTr* meets the objections that Ireneus raises to Gnostic exegesis, since it – like Heracleon's treatment of the Logos[15] – is completely without the interpretation of the Logos as part of the pleroma or the myth of Sophia.[16] *GTr* focuses on the Logos as the creator and savior. It opens with a Gnostic rendering of the Johannine prologue (CG I 16,32).[17] A web of Scriptural allusions[18] and Gnostic topoi describe the joyous awakening to Gnosis which has been made possible by the life and crucifixion of Jesus. *GTr* is unusual in the extensive allusions to the life and crucifixion of Jesus that form the context of his revelation of Gnosis.

Like *TriProt*, Logos appears independently of exegetical associations to designate the revelatory activity of Jesus. It represents perfect knowledge of the Father (36,38–37,18). Ménard has observed that even in this passage "Word" leads into the central theological preoccupation of *GTr*, its elaborate theology of the name "Son" which is the proper representation of the Indescribable Father (38,5–41,3).[19] In this regard, *GTr* is of a piece with the second century Christian apologists. Like most Gnostic interpreters of the Johannine prologue, *GTr* presents the "creative" activity of the Logos as pervading and holding the pleroma together so as to bring back to knowledge of the Father (23,34–24,20).[20] A similar theme underlies Ptolemy's interpretation of the Johannine prologue in *AdvHaer* I viii,5 without careful description of the action of the Logos. *GTr* is oriented around the Biblical texts. The Logos which supports the pleroma's turn toward the Father is primarily the Logos associated with Jesus.

Logos Speculation in TriTrac

Logos speculation is secondary to other concerns in most Gnostic authors. Those concerned with philosophical distinctions find it useful to distinguish between the Logos associated with the highest God and the revealer. Ptolemy introduces a separate Logos in his

interpretation of the Johannine prologue. *GTr*, on the other hand, is content to begin with the identification assumed in the Fourth Gospel. *TriTrac* is quite different. Logos speculation is an integral part of the monistic system developed by the author. He has not simply taken the Sophia myth and transformed her into Logos.[21] This philosophical orientation distinguishes *TriTrac* from *GTr* and the latter's exegetical concerns. It may represent a deliberate reformulation of traditions similar to those employed in *GTr*, since there are striking similarities between the two writings. Both begin with expressions of thankfulness to the Father for revealing himself. Both present the problem of Gnosis as a problem of the necessary ignorance of the divine by lesser beings; not as a problem associated with the story of Sophia's fall. Both presuppose a monism in which the Father can be said to embrace all, though ignorance makes it impossible to perceive Him. Schoedel has shown that such a "topological theology" underlies the position held by the opponents of *AdvHaer* II.[22] Both use the analogy with dreaming to explain the cosmological ignorance of the Father.[23] Yet the differences between the two systems seem to rule out direct contact between the two writings. Their theologies of naming the Unknowable Father are quite different. *TriTrac* makes the Logos a lower aeon. He is not identified with the Son. Though *TriTrac* does incorporate material from the life of Jesus, it does so without the collage of allusions to both the gospels and epistels that characterizes *GTr*. Instead, its fundamental structure derives from philosophical exposition of the Gnostic story beginning with the unfolding of the pleroma and ending with the final dissolution of the material world.

TriTrac is a sophisticated example of Gnostic monism. Ignorance functions as a negative description for the condition of the lower aeons and as a positive evaluation of the situation of all beings in the face of a radically unknowable God. No names are appropriate to God. Yet they are provided so that both the aeons and humans can praise Him:

> It is not possible for anyone to conceive of (νοεῖν) Him or think of Him. Who can approach the Exalted One, the one who is properly said to pre-exist? But (ἀλλά) every name which is conceived (νοεῖν) or spoken about Him is produced for honor and as a trace (ἴχνος) of Him according to the ability of each one. [CG I 65,35–66,5]

Thus, ignorance is implied in divine transcendence, since names can never approach the reality which is God.

Ireneus' debate with Gnostics who hold such a theology may have been responsible for his modification of the Father-Son relationship. Justin exemplifies the usual position: the Father is transcendent; the Son is knowable.[24] Ireneus has the Father and Son share invisibility and visibility equally (*AdvHaer* IV xx,5–7). Though the Father remains invisible, He is seen and known by humanity. This self-revelation is necessary to the saving gift of eternal life:

> Just as those who see light are in light and share its brightness, so those who see God are in God, sharing His brightness. Now those who see God are in God, sharing His brightness. Now those who see God share life. And for this reason the one who is unlimited (ἀχώρητος), incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος) and invisible (ἀόρατος) made himself visible, comprehensible and limited to humans [Gk: the faithful] so that he might give life to those who grasp and see him [Gk: through faith]. For just as his greatness is inscrutable so his goodness (ἀγαθότης) is unintelligible, thanks to it He is visible and gives life to those who see him. Since it is impossible to live without life, the existence (ὕπαρξις; Lat: substantia) of life results from participation in God, and participation in God is to know God and to enjoy His kindness (χρηστότης). [*AdvHaer* IV xx,5].

Though *TriTrac* also agrees that the goodness of the Father is associated with his self-revelation, he would balk at the ease with which Ireneus speaks of the unintelligible becoming intelligible.

From the other side, Ireneus would have a difficult time pinning many of his charges against the Gnostic Logos Christology on *TriTrac*. It does not begin with misinterpretation of the Johannine prologue. It accepts Ireneus' argument against the topological theology of his opponents that the Father is then implicated in ignorance (*AdvHaer* II v,2) by explaining that ignorance is the condition of all beings before the Father.[25] At the same time, *TriTrac* does not employ language about inside and outside the pleroma, which had served as a focal point for Ireneus' objections. Throughout the writing, the author insists that the goodness of the Father is responsible for the structure and devolution of the cosmos. Even the unfolding of the lower aeons, which will come to an end with the material world, are not blamed on the failure of the Logos, since they originate from his attempt to know the Father. That action was one of love for God and quite in accord with His will (70,18–30). *TriTrac* never shies away from the implications of its monism. Even the evil parts of the material world can be indirectly attributed to the Father. They contribute to the overall order in the cosmos by controlling the extremities and evils of the material world (103,19–104,3).

The two part company over the extent to which knowledge of God can be attained. Ireneus argues against the Gnostics that the providential presence of God in creation implies an intuitive monotheism and even salvific calling on Him prior to the coming of Christ (*AdvHaer* II vi,1–2). *TriTrac* would never venture so far. The two are closer together in their assessment of the positive value of God's unknowability. It indicates the need for grace and inspires the love for God necessary to the economy of salvation (cf. *AdvHaer* IV xx,7). *TriTrac* gives several explanations of why even the aeons must be ignorant of the Father. Without such ignorance they would not perceive their dependence on Him:

> Therefore, they had the one job of seeking Him, for they knew (νοεῖν) that he existed, but they wished to find Him, the one who exists. But since the perfect Father is good (ἀγαθός), just as He did not hear them before they came to be in his mind and then also gave them existence, so he will give them the grace to know the one who is, that is, the one who knows himself eternally. [CG I 61,24–37]

> He enclosed it in those who first came forth from Him; not enviously (φθονός) but so that the aeons would not receive their faultlessness at first and not exalt themselves in glory up to the Father and not think they alone have this of themselves. But just as he willed to bring them into existence so they are to be faultless. When he willed to do so, he gave them perfect knowledge of his goodness toward them. [62,18–33]

> The whole order (σύστασις) of the aeons loves and longs for the completely perfect discovery of the Father, and this is their concord, which is free from offense. Although the Father reveals himself eternally, He did not wish that they would know Him, so he lets himself be known (νοεῖν) so as to be sought by concealing his inscrutable primordial being. [71,7–18]

Thus, *TriTrac* is careful to preserve the Unknowability of God at the same time that His goodness prompts self-revelation.

TriTrac provides interpretations of certain Christian doctrines, which Ireneus claims are threatened by Gnostic soteriology. The fall of Adam requires a savior to reverse the situation (107,19–108,13 where a fall into ignorance is retained, though ignorance has a more positive face in *TriTrac* than in other Gnostic writings), as savior, the Logos is incarnate, born of a virgin, and takes on the humanity and death of those he came to save (114,31–117,36; cp. *AdvHaer* III x,2; xi,1; xvi,1; xix,2). Further, OT prophets made true statements about the savior, though they were not able to recognize his true origin (111,6–112,33; cp. the discussion of OT prophecy and visions in relation to

the Word in *AdvHaer* IV xx,5 & 11). Ireneus' own account of the threefold powers of the Word culminates in judgement. The Word communicates invisible things through the intellect; through law it provides order among outward visible things, and will judge the world (*AdvHaer* V xviii,3). A similar scheme might be applied to the activity of the Logos in *TriTrac*, since it, too, concludes with the eschatological judgment of material creation. That judgment even includes an analogy to Ireneus' doctrine of the recapitulation of humanity in Christ, the image of God (*AdvHaer* V i–ii), when it describes the gathering of the Gnostic church to its head (118,29-35). However, *TriTrac* would never parallel the savior and Adam, since the savior's origin is different from that of the rest of humanity.

Despite the extensive overlap in theological topics between Ireneus and *TriTrac*, their images, arguments and hermeneutic principles are quite different. Ireneus does not seem to have provoked *TriTrac* as a response. Perhaps, both shared a common list of Christian theological topoi such as Van Unnik has suggested for *AdvHaer* I x.[26] The most striking difference between the two writers is found in their use of Biblical materials. At best, *TriTrac* has occasional allusions to the gospels and epistles. It certainly is not concerned to tie its account of the savior to the narrative elements of the life and teaching of Jesus, an important element in Ireneus' apologetics. There is also a philosophical disagreement between the two over the applicability of mental categories to understanding God. While *TriTrac* uses them, Ireneus rejects such an approach. He argues that it represents misapplication of categories that are really appropriate only to limited humans (*AdvHaer* II xxviii,4f).[27] The content of *TriTrac* is also sufficiently different from that of the Roman schools of Valentinianism, which seem to have been Ireneus' sources, to suggest that the two are not directly associated. It has a much more sophisticated theology of divine names than anything reflected in *AdvHaer*. It never mythologizes the aeons by presenting pairs of personified abstract terms. Nor is there any trace of the use of esoteric angel names which is another common feature of the Gnostic pleroma.[28]

TriTrac reflects an even more striking development in Christian theology. It clearly articulates a doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son from the Father. Origen is the first orthodox writer to express this point precisely (*De Prin* I ii,2; *ComIo* X 37:246). Daniélou points to *TriTrac* as evidence that he was not the first to reach this con-

clusion.[29] However, *TriTrac* achieves this understanding only by separating the Son and the Logos. The latter is organically related to the lower heavens, to the created world and to time. It takes on the divided character that middle Platonism often attributes to the Nous. The Logos contemplates the pleroma above and, through the Demiurge, is responsible for administering the lower world (98,21–104,3). The middle Platonic roots of this picture of divine governance become even clearer when *TriTrac* insists that the realm governed by the Logos and its images is also the realm of what is beautiful (90,31–91,5; 97,27–31).

The eternal generation of the Son follows this separation rather easily, since the Son is not involved in temporality. *TriTrac* was probably motivated to make the distinction as a consequence of its concern for divine transcendence. Its divine triad has no relation to the created order. When compared with other Gnostic accounts, this triad has another striking feature: it lacks a female figure, which is commonly part of the generation metaphors of such Gnostic accounts. Instead, *TriTrac* insists that the origin of the lower entities from the Logos is analogous to mental processes. Even the lowest aeons can be embraced by this process. They are the result of negative mental states (97,27–98,7). *TriTrac* seems to presume the following ordering of the visible world:

Heaven, fixed stars – Logos
Planets, unstable – lower aeons derived from the Logos
Lunar (sublunar) realm – Demiurge

It is unusual in comparison with other Gnostic systems in keeping both the Logos and the World Soul.[30] Also, the Demiurge is not demonic but – subject to the guidance of the Logos – provides the necessary order and continuity for the material world with the lower aeons.

TriTrac's concerns for divine transcendence, for integration of all levels of being, and for a realm of the beautiful all suggest the influence of philosophical traditions rather than an attempt to integrate the Logos of the Johannine prologue into a Gnostic system. Another indication of the author's apologetic focus may be found in the purpose ascribed to Christian revelation. Pagans are to be converted from their gods and philosophies to Christian gnosis (133,16–25). It seems likely that *TriTrac* comes from a school of Christian Gnostics whose primary interest is intellectual respectability among educated pagans. They do not seem concerned to debate other Christians.[31]

Platonic "Dogmatism" in TriTrac

A number of common topoi that appear to have been part of middle Platonic speculation recur in *TriTrac*. Albinus' *Didaskalikos* (*Didask*) provides a typical summary.[32] Albinus' work evidences a well-developed tradition of negative theology. The transcendent One rests turned in upon itself. It cannot be described because it has no relation to the perceptible world (*Didask* X,1). The One is the cause of a second God who is turned in two directions (X,2). It is an active demiurgic principle which both contemplates the One and serves as the rational principle which awakens and enlightens the World Soul.[33] We have already seen that *TriTrac* employs a slightly different arrangement of principles. Transcendent Father and Son are above the Logos, which has the dual function here attributed to the second God.

A striking feature in Albinus' account of negative theology is its almost hymnic listing of divine attributes with explanatory glosses, a process even more extensively carried out in *TriTrac* (*Didask* X 3 & cp. CG I 52,6–53,38). *Didask* gives no indication of the function of such catalogues,[34] but *TriTrac* is quite explicit about the use of such names of God. They are to serve as praise for the Unknowable Father (66,1–5). These formulations of divine attributes belong to a more extensive treatment of naming God in both writings. Albinus points out that such names do not define God but are formulated by the appropriate application of negation, analogy and anagogy (X:164,31–165,7). *TriTrac* does not use such a philosophical distinction about the formation of divine names. Instead, it relies upon the necessity of naming for divine worship to justify the practice of naming God. This choice reflects the religious context in which its formulaic traditions of divine names were used. However, *TriTrac* is quite aware of the philosophical discussion of the appropriateness of certain names. A section of Albinus' list culminates in the description of God as Father:

> He is good (ἀγαθός) because as far as possible he benefits all things, since he is the cause (αἴτιος) of all good.
>
> Beautiful (καλὸς) because by his nature he is perfect and well proportioned.
>
> Truth (ἀλήθεια) because he is the source (ἀρχή) of all Truth as the sun is of light.
>
> Father in being the cause of the Universe (παντά) both ordering the heavenly Mind and the World Soul toward himself and his thoughts. According to his will, he fills

> all things with himself, lifting up the World Soul and turning it toward himself, since he is the cause of its mind, which, when it has been set in order by the Father, orders all nature in this world.[35]

TriTrac begins meditation on the incomprehensibility of God with the assertion that only God is properly called Father, since He is the only one who begets without having been begotten by another:

> Yet he [one who has his origin from another] is not a father in the proper sense; nor a god, because there is someone who begot him and created him. Properly speaking, the only Father and God is the one whom no one else begot. Rather, He begot and created the Universe. [51,38–52,6]

Thus, *TriTrac* would seem to have derived some of its material on the appropriateness of divine names from the Platonic traditions of the second century.

Such philosophic concerns may be responsible for its modification of the Gnostic cosmos from three to four principles. The Unknown Father and the Son belong entirely to the world of the pleroma while the world of the heavens, the beautiful and the visible is under the dual administration of the Logos and the World Soul. This latter combination is close to the interaction of Mind-World Soul in Albinus.[36] However, Albinus' middle Platonic topoi do not furnish a complete parallel, since they do not engage in Logos speculation.[37] That appears in much more limited circles of Alexandrian Platonism where the primary examples are Philo and later Christian writers.[38]

TriTrac and Alexandrian Logos Speculation

Our examples of second century Logos speculation can all be tied to Alexandria. Philo's use of Logos points to equally active sources of Logos speculation in the first century. It may derive from the first century B.C. teacher, Eudorus, whose neo-pythagorean formulations are also typical of later examples of the tradition.[39] Eudorus evidences a One-Dyad division that would be typical of latter reflection. The One, which transcends all attributes, is the cause of all things. At the second level of reality, the Monad (form, limit) works on the unlimited Dyad (matter) to produce the ideas, which as *logoi* or simply as Logos create the material world. Philo's discussion of the Logos presupposes such a combination of Platonic and Pythagorean motifs.[40] A later witness to the continued use of such traditions is Plutarch. He probably learned them from his Alexandrian teacher Ammonius.[41]

This tradition was just as concerned about the transcendence of God. No words are properly used to describe Him (Philo, *Leg. Gaius* 6). God as the totality of ideas is the *paradeigma* of all that is *kalos*, especially that human virtue grounded in contemplation of the divine (Plutarch, *De Sera* 550D). While *TriTrac* continues the tradition of God's transcendence, it objects to the *paradeigma* connection between God and the world of the beautiful or theoretic virtue. *TriTrac* explicitly denies that the Father has any *paradeigma* (53,27-29).

Another element of the tradition derives from the commonplaces of Platonic exegesis: two powers are over the material world (*dynamis*, Philo; *arche*, Plutarch). The power on the right looks above; that on the left is somewhat responsible for the disorder below, though it also keeps disorder in check through force and punishment. They are unified by a third power between them. In Philo, the Logos rules God's merciful or creative power and His punitive or royal one (cf. *Cher* xxvii-xxix; *Q.E.* II, 68). Plutarch uses the right and left powers in his exegesis of the dualistic figures in mythology. Both he and Philo relate this division of powers to the governance of the material world. This tradition appears in *TriTrac*. The right and left powers are brought together by Thought, which is set between them (108,13–109,5). *TriTrac* contrasts this explanation of order in the cosmos with false philosophies which hold to a single principle (109,5–21).

We also find this tradition providing an anthropological correlation for the powers. They are associated with types of soul or spiritual attainment. In *TriTrac*, the Logos, corresponds with the Gnostic, the right with the psychic, and the left with the hylic. The final group is not capable of salvation. Philo presents a threefold ranking of souls dependent upon their level of perception of the divine. The most gifted attain to God Himself because they gain wisdom from the divine Logos. Those who are less able attain love for the creator because they are able to recognize Him as the source of their being. The lowest type falls under the kingly power. Its piety is projected onto the created order and is maintained through fear of divine punishment. Though such souls cannot attain the principal gifts of God, still they can avoid evil (*Fug* 97–105; *Abr* 120–130). The lowest type of soul may not be completely lost, but its relationship to the divine is qualitatively different from that of the other two. Plutarch may have known a version of the anthropological correlation which came even closer to the Gnostic position. His dialogue *On the Daimon of Socrates* focuses

on a mythic vision of the order of the cosmos. The soul is presented as a combination of an external daimon tied to an irrational soul and lowest class of soul is so completely absorbed in the body as to be "alogos". Such souls may even be said to be without a daimon. Others have that part of the soul commonly called the *nous* riding above the soul-body like a buoy. The highest type are like the fixed stars. They ride quietly over well-ordered souls. The middle group, on the other hand, have difficulty controlling their souls. They describe uneven, spiral courses (like the planets?). Clearly the lowest group has no attachment to the heavenly world at all (*Daim.Soc.* 591D–592B). The Gnostic would easily take hylic soul, which will perish along with the material world. It appears, then, that *TriTrac* derives its anthropological correlation from this tradition of Alexandrian Platonism.[42]

Both Philo and Plutarch make it clear that cosmological principles such as the Dyad were used to interpret religious texts. *TriTrac* seems to be engaging in the same type of exegesis over against earlier Gnostic myths. It makes the dual nature of the Logos the explanation for the warring divisions between the lower aeons (77,25–80,19; 83,11–85,15). Plutarch uses a similar connection between the divided nature of the Logos and warring *eikones* in his exegesis of the Isis myth (*IsOsir* 373AB). It was probably a set topos in the mythological tradition. However, the same section of Plutarch contains another topos, which *TriTrac* does not pick up, though it would have been congenial to most Gnostic speculation, identification of the Dyad and Sophia.[43] Plutarch associates the Unlimited Dyad with Isis (*IsOsir* 372E). Philo identifies the Dyad with Sophia (*Som* ii,70; *SpecLeg* iii,180). *TriTrac*'s cosmology avoids such female figures. The author holds that there is no independent principle of matter, which is what the Dyad represents. He thus rejects several principles common to most cosmological systems: God does not have any *paradeigma* from which He creates; there is no independent principle of matter, and – contrary to the usual presentations of Logos/Sophia – does not have a co-worker (53,31–37). *TriTrac* rejects all such opinions as ignorant. Once again, this selection of principles correlates with his commitment to an unwavering monism with regard to the radical transcendence of God. His Logos is not a simple conversion of the Sophia of Gnostic myth, since he has rejected the fundamental correlation between the Dyad and matter that the philosophical tradition used to understand such female figures. Perhaps, the very revisions of the topoi of Platonic exegesis belong to

the proof of the author's apologetic project. Only Christian Gnosis can provide the proper understanding of the principles of the universe.

Conclusion

The second century Valentinian teachers in Rome seem to have conducted Christian schools much as their orthodox counterparts did. Both Ptolemy and Valentinus enjoyed high regard among Roman Christians.[44] Though *TriTrac* does not preserve the name of a particular Gnostic teacher, it too would seem to be the product of such a school. Yet the Logos speculation of this writing is quite different from the emphasis on exegesis of the Johannine prologue that seems to have been characteristic of Roman Valentinians. Since the author's philosophic background belongs to traditions of Logos speculation that were fostered by Alexandrian teachers, we suggest that *TriTrac* represents a school of Alexandrian Gnostics. Unlike elements of Logos Christology which are adopted in other Gnostic writings because of their Christian associations, the Logos speculation in *TriTrac* serves an apologetic aimed at pagans, not at other Christians. Gnosis is the only way in which a person can come to a fundamentally sound view of the cosmos. Further, the revealing activity of the Logos through the Gnostic savior provides the only true knowledge and worship of the Unknowable Father.

NOTES

[1] C. Colpe, 'New Testament and Gnostic Christology', *Religious in Antiquity. Festschrift E. R. Goodenough*, ed. J. Neusner, (Leiden 1968) 227–43.

[2] See E. Pagels, *The Johannine Gospel in Gnostic Exegesis*, (Nashville 1973) 20–50.

[3] A. H. Armstrong, 'Gnosis and Greek Philosophy', *Gnosis. Festschrift H. Jonas*, ed. B. Aland, (Göttingen 1978) 87–124.

[4] *AdvHaer* I viii,5–ix,4. Pagels follows Ireneus' view, though she insists that Gnostics are less perverse than Ireneus suggests, since their exegesis to gradations in being. *AdvHaer* I ix,4 has caught onto an important principle of Gnostic exegesis, collection of texts around a theme independent of context. We find other examples in which references to the Logos or the Johannine prologue are simply part of the collection. The account of the Peratae (*Ref.* V 12,1–17,13; Pagels:22f) grafts the Logos onto a collection of astrological speculation about the motion of the heavens. The Naassenes (*Ref.* V 6,5–11,1) are simply collecting mythic figures. Neither collection (pace Pagels) is concerned with exegesis of the Johannine prologue per se. Such collections are a typical feature of the impact of literacy on religious traditions. Ireneus' insistance upon order and context within Scripture represents an advance to quite a different order of

intellectual abstraction, see my *The Gnostic Dialogue*, (New York 1980) 196–201. Ptolemy's exegesis is based on a philosophical objection: the Logos which emanates from the highest God cannot be identified with that involved in creation or redemption. Therefore, he seeks to allocate the verses of the prologue to the different Logoi (also see Pagels, 43). Ireneus' strongest counter-argument is that the general understanding of the prologue has it refer to only one Logos.

[5] See the protest against Gnostic refusal to make such an identification in *AdvHaer* I ix,3.

[6] We are excluding the Hermetic writings, as they would require a separate study of the use of Logos in the Corpus Hermeticum. Their Logos speculation may well be an independent elaboration of Alexandrian Logos traditions.

[7] See our discussion of this writing, On the Origin of the World (CG II,5): A Gnostic Physics, *VigChr* 34 (1980) 36–46.

[8] The extensive parallels to *ApocryJn* and *GEgypt* in Y. Janssens' commentary, Le Codex XIII de Nag Hammadi, *Muséon* 87 (1974) 341–413, make it clear that *TriProt* belongs to the same tradition. R. McL. Wilson, 'The Trimorphic Protennoia', in *Gnosis and Gnosticism* (NHS VIII) ed. M. Krause, (Leiden 1977) 50–54, argues that *TriProt* is dependent upon the Fourth Gospel and is not an indication of Gnostic tradition that influenced *John*.

[9] CG IV 59,20–60,22. See A. Böhlig and F. Wisse, *Nag Hammadi Codices III,2 and IV,2. The Gospel of the Egyptians* (NHS IV), (Leiden 1975) 175. They point out that the phrase "son of the great Christ" is probably an interpolation. The relationship presented is that between Sigē and Logos.

[10] See the parallels to *3StSeth* in Janssens, *op. cit.*

[11] Janssens, *op. cit.*, 405.

[12] Jn 1:14; See Janssens, *op. cit.*, 409; Wilson, *op. cit.*, 53f.

[13] The I AM summons of the Mother is tied to the call of awakening in the Gnostic baptismal liturgy, CG XIII 45,2–20.

[14] See J. Daniélou, *Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture*, trans. J.A. Baker, (Philadelphia 1973) 364. Logos speculation is also fairly restricted among Platonists of the period. See the discussion of Philo in H.J. Kramer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, (Amsterdam 1964) 264–81.

[15] Pagels, *op. cit.*, 47–50.

[16] See G.C. Stead, The Valentinian Myth of Sophia, *JTS* 20 (1969) 77. He argues that one should not read the elaborate Valentinian Sophia myth from other sources into *GTr*.

[17] J.E. Ménard, *L'Évangile de Vérité* (NHS II), (Leiden 1972) 72.

[18] See Ménard, *op. cit.*, 3–8.

[19] *Ibid.*, 180f.

[20] *Ibid.*, 117f.

[21] Contrary to Zandee's view in R. Kasser, M. Malinine et al., *Tractatus Tripartitus: Pars 1: De Supernis; Pars 2: De Creatione Hominis; Pars 3: De Generibus Tribus* (Bern 1973/1975) 1, pp. 44–47. Zandee even goes so far as to use Sophia in his title to the section on the Logos in the lower world.

[22] W.R. Schoedel, Topological Theology and Some Monistic Tendencies in Gnosticism, in *Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of Alexander Böhlig* (NHS III), ed. M. Krause (Leiden 1972) 88–108.

[23] See the discussion of *GTr* CG I 28,10–30,26 in my Gnosis as Salvation – A Phenomenological Inquiry, *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II, 22, ed. W. Haase, forthcoming. Both *GTr* and *TriTrac* use this analogy to explain why the Father is not known though he is present everywhere. Ireneus grounds a "natural" knowledge of God in this mode of divine presence.

[24] Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 357–60.

[25] Zandee, *Tractatus*, 38, points out that *TriTrac* takes the Father's involvement in ignorance more seriously than any other Gnostic writing.

[26] W. C. Van Unnik, A Document of Second Century Theological Discussion (A.H. I 10.3), *VigChr* 31(1977) 196–228.

[27] Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 357, criticizes Ireneus for being too biblicistic and not appreciating the necessary transition to theological reflection.

[28] Perhaps the praise of the prophets for speaking from the truth and not from imagination, analogy or human thinking (CG I 111,10–13) is a criticism of earlier Gnostic Biblical interpretation.

[29] Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 376–78.

[30] See Kramer, *op. cit.*, 241. The usual pattern is Planets-Demiurge; Moon and Sublunar Realm-Demons. Kramer notes that Philo's transcendent and immanent Logoi seem to have replaced the usual Nous and World Soul. He suggests that this transition represents a neo-pythagorean stoicizing of Platonic doctrine typical of the period, *op. cit.*, 276–78.

[31] This apologetic project might be similar in tone to that of Clement of Alexandria and appeal to some audience. Much of the teaching of Platonism in this period seems to have taken place in groups that gathered around private teachers. Second century Platonism was particularly indebted to the efforts of teachers from Asia Minor, so J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978) 134–143. Second century Gnostic teachers at Rome fit this mould, see G. Lüdemann, Zur Geschichte des ältesten Christentums in Rom I. Valentin und Marcion; II. Prolemäus und Justin, *ZNW* 70(1979) 86–114. There seems to be an important axis of development between Rome and Alexandria that underlies the development of Neo-platonism in those centers prior to its appearance in Athens, Glucker, *op. cit.*, 225. *TriTrac* seems to represent the Alexandrian end of the development of Valentinian schools. It seems to this author that the deliberate use of Platonic traditions distinguishes *TriTrac* from the exegesis of Heracleon, which aims to show orthodox Christianity to be merely the "psychic" interpretation of Scripture. The positive attitude toward the "psychic Christians" seems to be typical of Alexandrian gnostic teachers. For a defense of the view that *TriTrac* stems from Heracleon or his school see H.-Ch. Puech & G. Quispel, Le Quatrième Écrit Gnostique du Codex Jung, *VC* 9 (1955) 65–102.

[32] See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 283, on the *Didask* as a compendium of Platonism.

[33] See the translation and comments of A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* IV, (Paris 1954) 95–102.

[34] Dillon, *op. cit.*, 283, suggests that the hymnic character of this list be compared to Hermetic liturgy.

[35] *Didask* X 3:164,27. Translation from text in J. C. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* vol. III (Leiden 1973) 403, sec. 1327d.

[36] See the discussion in Dillon, *op. cit.*, 283f., who argues that the passage refers to two separate entities below the Father.

[37] Ibid., 284f., and Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 365.

[38] See the discussion of Logos theology in Kramer, *op. cit.*, 264–92. Most of his treatment is taken up with Philo. The discussion of Christian writers should distinguish between Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who develop the Alexandrian Logos speculation, and the Apologists, who do not seem to have been influenced by it.

[39] Glucker, *op. cit.*, 122, argues vigorously against the idea that Eudorus headed a formally established school at Alexandria. He considers him simply a private teacher; also see Dillon, *op. cit.*, 127f.

[40] Dillon, *op. cit.*, 128f.

[41] Glucker, *op. cit.*, 124–34, though we would be less ready than Glucker to suppose that Plutarch knows Philo.

[42] *TriTrac* also uses a Gnostic interpretation of the dual creation of Adam in Genesis that is widely considered to be dependent upon traditions of Genesis exegesis employed by Philo (CG I 104,31–105,10).

[43] See Kramer, *op. cit.*, 238–61.

[44] See the evidence in Lüdemann, *op. cit.* The debate over the incarnation of the Logos reflected in Tertullian *De carne Christi* xviii-xix suggests that Valentinian teachers in Carthage had made an attempt to provide an anthropological explanation of the "incarnate Christ" which is much more elaborate than that presented in *TriTrac* and may represent a further development of such speculation in Valentinian circles. Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to consult the discussions of the Valentinian tradition from the Yale Conference, B. Layton ed., *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism. Vol. I: The School of Valentinus* (Sup. Num. 41; Leiden 1980).

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DAS MANICHAEISCHE BEMAFEST UND DAS PASSAFEST DER SYRISCHEN CHRISTEN

VON

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In der Erforschung der Lehre Manis und der Manichäer ist schon öfters auf die möglichen christlichen Wurzeln bestimmter Aspekte dieser Religion hingewiesen worden.[1] Man war dabei selbstverständlich vor allem an denjenigen Gruppen interessiert, mit denen Mani und die ersten Manichäer besonders bekannt gewesen sein müssen: den in Syrien, Mesopotamien und Babylonien Beheimateten.[2]

In diesem Zusammenhang möchte ich auf ein Thema eingehen, das dann und wann wohl berührt, aber nie systematisch untersucht worden ist: das Verhältnis zwischen dem manichäischen Bemafest und dem christlichen Osterfest.[3]

Es hat natürlich keinen Zweck, dabei über das christliche Osterfest im Allgemeinen zu reden. Man wird die Unterschiede zwischen den Traditionen der verschiedenen christlichen Gruppen und Strömungen beachten müssen.

Nun gibt es einige besonders interessante Texte die uns über die Osterfeier gerade der Christen Syriens und Mesopotamiens informieren können. Gemeint sind vor allem das einundzwanzigste Kapitel der Didaskalia,[4] die zwölfte Demonstratio von Aphraates[5] und Ephraems Hymnen über das Passa.[6]

Im Folgenden werden wir uns zunächst mit diesen christlichen Dokumenten befassen. Im zweiten Teil unserer Untersuchung werden wir uns dann dem manichäischen Fest zuwenden um zu sehen in wieweit die Osterfeier der syrischen Christen das Bema in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lässt.

I

Schon oft hat man versucht, die Passafeier der Quartodezimaner dem Inhalt nach von der Ostersonntagsfeier zu unterscheiden. Die erste wäre dem Gedächtnis des Todes Jesu gewidmet und die zweite der

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Auferstehung.[7] In diesem Sinne hat A. Baumstark[8] einen Unterschied zwischen einem „Pascha staurosimon" und einem „Pascha anastasimon" gemacht.

Diese These ist stark angegriffen worden. Namentlich hat B. Botte[9] nachgewiesen, dass die beiden von Baumstark benutzten griechischen Ausdrücke nirgendwo in Mignes Patrologia Graeca vorkommen. Er hat sogar entdeckt, dass sie von einem holländischen Gelehrten des 17. Jahrhunderts erfunden worden sind. Trotzdem scheinen einige syrische Texte, mit denen er als Orientalist gut bekannt war, Baumstark wenigstens teilweise Recht zu geben.

In seiner zwölften Demonstratio, die vom christlichen Passafest handelt, bezeichnet Aphraates dieses Fest als »*peṣḥā dᵉ-ḥaššā dᵉ-māran*« (das Passa des Leidens unseres Herrn).[10] Fast derselbe Ausdruck findet sich in Ephraems elften Hymnus *De Epiphania*: »*peṣḥā dᵉ-ḥaššā rabbā*« (das grosse Passa des Leidens).[11] Man muss doch zugestehen, dass diese Bezeichnungen dem »Pascha staurosimon« sehr nahe kommen.

Es geht dabei nicht nur um Worte. Es ist nämlich bezeichnend, dass bei den genannten Autoren das Leiden und der Tod Jesu einen viel zentraleren Platz beim Passafest einnehmen als die Auferstehung oder das leere Grab. Schon Baumstark hat darauf hingewiesen, dass es unter Ephraems Passahymnen keinen gibt, der exklusiv der Auferstehung gewidmet ist.[12] Dieses lässt sich kaum dadurch erklären, dass in den Handschriften gerade die Blätter mit den Hymnen für den Ostersonntag, verlorengegangen wären. Es ist viel wahrscheinlicher, dass Ephraem überhaupt nie für einen Ostersonntag Auferstehungshymnen geschrieben hat. Ausserdem kann man aus einer präzisen Analyse der zwölften Demonstratio von Aphraates ableiten, dass die persischen Christen irgendwann einmal, wahrscheinlich vor dem nicaenischen Konzil, Quartodezimmer gewesen sind, an einem bestimmten Moment ihr Passafest vom 14. Nisan auf den Freitag nach diesem Datum verlegt haben und dass erst dann bei ihnen die Karwoche entstanden ist, die mit einem der Auferstehung gewidmeten Ostersonntag abgeschlossen wurde.[13] Dies nun könnte auch die Passahymnen Ephraems in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lassen. Zeigen diese nicht die Spuren einer quartodezimanischen Vergangenheit der syrischen Kirchen?

Diese Vermutung wird bestätigt durch einen Vergleich der Passatheologie von Aphraates und Ephraem mit der die sich in der Homilie des Quartodezimaners Melito[14] befindet und in einer Predigt,[15] deren

Autor bis jetzt unbekannt ist, die aber auffallende Uebereinstimmungen mit dem Text Melitos zeigt, und für welche man einen quartodezimanischen Hintergrund vermutet hat.[16] Was die Passatheologie betrifft stimmen Aphraates[17] und Ephraem und die beiden genannten quartodezimanischen Texte im Wesentlichen miteinander überein: alle vier handeln vor allem von der Passion und dem Tode, und nur nebenbei von der Auferstehung Christi.

In diesen Schriften geht man von der Symbolik des jüdischen Festes aus, die typologisch-christlich interpretiert wird. Den Mittelpunkt bilden Exodus 12 und das Passalamm, das als ein Typos Christi, des neuen und wahren Passalammes, gilt.[18] Insoweit steht das Leiden eher im Zentrum als die Auferstehung. Andererseits ist das Passa nicht nur ein Tag der Trauer, weil das Leiden Christi einen Sieg über die Sünde, den Satan und den Tod bedeutet. Die Christen werden nicht mehr aus dem Land Aegypten, sondern aus der Lage, die seit dem Fall Adams eingetreten ist, erlöst. Die Erlösung gilt nicht nur für ein Volk, sondern für die ganze Menschheit, die von der Gewalt des Satans und des Todes tyrannisiert wird. Das Aegypten, aus dem die Menschheit erlöst werden muss, ist irgendwie die Erde, aber vor allem die Scheol, das Totenreich, das sich unter der Erde befindet. Erlöst werden heisst bis zum Paradies emporsteigen, woraus der erste Mensch, wörtlich genommen, »gefallen« ist. Darum steigt Gott, um den Menschen zu befreien, bis auf die Erde hinab und sogar bis in das Totenreich. Dort findet er den gefallenen Adam, den er, durch die Himmelfahrt,[19] emporführt bis ins Paradies, seine alte Heimat. So tritt die Himmelfahrt an die Stelle des Auszuges aus Aegypten. Man könnte diese Himmelfahrt sogar einen »vertikalen Exodus« nennen, aus dem Totenreich bis ins Paradies. Und vor allem, die Auferstehung spielt der Höllen- und Himmelfahrt gegenüber fast eine untergeordnete Rolle. Sie ist nur eine Durchgangsphase während der Himmelfahrt.

Die oben geschilderte Passatheologie, die das jüdische Passa christlich interpretiert und die Passion Christi, des wahren Passalammes, vom jüdischen Fest her versteht, passt besonders gut mit einer quartodezimanischen Praxis, die sich ja für das Datum gerade völlig auf das jüdische Passa stützt, zusammen. Wenn sich diese Theologie nun auch bei Aphraates und Ephraem findet, liegt dann die Schlussfolgerung nicht nahe, dass auch bei ihnen wenigstens Spuren einer quartodezimanischen Passafeier vorhanden sind? Auf alle Fälle findet sich bei ihnen ein »Leidenspassa«, in dem die Passion und der Tod – und

daneben auch die Höllen- und die Himmelfahrt – stärker betont werden als die Auferstehung.

Wir möchten noch auf einen weiteren Aspekt des alten syrischen (quartodezimanischen) Passafestes aufmerksam machen. Vom Anfang an muss zur christlichen Passafeier ein Fasten gehört haben, dessen älteste Form wahrscheinlich im 70. Kapitel des Buches *Adversus Haereses* von Epiphanius beschrieben wird,[20] wo dieser sich mit den Audianern auseinandersetzt. Diese berufen sich für ihre Passafeier auf ein Dokument, das als »Diataxis der Apostel« bezeichnet wird. Darin steht, dass die Christen trauern und fasten sollen, wenn die Juden ihr Passamahl sich »wohl schmecken lassen« und dass sie es sich »wohl schmecken lassen« sollen, wenn die Juden trauern, indem sie das ungesäuerte Brot mit den bitteren Kräutern essen.[21] Mit der „Diataxis" kann nur die aus Syrien stammende Didaskalia gemeint sein, aber es muss sich um einen älteren Text dieses Dokumentes handeln, der noch nicht so sehr umgearbeitet und den liturgischen Entwicklungen angepasst war wie der uns bekannte.[22] Aus dem von Epiphanius überlieferten Zitat kann man folgern, dass die Christen während des Passamahles der Juden fasteten, und assen, d.h. eine Agape und eine Eucharistie feierten, wenn das Mahl der Juden zu Ende war.

Das Fasten der Christen während des jüdischen Passa wird schliesslich im Diataxiszitat auch noch begründet. Die Christen trauerten während der Feier der Juden, weil diese, am Tage ihres Festes, den Christus gekreuzigt hätten.

All dieses nun stimmt mit dem überein was wir in einigen Strophen von Ephraems fünften Hymnus *De Ieiunio*[23] lesen, wo der Dichter die Gläubigen dazu einlädt, beim Fasten daran zu denken was die „Toren", d.h. die Juden, während ihres Fastens getan hätten. Sie hätten nämlich am Passafest den Herrn des Passa getötet.

Genauso wie aus dem Diataxiszitat ergibt sich aus dieser ephraemischen Stelle, dass irgendwann die syrischen Christen am 14. Nisan eine Art Protestfasten gehalten haben, das Teil ihrer eigenen, christlichen Passafeier war.

II

Das Vorhergehende wirft ein neues Licht auf einige Aspekte des manichäischen Bemafestes.

Es gibt einen manichäischen Text, einen parthischen Kreuzigungshymnus,[24] der darauf hinzuweisen scheint, dass eine alte quartodezi-

manische syrische Passafeier bei den Manichäern Spuren hinterlassen hat. Nach diesem Hymnus nämlich ist Jesus, der Gottessohn, am vierzehnten des Monats Mihr „ins Parinirvana eingegangen". Bei diesem Datum muss der Monatsname aus einem syrischen Original mitübersetzt worden sein, der höchstwahrscheinlich einmal „14. Nisan" gelautet hat. Ist es nun nicht merkwürdig dass die Manichäer das Datum des 14. Nisan kannten? Ueberdies denkt man bei dem „ins Parinirvana eingehen" sofort an eine Art Himmelfahrt. Aber dann ist es doch sehr bemerkenswert, dass sie auf den 14. Nisan gesetzt wird! Könnte dies nicht darauf hinweisen, dass im Hintergrund ein christliches quartodezimanisches Passa steht, an dem unter anderm auch der Himmelfahrt gedacht wurde?[25]

Vor allem aber ist es für den Vergleich mit dem Bemafest interessant, dass im alten syrischen Passafest das Leiden und der Tod Christi im Mittelpunkt standen.

Bekanntlich wurde am Bemafest der Märtyrertod Manis kommemoriert. Nach Augustinus konkurrierte[26] das Bema bei den Manichäern sogar mit dem Passa, weil für die Manichäer Christus nur dem Scheine nach gelitten hatte. Darum, so behauptet der Kirchenvater, gedachten sie stattdessen des Todes Manis, der wohl wirklich gelitten hatte und gestorben war.

Die Behauptung des Kirchenvaters stimmt mit den koptischen Bemapsalmen überein,[27] die einige Stellen enthalten, wo in der Beschreibung der Passion Manis dieser die Züge Christi trägt. Die Magier, die Mörder Manis, werden ausdrücklich mit den Juden verglichen und sogar ihre „Brüder" genannt.[28] Am auffälligsten ist, dass von einem „Kreuz" und von „kreuzigen"[29] gesprochen wird, während Mani doch bekanntlich nicht am Kreuz gestorben ist.[30]

Bestätigen diese, im allgemeinen doch zuverlässige,[31] koptische Texte nicht, was Augustinus behauptet, dass nämlich für die Manichäer das Bema eine Art manichäisches Passa war, welcher statt der Passion Christi des Leidens und des Todes Manis gedachte? Unsererseits könnten wir nun hinzufügen, dass dies alles besonders verständlich wird, wenn man bedenkt, dass im persischen Reich, wo die ersten manichäischen Gemeinden lebten, und wo also wahrscheinlich auch das Bemafest entstanden ist, im christlichen Passa vor allem das Leiden im Mittelpunkt stand.

In diesem Zusammenhang sind wir gezwungen, einige kritische Bemerkungen zu der jüngsten Veröffentlichung zu machen, die vom

Bema handelt. Dort versucht der Autor, J. Ries,[32] drei unterschiedliche Phasen in der Entwicklung des manichäischen Festes zu zeigen.[33] 1) Das Bema als Tag der Sündenvergebung gehe auf den Gründer des Manichäismus selber zurück. 2) Nach seinem Tode sei schon bald, sowohl bei den westlichen wie auch bei den östlichen Manichäern, seiner Passion gedacht worden. Am Anfang sei man dabei vor allem historisch interessiert gewesen. 3) Später seien diese historischen Traditionen theologisch ausgearbeitet und „paschal" und „gnostisch" gefärbt worden. Die „commémoration de la Passion" sei so eine „célébration pascale de la Gnose" geworden.[34]

Während das Gedächtnis der Passion Manis auf die ersten Manichäer des persischen Reiches zurückgehe, habe die „paschale Gnosisfeier" ihren Ursprung in der missionären Aktivität in Aegypten, wobei die Manichäer versucht hätten zu beweisen, dass sie, und nicht die grosskirchlichen Christen, die wahre Kirche Iesu seien.[35]

Die Argumentation von Ries enthält einige Schwächen und ist nicht überzeugend. Erstens vernachlässigt er völlig die nicht-westlichen Quellen.[36] Wir werden sehen, dass sich auch darin Reminiszenzen an ein christliches Passafest befinden. Und diese können doch wohl schwerlich auf die ägyptischen Manichäer zurückgeführt werden.

Zweitens, bei dem Leidenspassa der syrischen christlichen Kirchen kann man keinen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen „historisch" und „paschal" machen, weil das Objekt des Festes das vom jüdischen Passa her verstandene historische Ereignis des Leidens Christi ist, oder, so man will, das vom Leiden Christi her typologisch aufgefasste jüdische Passa.

Ist es darum nicht wahrscheinlicher, dass sofort nach dem Tode Manis, der in der Zeit des christlichen Passas stattfand, schon in Persien von den Manichäern das Bema gefeiert wurde als ein manichäisiertes christliches Passafest, wobei statt der Passion Christi das Leiden und der Tod Manis ins Zentrum gerückt wurden?

Diese Hypothese wird dadurch bestätigt, dass in den manichäischen Quellen, die vom Bemafest handeln, auch in den nicht-westlichen, andere Reminiszenzen an das christliche Passafest zu finden sind:
1. Wie beim christlichen Fest bildet auch beim Bema das „Wachen" einen wesentlichen Bestandteil der Feier.[37]
2. Besonders interessant ist die Rolle, die das Fasten vor und während des Bemafestes spielt.

Die koptischen Bemapsalmen sprechen ausdrücklich vom Fasten.[38] Die dritte koptische Homilie[39] spricht im Zusammenhang mit dem Bemafest vom Fasten der „Sekten". Obschon der Text nur sehr bruchstückhaft ist, geht daraus klar hervor, dass das Fasten der Manichäer dem der Sekten gegenüber gestellt wird. Wenn mit den „Sekten" die Juden gemeint sind, dann muss man automatisch an die angeführten christlichen Texte denken, in denen das Fasten der Juden kritisiert wurde. Wenn es um die Christen geht, dann ist aus der christlichen Kritik an Juden eine manichäische an Christen geworden! Wie dem auch sei, man begegnet hier einem Aspekt der christlichen Passatradition.

Besonders interessante Auskünfte liefern uns einige spätere Texte, Al-Nadims *Kitab al-Fihrist*,[40] und einige Bruchstücke sogdischer Kalender.[41] Aus diesen deutlichen nicht-westlichen Quellen ergibt sich, dass das Datum des Bema praktisch nicht unabhängig von dem vorangehenden Fasten von dreissig Tagen gesehen werden kann, das von dem Tage an, da Mani verhaftet wurde, gezählt wird. Nach sechsundzwanzig Tagen wird zwei Tage lang besonders streng gefastet, um des Todes Manis zu gedenken. Am Ende des Monats wird dann das Bema gefeiert.[42]

Wo findet man sonst einen solchen Zusammenhang zwischen Fasten und Gedächtnis des Leidens und des Todes als in der christlichen Passatradition? Obwohl nicht alle Schichten des einundzwanzigsten Kapitels der Didaskalia gleich alt sind und man darum dieses Dokument nur mit Vorsicht benutzen kann, möchten wir doch auf eine Tradition in diesem Kapitel hinweisen, wonach die Christen während des Passas von dem Zeitpunkt an, da Christus verhaftet wurde, fasten müssen.

3. W. Henning glaubt in einem auf Parthisch, Sogdisch und Mittelpersisch abgefassten Fragment eine Liturgie zum Bema[43] erkannt zu haben, in dem am Ende ein Mahl gehalten wird. Hennings Interpretation scheint umstritten zu sein.[44] Aber auch aus einer von A. von Le Coq veröffentlichten Miniatur aus Turfan[45] scheint sich zu ergeben, dass zur Bemafeier unter anderm ein Mahl gehörte. Auf dieser Darstellung sieht man neben dem Bema einen Tisch mit Kultgebäck und eine Schale mit Früchten. In der gleichen Szene findet man Hinweise auf das Bema und ein Mahl. Wahrscheinlich wurde also während der Bemafeier das Wachen und das Fasten abgeschlossen mit einer Mahlzeit, wie bei den Christen in der Passanacht.

4. Das alte syrische, quartodezimanische Passafest feierte nicht so sehr die Auferstehung wie die Höllen- und die Himmelfahrt.

Von einer Höllenfahrt Manis nun wird nicht gesprochen. Dies braucht uns nicht zu wundern, weil es für die Manichäer keinen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen der Erde und der Hölle gibt. Einmal auf der Erde angelangt, braucht Mani nicht noch tiefer hinabzusteigen.

Die Himmelfahrt Manis aber ist für die Manichäer um so wichtiger. Das ergibt sich auch aus den Texten, die für das Bemafest bestimmt sind.[46]

Die Manichäer müssen nicht unbedingt das Thema der Himmelfahrt von der christlichen Passatradition übernommen haben, aber es ist klar, dass die Kommemoration der Himmelfahrt Christi während des Passafestes es für die Manichäer besonders geeignet machte daraus einen Gedenkentag des Todes Manis zu gestalten.

5. Während des Festes, steigt Mani aus dem Paradies herab, um auf einem Richterstuhl, dem Bema, sitzend, die Sünden zu vergeben.[47] So enthält das Fest auch einen Hinweis auf das Endgericht, wenn Jesus, der grosse Richter, kommen wird, um zu urteilen.[48]

Nun ist in den vom christlichen Passa handelnden Texten Ephraems, Aphraates und der Didaskalia kaum etwas zu finden von einer eschatologischen Erwartung. In den Studien über das Passafest ist dieser Aspekt stark übertrieben worden.[49] Es gibt jedoch einige Texte (unter anderem syrische), aus denen hervorgeht, dass während des Passafestes, das darin vorausgesetzt wird, auch die Wiederkunft Christi erwartet wurde.[50] Schliesslich geht diese Auffassung auf jüdische Traditionen zurück, wonach der Messias in der Passanacht kommen wird.[51] Ist es nicht möglich, dass diese alte christliche Tradition auch noch im manichäischen Bemafest durchklingt, währenddessen Mani sich als Vorläufer Christi auf den Richterstuhl setzt?

Fassen wir zusammen: Man begegnet sowohl in westlichen wie in asiatischen manichäischen Quellen, die vom Bema handeln, Elementen und Themen, die manchmal an das christliche Passafest im allgemeinen, manchmal an das syrische Leidenspassa insbesondere erinnern.

Diese können am besten dadurch erklärt werden, dass sofort nach dem Tode Manis, der in der Zeit des christlichen Passas gestorben war, die ersten persischen Gemeinden das christliche Passafest mani-

chäisierten, wie einst die Christen das jüdische Passafest christianisiert hatten.[52]

Das Bema als Tag der Sündenvergebung muss schon auf den Gründer des Manichäismus selber zurückgehen. In diesem Punkt können wir Ries zustimmen.[53] Aber schon in den ersten persischen Gemeinden ist der Inhalt des Festes unter dem Einfluss des christlichen Passafestes wesentlich geändert und bereichert worden.

ANMERKUNGEN

* Text eines Vortrages der am 9. September 1980 auf dem dritten Symposium Syriacum in Goslar gehalten wurde. Ich danke Dr. Dorothea Wendebourg für die Korrektur der deutschen Sprache.

[1] Die Manichäer müssen eine ziemlich umfassende Kenntnis des Neuen Testaments (A. Böhlig, Christliche Wurzeln im Manichäismus, in : *Mysterion und Wahrheit*, Leiden, 1968, S. 201–221 und F. Decret, *Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine*, Paris 1970) wie auch des Thomasevangeliums (H. Puech, in : E. Hennecke-W. Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* I, Tübingen 1959, S. 203) und bestimmter christlicher apokrypher Apostelakten (siehe etwa J. D. Kaestli, L'utilisation des actes apocryphes des apôtres dans le Manichéisme, in : *Gnosis and Gnosticism*, Ed. M. Krause, Leiden 1977, S. 107–116; P. Nagel, Die apokryphen Apostelakten des 2. und 3. Jahrhunderts, in : *Studien aus Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, hrsg. von Karl-Wolfgang Tröger, Berlin 1973, S. 149–182) gehabt haben.

Vor allem neuere Studien betonen wieder die zentrale Stelle die Jesus als Erlösergott in der Lehre Manis und der Manichäer einnimmt und die nicht einfach mit missionarischen Gründen, als eine Konzession an die christliche Kirche, erklärt werden kann (siehe schon z.B. : F. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichees*, Cambridge 1925, 38–39 und E. Waldschmidt-W. Lentz, *Die Stellung Jesu im Manichäismus*, Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1926, Nr. 4 und jüngst J. Ries, Jésus-Christ dans la religion de Mani, in : *Augustiniana* 14, 1964, 437–454; F. Decret, *Aspects du manichéisme*, vor allem S. 11, 152, 189 und E. Rose, *Die manichäische Christologie*, Wiesbaden 1979 (= Studies in Oriental Religions, 5).

Wahrscheinlich haben auch bestimmte „Sakramente" und liturgische Bräuche der Christen die Riten der manichäer beeinflusst (A. Böhlig, *Christliche Wurzeln*, S. 217; H. Puech, *Liturgie et pratiques rituelles dans le Manichéisme*, in : *Sur le Manichéisme*, Paris 1979, vor allem S. 238–241; 319–355; Idem, *Le Manichéisme*, Histoire des Religions II (Encyclopédie de la Pléiade) 1972, vor allem S. 597–601.

Vor allem seit dem Fund des Kölner Manikodexes steht die Frage nach der Beziehung Manis und der Manichäer zum Christentum wieder im Mittelpunkt des Interesses. Ein Teil dieses Textes ist von L. Koenen-A. Henrichs, Der Kölner Mani-Kodex, in : *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 19, 1975, 1–85 und 32, 1978, 87–199 herausgegeben worden. Vgl. R. Cameron und A. Dewey, *The Cologne Mani-Codex*, Missoula Montana 1979 (Griechischer Text und englische Uebersetzung). Siehe auch L. Koenen-A. Henrichs, Ein griechischer Mani-Codex, in : *ZPE*, 5, 1970, 97–216 und : K. Rudolph, Die Bedeutung des Kölner Mani-Codex für die Manichäismusforschung, in : *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech*, Paris 1974, 471–486.

[2] Man hat längst auf die Beziehungen zu Markion und Bardaisan hingewiesen. Der eine hat starken Einfluss in Syrien gehabt und der andere ist sogar edessenischer Herkunft. Cfr. F. Burkitt essay, in: *S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations II*, London 1921, S. CXLIIff.; Ders., *The Religion of the Manichees*, 74–86; H. Schaeder, *Urform und Fortbildungen des manichäischen Systems*, Leipzig 1927, 73ff; A. Böhlig, Christliche Wurzeln..., 208ff.; E. Rose, *Op. cit.*, 33. Cfr. auch H. Drijvers, Mani und Bardaisan, in: *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech*, 459–469, der vorsichtig spricht von einer „zusammenhängenden Tradition zwischen Mani und dem Philosophen aus Edessa", die „in einer Kontinuität der Probleme und Motive" bestehe (469).

Es gibt sehr auffallende Parallelen zwischen bestimmten manichäischen Texten und den Thomasakten (Siehe z.B. A. Henrichs-L. Koenen, in *ZPE* 5, 1970, 171–182 über Manis himmlischen Zwilling und das Perlenlied). Wie gesagt soll Mani auch das Thomasevangelium gekannt haben (Anm. 1).

[3] Puech gibt sehr wichtige Hinweise auf das Bemafest, worauf wir uns übrigens oft stützen. Sie sind aber sehr fragmentarisch, und nur nebenbei erwähnt er das christliche Fest (*Liturgie et pratiques rituelles*, 301–304; 389–394 und für das Fasten, das dem Bema vorangeht, S. 280–284). J. Asmussen hat einige sehr wichtige Bemerkungen in einer Anmerkung versteckt (*Xuastvanift. Studies in Manichaeism*, Copenhagen 1965, 227–229). Andere Autoren gehen nicht genügend auf das Verhältnis zwischen beiden Festen ein (C. Allberry, Das manichäische Bemafest, *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*, 37, 1938, 2–10 und J. Ries, La Fête de Bema dans l'Église de Mani, in: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 22, 1976, 218–233).

[4] A. Vööbus, *The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac*, CSCO 401–402, 407–408, Louvain 1979.

[5] Ed. I. Parisot, *Patrologia Syriaca* I, Paris 1894, 505–540.

[6] Ed. E. Beck, *Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Paschahymnen*, CSCO 248–249, Louvain 1964.

[7] Man findet einen Literaturüberblick bei B. Lohse, *Das Passafest der Quartadecimaner*, Gütersloh 1953, 30–34. Siehe auch: W. Huber, *Passa und Ostern. Untersuchungen zur Osterfeier der alten Kirche*, Bonn 1969, 12–31.

[8] A. Baumstark, *Liturgie comparée*, Chevetogne 1953, 186–193.

[9] B. Botte, Pascha, in: *L'Orient syrien* VIII, 1963, 213–226.

[10] *Dem.* XII,8 (*Patrologia Syriaca* 1, 521).

[11] *De Epiphania* XI,3 (E. Beck, *Des heiligen Ephraems des Syrers Hymnen De Nativitate (Epiphania)*, CSCO 186 und 187, Louvain 1959.

[12] Siehe Anm. 6.

[13] Dies habe ich in dem Kurzvortrag, The Date of Easter in the Twelfth Demonstration of Aphraates', auf dem patristischen Kongress in Oxford 1979 zu beweisen versucht. Der Text dieses Vortrages wird erscheinen in: *Studia Patristica. Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 3–8 September 1979* (Im Druck).

[14] Siehe: *Méliton de Sardes, Sur la Pâque*, ed. O. Perler, SC 123, Paris 1966 und: *Melito of Sardis. On Pascha and fragments*, ed. S. Hall, Oxford 1979.

Seit der Auffindung und Herausgabe des Papyrus Bodmer XIII, der vielleicht noch dem 3. Jahrhundert angehört, und in dem die Homilie den Titel „Melitōnos peri pascha" trägt (siehe die Editionen von Perler und Hall), darf die Verfasserschaft des

Melitos wohl als gesichert gelten (vgl. O. Perler, in : *Méliton de Sardes*, 18–23; W. Huber, *Passa und Ostern.*, 33–34, Anm. 17).

Die nächste Frage is nun ob Melito, der Autor der Homilie, tatsächlich ein Quartodezimaner ist und ob seine Homilie wirklich bei einem quartodezimanischen Passa gehalten worden ist. Euseb zitiert in seiner Kirchengeschichte (V,24; Ed. E. Schwartz, GCS, *Eusebius*, II, 1, Leipzig 1903) aus einem Brief des Polykrates von Ephesus, aus dem sich entnehmen lässt, dass der „Eunuch Melito" das Passa am 14. Nisan gefeiert habe (V, 24, 5–6). Ist mit diesem Melito nicht der Autor der Homilie gemeint?

Vor kurzem hat W. Huber behauptet, Melito sei kein Quartodezimaner gewesen. Wahrscheinlich sei Polykrates von Ephesus sich dessen nicht bewusst gewesen, dass Melito bereits von der quartodezimanischen Tradition abgerückt war (S. 31–45). Huber gibt für seine Hypothese, Melito sei kein Quartodezimaner gewesen, folgende Gründe an :

a. Nach Eusebs Kirchengeschichte (IV, 26, 4) hat Klemens von Alexandrien aus Anlass der Schrift Melitos (über das Passa) selbst eine Schrift über das Passa verfasst. In einigen Klemens-Fragmenten, die im Chronicon Paschale überliefert sind, verteidigt dieser die johanneische Chronologie. Huber schliesst daraus, das Melito dann die synoptische Chronologie vertreten haben müsse. Weil nun Apollinaris von Hierapolis, der sicher Quartodezimaner war, die johanneische Chronologie verteidigte (*Chronicon Paschale*, Ed. L. Dindorf, Bonn 1832, I, S. 13ff), kann nach Huber Melito kein

Die Homilie scheint tatsächlich die synoptische Leidenschronologie voraus zu setzen (Huber, S. 44). Aber heisst das auch, dass der Autor darum kein Quartodezimaner gewesen sein kann? Die quartodezimanische Praxis könnte mit beiden Chronologien zusammengegangen sein. Ja, man könnte eine solche Praxis sogar auch mit der synoptischen Passionschronologie begründen (vgl. A. Strobel, *Ursprung und Geschichte des frühchristlichen Osterkalenders*, Berlin 1977, 21).

b. Nach Huber entspricht der Inhalt der Homilie nicht dem, was wir aus anderen Quellen vom Inhalt des quartodezimanischen Passafestes wissen. Er meint, dass in der Homilie die Parusieerwartung keine zentrale Bedeutung habe. Bei dem quartodezimanischen Passa sei das hingegen sicher der Fall gewesen. Huber stützt sich dabei auf die Epistula Apostolorum und vor allem auch auf die Hypothesen B. Lohses (*op. cit.*).

Für Huber ist die Alternative : „Entweder ist die Predigt von einem Quartodezimaner; dann ist die Bestimmung des Festinhaltes des quartodezimanischen Passa durch Lohse verfehlt; Die Parusieerwartung hat dann nicht die zentrale Bedeutung, die er ihr zuspricht. Oder Melito, der Verfasser der Predigt, ist kein Quartodezimaner" (S. 43). Huber wählt die zweite Lösung, wir aber die erste. Es ist überhaupt nicht bewiesen, dass beim quartodezimanischen Passa die Parusieerwartung eine so zentrale Rolle spielte. Lohse und Huber stützen sich vor allem auf die Epistula Apostolorum. Aber erstens ist der quartodezimanische Hintergrund dieser Schrift zwar wahrscheinlich, aber nicht bewiesen. Zweitens handelt es sich nur um einen einzigen Text (Cfr. S. Hall, *Melito of Sardis, On Pascha and fragments*, S. XXV und R. Cantalamessa, *L'omelia „In S. Pascha" dello Pseudo-Ippolito di Roma*, Milano 1967, 85, Anm. 28). Damit sind die Bedenken Hubers gegen den quartodezimanischen Charakter der Homilie Melitos hinfällig geworden.

[15] *Homélies pascales I. Une homélie inspirée du traité sur la Pâque d'Hippolyte*, Ed. et trad. P. Nautin, SC 27.

[16] R. Cantalamessa, *L'omelia „In S. Pascha" dello Pseudo-Ippolito di Roma.* Es ist aber fraglich, ob die Homilie in ihrer jetzigen Form noch als quartodezimanisch betrachtet werden kann. Schon P. Nautin meint, dass in diesem Texte zwischen Teilen, die einer älteren Quelle angehörten, und solchen, die von einem späteren Redaktor stammten unterschieden werden müsse. Die Argumentation Nautins macht einen überzeugenden Eindruck (SC 27, 59–61; Cfr. J. Gribomonts Rezension zu R. Cantalamessa, *art. cit.*, in: *Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa*, 1969, 161). Es kommt mit am wahrscheinlichsten vor, dass die Homilie eine quartodezimanische Quelle enthält.

[17] *Dem.* XII, 8.

[18] Vergl. vor allem Aphraates *Dem.* XII, 8; Ephraems Hymnen *De Azymis* III–VI; IX und *De Crucifixione* II, die ganze Homilie Melitos und Ps. Hippolytus 5–42.

Weil die Symbolik des jüdischen Festes so wesentlich bestimmend ist für die Theologie der Passafeier der syrischen Christen, sprechen wir im Folgenden möglichst von „Passa" statt von „Ostern".

[19] Besonders Ephraems Hymne *De Resurrectione I*, Melito Hom. 100–104 (vergl. auch 47–56 als eine Beschreibung der Sünde Adams und deren Folgen) und Ps. Hippolytus 61.

[20] Ed. K. Holl, III, GCS 37, 1933, 242ff.

[21] Ders., 244.

[22] Vgl. A. Strobel, 347–352.

[23] *De Ieiunio* V, 6–10. Ed. E. Beck, *Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen de Ieiunio*, CSCO 246–247, Louvain 1964.

[24] *M.* 104. Siehe F. Andreas-W. Henning, *Mitteliranische Manichaica aus Chinesisch-Turkestan III*, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Berlin 1934, 882.

[25] Schon H. Schaeder glaubt, dass der Monatsname aus dem Syrischen mitübersetzt worden ist (siehe F. Andreas-W. Henning, *op. cit.*, 882, Anm. 4).

Was das „parinirvana" betrifft (parthisch prnybr'n), dieser Terminus ist dem Buddhismus entliehen und aus dem Sanskrit übernommen worden (Cfr. L. Ort, *Mani. A. Religio-Historical Description of his Personality*, Leiden 1967, S. 150–153). Normalerweise wird er für den Tod benutzt. Meistens betrifft es dann ein „emporsteigen", eine Art Himmelfahrt (Vgl. *T.*II.*D.*173a = A. von Le Coq, *Türkische Manichaica aus Chotscho* I, Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1911, Nr. 6 Berlin, S. 12; *M* 5 = F. Andreas-W. Henning, op. cit., 864; *M* 5569 = *T.*II.*D.*79, *Ibidem*, S. 860–862; *M* 8171 = *T.*III.*D.*III.267, *Ibidem*, S. 868.

[26] *Contra epistulam quam vocant fundamenti* 8.9; Siehe E. Jolivet und M. Jourjon, *Six traités anti-manichéens*, Paris 1961, 409–411.

[27] C. Allberry, *A Manichaean Psalm-Book*, Stuttgart 1938, 1–47.

[28] *Ps.* 225; *Ps.* 241.

[29] *Ps.* 226; *Ps.* 236; *Ps.* 241. Man findet auch besonders treffende Uebereinstimmungen zwischen den Beschreibungen der Passion Manis und den Leidensgeschichten Jesu der Evangelien in den koptischen Homilien (H. Polotsky, *Manichäische Homilien*, Stuttgart 1934; S. auch die Bemerkungen von J. Asmussen, *op. cit.*, 228). Es ist interessant, dass in diesen Homilien auch vom Bema gesprochen wird (S. 27, 28, 33, 36, 53.71).

[30] H. Puech, La conception manichéenne du salut, in : *Sur le manichéisme*, 92.

[31] Siehe z.B. : K. Rudolph, Die Bedeutung des Kölner Mani-Codex, 485.

[32] J. Ries, La Fête de Bema dans l'Église de Mani, in : *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 22, 1976, 218–233.

[33] Siehe vor allem S. 229–233.

[34] S. 233.

[35] *Ibidem.*

[36] Siehe auch die Rezension von M. Tardieu, in : *Rev. Ét. Aug.* 23, 1977, 369.

[37] *Ps.* 232, 236, 237, 240. Augustinus, *loc. cit.*

[38] *Ps.* 229. Vgl. auch Augustinus, *loc. cit.*

[39] *Op. cit.*, 72.73.

[40] G. Flügel, *Mani, seine Lehre und seine Schriften*, Leipzig 1862, 65–66 und 97.

[41] W. Henning, The Manichaean Fasts, *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1945, 146–155.

[42] Es handelt sich hier um eine Rekonstruktion von W. Henning und S. Taqizadeh (W. Henning, *art. cit.*, und S. Taqizadeh, *ibidem*, S. 155–164 und S. Taqizadeh, The early Sassanians, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XI, 1943–46, 6–51, vor allem der Exkurs, S. 42–51. Vgl. auch H. Puech, *Liturgie et pratique rituelles*, 280–284 und C. Allberry, Das manichäische Bema-Fest, 319–320).

Nach dem arabischen Text kennen die Manichäer im Jahr vier besondere Fastenzeiten, drei kurze von zwei Tagen und eine viel längere, die einen Monat dauert. Die letzte fängt am achten nach dem Neumond an, wenn die Sonne im Zeichen des Wassermannes steht. Taqizadeh hat berechnet, dass nach dem babylonischen Kalender dieses Datum dem achten Shabat entspricht ausser in den Schaltjahren, wenn das Fasten am achten des ersten Adars anfängt.

Die sogdischen Kalenderfragmente sprechen von fünf Fastenzeiten, Yimkis genannt, die alle zwei Tage dauern. Die vierte entspricht den ersten beiden Tagen des Fastenmonats der *Kitab al-Fihrist*, und die fünfte findet sechsundzwanzig Tage später statt, also wahrscheinlich am sieben- und am achtundzwanzigsten des Fastenmonats der *Kitab al-Fihrist*.

Das arabische Dokument lässt sich leicht mit den sogdischen Fragmenten in Einklang bringen, wenn man einigen chronologischen Daten Rechnung trägt. Nach Quellen in verschiedenen Sprachen (Koptisch, Parthisch und Chinesisch), wird Mani am achten eines Monates verhaftet, während er am vierten des nächsten Monats stirbt (Puech, *op. cit.*, 282). Diese Daten gehen sicher auf einen achten Shabat und einen vierten Adar im babylonischen Kalender der erste Gemeinde zurück. Das heisst, dass die Manichäer an dem Tag zu fasten anfangen an dem Mani gefangen genommen wurde. Ueberdies gibt es genau sechundzwanzig Tage zwischen dem Tag der Gefangennahme und dem Tod Manis. Dies nun stimmt auffallenderweise mit den koptischen Quellen überein (*Hom.* III, S. 60 und *Ps.* 225 und 241), wonach Mani gerade 26 Tage im Gefängnis verbracht hat. Dann aber ist auch klar, warum der fünfte Yimki 26 Tage nach dem vierten gehalten wurde. Innerhalb des Fastenmonats, wovon der *Kitab al-Fihrist* spricht, wurde zweier Momente der Passion besonders gedacht, der Gefangennahme und des Todes, der „Kreuzigung". Der arabische Text verschweigt die beiden besonderen Festtage, und die sogdischen Fragmente erwähnen nur diese.

Nach dem koptischen *Psalm* 41 ist das Bema der dritte Tag. Dann wird das Fest also gefeiert am Ende des Fastenmonats, am dritten Tag nach dem Tode Manis (am

siebenundzwanzigsten des Fastenmonats). Uebrigens suggeriert auch der *Xuastvanift* (XIV A), dass das Fest am ende dieses Monats fällt.

Aus dem Vorangehenden ergibt sich, dass der im *Kitab al-Fihrist* erwähnte Fastenmonat kaum späten Datums sein kann, obwohl er in den westlichen Quellen nicht ausdrücklich genannt wird (gegen J. Asmussen, 225; vgl. aber A. Böhlig, *Die Gnosis*, III, *Der Manichäismus*, München, 1980, 42).

Schliesslich sollen nach einigen späten arabischen und syrischen Quellen auch die Ssabier aus Harran vom achten Tag nach dem Neumond des Adars an dreissig Tage gefastet haben (D. Chwahlsohn, Die *Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, II, Petersburg 1856, 6, 36, 497 und 501; vgl. auch Puech, 282-283). Puech wird hierdurch beunruhigt. Das manichäische Fasten könne auch einer Imitation der ssabischen Praxis entstammen. Die Quellen betreffs der Ssabier sind aber spät und überdies verworren (K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I, Göttingen 1960, 36–41). Vor allem sind die Beziehungen zu den Daten Manis Gefangennahme und dessen Todes allzu auffallend.

[43] W. Henning, *Ein manichäisches Bet- und Beichtbuch*, Abhandlungen der Königl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. hist. Klasse, 1936, N° 10, S. 46.

[44] C. Allberry, Das manichäische Bemafest, S. 325 (Zitiert nach G. Widengren (ed.), *Der Manichäismus*, Darmstadt 1977).

[45] A. von Le Coq, *Die buddhistische Spätantike in Mittelasien*, 2. Teil. *Die manichäischen Miniaturen*, Berlin 1923, Tafel 8b, Abb. a. Vgl. A. Adam, *Texte zum Manichäismus*, Berlin 1954, 107–108.

[46] Siehe W. Henning, *Ein manichäisches Bet- und Beichtbuch*, 46 (*T* II *D* 123). Cfr. die dritte koptische Homilie (S. 60) und Ps. 226 und 241. Zum Thema der Himmelfahrt Manis siehe auch die *Parinirvana-Hymnen M* 5, *M* 6 und *T* III *D* III 267 = *M* 8171 (F. Andreas-W. Henning, *Mitteliranische Manichaica aus Chinesisch-Turkestan* III, 862–868).

[47] Dieses Thema trifft man praktisch in allen einschlägigen Dokumenten an. (Koptische Psalmen; *M* 801 (W. Henning, *Ein manichäisches Bet- und Beichtbuch*, 18–20), *T* II *D* 123; *Xuastvanift* XIV A. Man vergleiche auch die erwähnte Miniatur aus Turfan, wie auch ein Bema-Bild auf Bergkristall (A. Adam, *op. cit.*, 105–106).

[48] Siehe V. Arnold-Döben, *Die Bildersprache des Manichäismus*, Leiden 1978, 175–177. Cfr. auch *Kopt. Ps.* 229, wo gesagt wird, dass das Bema herrschen wird, bis am Ende der Welt Jesus kommen wird.

[49] S. auch die Bemerkungen Cantalamessas, *op. cit.*, 85, Anm. 28, und Anm. 14 dieses Aufsatzes.

[50] Siehe z.B. das syrische *Testamentum Domini* (II, XIX. Ed. I. Rahmani, Mainz 1899, 139) und vor allem auch die *Epistula Apostolorum* (C. Schmidt, *op. cit.*) die wahrscheinlich syrischer Herkunft ist (G. Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie*, Tübingen 1965, 50–51 und R. Staats, Die törichten Jungfrauen von Matthäus 25 in gnostischer und anti-gnostischer Literatur, in: W. Eltester (ed.), *Christentum und Gnosis*, Berlin 1969, 98–115.

[51] Siehe z.B. R. Le Déaut, *La nuit pascale*, Rom 1963, 263–338.

[52] Die dem Alten Testament entliehenen Themen (Aegypten, Passalamm) sind verschwunden. Dies erklärt sich aber, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Manichäer vor allem am Verhältnis zwischen den Passionen Iesu und Manis interessiert und überdies stark antijüdisch und anti-alttestamentlich waren.

[53] *Art. cit.* Vgl. auch *Ps. 227.* Der Autor weist auf die Rolle hin, die die Sündenvergebung und die Beichte im Manichäismus und in der Lehre Manis spielten. Uebrigens bleiben hier einige Fragen stehen. Ging dem Tag der Sündenvergebung schon vor dem Tode Manis ein Fasten voraus? An welchen Tag wurde die Feier vor dem Tode des Stifters der Religion begangen? Am Ende des Jahres? Welches Kriterium hat die Wahl des Datums bestimmt?

Vielleicht spielte auch schon vor dem Tode Manis der Thron, das „Bema" eine Rolle beim Fest. Klar ist jedenfalls, dass das „Bema" dem kirchlichen Sprachgebrauch entliehen ist. Neben den Briefen des Apostels Paulus (vgl. *Ps. 222*; für die paulinische Stellen, s. *2 Kor. 5, 10* und *Röm. 14, 10*) müssen dabei auch die Traditionen der syrischen Kirchen eine Rolle gespielt haben : schon Ephraem redet vom Richterstuhl Christi als vom „bīm" (*Cruc.* VIII, 10). Vor allem aber spielt gerade in den syrischen, namentlich in den ostsyrischen Kirchen das Bema, eine Erhöhung im Schiff der Kirche, auf der die Katechumenenmesse gefeiert wurde, eine Rolle (s. R. Taft, Some Notes on the Bema in the East and West Syrian Traditions, *OCP* 34, 1968, 326–359; Ders., On the Use of the Bema in the East-Syrian Liturgy, *Eastern Churches Review* III, 1970, 30–39; R. Coquin, Le „bîma" des églises syriennes, in : *L'Orient syrien* X, 1965, 443–474). Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich hier um einen Einfluss des „Bemas" der jüdischen Synagoge (D. Hickley, The Ambo in Early Liturgical Planning, *The Heythrop Journal* VII, 1966, 407–422). Jedenfalls ist das Bema als Ort des Wortgottesdienstes schon Ephraem bekannt (s. Ephraem de Nisibe, *Memre sur Nicomédie*, ed. Ch. Renoux, PO XXXVII 2 et 3, Turnhout 1975, 153 (memra VIII)

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POLYMORPHIE DIVINE ET TRANSFORMATIONS D'UN MYTHOLOGÈME : L'»APOCRYPHON DE JEAN« ET SES SOURCES*

PAR

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Pour la psychologie religieuse, la polymorphie caractérise souvent les personnages numineux, dotés d'un pouvoir surnaturel. Le thème de la polymorphie du Christ, en particulier, est assez fréquent dans les littératures paléo-chrétienne et gnostique, et a déjà suscité l'intérêt des chercheurs.

Dans divers apocryphes du Nouveau Testament, le Christ apparaît à la fois (à différents témoins) ou successivement sous les formes d'un enfant, d'un jeune homme et d'un vieillard. Erik Peterson, pour expliquer le sens originel de cette trimorphie, se réfère à un passage fameux du *Discours contre les Grecs* de Tatien où l'Aiôn, le temps éternel, apparaît aux hommes sous les formes du passé, du présent et du futur :[1]

> Pourquoi divisez-vous le Temps, en disant qu'une de ses parties est le passé, une autre le présent, et une autre le futur? ... De même que les passagers d'un navire qui se meut croient, de façon erronée, que ce sont les montagnes qui se déplacent, vous ne savez pas que vous vous déplacez, alors que l'Éternité reste statique (ἑστῶτα δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα) aussi longtemps que le Créateur désire qu'elle existe.[2]

La solution de Peterson a été reprise par Henri-Charles Puech, qui a consacré à ce sujet, pendant plusieurs années consécutives, son séminaire à l'École Pratique des Hautes Études.[3] Puech élargit considérablement la liste des textes examinés, en étendant l'enquête à l'ensemble de la littérature gnostique et manichéenne, ainsi qu'à certaines traditions plus tardives reflétant le même thème.[4] Il conclut que

> le sens et l'origine du thème de la »trimorphie« appliqué à Jésus sont ... susceptibles d'être découverts : Jésus doit être, en l'occurrence, une figure, une personnification de l'Αἰών; les trois aspects d'enfant ou d'adolescent, d'adulte, de vieillard, sous lesquels il se manifeste signifient l'éternité, la perpétuité de son être

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et répondent, du même coup, à autant de modes de vision ou de connaissance proportionnés à l'homme et conformes aux trois principales étapes de l'existence humaine ...[5]

Plusieurs indices laissent penser que cette solution correspond à l'intention de certains auteurs gnostiques ou paléo-chrétiens. L'*Apocryphon de Jean*, sur lequel nous reviendrons en détail plus bas, décrit comment Jésus apparut sous les trois formes d'un enfant, d'un adulte et d'un vieillard, ajoutant: [»Je suis venu pour enseigner] ce qui est [et ce qui était] et ce qui [sera]« (CG II, 1, p. 2, ll. 16–18). De même, d'après Hippolyte, Simon le Mage se qualifiait de ὁ ἑστώς, στάς, στησόμενος, ces termes impliquant chez lui une conception de sa propre éternité.[6]

Il peut cependant sembler surprenant de voir un mythologème prendre sa source dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature du temps et de l'éternité. A priori, le phénomène inverse semble plus probable – à savoir la rationalisation d'un mythologème déjà existant. L'ingénieuse solution proposée par Peterson, puis par Puech, apparaît donc anachronique – peut-être parce que tous les deux s'attachent à résoudre *directement* le problème de la trimorphie du Christ. Il est significatif à cet égard que ni l'un, ni l'autre ne relient l'idée de trimorphie à celle, attestée elle aussi, de bimorphie du Christ (*puer/senex*) – bimorphie pourtant étudiée par Puech lui-même.[7]

C'est en m'interrogeant sur les liens entre bi- et trimorphie que je voudrais ici présenter une nouvelle interprétation du mythologème primitif de la polymorphie du Christ. Je commencerai par l'analyse d'un passage de l'*Apocryphon de Jean*, passage qualifié par Peterson de remarquable, mais d'interprétation malheureusement difficile.[8] Après avoir situé le mythologème dans le cadre des traditions sur la polymorphie du Christ dans les textes gnostiques ainsi que dans les Apocryphes du Nouveau Testament et chez les Pères de l'Église, je voudrais attirer l'attention sur certains parallèles glanés dans la littérature rabbinique, et m'interroger sur leurs implications.

L'*Apocryphon de Jean* a depuis longtemps été reconnu comme l'un des plus importants textes gnostiques conservés en copte.[9] Quispel, en particulier, a noté à plusieurs reprises qu'une analyse méticuleuse de la mythologie de l'*Apocryphon* pourrait bien révéler certains traits essentiels de la pensée gnostique à ses débuts.[10]

L'*Apocryphon* se présente comme une révélation qu'aurait reçue le

fils de Zébédée alors qu'il méditait, à Jérusalem, sur la nature du Père et sur celle du Fils, ainsi que sur le salut. Dès le début du texte, le révélateur – qui n'est pas explicitement identifié à Jésus Christ, bien que dans la suite du texte il soit appelé le »Sauveur« et »Seigneur«[11] – apparaît à Jean. Dans la reconstitution de la version longue, on lit:

> Immédiatement, [alors que je contemplais ces choses,] voici que les [cieux s'ouvrirent et toute] la création [qui est] sous le ciel brilla et [le monde] fut secoué. [Et je pris peur, et voici que je] vis dans la lumière [un jeune homme (*alou*), se tenant] près de moi. Alors que je [le] regardais, [il se transforma] en vieillard (*noč*). Et il [changea sa] forme à nouveau, devenant comme un serviteur (*hal*). Il n'y avait [pas de pluralité] devant moi, mais une [apparence] aux formes (μορφή) multiples dans la lumière, et les [formes] apparurent l'une à travers l'autre, l'apparition ayant trois formes (μορφή).[12]

Le texte de la version courte est ici différent:

> Et voici que se [manifeste] à moi un jeune homme (*alou*), mais [je vis] la forme d'un vieillard (*h^{e}llo*) dans laquelle était de la lumière; je le regardai, je ne [compris] pas cette merveille; si [c'est] une [unité] dont les formes (μορφή) sont multiples [dans cette] lumière, ses formes (μορφή) se manifestent ... si elle est une, [comment] a-t-elle trois aspects?[13]

Les deux versions concourrent pour parler des trois formes sous lesquelles le révélateur apparaît, bien que seules la première et la deuxième, le jeune homme et le vieillard, soient mentionnées par les deux versions. La troisième forme, celle d'un serviteur, n'apparaît explicitement que dans la version longue. Ce dernier texte offre aussi une interprétation de la vision trimorphe: »Je suis le Père, je suis la Mère, je suis le Fils«.[14] Nous avons là, manifestement, une tentative, de la part du rédacteur, d'identifier la vision à la Trinité. La Mère, en effet, est parfois identifiée à l'Esprit Saint dans certaines traditions paléo-chrétiennes, comme en témoignent les fragments de l'*Évangile des Hébreux*.[15] Divers chercheurs, tels que Yvonne Janssens ou Élaine Pagels, semblent accepter cette identification de la vision trimorphe à la Trinité comme allant de soi,[16] sans remarquer les difficultés que soulève une telle interprétation, qui explique l'*obscurum* par l'*obscurius*. Pourquoi le Père, en effet, serait-il identifié à un jeune homme, ou la mère à un vieillard? Il semble bien qu'il s'agisse ici d'une glose, qui nous transmet peut-être le sens qu'avait prise la vision trimorphe pour les lecteurs de l'*Apocryphon de Jean* ou de sa *Vorlage*, mais qui ne fait probablement pas partie du mythologème primitif. Avant d'essayer de retrouver le sens et le contexte originaux de ce mythologème, il faut d'abord rappeler d'autres textes de la

littérature paléo-chrétienne et gnostique, qui traitent de la polymorphie du Christ. Cette polymorphie s'exprime sous deux aspects principaux. Alors que certains courants insistent sur les diverses formes *angéliques* revêtues par le Christ lors de sa descente à travers les cieux, d'autres se préoccupent surtout de décrire les différentes formes *humaines* sous lesquelles il apparaît ici-bas. Ce sont ces dernières descriptions qui nous intéresseront particulièrement ici, mais on peut cepedant, afin de préciser le cadre de notre mythologème, commencer par noter quelques exemples de la polymorphie angélique du Christ.

Nous savons combien l'*Ascension d'Isaie* était populaire dans certains milieux gnostiques.[17] Dans cet ouvrage, Dieu ordonne au Christ de descendre en ce bas-monde, et précise : »Et tu te transformeras selon la forme de tous ceux qui sont dans les cinq cieux, et tu veilleras à te transformer selon la forme des anges du firmament ...«.[18] Continuant, le Très-Haut donne la raison de cette transformation multiple : »Et qu'aucun des anges de ce monde ne sache que tu es avec moi ... afin que tu juges et que tu anéantisses les princes et les anges et les dieux de ce monde ...«.[19] Ce thème est reflété dans les traditions et la littérature gnostiques, où il prend une importance considérable. Au témoignage d'Irénée, par exemple, Simon le Mage, prétendant s'être »manifesté parmi les Juifs comme Fils«, expliquait qu'»il descendit, en se métamorphosant et en se rendant semblable aux Principautés, aux Puissances et aux Anges : c'est ainsi qu'il se montra également parmi les hommes comme un homme, quoique n'étant pas homme ...«.[20] De son côté, selon une tradition simonienne rapportée par Épiphane, c'est Hélène qui dit : »Je change de forme dans chaque ciel, selon l'apparence de ceux qui s'y trouvent, afin de ne pas être connue de mes puissances ...«.[21]

Divers textes de Nag-Hammadi font écho à ces descriptions. Dans le *Second Traité du Grand Seth*, ouvrage de caractère très ouvertement docétiste, le Christ explique que s'il a réussi non seulement à tromper la vigilance des archontes qui cherchaient à s'emparer de lui, mais encore à soumettre tous leurs pouvoirs, c'est parce que sa descente s'était faite incognito, »car je changeais, dit-il, mes contours, changeant de forme en forme. Et ainsi, quand je fus à leurs portes, j'assumai leur ressemblance«.[22] Dans la *Sophia de Jésus Christ*, nous lisons que »le Sauveur n'apparut pas dans sa forme première ...«, mais »sa forme était comme un grand ange de lumière«.[23] Dans la seule citation qui nous reste de l'*Évangile* gnostique *d'Ève*, le révélateur apparaît

aussi sous deux formes différentes, à savoir comme un homme de grande taille, et comme un autre rabougri (ἄνθρωπον μακρὸν καὶ ἄλλον κολοβόν).[24] A la polymorphie du Christ s'ajoute dans ces deux derniers textes un thème différent, bien que parallèle : celui de la haute taille, ou des dimensions énormes, du Christ dans son apparence angélique. Ce thème, qu'on retrouve dans divers textes paléochrétiens, en particulier dans certains apocryphes du Nouveau Testament, ne fait cependant pas directement partie de la présente discussion.[25]

L'auteur de l'*Évangile selon Philippe* développe de façon conséquente le thème de la polymorphie de Jésus-Christ, en l'élargissant au domaine humain. Il écrit en effet que ce dernier s'est révélé aux anges comme un ange, et aux hommes comme un homme. Il possède, en effet, tout en lui même, »aussi bien ange, homme, mystère, que le Père«. Le Christ, en effet, a assumé de nombreuses ressemblances; il apparaît dans la forme sous laquelle chacun peut le voir.[26]

Les Actes apocryphes des Apôtres se font l'écho de ces spéculations sur la polymorphie du Christ. Dans les *Actes de Jean*, par exemple, Jésus-Christ apparaît non seulement comme un beau jeune homme souriant,[27] mais il révèle aussi au héros son apparence polymorphe.[28] Ailleurs dans le même ouvrage, Jean dit que le Christ lui est apparu »comme un homme à peu près chauve, mais possédant une barbe épaisse«, alors qu'à Jacques il était apparu »comme un jeune homme dont la barbe commençait à peine à pousser«.[29]

D'autres traditions insistent sur l'apparence *enfantine* du Sauveur. D'après Evodius d'Uzala, les Manichéens tenaient en grande faveur certains Actes apocryphes, dont l'auteur était un certain Leucius Charinus. Dans ces Actes, d'après Evodius, mention était faite d'un jeune enfant resplendissant (*puerulus speciosus*), que Leucius tenait pour être Dieu, »ou au moins un ange«.[30] Par la *Bibliothèque* de Photius, nous apprenons d'autres détails intéressants sur les écrits de Leucius Charinus. Il s'agissait d'un pentateuche contenant des *Actes* de Pierre, de Jean, d'André, de Thomas et de Paul, où, entre autres, le Christ, appelé aussi le Bon,[31] était à la fois Père et Fils – et était mis en opposition au méchant Dieu des Juifs et à son serviteur, Simon le Mage. Photius ajoute que d'après Leucius, le Christ »ne devint pas réellement homme, mais semble seulement le devenir, et il apparut souvent à ses disciples sous de nombreuses formes, comme un jeune homme (νεός), comme un vieillard (πρεσβύτης), comme un

enfant (παῖς), de nouveau comme un vieillard, et de nouveau comme un enfant, plus grand, puis plus petit, puis de haute taille, de façon telle que sa tête atteignait parfois les cieux«.[32] Un passage de l'*Acte de Pierre avec Simon* s'accorde de près avec cette description : Pierre demande aux frères de décrire la vision qu'ils viennent d'avoir. Certains parlent d'un vieillard (*seniorem*) dont ils sont incapables de décrire le visage, d'autres mentionnent un jeune homme (*iuvenem adulescentem*), d'autres enfin disent avoir vu un enfant (*puerum*).[33]

La littérature patristique conserve les traces de ces spéculations sur les différentes formes humaines assumées par Jésus-Christ, bien plus que de sa polymorphie angélique. Pour les Pères, en effet, la mission du Christ, qui consiste à apporter le salut aux hommes, n'implique pas nécessairement, comme dans le contexte gnostique, une lutte contre les mauvais archontes, lutte dans laquelle ses armes principales sont la ruse et le déguisement. Pour Irénée, par exemple, le Christ »ne méprisa ni ne s'échappa d'aucune condition humaine, ni ne refusa pour lui-même la loi qu'il avait établie pour la race humaine, mais sanctifia tous les âges ... ainsi il passa par tous les âges, devenant nouveau-né pour les nouveaux-nés, sanctifiant ainsi les nouveaux-nés; enfant pour les enfants, sanctifiant ceux de cet âge... jeune homme pour les jeunes ... et, comme il devint un vieillard pour les vieillards, sanctifiant par là-même les vieillards ... enfin, seulement, en vint-il à la mort elle-même«.[34] Pour Origène, de façon similaire, le Christ se rend semblable à ceux qu'il veut sauver. Comme déjà pour Clément, la multiplicité des êtres implique donc pour lui, d'une certaine manière, la multiplicité du Christ : »... notre Sauveur, à cause de la multiplicité (des créatures) ... devint beaucoup de choses, peut-être même tout ce qu'attend de lui toute créature capable de recevoir la délivrance«.[35]

Notons ici que la description de Jésus comme un nouveau-né et comme un enfant reflète les traditions évangéliques elles mêmes (voir par exemple *Mat.* 2:11 ou *Luc* 2:7, 16–17 et *Luc* 2:42 sv.). Mais comment comprendre le fait que Jésus soit aussi apparu comme un vieillard? Irénée savait aussi bien que n'importe qui que c'est dans la force de l'âge que le Seigneur avait été crucifié! Le texte d'Irénée donne l'impression d'une tentative de »récupération«, ou réinterprétation théologique d'un mythologème antérieur, reçu de tradition mais incompréhensible tel quel. Il semble donc que la conception développée par Irénée (et transformée par Origène) et le mythologème qui apparaît dans l'*Apocryphon de Jean* remontent à une source commune.

Si les textes cités plus haut ne recouvrent pas toutes les récurrences du thème dans les littératures paléo-chrétienne et gnostique, ce sont cependant les plus significatifs, et on peut présenter en un tableau les différents termes utilisés par ces textes, et faire quelques remarques sur les différentes formes humaines prises par le Christ (ou par le Révélateur dans l'*Apocryphon de Jean*) :

Apocr. Jn.	*alou*	*noč, h^{e}llo*	*hal*
Actes Jn.	νεανίσκος dont la barbe commence à peine à pousser	homme chauve, mais à barbe épaisse	
Leucius Charinus	νεός	πρεσβύτης	παῖς
Acte Pierre et Simon	adulescentem iuvenem	seniorem	puerum

Il ressort de ce tableau, avant tout, que les différents textes décrivent sans ambiguité aucune la figure d'un vieillard. Les mots coptes *noč* et *h^{e}llo* correspondent en effet exactement à πρεσβύτης et à *senior*. Par contre, il est plus difficile de préciser l'identité des deux autres figures. Le copte *alou*, en effet, peut aussi bien traduire παῖς, ou παιδίον, que νεανίσκος (voir Crum, *Coptic Dictionary*, p. 5a), c'est-à-dire que le même mot peut aussi signifier enfant, jeune homme, ou serviteur, reprenant l'ambivalence du grec παῖς.[36]

Le même mot *alou* se retrouve d'ailleurs dans d'autres textes gnostiques, où il semble bien devoir être traduit par »enfant«. Ainsi la mention, dans l'*Évangile des Égyptiens*, de »l'enfant trois fois mâle«, ou de »l'enfant incorruptible« (ἄφθαρτος),[37] l'identification du Christ à un »petit enfant« dans l'*Apocalypse de Paul*,[38] la mention de l'enfant divin dans les *Trois Stèles de Seth*,[39] de »l'enfant parfait« (τέλειος) dans *Zostrianos*,[40] identifié au triple mâle divin (et à un *logos*) dans l'*Allogène*,[41] ou encore le Sauveur-jumeau de la *Pistis Sophia*, appelé encore »l'enfant de l'enfant«.[42]

Alou apparaît de même dans le *Traité Anonyme* du Codex de Bruce où il désigne l'un des deux aspects du Setheus.[43] Schmidt avait traduit *Kind* (suivi par MacDermot : *child*). Baynes, cependant, avait préféré *servant*, en se référant à un autre passage du même texte,[44] où le παντόμορφος,[45] aussi appelé l'»étincelle-lumière«, et celui qui possède trois puissances (τριδύναμις), envoyé hors du plérome, est dit être le serviteur (διάκονος) des éons, et servant le plérome.[46] La traduction

de Baynes, qui se fonde sur l'ambivalence d'*alou*, parallèle à celle de παῖς, est certes possible, mais on ne peut rejeter la traduction »enfant«, car il n'est pas clair que l'*alou* du chapitre 3 et le διάκονος du chapitre 8 soient le même personnage. Notons, enfin, que le *Traité sur l'Origine du Monde* (»Traité sans Titre«) décrit Yaldabaoth, le fils de Pistis Sophia, comme étant un νεανίσκος, et présente ce terme comme une étymologie de Yaldabaoth, faisant donc allusion à la racine hébraïque *yod lamed daleth* dans son sens d'*enfant*.[47]

Le mot copte *hal*, à l'encontre d'*alou*, est univalent et ne peut signifier que serviteur, ou esclave. D'après Crum, il peut en effet traduire le grec δούλος ou encore παῖς, *mais seulement dans son deuxième sens*: jeune serviteur ou esclave. On pourrait certes arguer que *hal* est un contresens du traducteur copte, qui aurait compris un putatif παῖς de la *Vorlage* grecque comme serviteur plutôt que comme enfant. Cet argument, cependant, n'emporte pas vraiment la conviction, et ce pour deux raisons. D'une part, l'ordre dans lequel les trois formes sont mentionnées me semble significatif, et mériter notre attention. Or, le παῖς et le *puer* apparaissent chez Leucius Charinus (dans la tradition rapportée par Photius) et dans l'*Acte de Pierre avec Simon après* le jeune homme et le vieillard – alors qu'on attendrait, de façon naturelle, qu'ils soient mentionnés en premier lieu. D'autre part, les *Actes de Jean* ne font mention que de deux formes prises par le Christ: celle d'un jeune homme et celle d'un vieillard. Ces deux faits s'accordent pour suggérer une certaine ambiguïté dans les différentes traditions sur la polymorphie du Sauveur. Alors qu'une conception semble parler des deux formes opposées, celle d'un jeune homme et celle d'un vieillard, une autre mentionne les trois formes qu'il aurait prises. A côté de celle d'un jeune homme et celle d'un vieillard, celle d'un serviteur (ou, peut-être, d'un enfant).

On sait que le contraste entre le jeune garçon et le vieillard est un *topos* littéraire fameux dans l'Antiquité tardive. Ernst R. Curtius, qui a analysé le motif, pense que le *topos* du *puer senilis*, ou de *puer-senex* était déjà bien établi dans la littérature du début du deuxième siècle.[48] Quant à sa signification, Curtius conclut de parallèles aussi divers que chez Lao Tseu, un saint bouddhiste, le dieu étrusque Tages ou le *khadir* musulman qu'il faut voir là un archétype, dans le sens Jungien du terme: »Les siècles de l'Antiquité romaine tardive et des débuts du Christianisme sont pleins de visions qui ne peuvent souvent être comprises que comme des projections de l'inconscient«.[49]

L'appel légitime aux schèmes de l'inconscient collectif, s'il peut éclairer les conditions psychologiques dans lesquelles se développent les images mythiques, ne dispense cependant pas l'historien d'essayer de retrouver des sources intellectuelles ou littéraires plus directes de leur apparition dans un contexte culturel précis. C'est dans ce but que je voudrais présenter ici quelques parallèles frappants tirés de l'ancienne littérature rabbinique, en espérant éclaircir à leur lumière le sens original des trois formes du Révélateur dans l'*Apocryphon de Jean.*

Examinons pour commencer un passage du Talmud de Babylone, *Ḥagiga* 14a. On sait que les pages 14 et suivantes de ce traité nous conservent certaines des traditions ésotériques les plus anciennes de la littérature rabbinique.[50] C'est dans ce contexte que Rabbi Samuel bar Nahman (*amora* palestinien du troisième siècle, connu pour son penchant pour les traditions mystiques) dit, à propos de Dieu, qu'un ange est créé de chacune des paroles (*dibbour*) sortant de sa bouche. Le texte continue ainsi :

> Un verset dit : »Son vêtement, blanc comme la neige ; les cheveux de sa tête, purs comme la laine«, et [d'autre part] il est écrit : »Ses boucles sont des palmes, noires comme le corbeau.« Il n'y a pas contradiction [entre les deux versets] ; dans l'un [Dieu est décrit] en session, dans l'autre, en guerre. Car un maître a dit : »Il n'y a rien de plus convenable qu'un vieillard (*zaqen*) pour siéger, et qu'un jeune homme (*baḥūr*) à la guerre«.

Les deux versets cités par le maître anonyme du Talmud sont *Daniel* 7:9 et *Cantique des Cantiques* 5:11. Or, la citation dans le même souffle de versets tirés de ces deux chapitres n'est pas le fruit du hasard. On sait en effet que le livre du *Shi'ur Qomah* (»mesure de la taille«) l'un des textes majeurs de l'ancienne théosophie juive, qui décrivait les dimensions physiques gigantesques de Dieu, se présentait à l'origine comme un commentaire du chapitre 5 du *Cantique*, et plus particulièrement des traits de l'Amant, appliqués à Dieu.[51] D'un autre côté, la description de l'Ancien des Jours dans le chapitre 7 de *Daniel* avait tôt servi de base à des spéculations sur l'apparence divine.

En fait, le Targum du *Cantique des Cantiques* sur 5:10 lie expressément ce passage : »Mon bien aimé est radieux et vermeil« à *Daniel* 7:9 : »Son vêtement, blanc comme la neige«.[52] Dans le passage de ce Targum auquel je fais allusion, la congrégation d'Israël commence ainsi sa bénédiction du Maître du monde :

> C'est le même Dieu que je désire servir qui est de jour vêtu d'une robe blanche comme neige et étudie les vingt-quatre livres [de la Bible] ... et qui la nuit étudie les six

Ordres de la Mishnah; la gloire de son visage resplendit alors, brillante comme feu ...[53]

C'est le même Dieu, donc, qui apparaît sous deux formes différentes. Cette description a surtout acquis sa célébrité par le poème liturgique du *shir-ha-kabod* (chanté à la fin de l'office du *moussaf* le Sabbat), composé par le mystique Judah le Pieux (mort en 1217). Ce poème, qui fait nettement allusion à l'amant du *Cantique* 5, a certains accents »docétiques«, qui visent à atténuer l'anthropomorphisme des métaphores: les visions de Dieu comme un jeune homme aux cheveux bouclés ou comme un vieillard ne sont que le fruit de l'imagination humaine, et ne réussissent pas à révéler l'essence divine.

La même conception se retrouve ailleurs; dans la *Mekhilta* de Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, par exemple, Dieu est dit se révéler comme un vieillard compatisant (*zaqen male raḥamīm*) au Sinai – le texte à l'appui est toujours *Dan.* 7:9 – alors qu'il apparut comme un jeune homme lors de la traversée de la mer Rouge.[54]

D'autres textes midrashiques se font l'écho de la même tradition. Avec à peine quelques changements stylistiques, on la retrouve dans la *Mekhilta* de Rabbi Ishmael, ainsi que dans la *Psiqta Rabbati.* Dans ces trois textes, cependant, le verset cité pour justifier la théophanie lors de la traversée de la mer Rouge est *Exode* 15:3: »Le Seigneur est un homme de guerre, le Seigneur est son nom«.[55]

Ces textes rabbiniques offrent, me semble-t-il, un parallèle remarquable (qui n'a pas, à ma connaissance, été noté jusqu'à présent) à la conception selon laquelle le Christ apparaît sous la forme d'un jeune homme et sous celle d'un vieillard. Dans la littérature rabbinique, de plus, cette conception s'inscrit dans le cadre précis de traditions exégétiques ésotériques, cadre dans lequel elle prend tout son sens. Dans le contexte gnostique et chrétien, par contre, ce sens semble oblitéré – ainsi dans l'*Apocryphon de Jean*, où l'identification des trois formes aux trois personnes de la Trinité semble une glose tardive, ou chez Irénée, qui manifestement ne comprend plus le sens premier du mythologème qu'il réinterprète. Un argument de logique structurale voudrait donc que le mythologème soit né dans le cadre qui est encore le sien dans la littérature rabbinique – c'est-à-dire autour de textes bibliques tels que *Cantique* 5 et *Daniel* 7.

A un tel argument, cependant, semble s'opposer le fait que c'est la polymorphie de Dieu, pas celle du Christ, que les traditions rabbiniques

décrivent. Pour répondre à cette objection, notons que (1) le passage de *Ḥagiga* apparaît dans le cadre d'une réflexion sur les hypostases divines; (2) plusieurs des textes décrivent les différentes formes humaines assumées par le Christ – notamment l'*Évangile de Philippe* ou la description que fait Photius des *Actes* de Leucius Charinus – soulignent en fait que le Christ est aussi bien »Père« que »Fils«. D'après Photius, encore, le Christ est appelé dans ces textes »le Bon« – épithète propre à Dieu lui-même. D'après Evodius, enfin, Leucius identifiait l'»enfant« mentionné dans de tels ouvrages avec Dieu, »ou au moins [avec] un ange«.[56] Il semblerait donc que la différence entre les textes gnostiques et les textes rabbiniques ne soit pas capitale. La forme humaine de Dieu attribuée à son Fils est en fait une conception commune dans la littérature païenne de l'Antiquité tardive. Dans le *Poimandrès*, par exemple, Anthropos, le fils de Nous, le Dieu suprême, est décrit comme étant la propre forme de son Père.[57] En cela, l'auteur du *Poimandrès* ne fait d'ailleurs que présenter la variante d'une conception très largement acceptée à l'époque, selon laquelle le monde, considéré comme l'image visible, ou le fils, du premier dieu invisible, possède un corps anthropomorphe (mais bien entendu de dimensions cosmiques).[58]

Quoi qu'il en soit, le parallélisme entre textes gnostiques et chrétiens traitant de la polymorphie du Christ et les conceptions rabbiniques se trouve très nettement renforcé par diverses traditions sur l'ange suprême Métatron, que je voudrais analyser ici.

Un passage du Talmud met dans la bouche du »Prince du Monde« (*sar haʿolam*) le verset de Psaumes 37:25:

> »J'étais jeune (*naʿar*), et puis j'ai vieilli«.[59]

Or, comme Gershom Scholem le souligne,[60] »Prince du Monde« est un titre parfois accordé à Michael dans la littérature rabbinique (par exemple au ch. 27 des *Pirké de-Rabbi Eliezer*) bien que ce soit aussi parfois Métatron qui porte ce titre – comme par exemple dans l'un des textes les plus importants de la littérature des *Hekhaloth*, les *Reʾuyoth Yeḥezqeʾel*.[61]

Cette attribution de la bimorphie jeune/vieux à Métatron a en tous cas survécu longtemps, car on la retrouve dans l'un des écrits du Kabbaliste du treizième siècle Abraham Aboulafia. Dans son *Ḥayyé-haʿolam habā*, on lit:

> Si tu enlèves 24 noms dont la valeur est *dōdī*, dans le verset »La voix de mon Bien Aimé frappe« (*qōl dōdī dōfeq*; *Cant.* 5:2), tu verras la forme (*demūt*) d'un

jeune-homme (*naʿar*) et celle d'un vieillard (*sheikh*); l'arabe *sheikh*, signifie en effet vieillard (*zaqen*), et ainsi, en *gematria*, le jeune homme est un vieillard, et le secret de ce nom est Meṭaṭron ... et il lui répondit en disant »Parle, mon maître, car ton serviteur (*ʿavdekha*) écoute« (*I Samuel*, 3:9–10).[62]

Il est clair que ce texte nous livre la trace d'une spéculation ancienne sur la polymorphie de Métatron (avec l'addition d'une *gematria* provenant d'un milieu kabbaliste arabisant).[63] Ce qui rend ce texte particulièrement intéressant pour notre propos, c'est le fait que cette polymorphie apparaisse dans le contexte d'une exégèse de certains versets du chapitre 5 du *Cantique*, comme dans le Targum du *Cantique* cité plus haut.

De plus, notons l'attribution à Métatron de la qualité de serviteur. Cette conception de Métatron comme serviteur de Dieu n'est pas du cru d'Abulafia, mais reflète les plus anciennes strates des spéculations sur Métatron. L'épithète le plus communément attribué à Métatron, en effet, dans la littérature hébraïque est *naʿar*, mot qui possède exactement la même double signification que παῖς: à la fois jeune garçon et serviteur (le deuxième sens est présent déjà en hébreu biblique).[64] Dans le *Sepher ha-Hekhaloth* (communément appelé *III Enoch*), Metatron est appelé le *naʿar* de Dieu. Scholem a démontré que l'épithète indique ici la qualité de serviteur de Dieu de Métatron, plutôt que son âge, en se référant en particulier à un passage du *Shiʿur Qomah* où il est appelé, en araméen, *šemasā raḥīmā*, (serviteur aimé). C'est en jouant sur le double sens de *naʿar*, d'après Scholem, que Samuel ben Nahman pouvait attribuer à Métatron, dans le passage de *Yebamoth* cité plus haut, le verset de *Ps.* 37:25 »J'étais jeune (*naʿar*) et puis j'ai vieilli«.[65]

Que Métatron soit le serviteur de Dieu, c'est ce qui ressort aussi de la formule du Talmud, selon laquelle le nom de Métatron est le même que celui de son maître (Meṭaṭron, *šᵉ-šᵉmō kᵉ-šem rabbō*).[66] En hébreu tannaitique, en effet, le corrolaire de *rab*, c'est *ʿebed*, serviteur.[67]

La même idée est exprimée de façon plus précise dans le *Sepher Hekhaloth*, sèlon lequel Dieu a pris (*naṭal*) soixante-dix de ses noms et les a déposés (*hiniaḥ*) sur Métatron.[68] Cette affirmation d'une quasi-identité de nom entre Dieu et Métatron, cependant, reste incompréhensible tant qu'on ne remarque pas que la figure de Métatron, qui n'apparaît probablement pas avant le deuxième ou troisième siècle chrétien, a pris la place d'une autre figure angélique, Yahoel.[69] Yahoel, dans l'*Apocalypse d'Abraham* (ch. 10) dit en effet à Abraham :

»Je m'appelle Yahoel ... un pouvoir en vertu du nom ineffable qui réside en moi«. Le nom *Yahoel* ou *Yoel*, étant un composé des deux noms divins, les références à l'identité de nom prennent tout leur sens Notons que Yahoel apparaît aussi comme le petit Dieu, *Yah qaṭan* – terme qu'on retrouve d'ailleurs dans la littérature gnostique, tout comme Yoel.[70]

Certaines traditions appliquées à Métatron dans la littérature rabbinique semblent donc avoir été originellement liées à une autre figure angélique. A ce propos, on doit s'interroger sur les implications d'un parallèle frappant entre une tradition conservée dans la littérature rabbinique et une tradition gnostique. Dans le plus long passage conservé du livre *Shi'ur Qomah*,[71] il est dit que Métatron possède deux noms : le premier comprenant 24 lettres, et l'autre n'en comprenant que six (m ṭ ṭ r w n).[72]

Irénée nous apprend, dans l'*Adversus Haereses*, que Marc le gnostique – dont on a par ailleurs depuis longtemps relevé les affinités avec certaines conceptions du *Shi'ur Qomah*[73] – concevait le Christ comme possédant deux noms : l'un ésotérique, en vingt-quatre lettres, et l'autre, exotérique, en six lettres (Ἰησοῦς)![74] Vingt-quatre, comme symbole de la totalité des éléments (στοιχεῖα), semble faire originellement allusion au nombre des lettres (στοιχεῖα) de l'alphabet grec, mais on ne peut en déduire que la tradition hébraïque soit influencée ici par la conception marcosienne : comme nous l'avons vu, en effet, vingt-quatre est aussi le nombre des livres de la Bible selon le comput juif, et apparaît aussi ailleurs dans la littérature rabbinique comme symbole de totalité.[75] Notons que dans la mythologie de Marc, les vingt-quatre lettres de l'alphabet, groupé par couples α–ω, β–τ, ..., selon la formule qu'on retrouve dans la littérature kabbalistique sous le nom de *atbash*, dessinaient aussi la forme du corps de l'entité divine appelée Vérité (σῶμα τῆς ἀληθείας).

On a donc deux sortes de traditions juives sur la polymorphie de Métatron (ou de Yahoel). D'une part, la polymorphie jeune homme/vieillard, et de l'autre, sa description comme serviteur de Dieu, mais qui porte le nom de son maître, ou plutôt, qui porte deux noms, dont l'un est manifestement divin. Nous avons vu, de même, que c'est l'ambiguité du mot *na'ar* qui fait le lien entre les deux couples bimorphiques.

A ce stade de l'enquête, force est de noter que la polymorphie du Révélateur dans l'*Apocryphon de Jean* reste toujours inexpliquée,

malgré les nombreux parallèles que nous avons relevés entre les traditions rabbiniques et les textes gnostiques. Le problème est en partie chronologique : tous les textes cités jusqu'à présent restent difficilement datables.

Pour sortir de l'impasse, il faut joindre au dossier un autre texte, datant probablement, dans sa forme actuelle, de la première moitié du premier siècle. Il s'agit de l'hymne christologique de *Philippiens* 2:6–11, qui offre un parallèle saisissant aux passages étudiés plus haut. Dans cet hymne, dont la recherche contemporaine souligne les origines juives,[76] le Christ est d'abord dit être à la forme de Dieu (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ), ou semblable à Dieu (ἴσα θεῷ). Il est ensuite décrit comme ayant pris la forme d'un esclave, ou d'un serviteur (μορφὴν δούλου). Enfin, il est dit que Dieu lui a donné le Nom qui est au dessus de tous les noms (τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα). On retrouve dans cet hymne, à propos du Christ, certains des traits appliqués par les traditions rabbiniques à Métatron : ayant la forme d'un serviteur, Dieu lui fait le don de son propre nom. Linguistiquement, de plus, la μορφὴ δούλου prise par le Christ est exactement identique à la *morphè nhal*, la troisième des formes revêtues par le Révélateur dans l'*Apocryphon de Jean*.

Avant de pouvoir regrouper l'information qui nous est donnée par ces différentes remarques, et d'en tirer une conclusion, il faut noter l'importance exégétique accordée par divers courants gnostiques à l'hymne de *Philippiens* 2.

Rappelons tout d'abord l'affirmation de l'*Évangile de Vérité*, selon lequel »le nom du Père est le Fils«,[77] à laquelle fait écho l'*Évangile selon Philippe* : »Un seul nom n'est pas prononcé dans le monde, le nom que le Père a donné au Fils, le nom au dessus de toutes choses : le nom du Père. Car le Fils ne deviendrait pas Père s'il ne portait pas le nom du Père«.[78]

En contexte valentinien, on retrouve d'ailleurs *Phil.* 2:7 dans une citation qu'en font les *Extraits de Théodote*.[79]

Au témoignage de Tertullien, d'autre part, Marcion citait notre texte comme preuve de son docétisme, identifiant le serviteur à la figure humaine, et soulignant que la *forme* du serviteur indique qu'on ne peut parler de véritable incarnation du Christ.[80]

Dans l'exégèse séthienne la forme de l'esclave, qui est celle du serpent, est mise en parallèle au devoir fait au Logos de descendre dans la matrice d'une vierge.[81] Hippolyte nous révèle encore que

d'après les Naassènes, Jacques, le frère du Seigneur (en le nom duquel sont transmises plusieurs des traditions judéo-chrétiennes) aurait transmis à Marianne une doctrine selon laquelle le grand Anthropos d'en haut se serait incarné dans la forme d'un esclave (καταδουλόμενος).[82]

Toujours d'après Hippolyte, une spéculation sur la *kenosis* accomplie par le Christ, et qui lui donne la forme d'un serviteur (*Phil.* 2:7) se retrouve chez les Docètes. Le Fils monogène, qui veut sauver les éons posés dans les corps ténébreux, éprouve le besoin de se contracter lui-même »comme un grand éclair dans un tout petit corps«, parce qu'il sait que les éons ne sauraient soutenir la vue du Plérome entier.[83] Cette contraction en un corps est manifestement identique à la *kenosis*. De cette exégèse des Docètes, on peut tirer une conclusion d'importance. Dans leur système (mais peut-être aussi ailleurs) la μορφὴ θεοῦ est donc identique au plérome. Πλήρωμα, en effet, s'oppose directement à l'acte de se »vider« lui-même (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν) qu'accomplit le Christ dans l'hymne. On peut suggérer ici la possibilité qu'une telle conception, selon laquelle la μορφὴ θεοῦ serait un corps de dimensions cosmiques (ou plutôt le cosmos entier conçu comme un corps), soit aussi à la base de l'hymne christologique lui-même. Une telle possibilité – qui ne peut bien entendu pas être démontrée – me semble expliquer les diverses expressions de l'hymne mentionnées plus haut de façon plus cohérente qu'on ne l'a fait jusqu'à présent.

La plausibilité de cette hypothèse se trouve d'ailleurs renforcée par le fait que des conceptions similaires semblent avoir été communes dans les représentations de la psychologie religieuse de l'époque, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut.[84] Il est fort possible que les conceptions du *Shi'ur Qomah* trouvent leur origine, elles aussi, dans le cadre de telles représentations.

Grâce à ce long détour par les traditions sur Yahoel-Métatron et par l'hymne de *Philippiens*, nous pouvons peut-être saisir de plus près la genèse de la conception polymorphique du Révélateur au début de l'*Apocryphon de Jean*. Il me semble avoir montré la plausibilité, ou même la probabilité, des points suivants :

(1) La trimorphie et l'identification à la Trinité, n'est pas le mythologène primitif, mais le résultat d'un développement, qui ajoute la forme du serviteur à celle du jeune-homme et du vieillard.

(2) Les spéculations chrétiennes et gnostiques sur la bi-morphie (jeune homme/vieillard) du Christ prennent leur source dans des

traditions ésotériques juives sur la figure de l'Amant dans *Cantique* 5 et de l'*Ancien des Jours* dans *Daniel* 7.[85]

(3) La description du Christ comme le serviteur, portant le Nom même de Dieu, dans l'hymne de *Philippiens* et dans divers textes gnostiques, semble être démarquée d'anciennes traditions juives sur l'ange supérieur Yahoel-Métatron, qui voient en lui, elles aussi, le Serviteur de Dieu, portant Son Nom.[86]

En conséquence, les traditions chrétiennes et gnostiques ne connaissent pas seulement une bimorphie du Christ, mais bien deux : non seulement jeune homme/vieillard, mais aussi forme de Dieu/forme du Serviteur.

Pour conclure, on peut induire de tous ces indices à la probabilité d'une *conflation* entre ces deux traditions sur la bimorphie du Christ – conflation qui serait à l'origine du mythologie de l'*Apocryphon de Jean*.

Les deux premières formes prises par le Révélateur (jeune homme et vieillard) représentant les deux μορφαί divines, auraient été ainsi identifiées à la μορφὴ θεοῦ ; la troisième, de façon naturelle, se devait d'être la μορφὴ δούλου.

NOTES

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1 Einige Bemerkungen zum Hamburger Papyrus-Fragment der *Acta Pauli*, *VC* 3 (1949) 142–162; voir en particulier pp. 158–159; repris dans le recueil d'articles de Peterson, *Frühkirche, Judentum und Gnosis* (Rome-Fribourg-Vienne 1959) 183–208.

2 *Oratio ad Graecos*, ch. 26, ed. E. Schwartz. TUGAL 5 (Leipzig 1888). Le texte est reproduit dans S. Sambursky et S. Pinès, *The Concept of Time in Later Neoplatonism*. Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (Jérusalem 1971) 102–103. Sur la divinité *Aiôn* pendant la période hellénistique, on consultera A. D. Nock, A Vision of Mandulis Aion, VI, dans ses *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Zeph Stewart, I (Oxford 1972) 377–396.

3 Voir ses comptes-rendus dans les *Annuaires* de la cinquième section de l'E.P.H.E., 1965–66, pp. 122–125; 1966–67, pp. 128–137; 1967–68, pp. 157–161.

4 En particulier les chapitres 31-32 du *Milione* de Marco Polo. Une liste des textes examinés est donnée dans l'*Annuaire* 1965-66, pp. 123-124. Les textes, cités par Puech ne sont cependant pas tous du même intérêt pour notre propos.

5 *Annuaire* 1966–67, p. 130.

6 *Elenchos* VI,9,1 (CGS 26; p. 136, l. 5 Wendland).

7 Voir son analyse du logion 4 de l'*Évangile selon Thomas* : »L'homme vieux dans ses jours interrogera un enfant de sept jours«, dans *En Quête de la Gnose*, II (Paris 1978)

84. Notons ici que la bimorphie jeune homme/vieillard caractérise l'Antichrist aussi bien que le Christ. Voir par exemple la description du Fils de l'iniquité dans l'*Apocalypse* copte *d'Élie*, 3,14 : »Il se transformera devant ceux qui le regardent, il deviendra un jeune homme et il deviendra un vieillard; il se transformera dans tous les signes, les signes de sa tête ne pourront pas se transformer« (version akhmimique; trad. J. M. Rosenstiehl, L'*Apocalypse d'Élie* (Paris 1972) 99. Voir aussi les *Actes de Thomas*, ch. 43 (p. 160, ll. 15–20 Bonnet) où l'Adversaire apparaît à différentes personnes comme un jeune homme ou un vieillard. Cf. *Apocalypse d'Esdras* (p. 29, 9 Tischendorff), et, à propos de Simon le Mage, le *Martyre de Pierre et Paul*, 14 (I, pp. 130ss. Lipsius). Pour une discussion de l'utilisation de νέος et ἠΐθεος *in malam partem*, voir A. Henrichs et L. Koenen, Cologne Mani-Codex, *ZPE* 32 (1978) n. 223, pp. 155–159.

[8] Cité par G. Quispel, The Demiurge in the Apocryphon of John, in R. Mc L. Wilson (ed.), *Nag-Hammadi and Gnosis* NHS 14 (Leiden 1978) 4. Le début de l'article de Quispel résume la position de Peterson et de Puech au sujet de la polymorphie du Christ. Quispel, qui accepte pleinement leur identification du Christ à *Aiôn*, prolonge cette piste en essayant de montrer que le démiurge de l'*Apocryphon* est modelé sur celui de l'Orphisme, Phanès ou Eros, devenu *Aiôn* pendant la période hellénistique.

[9] Le texte est conservé dans deux versions, une courte et une longue, chacune transmise par deux manuscrits. Les deux copies de la version longue dans la bibliothèque de Nag-Hammadi sont le CG II, 1 et le CG IV, 1. La version courte (CG III, 1) était déjà connue par le Codex Gnostique copte de Berlin (BG 8502, II), édité par Walter Till, *Die Gnostischen Schriften des Koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502*. TUGAL, 60, 5 (Berlin 1955). Carl Schmidt avait depuis longtemps signalé l'importance de l'Apocryphon : Irenaeus und seine Quelle in *Adv. Haer.* I, 29, *Philothesia Paul Kleinert* (Berlin 1907) 315-336. Les trois copies de l'Apocryphon trouvées à Nag-Hammadi ont été éditées et traduites par M. Krause et P. Labib : *Die drei Versionen des Apocryphon des Johannes im Koptischen Museum zu Alt-Cairo* (Wiesbaden 1962). La version longue (III, 1) a été éditée, traduite et commentée par S. Giversen, *Apocryphon Johannis* Acta Theologica Danica, 5 (Copenhague 1963). Une nouvelle édition est actuellement préparée par Frederik Wisse pour le *Coptic Gnostic Library*, projet de l'Institute for Antiquity and Christianity de Clairemont, Cal. Le Dr. Wisse a eu l'obligeance de me faire parvenir sa lecture du texte copte des deux premières pages du CG II, 1. C'est cette lecture que j'utilise et traduis ici. On peut aussi consulter la série d'articles que Y. Janssens a consacrée à l'Apocryphon de Jean dans *Le Muséon* 83 (1970) 157–165 et 84 (1971) 43–64 et 403–432. C'est seulement la version du Berolinensis que Mlle Janssens utilise. Ce fait ampute parfois son analyse, par exemple pour le sujet qui nous intéresse ici; voir *Le Muséon* 83 (1970) 162, où Janssens ne peut, sur la seule base de son texte, définir la troisième forme du Révélateur.

[10] Voir par exemple De oudste vorm van de gnostische mythe, *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 8 (1953) 20–25. Sur l'origine juive de la gnose, voir en particulier Der gnostische Anthropos und die jüdische Tradition, *Eranos Jahrbuch* 22 (1953) 195–234 et The Origins of the Gnostic Demiurge, *Kyriakon, Festschrift Johannes Quasten*, P. Granfield and J. A. Jungmann (eds.) (Münster 1970) 271–276.

[11] CG II, 1; 22:9–10.

[12] CG II, 1; 1:30–2:9. La traduction de Quispel (*art. cit.*, 4), qui traduit *hal* par »child«, me semble incorrecte. Sur ce point, ainsi que sur ma traduction de *alou* par »jeune homme«, voir discussion plus bas.

[13] BG 8502, II; 21:3–13 (p. 82 Till); Cf. *Pistis Sophia* I.4 (p. 7 MacDermot), où Jésus apparaît en trois formes de lumière, l'une supérieure à l'autre.

[14] CG II, 1; 2, 13–14; BG 21:19–21.

[15] Fragment 3, cité par Origène, *In Ioh.*, II, 12,87 et *Hom. Ier.* 15, 4. Il faut cependant noter que si la Triade Père-Mère-Fils est proche de la Trinité chrétienne Père-Fils-Esprit, ou Père-Esprit-Fils, elle ne lui est pourtant pas identique. Voir à ce sujet A. Böhlig, Triade und Trinität in den Schriften von Nag-Hammadi, in B. Layton (ed.), *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, II. Suppl. to *Numen* 41 (Leiden 1981) 617–634. Böhlig écrit, par exemple: »Das Christentum besitzt die Trinität Vater-Sohn-Geist als charakteristisches Merkmal, der Gnostizismus bietet sehr häufig die Dreiheit Vater-Mutter-Sohn« (618). Cf. A. Kropp, *Ausgewählte Koptische Zaubertexte*, III (Bruxelles 1930) 21-22. Les Bogomiles ont conservé un avatar intéressant de cette identification des personnes de la Trinité à la trimorphie du Sauveur: Au témoignage d'Euthymus Zigabenus, en effet, ils conçoivent le Père comme un vieillard à la barbe épaisse (ὡς γέροντα βαθυγένειον), le Fils comme un adolescent dont la barbe commence à pousser (ὡς ὑπηνήτην ἄνδρα), et l'Esprit Saint comme un éphèbe imberbe (ὡς λειωπρόσωπον νεανίαν); *Panoplia Dogmatica*, ch. XXVII, 23, PG 130, col. 1320; texte noté par C. Baur, *Das manichäische Religionssystem* (Göttingen 1831) 323, n. 48. Mon épouse, Sarah Stroumsa, m'indique que les spéculations sur le visage barbu ou imberbe de Dieu se retrouvent dans des textes théologiques musulmans. Voir par exemple 'Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahg al-Balāghā*, M. Abu al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, ed. (Le Caire 1959) III, 228-229.

[16] Janssens écrit: »Il semble bien qu'un système 'trinitaire' ou tripartite soit à la base de notre Apocryphon«. (*Le Muséon* 84 (1971) 45; cf. 46–47, où Janssens met divers systèmes gnostiques trinitaires en parallèle à notre texte). La perspective de la présente étude est différente. Plutôt que de m'interroger, comme Mlle Janssens, sur la fonction du mythologème dans le cadre d'une mythologie gnostique trinitaire, c'est à ses origines que je tenterai de remonter. E. Pagels exprime la même vue que Y. Janssens, dans *The Gnostic Gospels* (New York 1979) 51–52.

[17] Par exemple chez les Archontiques de Palestine, ou encore parmi les disciples d'Hiéracas, selon le témoignage d'Épiphane (respectivement *Panarion* 40,2 et 67, 3, 4–5; GCS 31, p. 82, l. 14 et GCS 37, pp. 135, l. 23–136, l. 6 Holl).

[18] *Asc. Is.* 10, 9–10; cf. *Epistula Apostolorum* 24; sur les origines de l'identification du Christ à un ange, voir en particulier J. Barbel, *Christos Angelos* (Bonn 1941) et A. Bakker, Christ an Angel?, *ZNW* 32 (1933) 255–265.

[19] *Asc. Is.* 10,12. Je cite d'après la traduction d'E. Tisserant, *L'Ascensio d'Isaïe* (Paris 1909) 194–196.

[20] *Adv. Haer.* I, 23, 3 (SC 264, pp. 316–318 Rousseau-Doutreleau, dont je cite la traduction).

[21] *Pan.* 21, 2, 4 (GCS 25, p. 240, ll. 3–4 Holl).

[22] CG VII, 2; 56:20–27. D'autres textes décrivent ces transformations physiques du Sauveur, qui lui permettent de passer inaperçu parmi les ennemis de sa mission, comme les différents vêtements qu'il revêt. Voir par exemple *Paraphrase de Shem*, CG VII, 1, 18:1–16.

[23] *Sophia de Jésus Christ*, CG III, 4, 91:10–13. Cf. *Écrit sans Titre*, CG II, 5, 108:7–22, où l'ange appelé Adam-Lumière apparaît à Pronoia comme une lumière en laquelle se dévoile »une ressemblance humaine«.

[24] Epiphane, *Pan.* 26, 3, 1 (CGS 25; p. 278, ll. 8–13 Holl), cité par Janssens, *Le Muséon* 83, 161–162.

[25] Voir à ce sujet G. Stroumsa, Le couple de l'Ange et de l'Esprit : Traditions juives et chrétiennes, *Revue Biblique* 88 (1981) 42–61.

[26] CG II, 3, 57:28–58:2; *ibid.*, 56:13–15. Une conception similaire est exprimée dans la *Protennoia Trimorphe* (CG XIII, 1; 49:15–19).

[27] *Acta Ioannis*, 73 (II, p. 186, 13–14 Bonnet) ... εἰδόν τινα νεανίσκον εὔμορφον μειδιῶντα. Cf. V *Ezra* (= IV *Ezra* 1:43–47), où le Fils de Dieu apparaît comme un jeune homme de haute taille.

[28] *Acta Ioannis*, 82 (II, p. 191, 27-28 Bonnet), où il est dit du Christ : ὁ ἐμφανίσας μοι ἑαυτὸν τῇ πολυμόρφῳ σου ὄψει. Cette lecture accepte la conjecture de Zahn (*Neue kirchl. Zeitschrift* 10, 1889, 201, n. 1) qui lit ἐμφανίσας au lieu de ἐμφυσήσας. Cf. Hennecke-Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha* (Philadelphie 1963) II, 252, n. 1.

[29] *Acta Ioannis* 89 (II, p. 194, 20–24 Bonnet).

[30] *De Fide contra Manichaeos*, 38 (CSEL 25; pp. 968–969 Zycha). Cf. νεανίσκος ... φαίνων dans le fragment de Hamburg des *Actes de Paul* (Schmidt, ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ ΠΑΥΛΟΥ, p. 34, l. 28). Sur ce Leucius (pseudonyme se référant à un personnage du cercle de Saint Jean en Asie mineure) et sur ses œuvres voir Peterson, Beobachtungen zu den Anfängen der christlichen Askese, dans *Frühkirche* ..., p. 210, et Hennecke-Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, II (Philadelphie 1965) 178–188. Cf. P. Alfaric, *Écritures Manichéennes* I (Paris 1918) 192. Jésus apparaît aussi comme un enfant dans la *Sybille* grecque (ll. 61-65 Alexander), texte cité par David Flusser, An early Jewish-Christian Document in the Tiburtine Sibyl, dans *Paganisme, Judaisme, Christianisme. Mélanges Marcel Simon* (Paris 1974) 157.

[31] Cf. par exemple le principe supérieur, appelé *agathos* dans le système du gnostique Justin (Hyppolyte, *Elenchos*, V, 26, 1 = W. Völker, *Quellen zur Geschichte der christlichen Gnosis* (Tübingen 1932) 11–12; voir aussi le livre de Thomas l'Athlète, où le Dieu suprême, le roi, est appelé ὁ ἀγαθός (CG V, 145:13–14). Dans la *Pistis Sophia* (I, 7) »le petit Yao est appelé 'le bon'«. Voir V. MacDermot, *Pistis Sophia* NHS 9 (Leiden 1978) 12. Sur l'origine juive du »petit Yah(o)«, cf. I. Gruenwald, *Apocalyptic and Merkavah Mysticism.* Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums, 14 (Leiden 1979) 197 et nn. 13, 14. A la suite de *Mc* 10:18, les Pères de l'Église réservent à Dieu l'attribut de »bon«; voir par exemple Origène, *In Ioh.* XIII.25.151 (SC 222; III, p. 112 Blanc).

[32] *Bibliotheca*, cod. 114 (II, pp. 84–86 Henry). Le témoignage de Photius sur l'existence d'un pentateuque d'*Actes* chez les Manichéens n'est peut-être pas à prendre au pied de la lettre. J. D. Kaestli remarque que l'idée d'un tel *corpus*, sous son aspect limitatif et son aspect normatif, est discutable; voir »L'utilisation des Actes Apocryphes des Apôtres dans le Manichéisme«, dans M. Krausse, ed., *Gnosis and Gnosticism*, N.H.S. 8 (Leiden 1977), 108.

[33] *Actus Petri cum Simone*, 21 (I, p. 69, 9–13 Lipsius-Bonnet). Cf. *Martyrium Petri et Pauli*, 14 (I, p. 130, 18 – p. 132, 8 Bonnet), où Simon le Mage se fait passer pour le fils de Dieu aux yeux de Néron en apparaissant successivement sous les formes d'un enfant, d'un vieillard et d'un jeune homme. De même, dans la *Vita Abercii*, trois vieilles femmes voient le Christ comme un vieillard, un jeune homme, un garçon (p. 14, 7ss. Nissen). Texte cité par Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[34] *Adv. Haer.* II, 22, 4 (I, p. 330 Harvey). A cette idée s'ajoute celle que l'homme tout entier est à l'image de Dieu (*ibid.*, V, 6, 1), et qu'en conséquence le Christ, de même qu'il a donné son corps pour sauver le nôtre, a donné son âme pour sauver la nôtre (*ibid.*, V, 1, 1). H. Chadwick, qui cite ces deux derniers textes, retrouve cette idée développée par Origène dans le *Dialogue avec Héraclide* (6–7, p. 137 Scherer); voir The Domestication of Gnosticism, dans B. Layton (ed.), *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, I. Suppl. to *Numen* 41 (Leiden 1980) 9.

[35] *In Ioh.* I, 20, 119 (SC 120; pp. 122–123 Blanc). C. Blanc renvoie à Clément, *Strom.* IV, 25, 156: »Le Fils n'est ni parfaitement un, ni plusieurs, mais ὡς πάντα ἕν«. Cf. Origène, *In Ioh.* I, 31, 217 (pp. 166–167 Blanc) »... il est certain que (le Sauveur) s'est fait homme pour les hommes et ange pour les anges«. Cf. *Évangile de Philippe* 57:35–58:2, cité plus haut, n. 20. C. Blanc note à ce sujet (p. 166, n. 2) que Tertullien avait combattu cette opinion (*De carne Christi*, 14). Sur ce sujet, voir J. E. Ménard, Transfiguration et polymorphie chez Origène, *Epektasis. Mélanges ... Daniélou* (Paris 1972) 367-372. Ménard ne mentionne pas les deux textes du *In Ioh.* cités ici. Voir aussi H. Chadwick, Origen, Celsus and the Resurrection of the Body, *HTR* 41 (1948) 100 et n. 29, ainsi que, pour l'Origénisme, G. Florovsky, Origen, Eusebius and the Iconoclastic Controversy, *Church History*, 19 (1950), 90.

[36] Voir Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1289a.

[37] CG III, 2; 42:6–7 et passim (= CG IV, 2; 51:23–24); CG III, 2; 56:16. Cf. la discussion de ces passages par A. Böhlig et F. Wisse, *The Gospel of the Egyptians* NHS 4 (Leiden 1975) 34. Sur »l'enfant trois fois mâle« (*šomnt nhoout nalou*) voir la discussion de Schenke, Das Ägypter-Evangelium aus Nag Hammadi-Codex III, *NTS* 16 (1969–70), 197 et n. 1. Schenke, toutefois, a abandonné depuis son interprétation de l'expression comme un »*Dreimännerkind*« (The Phenomenon of Gnostic Sethianism, *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, II, 589, n. 2). Il est peut-être permis de suggérer un rapprochement entre cette expression et les *šomte nmorphè* de l'Apocryphon de Jean.

[38] CG V, 2; 18:16.

[39] CG VII, 5; 123:7.

[40] CG VIII, 1; 2:9.

[41] CG XI, 3; 51:33–37.

[42] I, 10 (= NHS 9; p. 18, 20–21 MacDermot). Cf. II, 86 (p. 194, 3 MacDermot); II, 96 (p. 231, 22–23 MacDermot).

[43] *Anon. Brucianus* 3 (= NHS 13; p. 231, 6–7 MacDermot).

[44] *Ibid.*, 8 (p. 239, l. 10 MacDermot).

[45] Ce terme se retrouve dans la littérature hermétique, où le monde, c'est-à-dire le fils de Dieu, est aussi dit être παντόμορφος (*Corpus Hermeticum* XI, 16; Nock-Festugière, I, 154, l. 15).

[46] C. A. Baynes, *A Coptic Gnostic Treatise contained in the Codex Brucianus* ... (Cambridge 1933) 58; cf. 63, n. 15.

[47] CG II, 5; 100:10-14. Voir la discussion de cette étymologie dans I. Gruenwald, *op. cit.* (n. 31 plus haut), 112, n. 64.

[48] *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (London 1953) 98-101.

[49] *Op. cit.*, 101.

[50] Ces pages traitent, entre autres, de la vision mystique du chariot divin d'Ezéchiel I (*ma'asseh merkavah*) et rapportent la parabole des quatre rabbins entrés, à leurs risques et périls, dans le verger de la connaissance divine (*pardes*).

[51] Sur le livre du *Shi'ur Qomah*, son caractère et son âge, voir G. Scholem, *Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism and Talmudic Tradition*, 2e éd. (New York 1965) 36–42; *ibid.*, appendix D, 118–126 (par S. Liebermann), et Gruenwald, *op. cit.*, 213–217.

[52] C'est Raphael Loewe qui a eu le mérite d'attirer l'attention sur ce passage. Voir The Divine Garment and Shi'ur Qomah, *HTR* 58 (1965) 153–160. Le texte du Targum est cité et traduit p. 156 et n. 23.

[53] L'insistence du Targum sur le fait que c'est le même Dieu que ces deux visions décrivent sous des apparences différentes, semble impliquer l'existence de certaines conceptions opposées, selon lesquelles il s'agirait de deux figures divines. Au dixième siècle, Saadya al-Fayyoumi fait allusion à de telles conceptions; dans son commentaire sur Daniel, il écrit, à propos de *Dan.* 7:9 : »quiconque dit que c'est un *ange* qu'il (Daniel) a vu fait partie des hérétiques (*hū min ha-shōnim*), qui parlent d'un grand et d'un petit (Dieu)«. Sur tout le problème du »dualisme« juif, voir Alan F. Segal, *Two Powers in Heaven : Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism*. Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity 25 (Leiden 1977).

[54] *Beshalaḥ* 15; ed. J. N. Epstein et E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem 1955) 81. Cf. Liebermann, Appendice D à Scholem, *Jewish Gnosticism*, 121, qui cite ce texte ainsi que plusieurs parallèles.

[55] *Mekhilta* de Rabbi Ishmael, *Baḥodesh* 5, *Shirta* 4; *Psiqta Rabbati*, *Pisqa* 21, 100b. Ces textes sont traduits et discutés par Segal, *op. cit.*, 33sv. Il faut noter que l'intérêt de ces textes est centré sur la dichotomie dans laquelle se révèle la polymorphie divine, et en conséquence sur l'affirmation de l'unité de Dieu à travers le temps de l'histoire.

[56] Textes cités plus haut, aux notes 26, 30, 32.

[57] *Corpus Hermeticum* I, 12, 14 (I, pp. 10, l. 18 et 11, ll. 8–11, Nock-Festugière).

[58] Voir par exemple les textes cités par Festugière dans son appendice A au *C.H.* X, 11 (I, pp. 137–138), ainsi que l'étude de R. van den Broek, The Sarapis Oracle in Macrobius, *Sat.* I. 20,16–17, dans M. B. de Boer et T. A. Edridge (eds.), *Hommages à Maarten J. Vermaseren*, vol. I. EPROER, 68 (Leiden 1978) 123–141.

[59] *b. Yebamoth* 16b; cf. Scholem, *op. cit.*, 40. Cette tradition est mise dans la bouche de R. Samuel b. Nahman, comme la tradition de *Ḥagiga*, 14a.

[60] *Op. cit.*, 44–45.

[61] Voir, dans l'édition de ce texte par Gruenwald, dans *Ṭemirin* I, ed. I. Weinstock (Jerusalem 1972) 101–139, le commentaire aux lignes 71–74 (p. 125).

[62] p. 125. Texte cité par Moshé Idel, *Abraham Abulafia's Works and Doctrine* (en hébreu. Dissertation, Université Hébraïque de Jérusalem, 1976) vol. II, 320. Je remercie mon collègue M. Idel d'avoir attiré mon attention sur ce texte.

[63] La valeur numérique des consonnes composant *na'ar* (320) équivalent à celle de *shin* et *kaf* (*sheikh* écrit sans *yod*).

[64] Voir par exemple *Gen.* 19:7; 22:3; *II Rois* 4:22, 26.

[65] *Op. cit.*, 50.

[66] *b. Sanhédrin*, 38b.

[67] Voir par exemple Biniamin Kosovsky, *Otzar Leshon Hatanna'im* (Jérusalem 1979) *s.v. Rab*, *Rabbo* (p. 1718).

[68] *III Enoch*, H. Odeberg, ed. (réimpression, New York 1973), p. 73 du texte hébreu. Cf. *Otiot de-Rabbi ʿAqiba*, in A. Wertheimer (ed.), *Batei-Midrashot*, II (Jérusalem 1955) 152, 154.

[69] G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 3e éd. (New York 1954) 68–69.

[70] Pour *Yah Qaṭan*, voir *Pistis Sophia*, cité n. 25 plus haut. Le nom Yoel (ou Youel) apparaît tout au long de l'*Évangile des Égyptiens* comme celui d'une »vierge male«. Voir CG IV, 56:11–20 (pp. 75–77 Böhlig-Wisse).

[71] Edité par S. Musajoff, *Merkavah Shelemah* (Réimpression, Jérusalem 1971). Voir la présentation du contenu de ce livre et l'état de la recherche dans I. Gruenwald, *op. cit.*, 213–217.

[72] p. 39b Musajoff.

[73] M. Gaster, Das Shiur Komah, dans ses *Studies and Texts*, II (Londres 1923–1928) 1330–1353, en particulier p. 1344. Référence donnée par Scholem, *Major Trends*, 365, n. 90.

[74] Irénée, *Adv. Haer.* I, 15, 1 (*SC* 234, pp. 234–35 Rousseau-Doutreleau). Cf. *Évangile selon Philippe* (CG II, 3; 56:3–4): »'Jésus' est un nom secret; 'Christ' est un nom révélé.« D'autres parallèles frappants entre certaines strates de l'ancienne littérature rabbinique (en particulier l'*Alphabet de Rabbi 'Aqiba*) et des conceptions chrétiennes sont signalées par mon collègue Y. Liebes, Influences chrétiennes sur le *Zohar* (en hébreu), à paraître dans *Eshel Be'er-Sheva* 9.

[75] Voir par exemple, *y. Sanhédrin* 10:6, 29c, cité par I. Gruenwald, Aspects of the Jewish-Gnostic Controversy, in B. Layton, ed., *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, II Suppl. to *Numen*, 41 (Leiden 1980) 714.

[76] Parmi les nombreuses études suscités par cet hymne, référons nous ici seulement à deux articles particulièrement incisifs – et où l'on trouvera de nombreuses indications bibliographiques. Dieter Georgi, Der vorpaulinische Hymnus Phil. 2:6–11, dans E. Dinkler (hrg.), *Zeit und Geschichte. Dankesgabe an Rudolph Bultmann* (Tübingen 1964) 263–293, et Jerome Murphy O'Connor, Christological Anthropology in Phil. 2:6–11, *RB* 83 (1976) 25–50. Pour Georgi, l'hymne représente la plus ancienne christologie, développée probablement dans les cercles juifs hellénistiques dont Étienne était proche (*art. cit.*, 291). Pour G. Quispel, de même, l'idée que Dieu a une forme (*morphè*) indique que l'hymne provient d'une communauté judéo-chrétienne. Cf. Ezekiel 1:26 in Jewish Mysticism and Gnosis, *VC* 34 (1980) 1–13, particulièrement 8–9. Quispel développe l'idée, à mon avis tout à fait convaincante, que l'Homme Primordial de la Gnose trouve son origine dans certaines conceptions mythiques juives. Il est peut-être plus difficile de le suivre quand il oppose de telles conceptions, en cours, d'après lui, seulement dans la diaspora, à celles développées dans la mystique des rabbins palestiniens du premier siècle, et quand il pense que Paul est influencé par les premières, mais non par les secondes.

[77] CG I, 3; 38:7. Cf. Jean-Daniel Dubois, Le contexte judaïque du 'Nom' dans l'Évangile de Vérité, *Rev. Théol. Philos.* 111 (1974) 198–215, avec nombreuses références bibliographiques (voir en particulier p. 205 et notes).

[78] CG II, 3; 54:5–10.

[79] 19,5 (SC; p. 96 Sagnard).

[80] *Adversus Marcionem* V, 20.3 (CC 1; p. 774, ll. 21–27).

[81] Hippolyte, *Elenchos* V, 19.21 (CGS 26; pp. 120, l. 22 – 121, l. 2 Wendland).

[82] *Ibid.* V, 7.78 (p. 80, ll. 10–21 Wendland). Voir aussi une allusion à *Phil.* 2:7 dans les *Psaumes* manichéens d'Héraclide : C. R. C. Allberry, *A Manichaean Psalm-Book*, II (Stuttgart 1938) 194, 3.

[83] *Ibid.* VIII, 10.3 (p. 229, l. 22 – 230, l. 2 Wendland).

[84] Voir p. 422 et n. 58.

[85] Le texte le plus clair, peut-être, à cet égard, est un commentaire du Grand Canon d'André de Crète, écrit par Acace le Sibaite au début du treizième siècle. Le texte inédit est décrit par Puech (*Annuaire EPHE*, cinquième section, 1968–1968, pp. 159–160. La troisième apparence sous laquelle Jésus apparaît aux rois mages est celle d'un vieillard »aux cheveux blancs comme neige«, assimilable à l'»Ancien des Jours«: ἐγὼ ἑώρακα αὐτὸν τὴν τρίχαν λευκὴν ὡς χιόνα καὶ ὡς παλαιὸν τῶν ἡμερῶν. Puech rapproche ce trait, à raison, de certains hymnes d'Ephrem et de la liturgie byzantine célébrant »l'Ancien des Jours« qui s'est fait enfant.

[86] Il est possible que des traces de cette conception de Jésus comme le Serviteur, par excellence, de Dieu (faisant allusion, évidemment, à *Isaie* 42–53) se retrouvent chez les Judéo-Chrétiens, qui pourraient bien être le canal par lequel les gnostiques la reçurent. Ainsi, on lit dans la notice d'Épiphane sur les Nazaréens (*Panarion* 29. 7, 3), dans Klijn-Reinink, *Patristic Texts Concerning the Jewish Christians*. Suppl. to *Novum Testamentum* 36 (Leiden 1973) 172–173: ἕνα δὲ θεὸν καταγγέλλουσι καὶ τὸν τούτου παῖδα Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν. Le mot παῖς trouble Klijn et Reinink (voir p. 46, n. 1), qui le traduisent pourtant »son«! Je suggère, plutôt, de voir ici l'équivalent du *na'ar* hébreu. Voir, de même, la *Lettre de Pierre à Philippe* (CG VIII, 2; 133:25–26), »dans ton saint *alou*, Jésus Christ«; Ménard, dans son édition, traduit *alou*, à tort, par »Fils« (Bibliothèque copte de Nag-Hammadi, section »textes« 1 (Québec 1977) 15). La distinction entre υἱός et παῖς s'estompe cependant dans la littérature patristique, ainsi que le remarque H.-I. Marrou, dans son commentaire à l'*Épître à Diognète*. SC 33bis (Paris 1965) 187. Pourtant, R. Braun note chez Tertullien et ailleurs (y compris dans l'épigraphie) un rejet de *puer* (*dei*) pour traduire παῖς θεοῦ; voir *Deus Christianorum: Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien* (Paris 1962) 244–246.

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REVIEWS

Eusèbe de Césarée, *La Préparation Évangélique*. Livres IV–V, 1–17. Introduction, traduction et annotation par Odile Zink, texte révisé par Éduard des Places, s.j. (Sources Chrétiennes, 262). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979. 356 p.

Eusèbe de Césarée, *La Préparation Évangélique*. Livres V,18–36; VI. Introduction, texte grec, traduction et annotation par Édouard des Places, s.j. (Sources Chrétiennes, 266). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1980. 290 p.

Après la parution des livres I, II, III et VII de *La Préparation Évangélique*, voici les livres IV, V et VI en deux volumes. Le sujet de ces trois livres peut être indiqué par un mot: démons. On sait comment la croyance en démons était commune aux païens, juifs et chrétiens. Selon sa méthode bien connue Eusèbe combat ses adversaires en citant leurs propres auteurs.

Dans la présente édition on a fait une séparation après le 17me chapitre du livre V, parce que la démonstration du Livre IV se poursuit jusqu'à ce chapitre. Bien qu'il soit un schéma assez grossier, on pourrait dire avec M. Zink (p. 39) que les textes du premier volume discutent la nature des démons. Ceux du deuxième se concentrent sur deux aspects de la démonologie dont nous traîterons ci-dessous. Quant aux auteurs cités par Eusèbe dans ces livres, il faut constater que dans chacun des deux volumes un auteur spécial est dominant: dans le premier c'est Porphyre, dans le deuxième Oenomäus.

Les textes du premier volume ont été introduites par M. Zink, qui discute les auteurs cités, l'argumentation d'Eusèbe, les échos de l'actualité, la théurgie, et donne une notice sur les démons; le Père des Places se restreint à une notice sur Oenomäus et une analyse des divers chapitres.

Le texte grec de ces deux volumes se fonde sur l'édition de Mras et a été révisé par le P. des Places; cela garantit une qualité excellente.

Le texte a été imprimé d'une façon impeccable. La traduction de ces

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textes, souvent assez difficiles, est d'une haute qualité; la parcourant j'ai fait les observations suivantes.

En IV 2, 4, 5–6 le traducteur a omis une partie de la phrase, dans laquelle Eusèbe dit qu'il fera voir, comment les démons dans leurs oracles »incitent ceux qui consultent les oracles à faire guerre l'un à l'autre«. En IV 9,1,2 la ponctuation est trompeuse; on écrit la virgule plutôt avant ὧν.

En IV 10,5,3 ss. Eusèbe dit qu'»il est impie et sacrilège non seulement de rabaisser le nom vénérable de Dieu et sa très haute dignité en l'assimilant aux esprits mauvais, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοῦ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις τὴν βασίλειον ἐπειμένου ἀξίαν λῆσται καὶ τοιχωρύχοις περιτιθέναι. M. Zink traduit »mais encore de confier à des brigands et à des voleurs les honneurs royaux dus à celui qui ne les a même pas revêtus chez les hommes«. Le traducteur ne semble pas avoir vu, que la négation μηδέ reprend la proposition capitale: μηδὲ (εἶναι ὅσιον). Eusèbe dit: il n'est pas même pieux de confier à des brigands et à des voleurs la dignité royale dont est revêtu quelqu'un parmi les hommes«, *a fortiori* il n'est pas pieux de rabaisser le nom vénérable de Dieu en le donnant aux esprits mauvais.

En V 18,5 Eusèbe, parlant du terrible tribut de quatorze de leurs propres enfants qu'Apollon avait enjoint les Athéniens d'envoyer à Crète pour être sacrifiés, constate qu'au temps de Socrate ce tribut μνήμην παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις διεφύλαττεν. Le Père des Places traduit: »restait en vigueur à Athènes«. Cela me semble dire trop. Seulement *la mémoire* en vivait.

En V 20,10 Eusèbe discute l'oracle fameux d'Apollon à Crésus, par lequel le dernier était totalement trompé. Il dit: »il (Apollon) fait que ce suppliant, ce dévot, ce client non seulement n'obtienne pas le royaume du voisin mais encore perde le sien propre«. Et il poursuit: οὔ τι ἑκών, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἀγνοίᾳ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀποβησομένου. Traduction du P. des Places: »intentionnellement, semble-t-il, ou plutôt par ignorance de l'événement futur«. Je préférerais: »*non pas* volontairement, à mon avis du moins, *mais* par ignorance ...«

Mais je voudrais surtout discuter avec le Père des Places une phrase centrale du deuxième volume. C'est la phrase introductoire du livre VI, dans laquelle Eusèbe fait la transition de ce qu'il a traité dans la deuxième partie du livre V à ce qu'il va traiter en livre VI. Le texte: Τοῦ περὶ τῶν χρηστηρίων τρόπου διὰ τῶν προδιηνυσμένων αὐτάρ-

κως ἡμῖν ἀπεληλεγμένου ....., φέρε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ εἱμαρμένης ψευδοδοξουμένων αὐτοῖς τὸν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπευθύνωμεν λόγον, ὡς ἂν μὴ διὰ μόνης τῆς τοῦ τρόπου μοχθηρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἀληθῶς αὐτοῖς δοξαζομένων φαῦλοι καὶ ἀδρανεῖς ὄντες οἱ τὰ χρηστήρια κινεῖν νενομισμένοι δαίμονες ἀποδειχθεῖεν. La traduction du P. des Places: »Maintenant que nous avons suffisamment réfuté par les développements précédents ce mode (de divinisation) par les oracles ..., entreprenons de régler encore le compte de ces démons à partir des fausses opinions humaines sur la Fatalité, afin que ce ne soit seulement la malice de ce (second) mode, mais aussi les opinions humaines incorrectes et fausses qui prouvent la misérable impuissance des démons réputés pour susciter les oracles«.

A mon avis, dans cette traduction les deux idées centrales de la phrase ne sont pas rendues d'une façon exacte. Eusèbe dit que, dans les développements précédents, il a réfuté le τρόπος περὶ τῶν χρηστηρίων. Qu'est ce qu'il a en vue dans ce terme τρόπος? Le Père des Places traduit »ce mode (de divinisation) par les oracles«. Mais en effet Eusèbe a attaqué dans les chapitres précédents la *mentalité* des démons comme elle se manifeste dans les oracles. De propos délibéré ils trompent les hommes par ses ambiguités. A mon avis, le terme τρόπος signifie ici: 'façon d'agir'. C'est la *façon d'agir des démons* qu'il a rejetée dans les chapitres précédents. Cette interprétation est confirmée par la dernière partie de cette phrase, où Eusèbe indique encore une fois les points essentiels de son argumentation: il a déjà rebuté, dit il, »la malice de ce mode d'agir« des démons. (Je ne comprends pas l'addition »(second)« dans la traduction donnée).

Dès maintenant, c'est-à-dire dans le livre VI, Eusèbe va mettre au point, dit il, les idées sur les démons ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ εἱμαρμένης ψευδοδοξουμένων αὐτοῖς. Le Père des Places traduit: »à partir des fausses opinions *humaines* sur la Fatalité«. D'où cette addition 'humaines'? A mon avis, le pronom αὐτοῖς ne peut que désigner les démons. Il en est ainsi pour διὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δοξαζομένων dans la dernière partie de la phrase. Et, en effet, Eusèbe attaquera dans le livre VI la fausse opinion des démons concernant la Fatalité, comme elle se manifeste dans leurs oracles. Alors ce ne sont pas les opinions *humaines* fausses qui prouvent la misérable impuissance des démons, mais l'*opinion fausse des démons* eux-mêmes *concernant la Fatalité*. (Il est significatif que dans la dernière paragraphe du livre V le Père

des Places traduit les mots ἀνάγνωθι ἐκ τῶν περὶ εἱμαρμένης τοῦ Πυθίου χρησμῶν par »les quelques oracles du Pythien *contre* la Fatalité«).

Évidemment cette façon d'agir malicieuse concernant (dans) les oracles et cette opinion fausse à l'égard la Fatalité trahissent le caractère non-divin des démons.

Heureusement cette interprétation faible de cette préface n'a pas nui à la traduction du livre VI, qui contient des textes sur la Fatalité qui sont extrêmement intéressants.

Pour ceux qui s'intéressent à l'œuvre d'Eusèbe ces deux volumes sont précieux et ils ne peuvent que souhaiter qu'on succède à continuer l'édition présente sur le même niveau excellent.

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Maximi Confessoris *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* I : Quaestiones I-LV una cum latina interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Eriugenae iuxta posita. Ediderunt Carl Laga et Carlos Steel (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, 7). Turnhout/Leuven, Brepols/University Press, 1980. CXVIII, 554 p.

Maxime le Confesseur est un des auteurs grecs chrétiens qui sont fameux pour leur profondeur d'esprit. Il écrit d'ailleurs une prose qui ne fait aucune concession à son auditoire. Cela a été déjà constaté par Photius dans sa *Bibliothèque*.

Néanmoins à travers les siècles les ouvrages de Maxime ont excercé une force d'attraction sur des auteurs spéculatifs, entre autres, sur Jean Scot Érigène, qui, dans le IX^{e} siècle a essayé de traduire en latin deux des ouvrages de Maxime, les *Ambigua* et les *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* (dorénavant *Q.Th.*).

Le présent ouvrage donne (la première partie d')une édition critique du texte grec de ces *Q.Th.*, fondée sur l'ensemble des manuscrits de ce texte grec, en combinaison avec une *editio princeps* de la traduction latine de Jean Scot Érigène.

Dans leur introduction les éditeurs mentionnent d'une façon très consciencieuse le grand nombre des manuscrits du texte grec (plus de quarante) et leurs relations mutuelles. D'ailleurs ils portent leur attention sur l'édition générale des œuvres de Maxime par François

Combefis, le fameux Dominicain du XVII^e siècle, dont le texte a été repris dans le volume 90 de la *Patrologia Graeca*.

Quant à la traduction latine, les éditeurs reconnaissent de devoir l'honneur de publier cette *editio princeps* à M. Paul Meyvaert, qui avait retrouvé cette traduction et préparé le terrain pour une édition critique, qui se fonde sur les deux manuscrits qui en existent.

Jean Scot Érigène vivait dans le XI^e siècle, une époque où la connaissance du grec était très limitée et où, comme les éditeurs remarquent (p. CII), on ne disposait pas des instruments de travail qui nous facilitent la lecture. On s'imagine facilement ce que cela signifie dans le cas d'un texte tellement difficile. Les éditeurs donnent une évaluation de cette traduction, qui fait justice à cette prestation, sans qu'ils oublient de mentionner les faiblesses et les erreurs.

A plusieurs lieux la description des manuscrits occasionnait aux éditeurs de mentionner des phénomènes qui étaient importants pour la constitution du textes, grec et latin, qui a été faite selon les règles de la critique, que les éditeurs ont formulées et qu'on ne peut qu'approuver. On admire leur grande prudence dans l'usage des manuscrits. Le résultat est une édition excellente.

Mais cela ne veut pas dire que les pensées de Maxime sont maintenant aisément accessibles. Les textes grecs restent extrêmement difficiles et souvent la traduction latine n'aide pas beaucoup à éclaircir leur sens. Mais le travail d'un commentaire peut commencer. On souhaiterait que les éditeurs publient ce qu'ils ont trouvé de remarquable et qui ne pouvait être inséré dans cette édition.

Pour donner une impression de la sublimité du texte maximien et de la difficulté de le traduire je cite une partie de la première phrase du *Prologue aux scholies*, où Maxime parle de la *sophia* qui est *logos* parfait, et alors il poursuit : ὅστις ἐστὶ νοῦς καθαρός, τῇ περὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἑνώσει σχέσιν λαβὼν νόησιν. Voyez maintenant les traductions de Jean Scot et de Combefis. Jean Scot : *qui est animus purus circa causam unitati copulam accipiens supra intellectum*; Combefis (PG 90, 26D) : *quae est mens pura, eo nexu quo auctori conserta est, affectionem nacta cogitatu omni superiorem.*

On ne peut que souhaiter que cette édition éminente sera bientôt terminée et qu'elle suscitera l'intérêt de ceux qui peuvent pénétrer la profondité de ces textes.

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Celestina Milani, *Itinerarium Antonini Placentini. Un viaggio in Terra Santa nel 560–570 d.C.* Milano, Vita e Pensiero. Pubblicazioni della Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1977. 324 S. Pr. 11.000 Lire.

Das *Itinerarium Antonini Placentini* ist die Beschreibung einer Pilgerreise nach und in dem Heiligen Land, die ein unbekannter Einwohner von Placentia, höchstwahrscheinlich in den sechziger Jahren des sechsten Jahrhunderts, von dieser Stadt aus mit einigen Mitreisenden unternahm. Dass die Beschreibung zunächst für einen Kreis von Bekannten in Placentia bestimmt war, geht hervor aus der Mitteilung in Kap. 7,8 der kürzeren Redaktion des Textes: *Nam et ibi mortuus est Johannes de Placentia, maritus Tecle*: die Hinzufügung des Namens der Gattin zeigt, dass Mann und Weib dem Leserkreis bekannt waren.

Der Text der Beschreibung ist in zwei Redaktionen überliefert: einer knapperen und einer sowohl ausführlicheren als in einem mehr korrekten Latein geschriebenen. In allen Handschriften der letztgenannten Redaktion, also sicher in ihrem Archetypus, sind einige Teile der zwei ersten Paragraphen (1,3^{b}–6 und 2,1–4) an eine etwas spätere Stelle (nach Par. 4) versetzt worden. Ein am Ende stehender Paragraph (48) hat in der kürzeren Redaktion keine Entsprechung: er ist deutlich vom Verfasser der längeren Redaktion hinzugefügt worden.

Früher wurde im allgemeinen die längere Redaktion als der ursprüngliche Text des Itinerarium betrachtet und die kürzere als eine Epitome der erstgenannten. Aber seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wird auf Grund der Untersuchungen von J. Gildemeister (*Antonini Placentini Itinerarium mit deutscher Uebersetzung*, Berlin 1889, S. IV–XXIII) und besonders von P. Geyer (Ausgabe in CSEL XXXIX (1898), S. XXVI–XXXIII und in seiner Erlanger Dissertation, *Kritische und sprachliche Erläuterungen zu Antonini Placentini Itinerarium*, Augsburg 1892) allgemein angenommen, dass die kürzere Redaktion die ursprüngliche Form des Textes ist; die längere Redaktion ist nach diesen beiden Forschern, denen die Verf. sich mit vollem Recht anschliesst, eine Neubearbeitung des kürzeren Textes, die redigiert wurde nach der karolingischen Sprach- und Schreiberform (s. dazu die Ausgabe, S. 32f.). Diese sicher ältere Redaktion ist überliefert in zwei Handschriften, dem *Sangallensis*, Stiftsbibl. 133, Ende 8.–9. Jhrh. (G) und dem *Rhenaugensis* (jetzt *Turicensis*, Zürich, Zentralbibliothek 73), 9. Jhrh., jedenfalls vor 842 (R). Die jüngere Redaktion ist überliefert in neunzehn Handschriften, von denen drei verloren gegangen sind.

Alle Handschriften dieser Rezension sind ebenso wie R geschrieben worden nach der karolingischen Reform; G ist somit der einzige Textzeuge, der vor dieser Reform geschrieben wurde. Durch eine sehr grosse Zahl gemeinsamer Fehler ist es unzweifelbar, dass G und R aus einer Vorlage stammen; jeder der beiden enthält aber so viele Sonderfehler, dass eine auch nur annähernde Rekonstruktion ihrer Vorlage ausgeschlossen ist. Dagegen lässt sich der Text der gemeinsamen Vorlage der sechzehn Handschriften der *recensio altera* einwandfrei zurückgewinnen (gründliche Besprechung ihres Zusammenhanges S. 59–69 mit Stemma auf S. 68). Diese Gruppe hat in der Ausgabe das Siglum α (in den Publikationen Geyers dagegen β, was leicht zu Versehen führen kann). Die Verf. bietet auf Grund dieser Tatsachen jeweils auf der linken Seite in zwei Kolumnen den Text von bzw. G und R, und auf der rechten Seite den Text von α. Dass dieser Text eine Verbesserung des von GR gebotenen sein soll, ist sofort klar.

Es restiert nun aber ein Problem, das von der Verf. zu kurz abgetan wird und zwar die Frage, ob α direkt die Vorlage von G und R benutzt hat, wie Gildemeister meint (a.a.O., XXII: „Von diesem nämlichen Text (sc. der Vorlage von GR) allein, und nicht etwa von einem ihm parallel stehenden, geht die Umarbeitung aus, welche in den Handschriften der Classe β (= α in der vorliegenden Ausgabe) enthalten ist.") oder ob sie auf einen gemeinsamen Archetypus von GR und α zurückgehen, wie Geyer (Diss., VI) annimmt. Die Verf. geht, wie gesagt, auf diese Meinungsverschiedenheit der beiden Forscher nicht ein; sie beschränkt sich zu der Bemerkung, die *recensio altera* sei „più ricca di particolari e in lingua migliore." Selbstverständlich muss man, um hier weiterkommen zu können, wissen, von welcher Art diese „particolari" sind: wenn sie Tatsachen enthalten, die sich direkt auf die Reise des Pseudo-Antoninus beziehen, müssen sie aus einer ausführlicheren Vorlage als aus der gemeinsamen Quelle von G und R stammen, und dann kann der Schreiber von α unmöglich nur die letztgenannte Quelle vor Augen gehabt haben. Es stellt sich nun aber auf Grund der von Gildemeister angefertigten Liste von Einzelheiten, die sich in α, nicht aber nicht in GR befinden, heraus, dass solche Einzelheiten nicht dabei sind, sondern dass sie entweder allbekannte Dinge betreffen oder aus der Hl. Schrift stammen, sodass der Redaktor von α sie ganz aus eigener Kenntnis hinzugefügt haben kann. So findet sich in c. 29,2 nach den Worten *Hieronimus presbiter* die Charakteristik

in loquendo peritus, interpretatione clarus, inter cunctos relator conspicuus; in 45,5 wird eine gleichartige Charakteristik des Athanasius hinzugefügt. Sieben Hinzufügungen in α stammen aus der Hl. Schrift, wie z.B. in 10,6 nach *Abesalon* (Genit.) die Worte *filii Dauid*; 9,1 nach *saturauit : extra paruulis et mulieribus* (aus Matth. 41,21); 31,4 nach *Nam in ipsos montes* (sc. *Gilboe*) *nec ros nec pluuia descendit : postquam Dauid eos maledixit* (aus II Reg. 1,21); s. weiter in der Ausgabe den Stellenapparat zu 19,4 und 20,3. Die einzige beachtenswerte Hinzufügung findet sich in 32,3, wo gesagt wird, dass die Holzsäge, mittels derer der Prophet Jesaja hingerichtet wurde, an einem bestimmten Ort in der Umgebung von Heliuteropolis bewahrt ist. GR sprechen von einem Ort, *ubi Esaias a serra secatus est uel iacet*; α hat dort : ... *secatus est, et ibidem iacet sub quercu Rogel iuxta aquarum decursum.* Woher dieser Bericht stammt, habe ich nicht gefunden; die Verf. sagt im Kommentar nichts dazu. Er wird nicht erwähnt im *Martyrium Isaiae*, Kap. 5 a.E. (s. die Übersetzung von J. Flemming-H. Duensing in Hennicke-Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen in deutscher Übersetzung*, II, 460). Wie dem auch sei, es ist m.E. klar, dass die Hinzufügungen zum Text von GR in α kein Argument liefern können wider die Annahme, dass α direkt die Vorlage von GR benutzt hat. Geyer (Diss., VI) findet ein solches Argument in der Tatsache, dass α eine gewisse Zahl von richtigen Lesarten hat, die sich nicht in GR finden, und die der Schreiber von α nach seiner Ansicht unmöglich durch Konjektur gefunden haben kann, sodass er sie nach ihm aus einer anderen Quelle als der Vorlage von GR geschöpft haben muss. Sieht man sich nun aber die einschlägige Liste an, so findet man, dass die übergrosse Zahl dieser Lesarten ganz einfach aus dem Zusammenhang abzuleiten war, besonders die zahlreichen Korrekturen von Verbalformen, Z.B. c. 7,7 *recitauerit* α] *recitaret* GR; 42,3 *permittunt* α] *permittit* GR. Wichtigere Verbesserungen in α sind m.E. nur die drei folgenden : 4,2 *amola*] *a multis* G *amula* R (somit in der Vorlage von G und R wohl *amula*); 7,3 *pertransit* a] *pertracide* G *pertrahit* R; 19,5 *cripta* α] *ereptura* G *creptura* R (in der Vorlage von G und R wohl *crepta* mit dem Abkürzungszeichen für *-ur-* über dem *t*). Indessen ist zu beachten, dass α auch recht viel fehlerhafte Konjekturen enthält, dass sein Redaktor somit von der *prurigo coniectandi* besessen ist; es ist daher nicht so erstaunlich, wenn er auch einige Male das Richtige konjiziert hat. Jedenfalls wird auch von dieser Seite kein Argument geliefert wider die Annahme, dass α die Vorlage von G und R vor Augen hatte.

Es kam mir notwendig vor, auf diese Frage der Herkunft der α-Klasse etwas ausführlicher einzugehen, weil im Fall einer direkten Benutzung der Vorlage von G und R durch α – die auch stillschweigend von der Verf. angenommen wird – hier ein eingehendes Studium der Technik der im 8./9. Jahrhundert ziemlich frequenten Überarbeitung älterer und als zu vulgär betrachteten Texte möglich wird. Ein solches Studium kann ebenso fruchtbar werden als die Untersuchung der Technik der Übersetzung aus dem Griechischen, wozu besonders die schwedische Latinistenschule soviel beigetragen hat. Wir wenden uns jetzt der Besprechung der vorliegenden Ausgabe zu.

Das erste Kapitel der Einleitung hat den Titel „Problemi dell' Itinerarium". Dort werden besprochen: die Sprache, die Verfasserfrage, die Datierung, die Quellen der Reisebeschreibung und die späteren *fata* der Schrift, sowie der Verlauf der Reise (der Text fängt an mit der Abfahrt von Konstantinopel und endet bei der Ankunft am Euphrat); interessant ist in diesem Paragraphen die Liste der vom Autor gemachten Fehler – offenbar hat er die Beschreibung längere Zeit nach der Reise verfasst. Erwähnenswert ist hier die Tatsache, dass die ursprüngliche Lesart der früheren Redaktion: *Precendente beato Antonino martyre*, die deutlich eine Bitte um Hilfe durch den Schutzheiligen der Stadt Placentia, den im vierten Jahrhundert martyrisierten Antoninus, enthält, in α durch *procedente* ersetzt worden ist, wodurch Antoninus als der Pilger und der Verfasser der Beschreibung vorgestellt wird; der unrichtige Titel wird somit erst zu α hinzugefügt sein. Das zweite Kapitel der Einleitung enthält eine sehr genaue Beschreibung der einzelnen Handschriften, das schon oben erwähnte dritte Kapitel die Untersuchung ihrer Filiation. Ausgezeichnet ist sodann die auf die Toponimie bezügliche Liste (S. 72–79), die die geographischen Namen erst auf Lateinisch in den beiden Redaktionen, sodann auf Griechisch und Hebräisch und schliesslich in der heutigen Form gibt. Im allgemeinen sind alle geographische Einzelheiten mit besonderer Sorgfalt erörtert worden, wie denn systematisch die heutigen Namen erforscht werden.

Die Textausgabe bietet für die beiden Redaktionen einen sehr klaren kritischen Apparat. Weiter steht unter dem Text der späteren Redaktion ein Apparat von Bibel- und Parallelstellen: die letztgenannte Liste ist eine besonders gute Leistung. Auf S. 236–261 findet sich sodann die italienische Übersetzung der *recensio altera*, wonach ausführliche Anmerkungen zu derselben Redaktion folgen. Das Ganze wird abgeschlossen durch den Text einer sehr stark gekürzten Redaktion, die

sich nur in einem codex Caduinensis (Arch. dép. Dord. Périgueux 172, 12. Jhrh.), foll. 120v–123 v, vorfindet.

Am Ende stehen zwei Indices, einer der Eigennamen und, was besonders willkommen ist, ein übersichtlicher und ausführlicher „indice linguistico" (S. 312–324): gern hätte man dazu noch einen Index der einschlägigen Bibelstellen gefunden.

Wir haben es hier also mit einer sehr sorgfältigen und viel Neues bringenden Ausgabe zu tun. Man hofft, dass die Verf. auch weitere derartige Itineraria, deren Text nicht selten noch im Argen liegt, behandeln wird.

2215 NB *Voorhout*, Sportlaan 3 J. H. WASZINK

Luciferi Calaritani opera quae supersunt ad fidem duorum codicum qui adhuc extant necnon adhibitis editionibus veteribus edidit G. F. Diercks (Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina VIII). Turnholti, Brepols, 1978. CXXXI, 565 p.

Une nouvelle édition des œuvres de Lucifer de Cagliari – traités et correspondance – nous est offerte par M. Diercks, dont la collaboration au Corpus Christianorum nous a déjà valu une édition remarquable des œuvres de Novatien (CCL IV). Les conditions de travail, de Novatien à Lucifer, différaient d'ailleurs du tout au tout. S'il fallait »glaner« les *Novatianea* dans la tradition manuscrite de Tertullien et de Cyprien, les *Luciferiana*, au contraire, nous sont parvenus comme *corpus* homogène. On n'en connaît, d'ailleurs, que deux manuscrits, qui sont de valeur très inégale par surcroît. M. Diercks, à la suite de De Bruyne et de Boniface Fischer, tient pour assuré que G (*Genovefensis* 1351, du quinzième ou seizième siècle) n'est qu'une copie d'un descendant direct de V (*Vaticanus Reginensis Latinus* 133, du neuvième siècle). Là où G s'écarte de V, il ne s'agirait pas de l'apport d'une tradition indépendante, mais de l'intervention personnelle d'un copiste. On a mis en doute, il est vrai, la dépendance de G sur V, mais l'argumentation de M. Diercks (p. XLV-LII) semble enlever à G la part d'autorité que, de temps à autre depuis sa découverte en 1893, on s'est plu à lui reconnaître. N'empêche que, tout en reconnaissant le poids des arguments de M. Diercks, il subsiste une question dans mon esprit. Où le copiste de G a-t-il trouvé le nom

de Lucifer qu'il a inséré dans les *inscriptiones* et les *subscriptiones* des pièces qu'il copiait? Dans les *inscriptiones* et les *subscriptiones* de V le nom manque. On ne peut pas dire du reste que les pièces de V sont anonymes. Lucifer n'était pas homme à chercher l'anonymat; il s'est nommé au moins quatorze fois dans ses traités (endroits cités dans l'index, p. 456). Il se pourrait donc que le copiste de G ait trouvé le nom au cours de son travail de transcription. On pourrait supposer aussi qu'il se soit servi d'un ancien catalogue de la bibliothèque de Corbie, où figurait bel et bien le nom de Lucifer (voir p. LI). Quoi qu'il en soit, dès qu'il s'agit de la relation entre les deux manuscrits, la question semble mériter un examen approfondi.

Dans le contexte des problèmes qui concernent la dépendance de G sur V je voudrais encore attirer l'attention sur un passage que les partisans de l'indépendance allèguent en faveur de leur opinion (voir p. XLVII). Il s'agit d'une citation du prophète Zacharie qu'on trouve dans le premier livre *De Athanasio* (*Zach.* 8,15 dans *De Athanasio* 1,37; voir p. 63). Le libellé de V porte *animae quiestote*, tandis que G a *animo equi estote*. On sera d'accord avec M. Diercks que le texte de G, au lieu d'être la bonne leçon, est une »correction savante« de V. Mais le libellé de V est-il défectueux aussi? M. Diercks l'admet et il fait sienne la conjecture que Hartel avait proposée jadis: *animae, quiescitote* (CSEL 14, 132). Je crois pourtant que V, à condition d'être bien lu, a conservé la leçon originale: *animaequi estote* (même tournure avec l'adjectif *animaequus*, d'emploi biblique, dans *Ev. Marc.* 6,15 selon le libellé du *codex Vercellensis*, où *animaequi estote* est, comme dans *Zach.* 8,15, la traduction de θαρσεῖτε). On en conclura, non seulement que la leçon de G est erronée à cet endroit et ne peut être invoquée pour étayer la valeur de ce manuscrit, mais aussi que M. Diercks a bien raison de souligner la valeur de V comme copie fidèle (voir p. XL): chaque fois que le sens des mots lui échappait, le scribe s'appliquait à reproduire exactement ce qu'il avait sous les yeux. On ne peut que souscrire au choix de l'*editor* qui, pour la constitution du texte, s'en tient en principe au témoignage de V et relègue dans l'apparat critique les variantes de G.

A la suite de ce choix il se trouvait dans une situation qui n'était pas sensiblement différente de celle de Hartel et de ses devanciers, qui ne se doutaient pas de l'existence de G. Le texte de Diercks diffère pourtant beaucoup de celui de Hartel. En maint endroit, là où ce dernier, déconcerté par telle particularité de la langue vulgaire de

Lucifer, corrigeait V selon les normes de la langue classique, M. Diercks adopte la leçon du manuscrit, certainement à bon droit dans la très grande majorité des cas : des formes comme *rugitos*, *ovilem*, *cornum*, *anathemam*, *persolviturus*, *detractantibus*, *regnum caelestem*, et tant d'autres, sont maintenues à juste titre contre les »corrections« de Hartel. On notera aussi la restitution particulièrement heureuse du titre d'un des traités : *Moriundum esse pro Dei filio*, que le copiste de G et les éditions avaient changé en *Moriendum esse pro Dei filio*; la forme *moriundum* est une particularité luciférienne (voir attestations p. 463). En parcourant la liste des quelque cinq cents passages où le texte de Diercks s'écarte de celui de Hartel (voir. p. LIX-LXX), on mesure le progrès qui a été réalisé ces cent dernières années dans le domaine des connaissances du latin vulgaire. Dans cette perspective aussi une nouvelle édition de Lucifer s'imposait : latinistes et romanistes se féliciteront d'avoir à leur disposition un texte de Lucifer beaucoup plus »pur« que Hartel n'était en mesure de procurer.

M. Diercks se demande à juste titre (p. C–CIV) pourquoi l'évêque de Cagliari, qui ne manquait pas de culture (les citations et réminiscences abondent, de la Bible en premier lieu, mais on en trouve aussi de Cyprien, de Lactance, de Grégoire d'Elvire, et même de Cicéron et de Virgile – voir p. 363–364 –; à noter aussi les éclats de rhétorique dans le goût du siècle – voir p. LXXIII–LXXXII), a choisi de s'exprimer dans un langage si peu soigné. Ses écrits sont des lettres adressées à l'empereur Constance, qui, pour des raisons politiques, s'acharnait à défendre la cause de l'arianisme. On accordera à M. Diercks que ces lettres ne peuvent appartenir à une correspondance privée. Lucifer aurait pris soin de s'exprimer dans les formes. Le vrai destinataire n'est pas l'empereur, mais le peuple des fidèles, désorienté par l'exil de son évêque. Les lettres sont des sermons sous forme de lettres ouvertes; l'auteur croyait apparemment que dans ces circonstances un langage soigné n'était pas de mise. On reste perplexe devant ce phénomène, car les grands prédicateurs des quatrième et cinquième siècles ne se sont jamais laissés aller à une telle négligence, le populaire Augustin pas plus que l'aristocratique Ambroise.

Dans sa longue introduction – qui à elle seule constitue un travail sur Lucifer dont les études à venir ne pourront se passer – l'*editor* consacre aussi un chapitre à la Bible luciférienne. L'évêque de Cagliari, en effet, est un des témoins les plus importants de la *Vetus Latina*, mais le problème de savoir à quelle(s) famille(s) de textes ses citations

appartiennent est loin d'être résolu. M. Diercks présente (p. CV–CIX) les résultats qui ont été obtenus jusqu'ici dans ce domaine. Il les fait suivre de quelques observations pertinentes sur l'usage luciférien de la Bible, notamment sur la manière dont sont introduites dans le texte les citations et allusions bibliques. Quant au canon de Lucifer (voir p. CVII), M. Diercks semble mettre fin à l'incertitude concernant l'évangile de Marc; il en relève une réminiscence, passée inaperçue jusqu'ici, dans *De non conveniendo* 4 (p. 172): *qui vestra caecaverint corda*, d'après *Ev. Marc* 8,17: *adhuc caecatum habetis cor vestrum.* En est-il de même pour l'épître de Jacques, pas encore attestée pour Lucifer, mais dont M. Diercks croit trouver une réminiscence dans *De Athanasio* 2,4 (p. 82): *inter misericordes fructibus misericordiae locupletatus regnum consequi caelestem*, texte qui renverrait en même temps à *Ev. Matth.* 5,7: *beati misericordes quoniam ipsi misericordiam consequentur* et à *Ep. Iac.* 3,17: *plena misericordia et fructibus bonis*? Le terme *fructus* dans le passage du *De Athanasio* provient du tour qui précède immédiatement: *fructus iustitiae*; je ne crois pas nécessaire d'invoquer Jacques pour expliquer cet emploi. Je ne suis pas non plus convaincu que la présence de la seconde épître de Pierre dans le canon de Lucifer soit démontrée par *De non conveniendo* 10 (p. 182): *quid igitur oportuerat nos facere, nisi secundum Petri beati praeceptum recederemus a vobis sacrilegis?* Le texte rappelle, non pas *2 Ep. Petr.* 3,17: *vos... fratres... custodite ne insipientium errore traducti excidatis a propria firmitate*, mais le discours de Pierre, le jour de la Pentecôte (*Act. Ap.* 2,40): *Petrus ... exhortabatur eos dicens: salvamini a generatione ista prava.*

Quant à la présentation du texte et des apparats, l'édition remplit des exigences sévères. L'apparat critique est soigneusement travaillé, reproduisant minutieusement les particularités des deux manuscrits et des éditions antérieures, facilitant ainsi le choix du lecteur dans les passages controversés. On saluera, à côté de l'index scripturaire et de celui des autres sources, un index des mots, locutions et noms propres qui, par sa richesse, rendra les plus grands services aux études luciférienne. L'*appendix orthographica* relève les particularités orthographiques qu'il n'était pas possible de faire entrer dans l'apparat critique. On comprend la présence d'un *addendum* de la dernière minute pour réfuter les thèses proposées en 1978 par V. Ugenti concernant la valeur du manuscrit G. La bibliographie s'annonce *selecta*; elle s'avère abondante. Nul doute que dans les futures biblio-

graphies luciférienes le présent volume occupera une place à part. Dans l'histoire des éditions de Lucifer le nouveau texte marque un grand progrès : on est en droit d'espérer qu'il suscitera un renouveau d'intérêt pour la personnalité et la langue, toutes deux déconcertantes, de Lucifer de Cagliari.

Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1 A. BASTIAENSEN

Testimonia orationis christianae antiquioris ediderunt P. Salmon, C. Coebergh, P. de Puniet (Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis XLVII). Turnholti, Brepols, 1977. XXXVII, 213 p.

Le volume XLVII de la *Continuatio Mediaevalis* du *Corpus Christianorum*, intitulé *Testimonia orationis christianae antiquioris*, contient quatre pièces du haut moyen-âge, qui relèvent toutes du domaine de l'euchologie. La première est l'*Oratio sancti Brandani*, composition irlandaise du huitième siècle. Dom Salmon nous procure une nouvelle édition de ce texte, qui remplacera celle de Moran, parue en 1872 et insérée telle quelle dans *Patrologiae Latinae Supplementum* IV (1967). Des manuscrits plus anciens que ceux dont disposait Moran sont à la base de la présente édition, notamment le *Monacensis Clm.* 13067, »qui présente de sérieuses garanties de fidélité à la tradition textuelle irlandaise« (p. XXXVIII). De plus, deux recensions abrégées sont transcrites intégralement en appendice. L'intérêt de l'*Oratio* réside entre autres dans le fait que, tout en étant d'origine irlandaise, elle renoue avec une tradition euchologique qui plonge ses racines dans un passé lointain. Il s'agit d'une forme de prière, héritée de la piété juive, qui se caractérise par une longue énumération des interventions divines en faveur des Justes tant de l'Ancienne Alliance que, pour les chrétiens, du Nouveau Testament. L'*Oratio sancti Brandani* pèche à nos yeux par une prolixité excessive, mais elle n'appartient pas moins à une tradition vénérable. On saura gré à Dom Salmon d'avoir mis à notre disposition un texte important sous une forme meilleure.

De la main de Dom Salmon nous avons aussi l'édition d'un *Psalterium adbreviatum*, nommé *Vercellense* à cause de son insertion dans un manuscrit de la célèbre Biblioteca Capitolare de Verceil. La pièce a été composée en Allemagne ou en Italie, probablement au neuvième siècle. Le texte du psautier utilisé est celui de l'ancien psautier romain, mais on y trouve des leçons propres au psautier

gallican, que la révision d'Alcuin popularisait de plus en plus. Dom Salmon fait observer (p. 50) que l'histoire définitive des psautiers abrégés est encore à écrire. Il faut dire que la présente édition et l'introduction qui l'accompagne invitent au travail : une ample documentation est mise à la disposition du chercheur, des pistes de recherche sont indiquées. Dès maintenant on appréciera la description du caractère de ces psautiers abrégés, compositions éclectiques, élaborées avec des extraits de psaumes, destinées à nourrir la prière personnelle. On cherche en vain les grands thèmes des psaumes messianiques et royaux. Ce sont les besoins personnels de louange, de supplication, d'action de grâces, qui ont présidé au choix des extraits (p. 41–44; 51–52).

L'édition des deux textes qui suivent a été réalisée également dans uñ *scriptorium* bénédictin. Dom Coebergh, qui avait déjà bien mérité de la science liturgique, n'a pas craint, vaillant octogénaire, de reprendre un travail que Dom de Puniet, liturgiste connu pour son édition du sacramentaire de Gellone, avait laissé inachevé. Le résultat est la présentation de deux sacramentaires abrégés, appelés dans le jargon du temps *libri sacramentorum excarpsi.*

Le premier, qui fait partie du contenu d'un manuscrit de Bruxelles (*Bruxellensis* 10127–10144), est une composition des environs de 800. Avec les autres pièces du manuscrit il constitue le »bagage professionnel« d'un prêtre de campagne qui exerçait son ministère dans le nord-est de la France ou au pays de Liège. Ce sacramentaire abrégé, apparenté au *Gellonense*, et, comme ce dernier, du type »Gélasien du huitième siècle«, »Gélasien mixte« (nommé mixte parce qu'il est composé d'éléments provenant des deux sacramentaires romains, le Gélasien et le Grégorien), présente un cycle des plus rudimentaires : les grandes fêtes et quelques dimanches; il prélude aux missels postérieurs par l'incorporation des péricopes de l'Écriture. On trouve aussi un rituel *ad infirmum caticuminum faciendum* et une série de *benedictiones.*

Le second, constituant le contenu d'un manuscrit de Paris (*Parisiensis* BN lat. 2296), appartient également au groupe des Gélasiens du huitième siècle. C'est le fruit du travail de deux scribes, l'un écrivant au début du neuvième siècle et présentant les éléments de la tradition grégorienne, l'autre écrivant une centaine d'années plus tard et puisant dans le fonds gélasien. Dom Coebergh signale (p. 118) une légère différence avec le *Gellonense*. Il s'agit d'une question de calendrier (insertion de la fête de St. Jacques avant ou après le dixième dimanche

après la Pentecôte). La différence, pourtant, ne saurait rendre douteuse la parenté des deux documents. Pour les questions de filiation, il y aurait lieu, peut-être, de souligner spécialement (avec Klaus Gamber, *Codices liturgici latini antiquiores* II, Freiburg Schweiz ²1968, pp. 371–374) la parenté étroite avec un sacramentaire de Rheinau, maintenant à Zürich (*Codex Rhenaugiensis* 30). Le contenu de l'*excarpsus* parisien diffère assez de celui qu'on trouve dans le manuscrit de Bruxelles. Le premier livre du parisien donne, avec le Canon de la messe romaine, un Temporal complet; par contre, le Sanctoral se présente sous une forme très réduite. Le second livre offre une longue série de *benedictiones* et *preces*, parmi lesquelles plusieurs formulaires de messes votives. Si l'abrégé de Bruxelles devait accompagner un missionnaire itinérant, celui de Paris a dû faire partie de l'inventaire liturgique d'une église déterminée, probablement l'église abbatiale de Saint-Amand dans le nord de la France ou une église de sa juridiction.

L'édition de ces deux textes pourrait susciter un réexamen des questions intéressantes, évoquées par M. Gamber dans le livre mentionné plus haut, où il met en doute le rôle prépondérant du *Gellonense* dans l'histoire des Gélasiens du huitième siècle (voir p. 369; à p. 374, note 3, le sens de *excarpsus* = abrégé est révoqué en doute; Dom Coebergh, à bon droit me semble-t-il, s'en tient à l'interprétation traditionnelle). Les chercheurs, occupés à suivre les traces des sacramentaires romains en pays franc, se féliciteront d'avoir à portée de main deux documents importants. Dom Coebergh a le mérite d'avoir achevé un travail dont les études liturgiques ne pourront que profiter.

Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1 A. Bastiaensen

Deux homélies anoméennes pour l'Octave de Pâques, Introduction, Texte, Traduction et Notes par Jacques Liébaert (Sources Chrétiennes, 146). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1968. 128 p.

Der Name des Johannes Chrysostomos und das schwerfällige Auge einiger Kopisten des 9., 10. und 11. Jhs. haben die beiden aus dem 4. Jh. stammenden arianischen Homilien für die Osteroktav davor bewahrt, dem Vernichtungsdrang des ketzerfeindlichen Byzanz anheimzufallen. Montfaucon hat sie dann zwar unter die Spurien des grossen Kirchenredners verbannt, sie nicht einmal der Veröffentlichung für

würdig gehalten, jedoch erst in den fünfziger Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts hat sie Marcel Richard als Predigten eines – unbekannten – Anomöers entlarvt. Dass die beiden Texte zusammengehören, hat Liébaert in seiner nun schon seit einigen Jahren vorliegenden *editio princeps* aus ihrem allgemeinen Aufbau, aus Sprache, Stil und Wortschatz, wie auch aus dem gleichen polemischen Anliegen, aufgezeigt. Beide Vorträge setzen sich mit den II, Z. 121 als solchen bezeichneten Sabellianern auseinander, d.h. mit den Verteidigern des Symbolon von 325. Der Subordinatianismus, bzw. anomöische Arianismus gibt sich in diesen Homilien als eine etwas abgeschwächte Richtung, ist aber, trotz der Benutzung des Begriffes μονογενὴς θεὸς λόγος (II § 1) und trotz der Überzeugung, dass Gott οὔτε ... ἄκων ... ἐπὶ τὸ σταυρικὸν παρεγένετο πάθος (I § 24), als Ketzerei unverkennbar. Ob die Ausführung über die Unveränderlichkeit des Gottessohnes, auch im Körper (οὔτε ἡ ἀνάληψις τοῦ σώματος τὴν τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἐσμίκρυνεν ὑπόστασιν I § 2) eine weitere Abschwächung durch den Autor wiedergibt oder als Interpolation zurückgewiesen werden soll, wie Liébaert meint, sei dahingestellt: das diesbezügliche Argument kann mich nicht überzeugen. Auch im ersten Fall bleibt unbestritten, dass der Homilet sich im trinitarischen Konflikt des 4. Jhs. auf die Seite der Gegner von Nikaia geschlagen hat. In wieferne schliesslich die literarischen Parallelen – zweifelsohne teilweise Topoi, wie Liébaert auch selber zugibt – und gewisse charakteristische Übereinstimmungen (*rapprochements*) im Detail zwischen unserem Autor und Asterios dem Sophisten auf eine engere Verbindung, bzw. eine Identität der beiden schliessen lässt, ist eine offene Frage.

Über die Geschichte der Textüberlieferung lässt sich leider nicht viel mehr sagen als der Editor S. 9–12 zusammengetragen hat. Für die erste Homilie hat er drei Hss. kollationiert, den Athen. 212 aus dem 10., (A), den Mosqu. Bibl. Syn. 128 (M) aus dem 9., und den Vat. Ottob.gr. 14 (O) aus dem 10. Jh. Er hält A für den besten Vertreter des Textes, gibt dafür allerdings keine Argumente: diese sind auch nicht aus dem kritischen Apparat herauszulesen. Für die zweite Predigt benutzt Liébaert neben A und M (nur darin sind die zwei Stücke gemeinsam enthalten) den Vat.gr. 574 (V) aus dem 11., und den lückenhaften Paris. gr. (P) aus dem 10. Jh. Wo nicht V eindeutig, wie es fünfmal der Fall ist, die bessere Lesung hat, beruft sich der Herausgeber für seinen Text auf die meistenteils übereinstimmenden Hss. A, M und P.

Das schwierig zu enträtselnde Verhältnis der Hss. A, M und O – schwierig, weil A bald mit M gegen O, M bald mit O gegen A und, seltener, A mit O gegen M zusammengehen – dürfte von einigem überflüssigen Beiwerk befreit werden können, wenn den Varianten eine genauere Betrachtung geschenkt würde. So können, um ein paar Beispiele zu nennen, in der ersten Homilie Z.10 εἰκός MA gegenüber εἰκώς O, Z. 26 μεταβάλλων MA (-βαλών O) und selbst Z. 31 ἡ περιβολὴ MO gegenüber ὑπερβολὴ A (in beiden Fällen "i per(i)voli"), auch Z. 62 ᾖδειν A (ἴδειν O, εἶδεν M), Z. 64 τούτων AM, τοῦτον O, und Z. 138 ἐστείρωσε MO, wo A ἐστήρωσε hat, kaum als echte Varianten gelten. Allzuviel Hoffnung auf eine Klärung des Sachverhaltes darf man auch dann nicht hegen, aber es müsste versucht werden.

Immerhin: bis weitere Zeugen auftauchen – was in der byzantinischen homiletischen Literatur keinesfalls unwahrscheinlich ist – haben wir in der vorliegenden Erstausgabe den denkbarst zuverlässigen Text, begleitet von einer tadellosen Übersetzung. Dem Herausgeber gebührt dafür unserer Dank.

2215 PB *Voorhout*, Linnaeuslaan 26 H. HENNEPHOF

Max Schär, *Das Nachleben des Origenes im Zeitalter des Humanismus* (Basler Beiträge zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 140). Basel-Stuttgart, Verlag Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1980. 317 S.

Dass die Wiedergeburt der klassischen Periode im Zeitalter des Humanismus und der Renaissance durch eine solche mancher Kirchenväter begleitet wurde, ist vermutlich nicht allgemein bekannt. Der Hauptinhalt des vorliegenden Buches ist die Origenes-Renaissance des 15. und der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts. Der Verfasser zeigt, wie sie sowohl in Italien als auch in Frankreich und dem deutschen Sprachraum in drei Stadien verlief: einer verhältnismässig langen Vorbereitungszeit von etwa einem Jahrhundert folgte eine kurze Blüte von gut drei Jahrzehnten und schliesslich, zumindest in Italien und Frankreich, ein Niedergang bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts (vgl. S. 299).

Die Aufmerksamkeit des Verfassers wendet zich zunächst den Editionen des Origenes zu, da diese Ausgaben die Geschichte der Rezeption des Kirchenvaters am deutlichsten widerspiegeln. Anlässlich dieser Editionen stellt er stets eine Anzahl von ganz bestimmten Fragen.

Der Verfasser beschränkt sich jedoch nicht auf das Zeitalter des Humanismus. Im ersten Kapitel skizziert er die Grundlagen und Vorgeschichte dieser Origenes-Rezeption, d.h. Leben und Werk des Origenes, die origenistischen Streitigkeiten in der alten Kirche, die in das bekannte Anathem von 553 resultierten, die Kenntnisse von Werken des Origenes im byzantinischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter, dort natürlich weitgehend in der Bearbeitung Rufins.

Der Verfasser lässt eine grosse Anzahl von Humanisten die Revue passieren. In dem italienischen Humanismus ragt Pico della Mirandola mit seiner berühmten *Disputatio de salute Origenis* deutlich hervor. In Frankreich ist, ausser dem ersten Herausgeber der sämtlichen origenischen Werke, Jacques Merlin, der Franziskaner Jean Vitrier von grösster Bedeutung gewesen, zumal der einflussreichste Verteidiger des Alexandriners im deutschen Humanismus, Erasmus, seine Vorliebe für Origenes von ihm übernommen zu haben scheint.

Die Origenes-Rezeption hat mehr oder weniger im Schatten der Verdammung im 6. Jahrhundert gestanden; und zwar ‚mehr' wo man Origenes zunächst als Platoniker und spekulativen Denker betrachtete, ‚weniger' für diejenige, die in ihm den genialen Schriftausleger und Meister der Allegorese erkannten. Es soll klar sein, dass das Verhältnis eines bestimmten Autors zu Origenes auch vieles über den Autor selbst besagt.

Es konnten hier nur einzelne Gedankenlinien dieses höchst interessanten Buches angedeutet werden. Dies möge jedoch genügen um die Aufmerksamkeit der Leser dieser Zeitschrift auf diese Arbeit über das Nachleben von einem der grössten Denker der frühchristlichen Zeit zu lenken.

2312 GD *Leiden*, Haarlemmerstraat 106 J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

Targum du Pentateuque. Traduction des deux recensions Palestiniennes complètes avec introduction, parallèles, notes et index par R. Le Déaut avec la collaboration de J. Robert. III: Nombres. IV: Deutéronome. Bibliographie, glossaire, index des tomes I-IV (Sources Chrétiennes, 261, 271). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979, 1980. 341, 411 pp.

These two volumes complete the edition of the Palestinian Targum of the Pentateuch in French, the first volumes of which appeared in

1978 and 1979; see *Vig. Chr.* 33 (1979) 409–411 and 34 (1980) 102–103 The edition provides a literal French translation of two 16th-century MSS of the Aramaic paraphrase of the Pentateuch, *Vatic. Neofiti* 1 and *Brit. Libr. Add.* 27031, printed side by side. Three apparatuses give text-critical notes, references to related traditions in other rabbinic and Jewish sources, and explanatory notes. At Deut. 32:14 (*Add.* 27031 : "and from one grape they will make a *kor* of red wine"), a note rightly refers to the parallel in Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* V,33,3, but the passage in question is not "un texte parallèle d'Irénée", but rather the chiliastic apocalypse of Papias of Hierapolis. Volume IV includes an extensive bibliography, a glossary of technical terms in the field of Judaic philology, indexes of Greek words which have passed into targumic Aramaic, and indexes of passages quoted from biblical, patristic, rabbinic and other Jewish literature. An analytical index will soon appear as a separate volume (V).

This French edition of the Palestinian targum of the Pentateuch is a worth-while instrument of study, helpful to specialists as well as to those to whom the original texts of the targumim are not readily accessible. The latter will profit by the careful translation, in which the words and passages in which the targum deviates from the Masoretic text have been marked by italics. The former will welcome the detailed information provided in the annotations, especially the numerous references to recent scholarly literature.

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Bruce M. Metzger, *New Testament Studies.* Philological, Versional, and Patristic (New Testament Tools and Studies, 10). Leiden, Brill, 1980. 234 p. 86,— guilders.

In this volume the well-known author of studies in the text of the Holy Scripture and its history publishes a number of articles published previously in widely scattered journals, *Festschriften*, etc. For patristic scholars the last three are of special importance. For the convenience of the readers of this periodical we give the titles of all articles. I. *Literary Forgeries and Canonical Pseudepigrapha* (1–22). II. *Names for the Nameless in the New Testament; a Study in the Growth of Christian Tradition* (23–45). III. *Ancient Astrological Geography and Acts 2:9–11* (46–56). IV. *The Punctuation of Rom. 9:5* (57–74). V. *The Nazareth Inscription Again* (75–92). VI. *An Early Coptic Manuscript*

of the Gospel According to Matthew (93–104). VII. *The Text of Matthew 1:16* (105–113). VIII. *A Comparison of the Palestinian Syriac Lectionary and the Greek Gospel Lectionary* (114–126). IX. *The Ending of the Gospel According to St. Mark in Ethiopic Manuscripts* (127–147). X. *The Problematic Thracian Version of the Gospels* (148–166). XI. *Patristic Evidence and the Textual Criticism of the Church Fathers* (167–188). XII. *The Practice of Textual Criticism Among the Church Fathers* (189–198). XIII. *St. Jerome's Explicit References to Variant Readings in Manuscripts of the New Testament* (199–210). Appendix: *A Lexicon of Christian Iconography* (211–222). Index (223–234).

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C. N. Tsirpanlis, Studies in Byzantine History and Modern Greek Folklore (Monograph Series in Orthodox Theology and Civilisation, 4). EO Press, R.D. 1 Box 107, Ulster Park, New York. 180 p.

Jan Badewien, Geschichtstheologie und Sozialkritik im Werk Salvians von Marseille. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980. 212 S.

BERICHT VON DER AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFT ZU GÖTTINGEN

Nach dem Tode von Hermann Dörries (gest. am 2. November 1977) wurde die „Kommission zur Erforschung altchristlichen Mönchtums" neu gebildet. Mitglieder: Prof. Dr. Carl Andresen (Schriftführer), Prof. Dr. Klaus Nickau – beide Göttingen, Prof. Dr. Suso Frank OFM – Freiburg/Br., Dom Basil Studer OSB – Rom. Sie beauftragte Frau Dr. Schulz-Flügel, 3400 Göttingen, Theaterstr. 7, mit der textkritischen Ausgabe der „Historia monachorum Rufini" (Betreuung durch Herrn Frank).